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ABSTRACT

CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE?
ECOSYSTEM BASED GOVERNANCE IN THE BAY OF
FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE REGION

By
John R.Coon
University of New Hampshire, May, 2012

Decades, even centuries, of resource extraction and exploitation by humans have
taken a toll on the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystems. The very real threats posed
by population growth and coastal development, climate change, habitat loss,
overharvesting, chemical pollution, nutrient overloading, and invasive species invasions
show no sign of abating. Traditional methods of managing the human activities that
impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine are proving unable to keep pace with the
growing threats. The Gulf of Maine Council and others have joined in the chorus calling
for a broader, more holistic ecosystem approach to the governance of the human activities
that that impact the coastal margin. This study uses the framework of the Policy Sciences
to suggest a model of Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process
characteristics indicative of an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance. The
model is first used to analyze the governance regime that existed in the Great Lakes
Basin during the first two decades under the International Joint Commission's oversight
of activities under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The framework model is
xi

then used to analyze the current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy
region. Using this analysis, the study concludes that an ecosystem-based approach to
governance is not possible in the region as currently configured. The study further
concludes that it will not be possible to transition to an ecosystem-based approach
without the education and significant outreach necessary to create a knowledgeable and
activist public able to understand the issues and threats and willing to press governance
for improvement. Further, ecosystem-based governance will require the creation of an
overarching and accountable entity that, with significant input from public and
stakeholder partnerships can collect reliable ecosystem indicator data from both sides of
the border, analyze the data, and direct the implementation of policy solutions, and
change course as necessary.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This study involves the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed and whether governance regime in the region has the capacity to implement a
more ecosystem-based approach to governance. When research and preparation for this
study commenced some 8 years ago I was prepared to learn about the human activities
and natural resource exploitation in the region, how those activities impacted the
environment, and how those activities might be moderated to permit some "sustainable"
level of impact through better governance. After a career as a trial lawyer, involved
mostly in complex litigation in environmental, toxic tort, and labor/management cases I
was prepared to find that governance could be improved through broader citizen
participation and greater institutional collaboration.
I was unprepared, however, for the magnitude and complexity of threats that
confront not only the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, but the planet Earth in general. I have
also been numbed by the significant and complex challenges that confront governance
regimes. Issues involving the environment and natural resources simply cannot be
viewed in isolation. Economics, culture, domestic and geopolitics, public attitudes and
opinion, and notions of equity and justice all weave their way through our society's
tapestry.

1

This study is an attempt to examine, from the perspective of one person the
overwhelming number and impact of the interactions of some of the decision-makers and
institutions whose activities are pertinent to the threats extant in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine. As part of this process I have attempted to identify the values and perspectives of
many, but not nearly all, of the policy actors in the region. The level of complexity in
these areas prohibits any in-depth or broad-based inquiry by one person acting alone.
There is much to be evaluated, both in terms of the ecosystems in the region and with
respect to the multi-level governance scheme. Human impacts on ecosystems may not be
examined or regulated without an understanding of the social and economic
interconnections. One thing is clear: The ecosystems in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
are under siege by human-driven forces and existing governance is doing little, if
anything, to stem the activities responsible for the harm. With this in mind, we can begin
to focus on the ecosystem dynamics, economics, sociocultural status, and policies that
impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine.
From a physical standpoint, the high tides and cold, nutrient rich waters of the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, a semi-enclosed sea extending from Cape Cod to the Bay of
Fundy, support several thriving ecosystems which are both complex and diverse (Smith
1997). Economically the market value of the goods and services derived from the overall
ecosystem, measured in traditional economic terms, to the economies of the federal, state,
and provincial jurisdictions that border the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, totals in the
billions of dollars. In addition, ecosystem functions and services that are vital to the
region and the planet that do not appear on the ledgers of traditional economics include
carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, waste recycling and storage, recreation, aesthetic
2

value, educational opportunities, and countless others (GOMCc 2007). Despite the
importance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, however, the integrity and resilience of
its ecosystem functions are threatened by anthropogenic factors (Pesch and Wells 2004).
Conditions in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine should not be viewed in isolation.
Indeed, largely land-based human activities have now been found to have adversely
affected nearly all of the world's oceans (Halpem, Selkoe et al. 2007; Halpern, Walbridge
et al. 2008). It is not surprising, therefore, that human activities in and around the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed and beyond have led to increasing ecosystem alterations
in a variety of forms due chiefly to overextraction of marine organisms, invasions of
nonindigenous (exotic) species, chemical pollution, eutrophication, toxic phytoplankton
blooms, alteration of physical habitat, and the consequences of global climate change
(Steneck 2001).
The need to manage the human activities that contribute to the degradation of
vital coastal ocean ecosystems in a sustainable manner has never been more apparent.
The pressure on coastal and ocean resources has increased relentlessly. While federal
and related state and provincial environmental laws and regulations enacted in the 1970's
have had an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air, lakes, and rivers,
locally and regionally rapid population growth, coastal development, and increasing user
conflicts have degraded natural resources and led to declines in both environmental
integrity and general productivity (Ullsten 2003). The coastal areas that provide essential
habitats for a significant portion of commercially valuable marine species are reeling
from the effects of habitat loss, pollution, and overfishing that have reduced populations
of coastal fish and other species to historically low levels of abundance and diversity
3

(VanderZwaag 1995; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). Further, larger coastal population leads
invariably to larger sewage treatment facilities, expanded solid waste landfills, increased
recreational use, and other environmental pressures (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998). As
the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative in the United States observed: "It is clear that
these invaluable and life-sustaining assets are vulnerable to the activities of humans. Our
failure to properly manage the human activities that adversely affect our oceans and
coasts is compromising the health of these systems and diminishing our ability to fully
realize their potential" (JOCI2006,6-7).
Certainly the overall picture is bleak. Yet stressed, degraded and overpopulated
coastal areas still provide critical ecosystem goods and services, including fish and
shellfish for market, coastal transportation, tourism, pollutant detoxification, oil and gas
potential and a wealth of other benefits. In terms of traditional economics, coastal
counties in the United States account for more than half of the nation's gross domestic
product (GDP) (JOCI 2006). Despite the frail condition of the coastal ecosystems, and
though sadly in need of relief, the reality is that humans continue to flock to the coasts to
live, work and play, adding to the countless stresses already in existence, reducing
ecosystem. Diversity and resilience are undoubtedly eroding and the deterioration of
ecosystem functions is likely accelerating at a global scale, with potentially catastrophic
social consequences if current trends are not significantly mitigated (Worm, Barbier et al.
2006).

4

From the Status Quo to Ecosystem-Based Governance

Local communities, national governments, NGOs, and international institutions
face difficult choices concerning goals, priorities, investments, policies, and
accountability needed to address systemic challenges driven by development and the
environment (MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005a). Nearly all of the human
activities that pose threats to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, including
pollution, coastal development, and overfishing, are still managed, some more intensely
than others, on a traditional media-specific sector-by-sector basis (JOCI2006). Current
laws, which have largely emerged from a patchwork of specific institutional reforms,
have resulted in "a hapless confusion of institutional purposes, authoritative controls, and
governmental boundaries" (Skowronek 1982,287). Status quo governance regimes
reflect the traditional tendency of government agencies and departments charged with
responsibilities for natural resources and coastal ocean activities to be limited to some
particular type of activity such as logging or fishing. Traditional scientific approaches
relying upon the isolation and control of variables and replication, however, do not fare
well in the study of ecosystem dynamics (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Gunderson 2003).
State and federal agency efforts are often directed to the harvest of optimum yield (e.g.
fisheries) instead of managing toward the health and resilience of the ecosystems that
produce the desired yields (Christie 2004). Thus management focus has historically been
narrow or sectoral and typically concerned with increasing production of desired
commodities (Juda 2003). It is, however,".. .understood that the collective result of these

5

individual jurisdictional efforts is not enough to ensure the long-term sustainability of the
entire Gulf of Maine region" (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002). Clearly "... the Gulf of
Maine is at a critical juncture, with new management approaches needed to protect its
valuable ecosystems for generations to come" (Pesch and Wells 2004).
With respect to the governance and management of the human activities that
impact the integrity and resilience of ecosystems, there is a growing sense that traditional
scientific management approaches are failing, and may in fact be making the problems
worse. The ruling paradigm, that we need to optimize targeted ecosystem components in
isolation of the rest of the system, is proving inadequate to deal with the dynamic realities
of the environment (Walker and Salt 2006). Yet the institutional structures that have
developed for decades around this paradigm are proving remarkably resistant to
fundamental change (Skowronek 1982; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Given the reality
that ecosystems are complex, dynamic systems that may not be understood by reduction
to and study of its component parts, it is becoming increasingly clear that the significant
problems we face cannot be solved by the same level of thinking that created them
(Einstein 1995).
While there have been repeated calls for a broader, more holistic ecosystem
approach to environmental management of the coastal oceans has been the pronounced
response to the perceived failure of traditional scientific sector-based management
(Haskell 1992; F.A.O. 1995a; Constanza 1998; EPAP 1999; Juda 1999; Sherman and
Duda 1999; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Macpherson 2001; Sherman and Duda 2001; Link
2002; Policy 2002), considerable thought must be given to how such an ecosystem-based
approach could effectively be implemented in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region.
6

Management focus in the region needs to shift from an emphasis on satisfying the needs
of humans through output objectives to an emphasis on protecting the ecosystem
functions that provide those goods and services. Sustainability requires ecosystems be
viewed as non-linear complex systems with self-organizing properties, resilience, and
inherent uncertainty (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Conventional natural resource models
that assume some quantifiable equilibrium or "climax" phase of ecosystems must begin
to recognize that nature is not necessarily equilibrium-driven but is, for the most part,
inherently unpredictable (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Barron 2003; Berkes, Colding et
al. 2003; Gunderson 2003).
Transitioning traditional governmental institutions into an integrated and holistic
regime capable of managing human activities in a sustainable manner is no easy task.
Change, particularly in the form of innovation is, frankly, hard (Steelman 2010). While
sustainable conditions may have occurred in some cultures in some places in the past, the
answer to the question of how modern societies can live sustainably has been deemed
..the greatest challenge facing humankind..." (Mangel, Hofman et al. 1993, 573). Put
more succinctly, while many have cited the need for sustainable governance, there exist
few real-world examples of institutional arrangements designed for the sustainable
regulation of natural resource protection and use.
Thus the transition from traditional natural resource sector-by-sector management
to the broader, more holistic, collaborative, and integrated ecosystem-based approach
poses a daunting challenge. There is an inextricable link between prescribed policy and
the institutional arrangements and processes that fulfill and implement the policies.
Institutions and agencies do not merely stand down for new policies formulated by
7

legislatures or other law-making bodies, for the institution itself"...provides an
environment in which policies can be devised, altered, interpreted, advocated, ignored, or
otherwise transformed" (Donahue 1988). Decades of institutional development since the
turn of the 20th century have resulted in a labyrinth of specialized environmental and
economic interests that generate profound ideological separation that will be difficult to
abolish through tools currently available to leaders in society. The effect has been to
multiply divisions among interests in society and to organize those interests to compete in
a more complex society. Central authorities find it more difficult to satisfy public
expectations as more agencies, institutions, and interest groups organize to be able to
block each other (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005).
Contributing to the inability to change the behavior of people and institutions so
that policy actions are undertaken for the public good rather than to promote special
interests is that democracy - or negotiating interests by relying on fair play, honest
dialogue, and mutual respect - has lost much of its meaning to the modern public.
Democracy as perceived presently is treated as something we already have, not
something we do (Lappe 2006). As this study points out in later chapters, there is a need
to move beyond the "Thin Democracy" of the present toward a more engaging "Living
Democracy" (Lappe 2006). Certainly many of the structures for democracy are in place,
and this study examines some of them and the missions and values inherent in those
institutions. Democracy, and the ability to implement change, however, requires more
than structural formalities; more than multi-level governments and competing
governmental agencies, commissions, and boards. Democracy requires public
engagement. Public participation, a constant theme in this research, requires a public that
8

no longer prefers to leave our futures to others (Becker 1993; Wondolleck and Yaffee
2000; Burger, Ostrom et al. 2001; Weber 2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Lappe
2006; Sachs 2011):

We need to reconceive the idea of a good society in the early twenty-first
century and to find a creative path toward it. Most important, we need to
be ready to pay the price of civilization through multiple acts of good
citizenship: bearing our fair share of taxes, educating ourselves deeply
about society's needs, acting as vigilant stewards for future generations,
and remembering that compassion is the glue that holds society together
(Sachs 2011, 5)
Thus while division, fragmentation, and stalemate remain stubborn legacies of
governance at the national, state, and provincial levels, there is opportunity for the
mitigation of these barriers at the local and regional level, especially with an active and
determined public (Fischer 2000; Prugh, Costanza et al. 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee
2000; Brunner, Colbum et al. 2002; Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). In Chapter III
we will discuss how more and more authors are calling for a greater role for local and
regional decision-making and adaptive, flexible governance with greater public
participation in order to keep up with the rapidly changing conditions extant in the socialeconomic conditions present in the real world.
While attitudes are beginning to change, and various iterations of ecosystembased decision making theories and experiments, there is little sign that stresses on the
coastal regions are abating. In fact the problems impacting critical coastal and aquatic
habitats appear to be worsening. Given the increasing adoption of ecosystem based
approaches to resource management in both watersheds and coastal marine areas, why do
many stresses and threats to ecosystem integrity of these systems still persist, or in some
9

cases, appear to be increasing? What lessons can be learned from the governance
regimes in other regions, including the Great Lakes, where ecosystem approaches to
resource management have been mandated by Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
between Canada and the United States since 1978 (1987)?
Research Focus
It is the goal of this dissertation research to examine whether the existing
governance regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity1 to implement an integrated,
adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the
respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem
rely. Related questions include: what, for instance, are the current goals of the
governance system (units and subunits) in relation to the human uses and anthropogenic
threats to the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine and how do these differ or resemble those
of similar ecosystem restoration projects? What are the barriers that may prevent the
current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine and comparable ecosystem restoration
areas from managing the living marine resources in the region in a sustainable manner?
What measures have been adopted in more veteran regions with more experience
implementing ecosystem-based governance models to modify and improve the
governance and management regime so that the critical functions of the ecosystem can be
preserved or enhanced while at the same time competing interests can be harmonized in a

1

The term capacity is used herein in a relational perspective and focuses on the ability of individuals,
institutions, communities and governments to establish and achieve their own goals and agendas. Factors
associated with capacity include those that block or promote these ends and may encompass technical,
financial, human resource, and institutional components. Karkkainen, B. C. (2001). "Collaborative
Ecosystem Governance: Scale. Complexity, and Dynamism." Virginia Environmental Law Journal 21: 189
- 243..
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fair and equitable manner? How can these innovations be incorporated in the Gulf of
Maine, if at all? How can the policies, priorities, and actions of local, state, provincial
and federal entities be integrated to assure a sustainable approach to the management, use
and development of coastal ocean resources across political boundaries?

11

II.

RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS

The purpose of this research is to examine whether the existing governance
regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable
ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective
ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely. This
inquiry, together with the related questions set forth at the end of Chapter 1, necessarily
involves an exploration of the complex, non-linear and dynamic interplay of social,
economic, and ecological forces (Holling 1995; Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998; Clark 2002;
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Berkes, Colding et al.
2003; Gunderson 2003).
In order to attempt to assess the multiple factors impacting the policy process in
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region this comparative case study uses qualitative
research guided by the analytical framework provided by the policy sciences. The policy
sciences approach was developed by Harold Lasswell as a problem-solving process to
examine complex, interrelated problems (Lasswell 1971; Clark 2002). The approach
recognizes that policy making is a result of the interactions of many actors, each with
different interests, information, and perspectives (Clark 2002). The framework itself,
described more fully below, permits researchers to examine a given policy process as a
system, moving beyond conventional reductionist views to step back and examine the
12

bigger picture in an attempt to engage difficult problems more fully (Lasswell 1971;
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002). The framework often permits researchers to
explain the failure of a system to achieve sustainable resource management without
resorting to "the same old causes such as lack of money, outside interference, or too little
research" (Clark 2002,12). The framework also permits researchers to shift attention to
facets of the policy process that have been largely overlooked by a trend that traditionally
dwells on congressional or governmental policy making (Keller 2009).
The Policy Sciences Analytical Framework
The analytical framework provided by the policy sciences recognizes that we need to
ask a significant array of questions of participants and actors in a governance regime. The
policy sciences analytical framework divides the policy process into stages and highlights
distinctive features of each stage. The framework contributes to an understanding of the
dynamic processes in which actors, resources, and participation change from one setting
to the next. The approach has evolved to reject, however, any assumption that policy
making proceeds from stage to stage and acknowledges that activities in each stage occur
in parallel with a confluence of multiple streams of activity that connect ideas, solutions,
and political will (Keller 2009).
The framework approach permits the development of context that helps to explain
environmental trends and the conditions that drive result from the complex interaction of
humans with their environment. Context is critical where, as in most environmental
issues, there exist human problems that have been created at many times and in many
places, under a variety of political, social, and economic systems (Ludwig, Hilbon et al.
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1993). From a policy sciences perspective, "the ongoing interaction of people in their
efforts to achieve what they value is the foundation of all policy, including that of natural
resources" (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993,36). From a public policy perspective,
therefore, public policy-making is a "never ending process whereby people attempt to
clarify and secure their common interests. Management is the actual manipulation of
people and resources through programs" (Clark and Willard 2000, 8).
Policy sciences analysis therefore recognizes that public policy involves more
than state and federal legislative initiatives but recognizes the importance of values and
the ever-changing nature of remarkably intricate social, political and environmental
problems:
Humanity's highest ambition can thus be defined as defined as a desire to
analyze problems to improve the human situation. Because no one can
fully appreciate a problem in terms of all who are affected by it, analysts
must be careful to include relevant human perspectives, desires, and
values as much as possible (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 5).
Thus the policy sciences looks beyond government, defined herein as the exercise of
power by political and public agencies and officials, and expands inquiry into
governance, or beyond state actors and institutions to include systems of rule at all levels
of human activity - from the family to international organizations, by which people and
institutions strive to secure their values, goals and interests (Kjasr 2004).
Given the complex interplay that defines governance, the importance of context,
human perspectives, and values to policy science inquiry cannot be overestimated. From
the values perspective, this study proposes that the overriding goal is the quest for human
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dignity2, encompassing freedom, the sharing of power among the many instead of the
few, and the widespread participation in all other value processes (wealth, power,
rectitude, etc.). With human dignity as the goal, democracy may remain humane even as
circumstances change (Brewer and deLeon 1983).
Human dignity is fundamental. The policy-making that leads to the achievement
of such a desired state requires the review and understanding of the competing interests
and values of those involved. Human dignity requires an approach that identifies the
common interests that rest within a given conflict or complex issue. Thus the purpose of
the policy sciences approach is to clarify and secure the common interests (Lasswell
1971; Clark 1997; Clark 2002).
Common interests are those that are widely shared within a community and
demanded on behalf of the whole community. This should be contrasted with special
interests that benefit only part of a community as the expense of the rest of the
community (Brunner, Colbum et al. 2002; Clark 2002; Steelman 2010).
Generally a policy process serves common interests if it:
• Is inclusive and open to broad participation
• It meets the valid expectations of participants
•

As implemented, or tested, it is responsive and adaptable in achieving the goals as the
context changes i.e. it is adaptive (Lasswell 1971; Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark
2002).

2 Human

dignity is used to mean the equal opportunity to shape and share in democracy and the values of
society, including wealth, power, respect, health, well-being, enlightenment, skill, affection, respect, and
rectitude. Lasswell, H. D. (1971). A Pre-View of Policy Sciences. New York, American Elsevier
Publishing Company, Inc.; UN (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. U. N. G. Assembly, UN.
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In order to provide an analytical basis for policy making that aspires to human
dignity and seeks to clarify and secure the common interest, some method of data
organization and inquiry direction must be employed. The policy sciences framework is
a useful and flexible tool that allows a researcher to gather a complex array of data from a
variety of sources and still understand the context of the present situation and ultimately
invent possible alternatives.
The framework operates in three principal dimensions: social process mapping,
decision process mapping and problem orientation. These dimensions provide a flexible
but stable frame of reference that allows analysts to look beyond technical particulars to
see the functional relationships that are present. Thus, rather than ask agency and
department heads directly whether they are employing an ecosystem-based management
approach to the issues presented within their jurisdictions, the policy sciences analytical
framework as used in this study attempts to review the literature and primary documents
to establish the foundation to ask questions designed to explore the social process,
decision process and problem orientation practices utilized by government and other
institutions as well as stakeholders, interested parties and the public. In this manner it
may be possible to determine the extent to which the components of an overall
ecosystem-based governance regime are in place (Lasswell 1971; Brewer and deLeon
1983; Clark 2002).
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Figure 1 The Policy Sciences Approach (Used with Permission of Susan G. Clark)

It is important, however, to discuss for a moment the observational standpoint
held by the author: me. "Standpoint consists of an individual's value orientations and
biases resulting from personality, disciplinary training, experiences (parochial/universal:,
epistemological assumptions, and organizational allegiances...All observers and
participants, especially professionals and analysts, should seek to be clear and realistic
about their own standpoint and those of others, using both selective and comprehensive
'lenses'" (Clark, Willard et al. 2000,21). (See Figure 1)
My research and writing comes from my perspective as a graduate student within
the Natural Resources and Environmental Studies Ph.D. program (NRES) at UNH. The
program permits students to take classes for two years in various departments in order to
develop a broader perspective on the problems and issues of interest to the student.
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Perhaps more relevant is the background, education and prior disciplinary training and
experiences that brought me to the NRESS program at the age of 46. I was raised in a
military/working class family. I attended law school and went on to practice law for
more than 20 years prior to my admission to UNH. My law practice encompassed
representation of a broad spectrum of clients. I have represented labor unions as well as
management in employment and labor conflicts. I have represented injured individuals
seeking redress against those companies whose negligence or product design caused them
harm. Most of the last ten years of my practice, however, involved the litigation of
complex multi-jurisdiction toxic tort and superfund cases. My clients were Fortune 500
companies that I defended in civil cases involving injuries alleged to be caused by them
either to individuals or to the environment.
As a result of my tenure as a trial attorney involved in complex environmental
litigation, I became frustrated that millions of dollars were spent with the express goal of
assigning blame. Seldom was there a resolution that actually served to remediate a
superfund site. Fairness and justice were generally an afterthought - there was only
evidence. It was this frustration that led me to talk to Dr. Becker about the possibility of
other means of resolving disputes and making meaningful changes. My biases clearly
steer me toward a desire to see justice, human dignity, and equal access to governance for
all; for actions and policies that foster the public good over often more-powerful private
interests.
I should also note that in addition to my career as a trial attorney, I am also a
Registered Investment Advisor with a series 65 license from the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority - or FINRA. I have been involved first-hand with investment and
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portfolio management decisions and strategies over the last 20+ years and have also been
a member of a hedge fund advisory board that helped hedge fund managers and others
develop strategies and research opportunities for the investment portfolios of clients. In
this role I have observed the growing power of corporations, financial leaders, and
corporate officers in the political and governance process and have watched what, from
my standpoint, a continuing shift away from governance for the public good and toward
private interests.
With that brief explanation of my observational standpoint, a description of the
three principal dimensions of the policy sciences analytical framework is probably in
order at this point (Table 1). Social process review tends to examine the particular social
contexts in which problems are embedded. A set of conceptual categories are used to
describe or map any social process or problematic situation. The categories will include
participants, their particular perspectives, and their values or assets to the extent they are
known. Participants use whatever values they have ("assets" or "base values") and use
various strategies to achieve desired outcomes that have effects. Values, both what
people strive for and the assets that are used to acquire more of them, are created and
exchanged (shaped or shared) through social interactions to gain more values. There are
eight values that, where relevant, are dealt with: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill,
well-being, affection, respect, and rectitude. Social and decision processes have
outcomes and effects that may be characterized as indulgent or deprivational in terms of
whether values are gained or lost for participants. Critical to the analysis of governance
process are the values of the participants that drive the political and institutional
framework. Understanding these values helps to identify the social participation gaps
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that need to be filled in order to make governance more broadly representative of human
dignity and common interests.
Table 1 Social and Decision Processes
Social Process

Decision Process

Participation

Intelligence

Perspectives

Promotion

Values

Prescription

Strategies

Implementation

Outcomes

Appraisal and Termination

Another principal dimension of the framework is the decision process. The
decision process as practiced in a given ecosystem governance regime requires an
analysis of the seven interlinked functions of intelligence, analysis is the fundamental
view that in all human interactions, people tend to act in ways they perceive will leave
them better off than if they had acted otherwise (Lasswell 1971). With respect to
ecosystem-based governance, social process mapping plays an important role in
determining the degree of involvement of the public in all stages of the promotion,
prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal (See Table 1). This
systematic analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration and
management plans to fail. By knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work,
participants can maintain good practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision
process can be a way of reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests
and policies through politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek
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different policies that reflect their particular, or "special", interests. As discussed above,
however, in natural resources management, people must reconcile interest differences to
clarify and secure their common interest. Investigation should reveal who establishes
what the common interests are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance,
trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive
fashion. Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open
and transparent, not slanted toward special interests, wealth, and power (Lasswell 1971;
Clark 1997; Clark 2002).
Table 2 Problem Orientation
Problem Orientation
Clarifying goals
Describing trends
Analyzing conditions
Projecting developments
Inventing, evaluating, and selecting alternatives

Finally, problem orientation is a strategy to address problems and invent
solutions. It requires goal clarification. So in terms of ecosystem conservation or
restoration, the question is what should a sustainable, viable, functioning, resilient
ecosystem look like? These questions need to be answered by the community only after
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considering the problem's context or social and decision process. If these questions have
been answered and policy determined, who were the participants? What was the process?
Were common interests defined or did special interests influence the process?
Social process inquiry sneaks in here so that process, participants, their values and
interests, and other factors can be evaluated to determine whether the approach used to
define the problems or propose the goals was in some way flawed. Further, trends must
be described with ample input from the natural sciences. Are conditions trending toward
the goals established by the community? If not, there is a problem and action needs to be
taken. Conditions need to be analyzed to determine the reason(s) for the environmental
breakdowns and developments need to be projected, including the likely outcome if no
action is taken (Clark 2002).
Methods
Few studies have systematically examined the effectiveness of ecosystem-based
governance. Conventional science, while good at solving certain kinds of problems,
especially those with tightly controlled variables carefully selected by the scientist, has
proven less than successful at attacking complex issues that demand policy responses
(Brewer and deLeon 1983). Where it is not possible to isolate and control
independent/dependent variables, develop theory through hypothesis testing, or carefully
select the narrow problems against which hypotheses can be tested, conventional science
has little to offer in terms of help for practical policy dilemmas (Brewer and deLeon
1983; Clark 2002).
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In order to attempt to assess the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region to determine whether it has the capacity to implement a broader, more
holistic, ecosystem approach to the management of human activities that impact the
environment, this study, guided by the policy sciences analytical framework, relies upon
a comparative case study methodology. Qualitative research is multi-method in focus
and permits the study of subjects and issues in their natural settings in an attempt to make
sense or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Cresswell
1998). Case studies provide a methodology capable of illuminating decisions, or sets of
decisions: why they were taken and with what result. A case study approach is also
suited to research that examines contemporary events where, as here, there is no reason
(or even ability) to control historic behavior or variables (Yin 1994). Finally, where
research is dependent upon context, case studies seem to be the most appropriate to
method to use to answer questions about "how" and "why" a selected ecosystem
approach decision-making initiative was more or less successful in the achievement of a
region's designated goals.
In order to examine the current governance regime of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine to determine whether the management human activities that impact the Gulf
ecosystem could become more sustainable with the implementation of a more integrated
and ecosystem-based approach to management of the region's resources this research was
conducted in three phases.

23

Phase 1: Literature Review and Identification of Comparative Case Study
Phase 1 of this study involved a review of scientific literature, primary
documents, government reports and texts to gain an understanding of ecosystem
dynamics and the human behaviors that impact the function and resilience of those
ecosystems. Insight was also gained into the institutions and prescriptions that govern
those human behaviors in both Canada and the U.S. and the provinces and states that
border the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. In furtherance of the research questions,
research was also devoted to literature that helped cull out the characteristics of
ecosystem-based approaches to the management of those human activities that impact
ecosystems. Review of literature and reports that advocate various ecosystem-based
management initiatives helped derive a set of characteristics or traits that would be
representative of the "ideal" management scheme. Literature discussing the policy
sciences analytical framework was used to help nest the traits of ecosystem-based
governance and management within the principal dimensions of the framework as set
forth in Chapter III.
Phase 1 also included a review of the literature relevant to a variety of potential
comparative case studies. After this preliminary review of treaties, laws, jurisdictional
issues and ecological challenges the governance regime in place in the Great Lakes Basin
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement ("GLWQA") and the Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission ("GLFC") during the time period of the 1970s and 1980s was
selected. This choice was made because the challenges to meaningful policy
development in the Great Lakes offer meaningful parallels to those present in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine.
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The primary threats to the health of the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine appear to
be posed by overharvesting, pollution, shoreland development, habitat destruction, and
global climate change (Steneck 2001; Clark 2002; Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). These
threats are not dissimilar to those present in the Great Lakes Basin during the relevant
time period (Dempsey 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005). Further, governance in both
systems has been challenged by the fragmented and often confusing array of local, state,
provincial, and federal regulatory bodies that frequently form bureaucratic barriers to
integrated and holistic management of the activities that threaten the health of their
respective ecosystem (Pesch and Wells 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005). The governance
regime in the Great Lakes Basin also provides interesting insights into ecosystem-based
initiatives because a basin-wide ecosystem approach to management has been mandated
under the GLWQA and the GLFC since the 1970s.
The choice of the governance regime in place in the Great Lakes watershed was
also influenced by the fact that a review of the literature reveals that many of the
characteristics typically attributed to ecosystem-based management, discussed further in
Chapter 3, were in place in the Great Lakes regime during the 1970s and 1980s. During
the 18th and 19th centuries the Great Lakes Basin, like the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed was widely exploited for its natural resources, including forest products and
fisheries. In the Great Lakes Basin, however, The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
between Canada and the US created the International Joint Commission (IJC) mostly to
mediate border disputes between the signatories. Under the treaty, however, the IJC was
also given a role to investigate pollution issues between the two countries (1909). With
the continued degradation of water quality and the ultimate collapse of the commercial
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fishing industry (1909; Dworsky 1988; Dempsey 2004), the IJC, galvanized by a
determined public, determined government officials, and unique NGO collaborations,
instructed both the United States and Canada to take action on the water pollution issues
in the Great Lakes.
After the two countries negotiated a basic water pollution agreement for the
waters of the Great Lakes in 1972, continued degradation and increasing public activism
resulted in another amendment in 1978 (Donahue 1988; Becker 1993; Dempsey 2004;
Botts and Muldoon 2005). The amended agreement was far more comprehensive and
included the declared purpose to ".. .restore and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity .. .of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." The ecosystem
was defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms,
including humans." Further evidence of the fact that the 1978 agreements had morphed
into the restoration of ecological integrity as the major goal, not just improved water
chemistry through pollution control, can be found in the definition of the Great Lakes
system as all of"...the streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water that are within the
drainage basin" (Becker 1993; GLWQA 1987). Thus the Great Lakes experience may
provide valuable lessons to future governance changes in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region. A more comprehensive explanation of the importance of these and related
developments in the basin-wide efforts of agencies, NGOs, and the public in the Great
Lakes during the relevant time period is set forth in Chapter IV.
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Phase 2: Data Collection
Validity and trustworthiness of the data and analysis in any study is, obviously,
critical. Validity is considered a goal rather than a product and it provides an avenue for
the reader or researcher to assess both the processes and outcomes of a study (Maxwell
2005; Greear 2011). Validity is defined by Maxwell (1996) as the "correctness or
credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sort of
account" (Maxwell 2005, 87).
In addition to the validity and trustworthiness of data as it is collected, equal care
has been taken in the logic of the analysis used for the research. As has been discussed
above and is more thoroughly explained below, this study has been guided by the policy
sciences analytical framework. Thus information and data have been organized into the
principal dimensions, tasks, or processes delineated under that framework. Thus data has
been accumulated and organized under three major categories - problem orientation,
social process, and decision process. Within each of the categories, data is further
organized and analyzed as tasks. The social process, for instance, consists of some six
tasks: participants, perspectives, strategies, values, outcomes, and effects (See Table 3).
Trustworthiness of the analysis extends beyond the collection and initial
organization of the data. One of the strengths of qualitative research is that it allows the
researcher to explain the processes that led to the outcomes (Maxwell 2005). The
explanations in a qualitative study, however, are necessarily dependent on a sound and
thorough method for the inquiry into the data (Siccama and Penna 2008). This study
used qualitative data analysis software, NVIVO 9.0, to analyze interview transcripts and
observational data. NVIVO was used to organize participants and data into case files
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called case nodes. In hierarchical fashion, sub-nodes were created to hold data relevant
to the nodes. Finally, attributes were created for the interview participants. Attributes
are demographic or other categorical information about participants and enabled the
researcher to compare and contrast the contents of cases based on the attribute values
assigned to them (Siccama and Penna 2008)(Table 3).
In this study, the collection, organization, and analysis of the data proceeded in
parallel fashion guided by the policy sciences analytical framework. Thus not only were
data collected and organized in the principal dimensions of problem orientation, social
process, or decision process matters, but the coding strategy in NVIVO 9.0 was defined
Table 3 Interview Participant Attributes

Canadian NGO

1

State Employee

1

3

US Federal Employee

2

3

in the same manner by the framework as well. The questions asked of interviewers, for
instance, were outlined to be consistent with the framework (See Appendix C). When the
transcripts were coded, the coding strategy paralleled the framework so that the
researcher simply coded responses into categories that mirrored and expanded upon the
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framework categories. In addition to nodes and sub-nodes that paralleled the framework,
additional coding categories were added within the sub-nodes that permitted the
researcher to code responses to categories that more specifically referenced indicators of
ecosystem-based governance as gleaned from the literature and explained in the narrative.
For example, interview responses that elaborated on jurisdictional limitations of a
particular agency, could be coded under the principal node of "decision process," then
further coded under the sub-node of "prescription," and finally under a category of
"jurisdiction." This enables the researcher to easily structure inquiries to reveal all
comments related to jurisdictional limitations.
In addition to the above, attributes were incorporated into the coding strategy
establishing the position of the participant (e.g. Canada Federal Government employee,
U.S State government employee, etc.) and the case the participant was involved with (i.e.
Great Lakes Basin or Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine) permitting interrogation that allowed
for analysis of response patterns that might be explained by an attribute. Thus an inquiry
that seeks information about the extent of significant public participation, for example,
can easily be broken down to determine whether significant public participation was
mentioned more by Canadian participants as opposed to their counterparts in the United
States.
NVIVO, as a qualitative research software tool, helps organize and enable enquiry
of a large amount of information. Software, however, is only as reliable as the data
underlying the inquiry. Trustworthiness of the underlying data is a critical element of
this inquiry. Qualitative research involving comparative case studies requires the use of
multiple sources of evidence in order to answer or at least explain the research questions.
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Recognized sources of evidence include documentation, archival records, interviews,
direct observation and participant observation (Yin 1994). It is important that these
sources are trustworthy. Trustworthiness, or "internal validity," of the sources used in
this study rests with the verifiability of the information, legal statutes, treaties, opinions
and other documents reviewed, all of which are in the public domain. Further, audio
tapes and transcripts of the interviews conducted for this study have been retained.
Observations are set forth in notes that were taken contemporaneously with the events by
the author and are available for review. These multiple methods provide a solid basis for
triangulation of the data that form the basis of the explanations and conclusions formed in
this dissertation. Trustworthiness may also be established through an open and
transparent logic chain that is set forth in the narrative (Maxwell 2005).
Documentation relevant to both cases was reviewed. Prescriptions in the form of
statutes and treaties were reviewed along with newspaper accounts, primary
documentation in the form of meeting minutes and other sources, and government and
NGO reports. Further, every effort was made to stay current with reports and
publications that became available during the time of this study. Much of this latter
documentation has forwarded by dedicated and cooperative individuals who were aware
of this research and who took it upon themselves to keep me informed of developments.
A review of this documentation provided key leads to help with the identification of key
institutions and individuals that have been or are involved in the policy process in both
the Great Lakes Basin during the relevant time period and the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine.
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The identification of institutions and individuals led to site visits and attendance at
a variety of meetings of groups associated with the governance regimes in both locations.
Most visits were associated with meetings of groups or individuals responsible for some
aspect of governance. Thus I attended numerous meetings of the New England Fishery
Management Council ("NEFMC") and the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment ("GoMC") between 2001 and 2010. Meetings involving the Gulf of Maine
Council also included quarterly meetings of the GoMC Working Group. I have attended
two meetings of the Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership in St. Andrews, NB. In the
Great Lakes Basin I have been present at two meetings of Great Lakes United (GLU), an
alliance of NGOs, government agencies, industry, conservation groups, labor unions, and
citizens groups from Canada and the United States whose mission since the 1970s has
been to develop and promote effective and coordinated policy initiatives, carry out
education programs, and promote citizen action and grassroots leadership to assure clean
water and air across borders in the region and to work together to safeguard and protect
the health of people and wildlife in the Great Lakes Basin (Jackson 2005). I have also
attended two biannual meetings of the International Joint Commission (IJC) in Kingston,
Ontario (2005) and Chicago, Illinois (2007), and three meetings of the International
Association of Great Lakes Researchers (IAGLR) in Windsor, Ontario (2006), Ann
Arbor, Michigan (2005), and Toledo, Ohio (2009). IAGLR is a scientific organization of
nearly 1,000 researchers studying the Laurentian Great Lakes that meets annually to
discuss and debate research and issues pertinent to the Great Lakes Basin. In May, 2008,
I attended the Coastal Zone Canada conference in Vancouver, BC, devoted to a
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discussion of managing our coasts for a sustainable and prosperous future. Finally, I
have attended at least one meeting of the Northeast Regional Oceans Council ("NROC").
The direct observation at these events contributed to the richness of the data
collected and enabled me to observe participants in their real-life roles using strategies
such as negotiation and diplomacy to further their interests and achieve their goals and
values. It also provided the opportunity to interact with participants on a formal and
informal basis permitting to gain insight into their thoughts, motivations, and frustrations.
In addition to direct observation, this research afforded a variety of opportunities
for participant observation. Participant observation is a special mode of observation in
which the researcher goes beyond the role of passive observer and actually participates in
the events being studied. I was fortunate to have been afforded a number of
opportunities to participate in this manner. In June, 2002, for instance, I worked with Dr.
Andy Rosenberg, Dr. Mimi Becker, and staff from the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") and the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC") for three days
and nights to bring together fishers, government scientists, and NGOs to try and negotiate
an agreement on Amendment 13 to the Groundfish Fisheries Management Plan. In July
and August, 2003, at the invitation of the East Coast Pelagic Association, a group of midwater trawlers that together accounted for nearly 90% of the herring catch on the east
coast of the United States, invited Dr. Mimi Becker of the University of New Hampshire
and I, with the help of staff from the NEFMC, to mediate and facilitate an agreement on a
herring fisheries management plan encompassing jurisdictional, catch-rate, area
designations, and participant eligibility issues to propose to the NEFMC.
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In addition to passive observation at meetings of the Gulf of Maine Council on the
Marine Environment I have had the opportunity provide reports to the Council on matters
related to this study under contract on two occasions. One report submitted on November
1,2005, involved a survey and synthesis of significant U.S. laws influencing governance
in the Gulf of Maine region (Coon 2005a). The second contract gave me the opportunity
to conduct a phone survey of Council members on a series of questions provided to me
by the GoMC Working Group concerning their views on the role and effectiveness of the
GoMC (Coon 2005b). In addition, in March, 2006,1 was asked to help facilitate a
meeting of the Climate Change Task Force sponsored by the Gulf of Maine Council on
the Marine Environment in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia. The purpose was to recommend
measures to be taken in light of changes in the environment due to climate change and to
pass those recommendations on to the GoMC for inclusion in their five-year action plan
(See GOMCc 2007).
Other significant participant observation opportunities have arisen more recently.
In June, 2007,1 was part of a group in Toronto, Ontario, that helped to facilitate a
discussion between an invited panel of government regulators, NGOs, scientists,
academicians, and First Nation representatives to develop and recommend alternative
governance structures for the human activities that impact the ecosystem of the Great
Lakes Basin. Finally, in January, 2009,1 was asked by the newly-formed New
Hampshire Coastal Protection Partnership to facilitate their first meeting attended by a
group of representatives from business, NGOs, and community members to attempt to set
goals and objectives for a new initiative to bring diverse interests in seacoast New
Hampshire to speak with one voice on social, economic and ecological issues in the
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region.
In addition to direct and participatory observation, interviews of key informants
provided essential information for this study. Interviews were conducted in accordance
with the approved guidelines of the University of New Hampshire's Institutional Review
Board ("Appendix A: "Institutional Review Board Approval;" "Appendix B: "Informed
Consent Form"). Interview questions generally followed the form of a "Focused
Interview Questions" form (Appendix C) but questions were largely open-ended in
nature, although participants were encouraged to expand on their answers and provide
their opinions and insights on issues relevant to this research. The interviews were taped
using a microcassette recorder and transcribed either by me or at my direction.
Transcripts of the tapes were then forwarded to each participant by email with
instructions to contact me if there were any inaccuracies or corrections.
Interview subjects were selected based upon their role and involvement in
governance or policy making in either the Great Lakes Basin or the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine watershed and their availability and willingness to participate in this research (See
Table 3 for a distribution of the participants). Those who were interviewed were chosen
because they were available and willing to participate in this study. Four of the
participants were veterans of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement development,
negotiation, implementation, and adaptation in the 1970s and 1980s.
Participants from the United States include current and former employees of
federal and state agencies with jurisdiction over some aspect of the human activities that
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Table 4 Social Process Coding Categories

Q
'

Framework
Node
Social
Process

Q

Subnode

Characteristics

Participants
Meaningful Public Participation
Expert Participation

QQ

Perspectives
Common Interests
Special Interest Demands

QQ

Situations
Ongoing and iterative
Conflict and crisis

QQ

Base Values
Power
Wealth
Enlightenment
Well-being
Skill
Affection
Respect
Rectitude

QQ

Strategies
Diplomatic
Ideological strategies
Litigation
Economic
Military

QQ

Outcomes and
Effects

impact the greater Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem or the Great Lakes Basin.
Similarly, Canadian participants are generally either current or former federal or
provincial employees in positions of responsibility for environmental policy and
implementation in their respective regions. Most of the government employees
interviewed in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region also play some role in the Gulf of
Maine Council, either as Council members or as members of the GoMC Working Group.
Two NGO representatives were interviewed in the United States and one NGO
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representative/community activist participated in Canada. The phone survey of all of the
GoMC council members conducted under a GoMC contract in 2005 also provided helpful
information.
Phase 3: Analysis
In the third phase, the interview transcripts were coded using NVIVO and the data

o

was analyzed using the framework of the policy sciences. Codes were assigned using the
content set forth in the policy sciences analytical framework and categories ("nodes") and
sub-categories ("sub-nodes") that correspond with the interview questions (Appendix C).
In addition, relevant text could be coded into characteristic sub-nodes within the task subnodes. Characteristics are essentially elements of a framework task that have been
identified in the literature as a part or characteristic of the sub-node. The actual NVIVO
node summary for the social process, decision process, and problem orientation coding
are set forth in Tables 4 - 6 .
Codes were assigned in order to group the information provided by participants
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interviews and observations in the manner depicted below enabled the data to be
compared and analyzed, contributing to an understanding of how the social and decision
processes in each region may have contributed the trends and conditions extant in each
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region. Tables 4-6 depict the categories and codes used to organize and analyze
interview data, meeting minutes, and observation notes by region and category. It is also
important to note that NVIVO coding categories for the interview transcripts and other
data, like the questions asked the interviewees as set forth at Appendix C, parallel the
organization and tasks provided by the policy sciences analytical framework. By using
the framework approach consistently through the data collection and data analysis phases,
then continuing the approach through the drafting of this dissertation, a high level of
consistency was maintained throughout a process that could easily have become
unwieldy.
It bears repeating that the purpose of this study is to assess the governance regime
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region to determine whether it has the capacity to
implement a broader, more holistic, ecosystem-based approach to the management of
human activities that impact the environment. It is critical that governance and
management recognize that ecosystems are dynamic and that related socio-economic
governance must manage for surprising events (Holling 1986; Holling 1995; Berkes and
Folke 1998; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Gunderson 2003; Daly and Farley 2004;
Halpern, Selkoe et al. 2007). The policy sciences analytical framework provides a
vehicle that lends support to the research questions in this study by focusing on a quest
for governance arrangements that focus on common interests (Lasswell 1971; Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005).
There is no question that a totally comprehensive evaluation of the governance
regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is beyond the scope of this study. What this
study proposes, however, is a qualitative methodology and contextual mapping strategy
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that will assist researchers in the future to determine whether existing governance
regimes have the capacity to provide a structure that is able to clarify and secure common
social, economic, and ecosystem-sustaining interests consistent with the general concept
of ecosystem-based governance, as that term is further explored in Chapter III.
The results of the data and information obtained, organized, and analyzed in the
manner described above are presented in this study in the following manner. Chapter III
describes the literature pertaining to the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the evolution
of our fragmented scientific management policy process. It then distills the
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and, using the policy sciences framework,
attempts to describe an "ideal" structure in terms of real-life decision and social
processes. Chapter IV applies the policy sciences framework developed in Chapter III to
the policy processes that guided policy development in the Great Lakes Basin in the
1970s and 1980s and compares those processes to "ideal" model. Chapter V uses the
framework to focus on the binational governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine. Finally, chapter VI compares the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region to both the "ideal" ecosystem approach and the regime extant in the Great
Lakes Basin in the 1970s and 1980s and suggests recommendations for change in the
governance that could promote the common interests relevant to the collaborative and
inclusive regulation of the human activities that impact the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
ecosystem.
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III.

THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH ANDTHE PUBLIC GOOD

Introduction
The need to manage the human activities that contribute to the degradation of
vital coastal ecosystems in a sustainable manner has never been more apparent. The
pressure on coastal and ocean resources has increased relentlessly. Federal and related
state and provincial environmental laws and regulations enacted in the 1970's have had
an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air, lakes, and rivers, locally and
regionally (Ullsten 2003). These laws and the authorized agencies that promulgate
regulations to protect the air, water, and other environmental resources have largely
transformed the private sector. The nation spends some $200 billion annually to carry
out these laws. An elaborate patchwork of regulatory efforts mandate an exhaustive
system of reporting, inspections, and penalties is relied upon to compel the population to
follow the rules. Indeed, since the early 1970's it is estimated that $3-4 trillion (in 2004
dollars) has been spent on environmental regulation mostly related to the requirements of
federal regulation (Fiorino 2006). Given the fact that air and water pollution from large
industrial point sources have been reduced, and many harmful chemicals have been
banned or removed from the environment, there is ample evidence that environmental
protection in the United States since the 1970s has been a major domestic policy success
(Easterbrook 1995).
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This study acknowledges the fact that the environmental regulatory scheme
developed over the last 40 years served us relatively well. The problems, however, are
changing. Ecosystems are dynamic, governance is evolving, and the problems we face as
a society now and in the future differ materially from the low-hanging fruit of pointsource pollution and water and air quality issues tackled mainly by government
enforcement measures through legislation that harkens back to the 1970s. In other words,
there is a need for fundamental change. As the Brundtland Commission noted:
The time has come to break out of past patterns. Attempts to maintain
social and ecological stability through old approaches to development and
environmental protection will increase instability...We are unanimous in
our conviction that the security, well-being, and very survival of the planet
depend on such changes, now (WCED 1987,22-3).
Change is inevitable. It may be denied, ignored, or concealed behind a deceptive
fagade of normalcy, yet change remains inevitable (Smil 1993). And, no question about
it, change and innovation are difficult, as one person's change may be another's
destruction (Steelman 2010). Thus the purpose of this research: to examine whether the
existing governance regime of the Gulf of Maine has the capacity to change - to innovate
- in order to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and
sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems, including the functions
upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely.
Commentators have spared no ink to offer their version of how governance of
human activities that impact ecosystem integrity needs to be changed. The role of this
chapter is to distill the literature to describe the underpinnings for change set forth in the
case studies and analysis of chapters IV, V, and VI. The end of this chapter proposes a
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framework for an "ideal" governance scheme against which other regimes may be
compared so that gaps can be identified and remedied.
Ecosystem Dynamics and Managing for Surprise
The notion of limiting or in some way managing the human activities that impact
our ecosystems is not new. Robin Hood and his Merry Men gained fame avoiding fish
and game laws in medieval England, after all. Thus before we can begin to examine the
governance and management challenges related to the human activities that impact
ecosystems, we first need to briefly explore the ecosystem dynamics that make
governance such a challenge. Some history may help put the regulatory perspectives into
context.
Much of the initial formal scientific research arose from issues surrounding fish
populations and related harvests. Although on land there were laws that forbade
poaching and set other limitations, bounty from the sea seems to have been taken for
granted for much of recorded history. Into the late 1800s or early 1900s ocean fisheries
were generally regarded as inexhaustible resources. While fisheries populations
fluctuated and occasional fisheries collapses occurred, they were tolerated. Following the
introduction of steam-powered trawlers in the late 19th century, however, the possibility
that there were limits to exploitation caused some government agencies and scientists to
believe that commercially important species were at risk unless their population
dynamics were better understood and new scientific knowledge could better inform
management efforts (Scheiber 1997).

42

It was largely the work of scientists in northern Europe and Great Britain that
began to introduce a new way of looking at fisheries populations and dynamics. As
Scheiber (1997) details, between the late 1800s and 1930, scientists in the region began to
advance knowledge on the "big picture"- the ecological dynamics that impacted the
fisheries. Hjort's studies in the North Sea and North Atlantic were designed to develop
an understanding of fishery habitats and ecosystem relationships. Schmidt studied the
Atlantic deep sea eel population to correlate migrations with the species' chemical and
meteorological environment. Nansens's work in the Arctic in 1893 established a link
between physical environment, atmospheric conditions plankton and fishery dynamics
(Scheiber 1997,638).
The importance of these and related studies cannot be underestimated. "These
theories conceived of fisheries ecosystem management as superior to a CPUE [catch per
unit effort] approach, with systematic evaluation of the condition of stocks to be based
not only on harvest data but also upon the holistic collection and analysis of data on the
entire ecosystem (chemistry, atmosphere conditions, currents and upwelling, etc.) relating
to the fishery environment, as well as biological data relating to population groupings,
migration patterns, inter-species competition, nutrients, and other characteristics of the
biomass and its dynamics" (Scheiber 1998,24). Thus scientists in the early 1900s were
beginning to look beyond total catch-related numbers and population dynamics equations
in order to understand what was happening to fish populations and other components of
the ecosystem.
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The term "ecosystem" was apparently first coined by A.G. Tansley in Great
Britain in 1935. At that time it was largely believed that ecosystems went through a
process of gradual attainment of complete dynamic equilibrium. Equilibrium, once
obtained, was deemed "perfect" and "its degree of perfection is measured by its
stability" (Tansley 1935, 301). Tansley linked ecology to advances in the physical
sciences and mathematics by inclusion of the term "system" and noted that these
ecosystems were of various kinds and sizes. He went on to encourage ecosystem studies
that combined ecology with other disciplines in order to study the interactions between
biotic and abiotic components (Tansley 1935; Aber and Melillo 2001Annex 12).
Others followed Tansley by using the term "ecosystem" and the study of
ecosystems began to encompass the important processes and complex interactions
between living and organic material. More research began to correlate the function of
ecosystems with the transfer of energy from green plants (producers) to animals
(consumers) and ultimately to microbes (decomposers) (Aber and Melillo 2001). In an
argument apparently novel for the time, Odum (1969) took it one step further and opined
that the principles of ecological succession bear importantly on the relationship between
man and nature (Odum 1969). His definition of the term "ecosystem" included humans
in the mix:
The ecosystem, or ecological system, is considered to be a unit of
biological organization made up of all of the organisms in a given area
(that is "community") interacting with the physical environment so that a
flow of energy leads to characteristic trophic structure and material cycles
within the system (Odum 1969,262).
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With the inclusion of humans, perhaps the most dominant species in terms of
ecosystem impacts, ecosystems are now defined and generally described as the complex
of organisms (including humans) that appear together in a given area and their associated
abiotic environment that interact through the flow of energy to build biotic structure and
materials cycles (MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005; Ruhl, Kraft et al. 2007). The
types of processes utilized by ecosystems to move and transform energy and materials
include photosynthesis, chemosynthesis, plant nutrient uptake, microbial respiration,
nitrification and denitrification, plant transpiration, mineral weathering, vegetation
succession, predator-prey interactions, and decomposition (Valiela 1995; Ruhl, Kraft et
al. 2007).
The functions and processes interacting within ecosystems permit such systems to
play a fundamental role in supporting life on earth. Ecosystems produce renewable
resources (e.g. timber, fish, etc.) and ecological services. Such services include
maintenance of the composition of the atmosphere, carbon sequestration, flood control,
waste assimilation, nutrient recycling, soil generation, crop pollination, and many others
(Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005; Folke, Lowell
Pritchard et al. 2007; Ruhl, Kraft et al. 2007). These and the many other ecosystem
services that sustain life at global, regional, and local scales do not result from ingredients
drifting in a uniformly mixed "soup." Interactions occur. Time and space matter (Mann
and Lazier 1996).
The relationships between the physical and biological processes that influence
ecosystem function are subtle and complex both in the terrestrial and marine
environments (Holling 1986; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Mann and Lazier 1996;
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Aber and Melillo 2001; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). The study of these same processes in
coastal regions influenced by both land-based and marine factors provides even greater
challenges. On land, terrestrial organisms are relatively easy to observe and manipulate
while in the ocean marine organisms are more difficult to access and monitor. Nutrients
required by terrestrial organisms are generally provided by the decaying remains of
nearby entities while decaying matter containing nutrients in the oceans generally sink
and leave the sunlit euphotic layer where photosynthesis occurs and only return to the
photic layer through upwelling, which may occur a half a world away (Mann and Lazier
1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005). The sea is larger and more
three-dimensional than the terrestrial environment. The low buoyancy of air strictly
limits the number of creatures that can fly or otherwise escape a benthic terrestrial
existence. Functional groups critical to ocean processes that are scarcer and much less
important on land include suspension-feeders, plankton, and nekton (Jennings, Kaiser et
al. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005).
While there are challenges to collaboration and to the collaborative study of the
coastal ocean margin, there are some important similarities that could link studies at the
land-water interface. Natural and anthropogenic biological and physical processes
located both on land and sea interact in critical ways. In addition, ecosystem functions on
land and sea are threatened by the same largely anthropogenic factors: overexploitation,
physical alteration of ecosystems, pollution, alien species, and global climate change. In
both land and sea small populations are at special risk. Top carnivores, other keystone
species, and structure-forming species are protection priorities because of their
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exceptionally important relationship with other species and on ecosystem processes
(Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Steneck and Carlton. 2001; Norse and Crowder 2005).
The natural world, unlike the controlled environment of a laboratory, poses
additional problems for the study, understanding, and management of marine ecosystems.
In addition to the physical factors and biological processes that impact ecosystem
function, there are other factors and conditions that impact the processes themselves.
Water temperature can significantly affect the rates at which biological processes
proceed. Currents, turbulence (including tidal mixing), and stratification can bring
nutrients into the euphotic zone and influence the availability of nutrients to the bottom of
the food chain (Mann and Lazier 1996). Also significant, from an ecosystem perspective
and, ultimately, as a management issue, is the scale at which many of the processes
occur. Scale may be defined as the "physical dimensions, in either space or time, of
phenomena or observations" (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006, 7; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al.
2007).
There are geographic scales that range from the size of the ocean, the maritime
boundaries of regions impacted by the forces of circulation, and, in the case of the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the strength and location of the Gulfstream, the North Atlantic
Oscillation, vigorous tidal mixing, upstream inputs from the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and
inter alia, the volume of dense slope water that enters the Gulf of Maine through the
Northeast Channel (Xue, Chai et al. 2000). At the other extreme, processes that involve
physical events like the inertial forces of turbulent fluctuations in the water and the
related changes in the methods and locomotion and composition of zooplankton and
phytoplankton can represent the shortest of length and smallest of geographic scales
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(Mann and Lazier 1996; Balch, Drapeau et al. 2007). To make things more confusing
from a management perspective, time scales must be added as an additional factor that
play a role in biological and physical processes. Time scales are often correlated to
length scales. Globally, thermohaline circulations are estimated to take a 1,000 years to
complete a circuit (Mann and Lazier 1996). Finally there are an abundance of cross-scale
interactions

. .where events or phenomena at one scale influence phenomena at another

scale" (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006, 8). The draining of a wetland, for example, takes place
at a local scale, but may influence regional hydrology by reducing water storage capacity
and thereby increasing flood threats, while also affecting rates of carbon emissions that
ultimately impact climate change on a global scale (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006).
Thus ecosystems depend upon an abundance of processes in order to continue to
function in a sustainable manner. The assemblage of processes, inputs, and systemically
important ingredients necessary for the continued viability of ecosystem health are
incredibly interlinked and dynamic. No longer can we assume that the services provided
by ecosystems are a natural result of some "perfect" stage of environmental evolution
infinitely capable of providing goods and services to humans. Ecosystems, in any form,
have limits. We've come a long way since Thomas Huxley, an esteemed director of the
UK Royal Commission on the Sea Fisheries, addressed a gathering in 1883 at the
International Fisheries Exhibition in London and assuaged the fears of those concerned
about reports of declines in fish catches by confidently opining that it was inconceivable
that the great fisheries for cod, herring, and mackerel could ever be exhausted (Sims and
Southward 2006).
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More realistically, the view that nature exists at or near an equilibrium condition
has been described as the "myth" of nature balanced (Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002,
12). Under this view equilibrium, if disturbed, will return to a similar if not identical
equilibrium through negative feedback (in systems terms). Nature is considered to be
infinitely forgiving and thus forms the basis for maximum sustainable yield and of
achieving fixed carrying capacity for animals and humans; the effect being the imposition
of static, rigid goals on dynamic systems. As we will see later, it is these static
assumptions that can create the environmental surprise and crisis that management seeks
to avoid. Given this, however, the myth of nature balanced may not be wrong, just
incomplete since inevitably there are forces of balance in the world; it's just that those
forces can be overwhelmed (Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002).
Since Huxley (1883) and Tansley (1935), the fundamental views of
ecosystem function and processes have changed. One of the major changes has been the
recognition that ecosystems do not progress in linear fashion to a climax or equilibrium
state. Nature is seldom linear and predictable. Indeed structure and processes, whether it
be in ecology, economics, social institutions, or any number of other areas are dominated
by uncertainty and nonlinear phenomena (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding
et al. 2003; Gunderson 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Natural systems, as
well as social and economic systems, are complex. Problems related to natural resources
and ecosystem degradation are thus complex systems problems involving the additional
complexity of interactions between natural and social systems often operating at different
scales (Holling 1995; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003)
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Thus while ecosystems can be studied at the level of their individual processes or
components, it should be stressed that in reality ecosystems are more than the sum of
their parts (Holling 1986; Francis 1993; Mann and Lazier 1996; Costanza, Low et al.
2001; Gunderson 2003). Synergistic feedbacks between organisms and their environment
exist and sustain the functioning and structure of ecosystems (Folke, Lowell Pritchard et
al. 2007). The interactions among species in an ecosystem, or food webs within an
ecosystem, together with their relations to water flow, temperature, and quality and to
biogeochemical cycling are complex and non-linear and riddled with lags and
discontinuities, thresholds, and limits (Francis 1993; Gunderson, Holling et al. 2002;
Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002).
Since ecosystems are complex, self-organizing systems nested across temporal
and spatial scales, any factor or process stemming from either internal changes or outside
disturbance can push ecosystems over a threshold and result in a regime shift (Gunderson
and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). The functions
and services that survive regime shift may not be those that humans need or even expect.
As self-organizing systems, with a complex array of dynamic structures and processes
exerting influences, ecosystems are evolutionary, not mechanical, and exhibit limited
predictability (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Thus complex natural systems are not easily
understood, let alone predictable. Despite the lack of predictability, humans continue to
become more dependent on ecosystem services even as ecosystems become more
vulnerable to unexpected events (Gunderson 2003).
Given the vulnerability of ecosystems, the issue becomes how they are able to
maintain their function and structure despite significant perturbation and disturbance.
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This ability to absorb shock and maintain its functions relate to the ecosystem's
resilience. Resilience can be used as a way to describe the return time to a steady-state
equilibrium following a perturbation. In ecosystems that do not show signs of a steadystate equilibrium phase, where instabilities can flip a system into another stability domain
or regime of behavior, resilience is the measure of the magnitude of disturbance that can
be absorbed before the system flips into a another stability domain by changing the
variables and processes that control behavior (Gunderson 2003; Walker and Salt 2006).
Further, stressed ecosystems, like those weakened from resource overexploitation, tend to
change in lurches, not gradually, after passing through a threshold, creating surprises, or
reactions that differ from predictive models both quantitatively and qualitatively (Holling
1986; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Holling 1995; Berkes and Folke 1998).
Thus the structure and resilience of ecosystems play a huge role in determining
how well such ecosystems perform from the perspective of human predictions and
expectations. Given the challenges posed by the co-evolving systems of humans and
nature, however, surprises are common and tend to be the rule, not the exception
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003). With no lack of ecosystems that have
been weakened by resource overexploitation, poor planning, etc., effective governance
will have to enable adaptive management capable of learning and able "...to deal with the
unpredictable interactions between people and ecosystems as they evolve together"
(Berkes and Folke 1998,11).
Given that ecosystems are not linear and do not function in predictable fashion,
what are the implications for the management or governance of the human activities that
impact ecosystems? How are resilience and management related? And how can we
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transition from management for human needs and sustainable yields to management for
resilience and "surprise?" The next section discusses these management and governance
issues.
Institutional Efficiency and the Legacy of Scientific Management
Humans need not travel in order to witness or be immersed in nature. There is no
need to head to the mountains or the shore. Humans are, without doubt, and without
more, an integral part of the ecosystems upon which they depend. Systems of people and
nature in fact co-evolve in what some have described as an 'adaptive dance' (Gunderson
2003). Resilience and adaptive behavior play critical roles in the choreography. As
discussed above, the interactions that occur in ecosystems between fast- and slowmoving processes as well as between processes with vastly different spatial dimensions
result in a nonlinear, unpredictable system. These self-organizing, nonlinear, and
unpredictable assemblages of processes and structures are marked by alternating stable
states and regular movements of biotic and abiotic variables between those states
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003).
It turns out that this variability is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact it is
essential for ecosystem maintenance. There is now an understanding that variability and
diversity are created by internal biotic and abiotic disturbances as well as external forces
that help maintain and renew the resilience and resistance of ecosystems. "Reducing
variability and diversity produces conditions that cause a system to flip into an
irreversible (typically degraded) state controlled by unfamiliar processes" (Gunderson
and Holling 2002,9).
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There is a propensity for society to reduce variability in order to feed some social
or economic need that frequently causes ecosystem function and, ultimately, services to
decline. Holling (1986) studied twenty-three examples of managed ecosystems. In each
case he examined both the way the ecosystems were organized and the way they were
managed. With respect to organization his study suggests that..the great diversity of
life in ecosystems is traceable to the function of a small set of variables, each operating at
a qualitatively different speed from the others" (Holling 1995, 6) More importantly his
study suggests that any attempt to manage ecological variables (e.g. fish, timber, water)
resulted in less resilient ecosystems, more rigid management institutions, and more
dependent societies. So, and as will be discussed more fully infra, success ultimately
leads to failure in the management of ecosystem activities (Holling 1995).
The intersection of unpredictable ecosystem processes and complex human
systems makes environmental problems doubly complex (Dryzek 1997). Yet there is an
understanding that there is a general pattern to unexpected changes and ultimately to
resource crisis. The pattern, as distilled by Holling's (1986) so-called 'science of
surprise', starts with a sequence of events that begins with exploitation of a resource
(Berkes and Folke 1998). As experience with the resource grows, and more and more
social and economic interests begin to use and rely on its existence, the resource is
exploited more efficiently (Berkes and Folke 1998; Gunderson and Holling 2002).
Efficiency, of course, is a major consideration in economics. To many if not most
economists efficiency refers to the use of resources in such a way as to maximize the
production of goods and services (Daly and Farley 2004). Thus successful suppression of
spruce budworm infestations using sprayed insecticides during the mid-1900s in Eastern
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Canada not only served to preserve a waning pulp and paper industry, but encouraged
expansion of pulp mills, leaving the forest and the economy exposed to"... more intense
extensive tree mortality than had ever been experienced (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995,
509). Exploitation of fresh water resources in the Everglades by a hodgepodge of
government agencies and private interests intent on funneling fresh water to developers
and agricultural enterprises has precipitated a steady series of environmental and human
crises in the form of flooding, drought, and unprecedented environmental degradation
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Similarly, passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (1976)
in the United States was designed to encourage and subsidize a U.S. fishing fleet with the
goal of catching fish sufficient to achieve optimum sustainable yield, or "a yield which
provides the greatest benefit to the United States as determined on the basis of the
maximum sustainable yield.. .as modified by relevant ecological, economic and social
factors." The act "loosed an unprecedented expansion of fleets, landings, and exports"
(Weber 2002,84 - 85). The brutal efficiency enabled by Magnuson-Stevens (1976) was
clearly a key factor in the exhaustion and collapse of the New England groundfish fishery
by the mid-1980s (Kurlansky 1997; Dobbs 2000; Weber 2002). Economic efficiency in
terms of resource exploitation seldom leads to sustainable and resilient ecosystem
viability.
Efficiency is also a key element of scientific management - the natural resource
management approach underpinning our past and present governance regime. As Teddy
Roosevelt proclaimed: "The Conservation of our national resources is only preliminary to
the larger question of national efficiency" (Taylor 1911,1).
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Scientific management strives to use the fullest extent of the latest scientific
knowledge (often described as the "best available science") through disinterested experts.
It should be made clear that this discussion concerning the scientific management
paradigm is not a condemnation of science or scientists. Science has provided enormous
value to society and it has the potential to contribute significantly to improving both the
discourse and the actions that will be required to deal with social and ecosystem
degradation (Pielke 2007). Scientific management, as a governance paradigm, insists
that planning and decisions made concerning the use or preservation of natural resources
are to be based on technology and efficiency. Further, scientific management routinely
relies on a single, central authority for making optimal decisions on a national scale and
implementing them through a bureaucratic chain of command (Hays 1959; Fischer 2000;
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007).
The paradigm of scientific management falls securely within the discourse that
John Dryzek (2005) defined as administrative rationalism. A discourse is a shared way
of looking at the world that allows for those who share the discourse to gather bits of
information and make them into coherent stories or accounts. Discourses can help
construct meanings and define relationships as well as shape interpretations of every day
events. Although the way a particular discourse, or perspective, views the world is not
always understood by others who do not share the discourse, seldom is there complete
discontinuity across discourses. Discourses also generally bring with them some
measure of political power and may exercise power in the manner that they condition the
perceptions and values of those that adhere to them as some interests and values are
pursued while others are suppressed (Dryzek 1997).
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Dryzek's administrative rationalism, like scientific management, consists of a
governance regime that governs largely through a bureaucracy with experts and managers
as the heads of the bureaucracies. Activities are managed by experts using expert tools
and theories like "cost benefit," "risk" analysis, environmental impact assessments,
"expert advisory commissions" and other methods that experts can speak about but which
shuts out the general public . As far as who's in charge:
...administrative rationalism implies hierarchy based on expertise, with
both power and knowledge centralized at the apex. Those at the apex are
assumed to know better than subordinate levels, so as to be able to assign
tasks and coordinate operations. But problems of any complexity defy
such centralization: nobody can possibly know enough about the various
dimensions of an issue such as acid rain, global climate change, ozone
depletion, or the interacting cocktail of urban air pollutants, not to mention
the social and economic aspects of these issues, to sit with any confidence
at the apex. (Dryzek 1997, 93).
Thus public or local knowledge is marginalized and relevant "expert" knowledge
is too often so dispersed and fragmentary that the closed, hierarchical style of
administrative rationalism simply cannot put the pieces together in a useful manner. If
aggregation is tried with complex problems, the result is typically problem displacement
rather than problem solving, e.g. air pollution getting turned into water pollution. As
Dryzek (2005) notes, most anti-pollution agencies operate under single-medium statutes
like clean air acts and clean water acts - thus increasing the likelihood of problem
displacement across media (Dryzek 1997,95).
Thus, whether it is called scientific management or administrative rationalism, the
present paradigm of fragmented bureaucratic, expert-driven, regulation with efficiencycentered decision-making hierarchy has been developing and strengthening since the
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early 1900s. The advent of the industrial era brought on increased need for expert control
and management because only scientific and technical experts had the requisite
knowledge and skills (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizens, who once largely
controlled the production of their own food, transportation, and other necessities, began
to rely upon increasingly complex corporate and institutional interests for their needs.
Individuals found themselves unable to easily determine their own interests and
escalating complexity left citizen participation in governance largely in its wake. Control
was turned over to technocrats and bureaucrats and public participation was left behind.
So just at a time in when political influence of the public was being folded into an
increasingly technical society "...it was undercut by the rise of bureaucratic organization
and technical expertise" (Fischer 2000, 6).
The tension between participatory democracy and social and technical complexity
continued to evolve in a special-interest laden version of "adaptive dance." Participants in
the natural resources arena learned over time that local groups were not nearly as
effective as national pressure groups. National pressure groups began to morph into
national single-interest groups and often combined with administrative agencies and
congressional committees that dealt with specialized subjects to marginalize more
integrated approaches. "Iron Triangles," a term describing the process that involved the
linkages formed between powerful special interest lobbying groups, government
regulatory agencies, and congressional committees or sub-committees so as to write rules
and regulations that harmonized their particular interests while preventing the more
general interests of society to participate, emerged as the dominant structures in spite of
the avowed goal of scientific management to rise above politics. The next logical step,
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naturally, was for organized interests to hire their own experts to justify conflicting
positions, ultimately leading to scientific analyses and economic assessments that
fractured along traditional political fault lines and contributing to an overall erosion of
public confidence in science (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002,212).
In this manner politics and policy have evolved to promote single or special
interests over the common good. We have already seen that ecosystem surprise is often
triggered by the targeting of a single commodity or focusing on output or yield of a
desired ecosystem product or service. Economic regimes form around the extraction or
use of desired commodity or product. To spell it out:
Economic dependence on a short list of products, linked via politicians in
powerful legislative positions who are supported by economic interests,
can reinforce the thinking in a bureaucracy managing a natural resource
(Trosper 2003, 328)
Thus under the scientific management status quo, bureaucracies and special
interests can feed off one another. In response, natural resource users and conservation
groups have had little choice but to engage each other in issue-by-issue power-balancing
politics. Politics, therefore, has rarely, if ever, been driven by the knowledge and input of
impartial scientific experts. Politics evolved as the context and typically enabled a
regulatory scheme that drafted and enforced rules dedicated to the controlled exploitation
of natural resource sectors and components (Dryzek 1997; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002;
Fiorino 2006).
There is more to the story. Ever-changing and evolving societies utilize more
than interactions that are based purely on economic or political forces to apportion values
and access to democracy and capital markets. Ultimately the behavior of individuals is a
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response to their environment in a way that is far more complex than can be delineated or
captured by basic rules of economics and politics (Dryzek 1997; Gunderson and Holling

2002).
What we have learned, therefore, is that there are common patterns behind the
failures of management of the human activities that impact an ecosystem's function. One
pattern that is typical of resource exploitation scenarios involves the need for or
identification of a target variable that is then successfully controlled. Social and
economic systems initially flourish with increased economic opportunity centering on the
controlled target variable. The efficiencies and limited, fragmented interests of the
scientific management/administrative rationalism paradigm are unable to effectively
control ecosystem variables and actually enhance exploitation. Initial success sets the
stage for ultimate failure with the stabilization of target variables effectively causing
meaningful changes in other ecological, social and economic components - leading
ultimately to the collapse of the entire system (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Dryzek
1997; Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al.
2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). In sum:
Although there is considerable variation in detail, there is remarkable
consistency in the history of resource exploitation: resources are inevitably
overexploited, often to the point of collapse or extinction. We suggest that
such consistency is due to the following common features: (i) Wealth or
the prospect of wealth generates political and social power that is used to
promote unlimited exploitation of resources, (ii) Scientific understanding
and consensus is hampered by the lack of controls and replicates, so that
each new problem involves learning about a new system, (iii) The
complexity of the underlying biological and physical systems precludes a
reductionist approach to management. Optimum levels of exploitation
must be determined by trial and error, (iv) Large levels of natural
variability mask the effects of overexploitation. Initial overexploitation is
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not detectable until it is severe and often irreversible (Ludwig, Hilborn et
al. 1993,17).
Clearly our current regulatory scheme is inextricably structured to permit the
identification and efficient exploitation of targeted ecosystem components. As we will
see below, this ability opens the door to ecosystem frailty and, ultimately, collapse.
Resilience and Adaptive Cycles
The previous section stressed that ecosystems are dynamic, continually changing,
and unpredictable. It also described the process whereby regulation that focuses on the
control of a target variable can lead ultimately to the collapse of the entire system. The
reason that most ecosystems don't collapse is that healthy ecological systems have the
resilience to withstand wide change and still maintain the integrity of their functions. As
was pointed out previously, resilience, or ecosystem resilience which "emphasizes
conditions far from any equilibrium, where instabilities can flip a system into another
regime of behavior - i.e., to another stability domain ... resilience is measured by the
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by
changing the variables and processes that control behavior" (Gunderson and Holling
2002,27-28).
It needs to be stressed, however, that ecosystem resilience involves humans.
Humans all live within social-ecological systems. We depend on ecosystems for our
existence. So when we talk about resilience and the capacity of a system to absorb
disturbance and still retain its structure and function, we are not simply talking about
"nature," but a totally linked social-ecological system of which we are all a part
(Davidson-Hunt and Berkes 2003; Walker and Salt 2006).
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In order to better understand change and resilience in complex systems, the
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metaphor of the adaptive cycle3 is useful (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Gunderson and
Holling 2002). Its phases of exploitation, conservation, release, and reorganization

3 The

adaptive cycle provides a vehicle for the discussion of ecosystem succession. The
traditional view of succession involved the incomplete "equilibrium" model discussed previously.
That view assumed that equilibrium, or the attainment of a climax phase, was controlled by two
functions: exploitation and conservation. Exploitation referred to the organizations and processes
that enable the quick colonization of recently disturbed areas by species considered r-strategists.
Conservation describes the slow accumulation and storage of energy and material by species
described as K-strategists. The use of r and K to describe the strategies of species in the
exploitation and conservation phases is directly related to the parameters of the logistics equation.
The r types are therefore species that have extensive dispersal ability and rapid growth in
disturbed areas or any area where the best 'scrambler' wins, while K-strategists generally have
slower growth rates and flourish in areas where resources become divided. Holling, C. S. (1995).
What Barriers? What Bridges? Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and
Institutions. L. H. Gunderson, C. S. Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University
Press: 3-34, Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv: Understanding
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island Press.
To continue the metaphor, the adaptive cycle responds to subsequent ecological inputs
and expands the traditional exploitation and conservation model by adding two additional
functions. The first addition is the function that results from the tightly bound accumulation of
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provides a strong framework that underpins the interpretation of ecosystem change and
governance (See Figure 4).
The adaptive cycle metaphor attempts to demonstrate how three properties of
ecosystems interact to focus and shape the future responses and trajectories of the
ecosystem, agencies, and people. These three properties are:
biomass and nutrients in the conservation of K phase. This addition, called the 'release' phase or,
borrowing from economics, "creative destruction" Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism.
Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper and Row., reflects the sudden collapse or release of
the nutrients and biomass accumulated in the K phase. Resources are released from their bound
and controlled state, connections are broken, feedback regulatory controls weaken, and
destabilizing positive feedbacks develop. This is designated as the omega (Q) phase (Figure 3)
Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv: Understanding Transformations in
Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island Press..
The second additional function is that of "reorganization" and is deemed the alpha (a)
phase. In this phase, the remnants of the collapse of the K phase begin a slow, random process of
reorganization. It is during the transition from CI to a that there is an explosive increase in
uncertainty where conditions might arise for chaotic behavior. During this phase the system is
essentially unregulated, connections are weak and there is no organization ibid.. Thus it is the
stage "most affected by probabilistic events that allow a diversity of entrained species, as well as
exotic invaders, to become established.. .it is the stage most vulnerable to erosion and to the loss
of accumulated capital... [And] it is the stage from which jumps to unexpectedly different and
more productive systems are possible" Holling, C. S. (1995). What Barriers? What Bridges?
Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. L. H. Gunderson, C. S.
Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University Press: 3-34..
The omega (Q) and alpha (a) phases, shaded in figure 3, form the back loop of the
adaptive cycle. The back loop phase, from Q to a, is a rapid reorganization and leads to renewal.
This can be contrasted with the front loop phase, r to K, which is the slow, incremental, phase of
growth and accumulation. The front loop is predictable with higher degrees of certainty. The
back loop, on the other hand, encompasses the outcomes following collapse and reorganization
and is highly unpredictable Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling, Eds. (2002). Panarchv:
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, D.C., Island PressThus there are two phases in the adaptive cycle where ecosystems become briefly vulnerable to
dramatic transformation. The back loop reorganization (a) phase and the conservation, or K,
phase of the front loop. These are phases where slower and larger levels in ecosystems become
vulnerable to small events and fast processes. The a phase is vulnerable, as we have seen, due to
the weak connections and lack of organization. At the other end of the spectrum, the K phase is
vulnerable because a mature ecosystem can become overconnected in a variety of ways as well as
brittle. Although the system may be at some version of equilibrium, there is a loss of resilience,
particularly if target variables are attempted to be controlled, manipulated, or exploited, and the
system becomes an accident waiting to happen Holling, C. S. (1995). What Barriers? What
Bridges? Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. L. H. Gunderson,
C. S. Holling and S. S. Light. New York, Columbia University Press: 3-34..
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• The potential [Capital] available for change, since that determines the range of
options possible;
• The degree of connectedness between internal controlling variables and processes,
a measure that reflects the degree of flexibility or rigidity of such controls - i.e.,
their sensitivity or not to external variation;
• The resilience of the systems, a measure of their vulnerability to unexpected or
unpredictable shocks (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Gunderson and Holling
2002, 32-33)
The adaptive cycle provides a helpful metaphor to demonstrate the dynamic,
complex and difficult if not impossible to predict nature of ecosystems. It also helps
depict the importance of resilience as a quality of ecosystem dynamics and function.
Ecosystems that are resilient are better able to absorb disturbance without changing in
structure and flipping to a new, and perhaps less desirable, equilibrium. One of the ways
to impair resilience, as we have seen, is for governance or regulation to try to control or
exploit targeted variables within the system.
Current governance, for the most part, is based on the legacy and processes of
efficiency and scientific management which strives to efficiently control variables and to
maximize value from natural resources using command and control bureaucracy and
expert-driven technology. The adaptive cycle metaphor demonstrates that ecosystems are
most vulnerable when the system is at seeming (and mythical) equilibrium but brittle
with entanglements between numerous variables within the system, including human and
institutional inputs. As ecosystems grow and mature, and variables are controlled or
limited for the benefit of society or for economic gain, the system becomes more brittle
and less resilient - the accident waiting to happen. The next section looks at whether
there may be a better way to develop governance that permits more effective
management of the human activities that impact the environment.
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Changing Course: An Ecosvstem-Based Approach to Adaptive Governance
The study of the impact of governance on the human activities that impact the
environment has been the poor step-child for researchers in the academic and scientific
communities. Far more work, money, and effort has gone into the study of the natural
components and processes underlying ecosystems, but research on socioeconomic and
governance aspects of ecosystem dynamics has been limited despite the fact that progress
in these areas is essential to achieving effective ecosystem-based approaches to
management (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). There is a need to develop connections between
the spatial and temporal scales of nested ecosystems and networked institutions capable
of monitoring, assessing, and regulating at appropriate levels of regional, national, local,
citizen and NGO involvement. It is axiomatic that the manner of organization of
governance arrangements is critical to resource use and, by extension, ecosystem health
(Costanza, Norton et al. 1992).
Current laws in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere reflect the traditional
tendency of government agencies and departments charged with responsibilities for
natural resources and coastal activities to be limited to some particular type of activity.
Thus management focus has traditionally centered on legislatively-mandated
jurisdictional sectors and is typically concerned with limiting some narrow activity or
increasing production of desired commodities (VanderZwaag 1995; Juda 2003; Fiorino
2006; Brunner 2010a).
With respect to the governance and management of the human activities that
impact the integrity and resilience of ecosystems, the notion that traditional scientific
management approaches are failing, and may in fact be making the problems worse, has
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been discussed. The institutional structure that has developed for decades around the
low-hanging fruit of egregious smokestacks and end-of-pipe discharges are proving
remarkably resistant to fundamental change and innovation (Skowronek 1982; Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005). Thus old regulation, evolving from a late 19th century obsession
with efficiency, largely designed to respond to a 1970s view of environmental problems,
and revolving around selective intervention by government based on a strategy of
bureaucratic control, is no longer an effective response. It may even be largely irrelevant.
We must move beyond simply controlling pollution to preventing it, reducing risk,
promoting eco-efficiency, advancing stewardship, and achieving a sustainable economy
and society over the long term (Fiorino 2006; Pielke 2007; NRC 2009).
As discussed in the Introduction to this paper, there have been repeated calls for a
broader, more holistic ecosystem approach to environmental management of the coastal
oceans has been the pronounced response to the perceived failure of traditional scientific
sector-based management (Haskell 1992; F.A.O. 1995a; Constanza 1998; EPAP 1999;
Juda 1999; Sherman and Duda 1999; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Macpherson 2001;
Sherman and Duda 2001; Link 2002; Policy 2002; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a;
Brunner and Lynch 2010b). The implementation of a more ecosystem-based approach to
regulations for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region will require considerable thought,
courageous experimentation, and the ability to monitor trends in order to learn from our
mistakes. Management must shift its focus from the current emphasis on satisfying the
needs of humans through output objectives to an emphasis on protecting the ecosystem
functions that provide those goods and services. It bears repeating that sustainability
requires ecosystems be viewed as non-linear complex systems with self-organizing
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properties, resilience, and inherent uncertainty (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995;
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Conventional natural
resource models that assume some quantifiable equilibrium or "climax" phase of
ecosystems must begin to recognize that nature is not equilibrium-driven and is
inherently unpredictable (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Barron 2003; Berkes, Colding et
al. 2003; Gunderson 2003).
It will certainly not be easy to overturn more than a century of developed
government, NGO, and economic interests that seemingly perpetuate profound
ideological separation. As laws and regulations became more complex society and
special interests evolved to divide and fragment environmental issues. Potential
regulatory change is frequently watered-down or blocked by galvanized and often
piecemeal efforts by interest groups organized to block each other. (Brunner, Steelman et
al. 2005). At a time when common or public interests should be front-and-center with
respect to the decisions and policies considered by policy makers that have the effect of
distributing values as well as resources, special interests, those interests that detract from
the public good, are often in control of the decision and policy making. With respect to
science having a role as a neutral, objective force:
Science in the service of common interests is threatened as scientists and
policy-makers have come to see science mainly as a servant of interest
group politics. That is to say, increasingly, science has come to be viewed
as simply a resource for enhancing the ability of groups in society to
bargain, negotiate, and compromise in pursuit of their special interests
(Pielke 2007,10)
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Certainly, at a national level, and often at a state or provincial level, many believe
that political institutions have broken down, so that the broad public no longer believes
them credible:
The American economy increasingly serves only a narrow part of society,
and America's national politics has failed to put the country back on track
through honest, open, and transparent problem solving. Too many of
America's elites - among the super-rich, the CEOs, and many of my
colleagues in academia - have abandoned a commitment to social
responsibility. They chase wealth and power, the rest of society be
damned (Sachs 2011, 5).
Given the precarious position of the federal political regime, and the distractions
provided by mindless power struggles, the division, fragmentation, and stalemate that
remain stubborn legacies of the nation's governance structure at the national, provincial,
and state levels may signal opportunities for the mitigation of these barriers at more local
and regional levels (Prugh, Costanza et al. 2000; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Cortese
2011). Indeed a goal of implementing an ecosystem-based approach to the management
of the human activities that impact the environment may be a way of ushering in a more
diverse and effective local and regional approach to governance. The move toward a
more regional and local governance regime will be discussed later in this chapter.
Ultimately, however, there is no magic or mystery to the notion of an ecosystembased approach to the management of human activities that impact ecosystems. The
ecosystem approach integrates ecological protection and restoration with human needs to
strengthen the essential connection between economic prosperity and environmental
well-being. The process requires meaningful collaboration between federal,
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state/provincial, local, and tribal and first nation governments, and an active and
informed public, to achieve the ultimate goal of a resilient and sustainable environment.
Expanding upon the definition proffered by the Helsinki Commission (2003), an
ecosystem-based approach to governance may be defined as:

A governance process that develops an integrated ecosystem approach to
coastal management bounded by ecological, not political, boundaries, and
uses collaborative, cooperative, and community actions as often as
possible to implement a goal-driven community-supported process for the
comprehensive integrated management of human activities. Policy
development is based on the best available local and expert knowledge
about the ecosystem and its dynamics in order to identify and
collaboratively take action at all appropriate levels on influences which are
critical to the health and resilience of coastal ecosystem, thereby achieving
sustainable use of ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of
ecosystem integrity
Thus the approach is applied within a geographic framework determined primarily by
ecological, not political, boundaries. The process must overcome the fragmentation
inherent in both the sectoral management approach and the splits in jurisdiction among
levels of government at the land-water interface. Included at every level is the need for
significant stakeholder and resource user involvement, recognition of human dignity
social justice, democracy, and intergenerational equity. Finally, scientific uncertainty
must be countered with the use of precautionary decision making.
The important characteristics of an ecosystem approach to governance may be
summarized as follows:
•

Management for resilience. Governance must take the perspective that its task is
to find common ground on policies that advance the common interest (Brunner
2002). The common interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity
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should outweigh parochial interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command
and control hierarchy. The critical component of ecosystem-based governance is
that management focuses on the relationship between people and the natural
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function, the life support
systems, while recognizing the need for human and institutional involvement at
every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000),
• Significant, meaningful public participation. Any ecosystem management regime
must provide the opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad
representative segment of the population in decision making processes (Costanza,
Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public
participation is required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999; Jackson 2005).
Participation must be open to almost any person or group with a significant
interest in the issue (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizen involvement and
partnership must be sufficient to build "civic science" instead of the traditional
public information programs designed to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et
al. 1995). Together we must "pay the price of civilization through multiple acts
of good citizenship..." (Sachs 2011, 5)
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement. Regulatory agencies must
participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and allow softer local and
regional input into governance. The approach is applied within a geographic
framework determined primarily by ecological, not political, boundaries. Thus
the process must overcome the fragmentation inherent in both the sectoral
management approach and the splits in jurisdiction among levels of government
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(Regier and Baskerville 1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell
Pritchard et al. 2007). In an ideal system, government acts less on other actors
and more with other actors in a collaborative and communicative way. There is,
therefore, more frequent, collaborative contact (i.e. not just during crisis). Thus
government would require less of the local, state, or federal governments exerting
control over others in society and more of a partnership-like interaction among
them (Fiorino 2006).
• Governance is adaptive. There must be a realization that stewardship cannot wait
on science to achieve a full understanding of ecosystem structure and function.
Thus an ecosystem based approach in any region must be prepared to cope with
the uncertainty inherent in complex natural and institutional systems (Sutinen,
Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Adaptive governance is a mode of
learning that allows for decision makers with a poor understanding of the
connection between their actions and the consequences to learn by doing
(Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Holling 1995; NRC 2009). Ecosystem surprises
stemming from delay in feedback, and/or rapid feedback, are both normal
ecosystem dynamics and require adaptable governance. It should be understood
that it is not humanly possible to design a flawless governance process capable of
coping with multiple, complex systems. All that can be done is to attempt to
design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be
generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and
continually adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural
limits (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy
70

choices and interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying
explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of
expert-driven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather
than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005).
• Mobilizing local knowledge. Social and cultural memory and contemporary local
knowledge must be mobilized by developing links between key persons and
providing a direction for adaptive governance. This is a way of building social
capacity for resilience in social-ecological systems (Holling 1995; Berkes,
Colding et al. 2003; Steelman 2010).
• Overarching lead or joint institution. Governance must have a lead or joint
institution able to adapt to new information and understanding (Christensen,
Bartuska et al. 1996). They must, therefore, have the authority (formal or
informal) and means to carry out systematic scientific research to understand
system response and status, to track compliance with policy goals and objectives
as well as to make changes when necessary. The obvious need is for transparency
and fairness as perceived by the public and regulated community. More pertinent,
however, may be the existence of informal or voluntary venues for dispute
resolution that gives the public and stakeholders an opportunity to work together
toward resolution of local or regional problems. This may be especially important
where, as in this study area, the problems we are having with environmental
degradation are the result of the cumulative impact of activities that are entirely(or
mostly) legal under our existing laws and regulations (Brunner 2002; Fiorino
2006).
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• A precautionary approach to uncertainty. A precautionary decision-making
approach must be used in order to account for the great degree of uncertainty
inherent in complex natural resource issues (Sherman 1994; Sutinen, Clay et al.
2000; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration makes it
clear that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation (Sitarz 1994). There must be a
realization that stewardship cannot wait on science to achieve a full understanding
of ecosystem structure and function. Thus ecosystem management in the region
must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in complex natural and
institutional systems ((Sherman, Kane et al. 2002; Whiteside 2006), Clay et al.
2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Rapid feedback and appropriate decisionselection mechanisms must be in place to compensate for lack of knowledge by
decision makers (Costanza, Low et al. 2001).
While the above attempts to cull some of the more obvious characteristics of
ecosystem-based governance from the literature, the more important message is that
governance as usual is not an option. As the National Research Council (2009) recently
pointed out in no uncertain terms, government agencies, private organizations, and
individuals are "...unprepared, both conceptually and practically..." to meet the
environmental challenges, including climate change, that will affect our futures (2009,1).
Thus the time is right for concerned institutions, groups, and individuals in the region to
seriously contemplate a transition from "business as usual" to a more holistic,
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collaborative, and participatory governance regime for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
region.
Significant change, especially the kind of change and innovation required to
achieve at least some of the characteristics set forth above, is exceedingly difficult. There
have indeed been many examples of bold innovation on the part of government agencies
and institutions aimed at fostering new approaches to remedy environmental harm and
achieve sustainable resource use. In the last decade, no fewer than twenty federal
agencies have adopted innovative ways to improve their efforts at achieving their
environmental tasks and mission, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), the
National Park Service (USNPS), the US Forest Service (USFS), and the US Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS) (Steelman 2010). Desired outcomes, however, remain
bewilderingly elusive. From an outside observer's standpoint, nothing seems to have
changed.
One significant reason that new initiatives fail is that innovative change must
occur within larger institutional processes that impact the effectiveness of innovations.
There is inherent tension between innovation and institutions. Innovations are often
adaptive and transitory. Institutions are not (Steelman 2010). Further, any attempt to
implement change and innovation in the regulation of the use and exploitation of natural
resources in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed must recognize that the
institutions and entities that comprise the governance regime of the region are embedded
in existing and enduring social and decision processes. There are economic, cultural, and
social systems in place now that determine how values are distributed (Lasswell 1971;
73

Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Industry, governments, and NGOs often have strong
vested interest in maintaining the status quo as change in governance can mean a
redistribution of values like wealth and power.
The next section attempts to distill the existing literature, including case studies
and academic treatises, to construct an "ideal" compilation of characteristics that I
suggest would be reflective of an ecosystem-based approach to governance within the
framework of the policy sciences. In chapters 4 and 5 the governance regimes of the
Great Lakes Watershed Basin during the 1970s and 1980s and the regime extant in the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed will be compared to the criteria and
characteristics set forth in the "ideal" framework. In this manner, using the framework, it
is hoped that gaps between the governance that "is" and the governance that "should be"
will be revealed and can lay the groundwork for the recommendations and conclusions
set forth in chapter 6.
The Ecosvstem-based Approach and the Policy Sciences Analytical Framework
The decision to use the policy sciences analytical framework approach to the
analysis of the ecosystem-based approach to governance is an attempt to organize the
various indicators or characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and put them into
context. The characteristics of ecosystem-based governance are not distilled from thin air.
Context is critical for the analysis of complex problems like those underpinning many if
not most environmental issues and assessments. The principle of context, that all things
are interconnected and that the meaning of anything depends upon those connections, is
at work in this investigation. Moreover, the related notion that the properties of the parts
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cannot be understood except in the context of the whole is consistent with our discussion
of the dynamic nature of environmental and social systems (Clark 1997). Holling (1995)
notes the importance of a "systems view" necessary for addressing complex ecosystem
issues. In the language of the policy sciences, a "systems view" is synonymous with a
"policy-oriented" perspective (Clark 2002, 30). The sobering reality, however, is that:

...the system we deal with is always incomplete. Surprise is inevitable.
Not only is the science incomplete, but the system itself is a moving
target, evolving because of the impact of management and the progressive
expansion of the scale of human influences on the planet (Gunderson,
Holling etal. 1995,13).
Thus reality and our less-than-satisfactory experience with fragmented, expertdriven, piecemeal restoration plans are forcing researchers, scientists, and policy-makers
to veer off the linear path into the decidedly non-linear woods where complexity,
contextuality, and uncertainty abound.
As has been discussed, an analysis of the policy process as fostered by the
framework provided by Lasswell and the policy sciences permits an examination of the
policy process through multiple stages. Lasswell's approach demands a greater
attention to context and to some degree enables scholarly attention to shift focus to
institutional and other aspects of the policy process that has long been dominated by a
fascination with congressional policy making (Keller 2009). Importantly, the research
approach suggested by the policy sciences framework acknowledges that the stages of the
policy process do not operate in linear fashion but instead may occur in parallel or
iterative cycles (Lasswell 1971; Clark 2002; Keller 2009).
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Problem Orientation
The problem orientation phase of the policy sciences analytical framework acts
rather like flexible bookends to guide and assess the entire framework. It helps frame the
mapping and context of the social and decision process in an effort to strike at the heart at
the primary concern of all analytical methods: how to bring appropriate knowledge to
bear in policy decisions (Clark 2002,128). Problem orientation is geared toward forcing
investigators to switch from being "solution minded" and to approach policy from a
"problem minded" perspective. In essence, problem orientation serves as a guide to the
learning process fostered by the decision and social process inquiries. As such the five
tasks within problem orientation serve as an overall "strategy to address problems and
invent solutions (Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard 2000, 9). Thus:
In problem orientation, the problems at hand must first be specified in
relation to the goals that people seek, thus permitting a clearer definition
of the problems than is otherwise possible. Historic trends must then be
described to see if events and decision making are moving toward or away
from the specified goals. Next, factors or conditions that have influenced
or caused these trends must be determined. When past trends and
conditions are adequately known, projections of future trends are possible.
Finally, after these four tasks have been completed and the necessary
information assembled, alternative courses of action for achieving the
stated goals can be invented; evaluated according to their effectiveness,
efficiency, and equitability in solving the problem (Clark 2008, 57).
Certainly problem orientation is ongoing and iterative. To begin the examination
using the framework approach we will look at the characteristics of goal clarification
under our "ideal" ecosystem-based approach to governance.
Goal Clarification. Clark tells us that clarifying the goals of the participants is our
first task. "People involved in a resource management issue must specify what they hope
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to achieve (a content matter) and also how they expect to achieve it (a procedural matter
(2002, 87). "The goal-clarifying task is indicated by the blunt question: 'What ought I to
prefer?'" (Lasswell 1971,40).
Goals are preferred outcomes within a specific context and are typically expressed
in terms of the distribution of values and practices. Clarifying goals means finding the
answers to the question: What value outcomes should we seek in an ecosystem-based
approach to governance? Under the traditional governance model, goals are often
established by a government with the supposed cognitive capacity to determine society's
environmental goals and, in some detail, how those goals should be achieved (Fiorino
2006). Goals are single targets to be realized efficiently; they are fixed, given, or
assumed to separate science from non-science, and progress is measurable (Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005). Goals of government agencies are fragmented, however, and
paradoxes abound. Different agencies operate independently striving to achieve separate
and often-unrelated or competing objectives. Furthermore, some agencies are charged by
statutory prescription with the responsibility to limit the taking of a commodity while
simultaneously promoting the same commodity for harvest (Cortner and Moote 1999). In
1976, for instance, the National Forest Management Act charged the Forest Service with
the responsibility to both protect forested lands and to proscribe rules for the harvest of
timber lands (Trosper 2003). Similarly, the Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996) requires the
National Marine Fisheries Service to rebuild overfished stocks of fish on a species-byspecies basis within certain time requirements, and at the same time determine optimum
yield catch limits while being pressured by some members of Congress and other special
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interests to extend deadlines and allow increased harvests (Safina, Rosenberg et al. 2005;
MSFCMA 1996).
Goal choices should, initially, be fairly broad and widely accepted. Clark cites
Lasswell and MacDougal (1992, 737-58) for the idea that the overriding goals should be
human dignity, ecosystem health, and democracy. Indeed, the emphasis on the protection
and advancement of human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the
policy sciences approach (deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the
effects of human decisions on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment
capable of sustaining human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human
dignity begins to make sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many
cultural traditions throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape
and share power, wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and
respect" (Lasswell and MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified
that the policy sciences strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human
dignity for the many, not the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since
the goal is democracy and dignity for the many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving
equal opportunity for participation in power, wealth, well-being, and the other important
values (Lasswell 1971).
While there can be little serious question as to the virtues of having the goals of
human dignity and democracy at the heart of any policy process, there needs to be more
detail for the goal process and content in an assessment of ecosystem conflicts and issues.
Some detail may be found in the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In
the universal agreement all nations agreed to recognize that the inherent dignity and the
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equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world (UN 1948). This sentiment ultimately expanded
into a carefully worded statement of world community intent that declared that "human
beings are at the center of the of concerns for sustainable development" and are entitled
to good health and economic well-being (UNCED 1992, Principles 1,3, 5,6,7,8,10,
13,14,15, 17, 18, 19,23,23,24,, 25,26).
The symptoms that governance and society in the United States are not living up
to the ideals of human dignity and democracy are numerous:
• In the last seventy years, barely half of eligible voters in the United States actually
voted in a presidential election (Norris 2002). Voter turnout in the U.S. is roughly
63% of that in Western Europe. Further, U.S. elections fail to meet
internationally recognized fairness standards (Lappe 2006).
• America is dividing. During the 1980s and 90s the United States underwent the
largest wealth transfer in its history as the net worth of the top 1 percent rose by
63% while the net worth of those in the bottom 40% dropped by 44%. At the start
of the 1970s, the corporate Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) earned an average
pay that was approximately 40 times the pay of an average worker. By the year
2000 it had reach 1,000 times the average worker's pay. Shockingly, the U.S.
census bureau records reveal that the median earnings of male full-time workers
actually peaked in 1973. Further, while earnings have declined, Conference
Board data indicate that job satisfaction has been on the wane for the last 25 years
(Sachs 2011).
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• In 1964 three-quarters of the American public trusted government. By the late
1990s that number had shrunk to one quarter - while the number of Americans
who believe that "the government is run by a few big interests looking out only
for themselves" more than doubled between the mid-1960s and the mid-90s,
reaching 76% (Orren 1997, 80-81). The number of lobbyists in Washington has
tripled since 1996, outnumbering members of Congress by fifth-six to one (Lappe
2006).
• Poverty is real and expanding. Thirty-five million Americans - a number equal to
the entire population of Canada - live in households that are so poor that they are
not sure from where their next meal is coming. Further, the Institute of Medicine
estimates that eighteen thousand Americans die unnecessarily each year because
they lack health care (Lappe 2006). In addition, the United States ranks fortysecond in infant survival (CIA 2005).
This list is, of course, not exhaustive. The point is simply that current governance
in America does not appear to be overly concerned with human dignity, fairness, or
democracy. "Moreover, we're made to believe that we like it this way - that we prefer to
leave our futures to others. Only a few oddballs care about contributing to something
bigger than themselves. You know, those activists" (Lappe 2006,6).
With the goal of human dignity and democracy in mind, there must be some focus
on how we best begin to change the trends and make headway toward a society that
advances these goals. It is noteworthy that a popular assessment of the cause of the
deteriorating social and economic equalities in this country is the notion that government
is the cause of society's ills. As I write these words, we are about a week from the 2012
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New Hampshire presidential primary election. There is a theme to the political rhetoric, a
mantra if you will that the ills of modern society are the fault of government regulation.
Certainly a discussion of the history of government and its relationship to human
dignity is beyond the scope of this research. To some degree, however, the notion that
governance should somehow back off and leave regulation, including rules relating to
human impacts on ecosystem health and resilience, entirely to supply and demand and
free market capitalism deserves brief comment.
There is little dispute that for some three decades, from the new Deal of the mid19308 through the civil rights legislative battles of the 1960s the federal government
steered the national economy and drove equitable policy as a trusted instrument of
democratic power. National highways were built, a national power grid was created, and
government teamed with private enterprise to launch satellites and create the Internet.
School systems became integrated and social programs, including Medicare, social
security, food stamps, and other programs supportive of the less-fortunate and elderly
came to fruition. As Franklin Roosevelt put it as he ushered in a new era of government
intervention in the economy:
[Government [is] the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the
individual the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization. Repeated
attempts at their solution without the aid of government had left us baffled
and bewildered.4
Yet those sentiments are hardly recognizable today. After Viet Nam, Richard
Nixon, and the oil crisis and higher interest rates of the 1970s, Ronald Reagan
proclaimed:
4

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 1937
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In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem....It is my intention to curb the size and
influence of the Federal establishment5
The rhetoric, through the popular and business media, is insisting that free market
capitalism remains the only way to a prosperous economy. The conservative right often
expands upon the "invisible hand" metaphor first used first by Adam Smith (2003)6 for
the proposition that the U.S. economy requires that entrepreneurs must have a free hand,
unfettered by government regulation, to create wealth and jobs for those that have thus
far been harmed by our status quo economic and regulatory scheme. So the challenge is
relatively clear. Can governance be restored to the point that citizens believe that it can
actually foster the public good? Is there any way that people can be convinced to pay the
price and participate with their interest, time, and commitment in a participatory
democracy that reflects the will of the populace?
As we know, governance is active at several levels. Public dignity and
democracy operate at local, state/provincial, and federal levels. Clearly the status quo is
a disappointment. The federal level of governance, however, may be losing credibility
while involvement and participation at local and regional levels could be fostered. Surely
every situation is different and context changes from community to community. Thus it
may be more productive to approach goal clarification as an inquiry into what the
5

Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, January 20, 1981

6 Interestingly, a review of Adam Smith's work shows that the term "invisible hand" was used but once in
his 1200+ page The Wealth of Nations and it was used with numerous caveats and conditions that involved
an overall notion of fairness and justice. It would likely come as a surprise to the current crop of
Republican candidates canvassing our state that Smith also concluded that workers were often oppressed
and that legislation pertaining to workers typically was harmful to workers (p. 195). Smith also wrote that
workers should be ".. .well fed, clothed, and lodged" (p. 110-111). Finally, modern day political rhetoric
seems to ignore the fact that Adam Smith believed that taxing the wealthy was appropriate, opining that
subjects . .ought to contribute toward the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion
to their respective abilities" (p. 1043). Smith, A. (2003). The Wealth of Nations. New York, Bantam Dell.

82

community wants. What values does the community prize over others? Again it is better
to start with broader goals. In theory all communities should want fishable, swimmable
water and the ability to harvest food from land and water from lakes and rivers that is
safe to consume.
In our ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance, goals would be determined
with a great deal of input from community. Strong public outreach and education efforts
should provide incentive for community members to establish goals consistent with the
overriding goals of human dignity and democracy (e.g. the "common good"). Resources
should be available to assist communities in clarifying their common interests and, if
necessary, stepping back from their individual demands, claims, and special interests to
find common ground in more general and widely shared values (Clark 2002). New and
measurable goals can be part of facilitated efforts by agencies with roles that evolve from
rigid enforcement toward collaborative efforts integrated across all media and
encouraging local and regional civic environmentalism (Fiorino 2006). Multiple goals are
to be integrated if possible or traded off if necessary; they depend on judgments in the
particular context and are subject to change (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Goals
should place the integrity and resilience of the ecosystem functions over human use
because human demands for ecosystem goods and services cannot otherwise be
sustainably met. Common interests should prevail over special interests. There should
be methods for individuals and groups to find common interests.
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Table 7 Goal Clarification
Traditional
Goals established by government
agencies with assumed expertise to
determine society's environmental
goals and how they should be
achieved. Agency goals trump
community acceptance.

Ecosystem-based Approach
Meaningful public and/or community
participation and input in the goal
clarification process. National goals
may provide guidance but community
has broad input into how to achieve
goals. Goal choices have broad
community acceptance

Public participation generally limited
to after-the-fact public comments on
plans developed by government
agencies and experts.

Strong public outreach and education
provide ability to establish community
goals inclusive of human dignity and
democracy and provide basis for
clarifying common interests. Human
dignity includes economic fairness and
sustainability.
Multiple goals may be integrated that
embrace human dignity, economic
fairness for the many, and equal access
to governance with a focus on
maintenance and preservation of the
integrity and resilience of ecosystem
functions.

Goals are traditionally single targets to
be realized efficiently; they are fixed,
given, or assumed to separate science
from non-science, and progress is
measurable

In sum, the key goal clarification characteristics of an ecosystem-based approach
to governance are:
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process;
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to governance options and
ecosystem issues, and
3) Multiple goals that are long-term and enduring and overall embrace human dignity,
economic fairness, and equal access to governance with a premium placed on
maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions (Table 7).

Describing Trends. The second task in problem orientation is the description of
past trends. Trend description serves in important function in ecosystem-based
examination and decision-making because reliable, objective trend analysis tells us what
progress, if any, we are making toward short, medium, and long-term goals. When
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examining ecosystem issues, our ideal ecosystem-based governance regime requires that
the status of environmental as well as social and economic variables be assessed, i.e. are
the eight values set forth in the social process becoming more abundant and available in
the community and are institutional practices beginning to reflect the goals of human
dignity, democracy, and ecosystem resilience rather than those of tyranny and deprivation
(Clark 2002; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
Thus in our ideal ecosystem-based governance the trends should be toward a
greater sharing of wealth, knowledge, education, power, health, respect, skill and
rectitude throughout the community. Ecosystem function should be trending toward
greater resilience and community demands on ecosystem services should be moving
toward a closer alignment with its capacity. Given that the pressures of global population
trends, and the increasing demands being placed on the resources at the coastal margins
of our continents, the earth's role as a provider of renewable and nonrenewable resources
is becoming strained (Table 8). This means that fewer resources must be spread further.
Trends, therefore, will reflect the value demands that will be rubbed raw in the years and
decades to come. As society takes steps to determine how the attainment of human
dignity will play out, the demands for wealth, knowledge, education, well-being, power,
rectitude, skill, and health will only grow. The sustainable management natural resources
will not be possible without the achievement of basic human rights for all (Clark 2002).
Trends in our ideal system should be determined and characterized factually,
based on reliable and verifiable knowledge. Knowledge plays a critical role in trend
analysis but needs to take a broader form than under traditional scientific management.
Traditional science is an important subset of knowledge and must play a critical role in
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determining trends and clarifying and attempting to expand the choices available to
policy makers (Pielke 2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Other kinds of knowledge
are important to making good policy, however. Local knowledge can materially assist
policy makers by providing context and place-based experience (Berkes, Colding et al.
2003; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
Table 8 Describing Trends
Traditional
"Best available science" mandates the
development of indicators by scientists
and academics to determine whether
ecological variables are reaching targets
established by government. Public input
into the development or relevance of
indicators limited. Data gathered by
scientists or academics.

Ecosystem-based Approach
The use of reliable methods to measure
whether a suite of socioecological
variables are moving closer to, not away
from, goals established with significant
input from community. Use of local
residents, NGOs, and community,
municipal, and regional participants to
gather trend data in collaboration with
scientists and academics.
Trend analysis performed by
Open and transparent communication of
scientists/academics and published mainly the progress and trend data to policy
makers and to an informed public through
through peer-reviewed literature and
frequent meetings, accessible media, and
professional/scientific conferences.
other techniques.
Trend data and analysis performed by
Significant opportunities for community
members and the public to be involved
scientific and/or academic community
with very little public input. Data may be with scientists in die assessment of trend
data using local knowledge and local
presented at public meetings or in
preferences. Public participation in the
newsletters, sometimes using "science
development of reports and presentations.
translators," but public not meaningfully
Public outreach used to educate public on
involved in report development or
educated to understand importance of data. the importance and significance of data in
advance of regular meetings in a variety of
forums.

Another form of knowledge has been called public preferences and involves
knowledge that is revealed through political behavior. It entails insights into the support
or opposition of individuals and groups in the community and the strength or intensity of
the public preferences (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Using local preferences can greatly
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assist policy makers who need to know how well past decisions and actions have
achieved the goals of the community, how well they have served the common interest,
what the perceived consequences (outcomes and effects) have been, and what groups,
institutions or segments of the community have benefitted as well as who has been
relegated to the background (Clark 2002).
Analyzing Conditions. Condition analysis is a task that encompasses the analysis
of the conditions that impacted or affected past events and decisions. For each trend
identified in a particular policy or natural resources problem and his socioeconomic
context, there are conditions both historical and current that influence those trends. It is
also an opportunity to determine how participants have performed against goals (Clark,
Willard et al. 2000). Once again knowledge, especially a collaborative scientific
approach encompassing a variety of disciplines, is necessary. Local knowledge also must
play an important role in the analysis of conditions (Becker 1993; Berkes and Folke
1998; Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002).
Buried within conditions analysis is the presumption by stakeholders and the
relevant community that there is an underlying ecological and socioeconomic equilibrium
that buttresses a status quo view of the current situation. Any analysis of conditions,
therefore, must pay particular attention to a search for factors that move a system toward
or away from that equilibrium. This includes social, institutional, and economic factors,
as well as problems in the natural ecosystem. The treatment of class may need to receive
careful attention as the upper classes in society have long enjoyed the most in terms of
values while lower classes the least. A broad understanding of the social, economic and
environmental factors should help explain individual and collective behavior - an
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explanation that lies within the social process, defined as humans pursuing values
through institutions using resources (Clark 2002). Indeed, thorough conditions analysis
needs to take into account the tension between democracy and capitalism in the
community and region. The root of this tension lies in the fact that democracy is based
on the ideal of political equality where every citizen has the same potential to influence
what government does - whether or not each citizen chooses to use the opportunity or
chooses to use their powers poorly. As "all are created equal," therefore, money should
not matter in this governance regime. Contrast this with capitalism and the marketplace,
where money matters a great deal. Markets often respond to preferences backed by
powerful financial interests. Thus the rich and poor, though equal politically, are seldom
equal in an economic sense. Conditions analysis can reveal where the contrasting features
of democracy and the free market come into play. All too routinely, economic markets
fail to produce "public goods" that are shared in common, like clean water, unpolluted
air, safe streets, and a system of justice. Similarly, corporate balance sheets seldom
account for negative externalities - the benefits, costs, or consequences that accrue to
those outside a market transaction (e.g. toxic waste disposal). Finally, other values can
get trampled by economic markets, including the fair treatment of workers, neighbors,
and even the fair distribution of wealth or economic rewards (Visser 2004).
In an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an iterative effort by
scientists and community members to determine the causes or other factors influencing
trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort out the
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Table 9 Conditions Analysis
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Conditions analysis is a function
of scientific and academic
communities with results
published in technical peer
reviewed publications and
infrequently shared with or
accessible by public.

Conditions analysis is iterative
with collaborative efforts by
scientists and community to gain
and share knowledge necessary
to determine the conditions that
are factors in any negative
trends.

Current iterations of democracy
and free markets can marginalize
the public well-being and
common interests by enabling
powerful financial interests to
the detriment of a fair
distribution of wealth, health,
education, and well-being.

Conditions analysis explores
more than ecosystem factors and
examines social and economic
factors in order to understand
whether economic or other
special interests are overriding
common interests and the public
good

various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any negative
ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem factors.
Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic activity.
Democracy, if waning, will be effectively unable to counter economic market pressures
%

and compel government and regulatory authorities to step in and correct environmental
abuses. Environmental and ecosystem measurements should be transparent and involve
the community in a significant manner. Education and outreach should be an integral
part of the ideal governance in order to keep citizens informed and aware of the
importance and context of conditions (Table 9).
Projecting Developments. This task is all about determining how likely it is that
the community will realize its goals. Policy decisions must look to the future, so past
trends and conditions must be projected forward. Problem solving here relies on the
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ability to estimate whether the important features of social context, conditions, and
problems will persist unchanged or in what manner they may change in the future given a
range of choices. If the future is unacceptable, action must be taken (Clark, Willard et al.
2000; Clark 2002).
Projecting developments depends upon reliable knowledge about trends and
conditions. Another factor creeps in here. History tells us that often policy makers are
knowledgeable about trends and conditions, yet are either unwilling to buck political
hazards or are blocked by special interest opposition (Clark 2002).
In our ideal system (Table 10), reliable knowledge will underpin the projection of
developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected developments appear to
take a community away from its goals, away from progress toward human dignity, and
toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be a system that will reward
those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers.
Table 10 Projecting Developments
Ecosystem-based Approach

Traditional
The task of projecting
developments and problem
solving is responsibility of
government and academic
institutions and policy makers
using best available science.

Through regular public
education and outreach, an
involved public collaborates
with academic institutions,
scientists, and policy makers to
understand reliable data and
project developments.

Policy makers and regulatory
authorities depend on reliable
knowledge about trends and
conditions, but may be unable to
project unpopular potential
developments because they are
either unwilling to buck political
hazards or are blocked by
special interest opposition.

With the input of
knowledgeable public, scientists
and policy makers can
acknowledge mistakes or policy
failures, learn from them, and
make adaptive changes, to
reverse negative trends without
fear of retribution from the
governance system.
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There also must be a way for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an
attempt to reverse negative trends without fear of retribution from a system more
concerned with wealth than long-term environmental viability.
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. In our ideal system, an integral
part of governance is that there is a learning approach that focuses on improving policy
and practice in the face of uncertainty. Governance and management strategies are
considered experiments. Learning in our ideal world is promoted through both structural
experimentation and management flexibility (Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Governance,
and the ability to invent, evaluate, and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and
Baskerville 1986; Francis and Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza,
Low et al. 2001; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Brunner
2010a; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices
and interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on
monitoring, evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of expert-driven planning
that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and error (Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005).
Thus alternative experimentation in our ideal system will employ social and
decision making processes that make use of inter alia of broad participation, rapid
feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate value trade-offs to
create a process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems (Table 11). No
particular set of practices or governance tools can regulate human impacts so as to
guarantee a resilient and productive ecosystem. All that we can do is attempt to design a
system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be generated over
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time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and continually adapt and
improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits (Francis 1993; Costanza,
Low et al. 2001; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007;
Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a). These characteristics are many and varied, and are
largely discussed in the next two sections involving the social and decision-making
portions of our ideal system.
Table 11 Inventing, Selecting and Evaluating Alternatives
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Existing governance is centered
on legislatively-mandated
jurisdictional sectors typically
concerned with one aspect of
the environment spectrum and
collaborative projection and
problem solving are typically
beyond the scope of fragmented
jurisdictional limits.

Government, policy makers, and an
informed public work together to
create, invent, evaluate, and select
alternatives in order to solve problems.
Agency jurisdictional lines do not
impede collaboration and focus is on
problem-solving. Policy choices are
treated as experiments and failures
provide a chance to leam and adapt.

Industry, governance, and
NGOs develop increasing
entanglements and strong vested
interests in maintaining the
status quo thus change is made
more difficult when there can be
a redistribution of wealth and
power away from existing
institutions.

Broad participation, rapid feedback,
reliable intelligence, transparent
promotion, and appropriate value
negotiation contribute to a process
capable of adaptation to cope with
multiple complex systems.

Social Process
Few would argue with the fact that humans are involved in ecosystem health and
resilience. Individual behavior expressed singly or through groups and institutions
defines how natural resources are used, misused, exploited, controlled, conserved or
restored. Social process gives us a way to map, often roughly, the interaction of people
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and institutions as they influence the actions, plans, or policies of others, even if there is
no awareness of the existence of one another:

The interaction of every individual and organized interest in society - in
other words, the social process - constitutes the context of every resource
problem, and neither the problems nor the decision-making processes
necessary to solve them can be understood unless their context is known
(Clark 2002, 32)
Thus this study attempts to map the basics of the social process participants and
factors at work in each of the case studies. In addition we need to be cognizant that every
participant in the use of resource services and every player with a potential say in the
governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem employs strategies in order
to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. Typically, as people seek to improve their
well-being by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off than if they had
acted otherwise, they are engaged in an interplay of human value trade-offs. Generally
no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective" scientists, no amount of
"education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic inherent value differences
or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this realization should not take away
from the fact that there are common interests and the need to attempt to clarify and secure
them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002).
In order to examine the social process components in our ideal system, we will
use the elements set forth by the policy sciences framework described in Chapter II as a
guide. We will, therefore, examine the social process of our ideal system by asking the
questions: Who should be participating? With what perspectives? In which situations?
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Using what strategies? With what outcomes? And with what effects (Clark, Willard et al.
2000; Clark 2002)?
Participants. In the traditional governance scenario, a key aspiration for
proponents of efficiency and scientific management is to use the latest scientific
knowledge and expert, disinterested personnel. As we have seen, the key participants in
traditional resource management are experts and scientists, with government relying upon
their divination and implementation of the best available science (Berkes, Colding et al.
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006) Further, pressure groups concerned
with single interests, i.e. navigation, fishing, irrigation, join with administrative agencies
in charge of individual programs as well as congressional committees to defeat any
attempt at an integrated approach. Conservation and environmental groups also join in
the policy process often belatedly and usually in a single-interest context (Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005) Courts are participants in traditional natural resource management
to resolve conflicts (Fiorino 2006). Thus top-down, command-oriented, fragmented
natural resource and environmental policy management are the rule in traditional
governance (Weber 2003).
In any ideal ecosystem management regime (Table 10) there must be an
expectation or at least the opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad
segment of the regulated population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et
al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is
required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999; Jackson 2005). Participation must be
open to almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Brunner,
Steelman et al. 2005). Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated
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fashion and allow softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville
1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen
involvement and partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public
information programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better
governance and enhanced accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem
management i.e. the ongoing, collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive
coalitions of the unalike (citizens, government regulators, small businesses,
environmentalists, commodity interests, and others) come together to resolve policy
problems affecting the environment, economy, and communities of a particular place
(Weber 2003) (See Table 12).
Table 12 Participants
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Governance relies chiefly on "impartial"
scientists and experts to determine the best
available science to address (or develop
plans) concerning natural resource use.
Pressure groups participate typically on
single issues of importance to their specific
values and strive to defeat integrated
approaches. Public informed, if at all,
through passive public information
programs.

Significant, meaningful public participation
is required. The expectation is for
significant meaningful participation and
input of a broad segment of the affected
population in decision making processes.
Participation must be open to almost any
person or group with a significant interest
in the issue. Active outreach to develop
citizen involvement and partnerships and
build "civic science" base

Top-down bureaucracies are the chief
means of enforcement of uniform rules and
regulations

Regulatory agencies must participate in
coordinated and integrated fashion and
allow softer local and regional input into
governance.

Perspectives. Since each participant in a policy process will have a different way
of viewing any policy issue it is important to try to understand the perspectives of
participants in order to help understand the differences and similarities in the quest to
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clarify and secure common interests. Perspectives are manifested through identity,
expectations and demands (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002).
Identity, frequently shaped by myth, is at the center of a participant's perspective.
"Conservationist" or "libertarian" are expressions of identity and overall can represent a
rather stubborn pattern of behavior which can be studied and anticipated when common
interests are sought. Parochialism, or a narrow, close-to-home outlook on the world, has
diminished a bit over time and now is basically seen as a barrier to the development of
cooperative solutions to problems. Parochialism may be contrasted with universalism,
which encompasses a broader, more encompassing view that takes into account the
experiences of all humanity (Clark 2002).
John Dryzek (2005) helped to shine some light on perspective in the context of
complex environmental issues when he developed and defined a series of discourses
which attempt to characterize the perspectives that people and organizations view the
environment. A discourse is essentially a shared way of looking at the world. It enables
those who prescribe to a particular discourse to convert information into a form
understandable to them. Each discourse has its own philosophy, and proponents share
assumptions, judgments and positions, creating their own version of reality after filtering
information through the filter of their discourse. A discourse may further be classified
with respect to its positions on economic growth and development (or industrialism), the
nature and manner of environmental problem solving, the motivation and identity of the
chief decision makers in the discourse, and the metaphors the discourse uses to convince
others of the correctness of their positions (Dryzek 1997). Dryzek labels the various
discourses. For example, the Promethean discourse views natural resources as
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inexhaustible. Those that adhere to this discourse believe that humans have the ability to
develop technology to solve any problem presented to them, including environmental
problems. In fisheries management issues, for instance, I would expect a Promethean to
believe that the ocean would supply an inexhaustible supply of fish for the world. Should
facts indicate otherwise, Prometheans might then offer that aquaculture could raise the
necessary fish while oceans systems recover to be fished another day (Dryzek 1997).
Another one of Dryzek's discourses pertinent to this study is Administrative
Rationalism, or as it has been called, the "Leave it to the Experts" discourse (Dryzek
1997, 75). This description is apt. Administrative rationalists believe that environmental
problems, and other societal ills and issues, should be left to experts: scientists,
experienced policy managers and others of a similar stature to manage. The repertoire of
administrative rationalism includes the professional resource-management bureaucracy
that makes decisions and implements "natural resource management" responsible for the
oversight, use and coordination of natural resources (Dryzek 1997,76). Natural resource
management does not take place in a vacuum in an administrative rationalism discourse,
and politics can worm its way into scientific or technical management, "especially the
influence of extractive industry," but administrative rationalism provides a public
justification for its positions regardless of the accuracy of the avowed justification
(Dryzek 1997, 77). Pollution control bureaucracies (generally media specific) are an
indicator of administrative rationalism.
In Dryzek's (2005) view, when classifying an entity as administrative rationalism
it is likely that there will be a government more concerned with rational management in
the service of a clearly defined public interest using the best available expertise than it is
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with democracy. Scientists and other experts will solve the problems. Thus technical
experts and managers have a greater say in government decisions than anyone else. The
motivation of the experts is generally assumed to be one of public interest.
As was discussed in chapter 2, administrative rationalism folds the scientific
management paradigm into a discourse or shared way of looking at the world: Scientists
and experts from many different fields working to solve a problem for the benefit of the
ecosystem and those who rely upon its products and services. Dryzak (1997) notes that
the only thing that spoils ecosystem management by experts is politics. Politicians, to an
administrative rationalist, are not to be trusted with issues on an ecosystem scale, for
politicians have a short term horizon (the next election), lack the patience to learn, and do
not have the willingness to tolerate failure for the sake of learning (what we would call
adaptive management) (Dryzek 1997).
While administrative rationalism parallels the model of scientific administration
by marginalizing public input and delegating decisions concerning ecosystem issues and
conflicts to experts, bureaucracy, and scientists, Dryzek (1997) suggests another
discourse that more closely resembles our general understanding of a more holistic,
ecosystem-based perspective to governance.
Democratic pragmatism, or "Leave it to the People," is a discourse that is
. .characterized in terms of interactive problem solving within the basic institutional
structure of liberal capitalist democracy" (Dryzek 1997,99). The term "democratic" is
used in the title of the discourse to refer to a way of approaching problems in a broadbased problem-solving manner. "Pragmatism" has two intended connotations. The first
signifies a practical view of the world. The second refers to the pragmatist philosophies
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of William James, John Dewey and others who believed that solving complex problems
in an uncertain world required a rational approach; more specifically, problem solving in
life as in science - through experimentation.
Thus democratic pragmatism, like our ideal ecosystem-based approach to
governance, relies upon expanded use of local knowledge since knowledge that is
centralized in the hands of any individual or centralized administrative structure is
typically incapable of solving environmental problems with significant complexity.
Problem solving therefore becomes a flexible process involving a broad array of
participants and cooperation across a variety of perspectives, creating an

. .essential

congruence between the demands of rationality in social problem solving and democratic
values" (Dryzek 1997,100).
The discourses described by Dryzek (2005) represent more than an intellectual
exercise. They represent positions, beliefs, and actions that help define and delineate the
views that people hold that are pertinent to the manner in which policy decisions
impacting human activities that affect the environment are made. The discourses also
provide a list of possible indicators that help us to understand whether an existing
governance system is moving toward democratic pragmatism, or an ecosystem-based
approach to governance, or whether indicators are telling us that we are stuck in the
traditional scientific management paradigm represented by the administrative rationalism
discourse.
In sum, the traditional paradigm, that we can somehow continue to optimize
components of a system in isolation of the rest of the system, is proving inadequate to
deal with the real world's dynamic complexity. The more those elements of an
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ecosystem are optimized for some specific goal, the more that resilience is diminished.
Thus the drive for efficiency, or business as usual, effectively makes the total system
more vulnerable to shocks and disturbances (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Walker and
Salt 2006). Reliance on the remnants of scientific management results in reliance upon
science, or even the "best available science." The traditional quest for scientific
justification is emblematic of perspectives that are driven by opposing views that proffer
tailored "science" that support their policy views (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino
2006). The role of science is viewed as the provider of data needed for litigation
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995).
Perspectives under an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance requires a
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common
interests (Brunner 2002). One common interest in ecosystem-based governance is to
enable management to focus on the natural processes necessary to sustain ecosystem
structure and function while recognizing the need for human and institutional
involvement at every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). The common
interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh parochial
interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. In addition,
the perspective necessary for ecosystem-based governance should be more universal and
open to new ideas and experimental approaches rather than parochial and institutionally
resistant to innovation. Problem solving should be viewed as a flexible process with
broad participation and a variety of perspectives and should be cognizant that
environmental, social, and economic systems are related with problems that overlap and
need to be approached with a concern for human dignity and a respect for democratic
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values (Dryzek 1997). Finally, perspective involves more than governance but extends to
the expectations and demands of people (See Table 13). In an ideal world, citizens would
have the knowledge necessary to adopt collective, community-oriented values instead of
the selfish materialism of consumer values (Dryzek 1997; Clark 2002).
Table 13 Perspectives
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Traditional perspective loses sight of the
common interest as politics and policy
have evolved to favor the special or single
interests over the common good.

Perspective requires a governance structure
that looks to find common ground on
policies that advance common interests. In
addition, the perspective necessary for
ecosystem-based governance should be
more universal and open to new ideas and
experimental approaches rather than
parochial and institutionally resistant to
innovation.
Problem solving should be viewed as a
flexible process with broad participation
and a variety of perspectives and should be
cognizant that environmental, social, and
economic systems are related with
problems that overlap and need to be
approached with a concern for human
dignity and a respect for democratic
access.
Common interest in ecosystem-based
governance is to enable management to
focus on the natural processes necessary to
sustain ecosystem structure and function
while recognizing the need for human and
institutional involvement at every level of
the ecosystem. The common interest of
maintaining and supporting ecosystem
integrity should outweigh parochial
interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or
command and control hierarchy.

Scientists and other experts will solve the
problems. Technical experts and
managers have a greater say in
government decisions than anyone else.

Legislative and regulatory perspective
promotes policies and enforces rules
dedicated to the controlled exploitation of
natural resource sectors and components
for human consumption or use even at the
risk of permanent harm to the natural
processes of the ecosystem that produce
the desired resources.

Situations. Inquiry into this task helps to tell us about the situations in which
participants - armed with their perspectives - make value demands on each other which
affect ecosystem functions and services. Participants in an ecosystem governance
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process may interact in formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly
or only during crises. Thus the examination of the situations in which participants
interact may temper elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may
also have spatial issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the
participants. There may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is
centralized or decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or
decreasing. Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize
participants to alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve
the crises (Clark 2002).
In terms of actions between government and stakeholders or participants,
traditionally participants interact in situations where there is an adversary relationship government acting to stop or limit economic or social activity because of environmental
issues (Fiorino 2006). As we have seen, crisis in the form of collapse or surprise is
generally the driving force behind interaction. Traditionally, success controlling an
ecological variable that normally fluctuates leads to reduced resilience. Surprise is the
result. Crisis, conflict and gridlock emerge when:

• There is a single target and piecemeal policy
•

A single scale of focus, typically short term and local

• No realization that all policies are experimental
• Rigid management with no priority to design interventions as ways
to test cause and effect assumptions
• Pathology increases when reaction to conflict is to demand more
data or more precision in data along with more certainty and more
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control of information and individuals (Gunderson, Holling et al.
1995).
In an ideal system, on the other hand, government acts less on other actors and
more with other actors in a collaborative and communicative way to understand and
address problems. There is more frequent, collaborative contact. Thus government
would require less of the state exerting control over others in society and more of an
interaction among them (Fiorino 2006). Decision-making and other collaborative
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply single-play problem-solving efforts
(Weber 2003).
The pathology of the status quo is broken when the issue is seen as a strategic one
of adaptive policy management, of science at appropriate scales, and of understanding
human behavior, not a procedural one of institutional control. It requires:

• Integrated policies, not piecemeal
• Flexible, adaptive policies, not rigid, locked in ones
• Planning and management for learning, not simply for economic or
social product
• Monitoring designed as a part of active interventions to achieve
understanding and to identify remedial response, not monitoring
for the sake of monitoring or purely for enforcement purposes
• Investments in "eclectic" science, or science on a broad-range of
topics, not just focused, controlled science
• Citizen involvement and partnership, not public information
programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995).
In our ideal system, the situations in which participants would interact would in
order to avoid collapse, surprise, or gridlock, might have the following characteristics in
common:
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• Frequent collaborative interaction between government and more
local resource users and the general public.
• Interactions between government and participants at local and
regional levels.
• Situations should be informal and formal, with agencies willing to
be used as resources for local involvement (Table 14).
Table 14 Situations
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Interactions typically occur in
adversarial situations when government
acts to stop or limit economic or social
activity because of environmental
issues. Inspections, citations,
enforcement and litigation typify the
contentious situations.

Collaboration, communication and
cooperation between government,
stakeholders, and the public allow for
governance that works more with
participants than on them. This means
more frequent collaborative interaction
between government and participants at
all levels. Further, agencies need to be
less geared toward enforcement and
more willing to be used as resources for
local involvement and for solving
problems where they arise.

Other interactions limited to situations
called for by legislation or regulation
that requires public hearings in order to
passively inform the public and/or
solicit public comments on plans that
have largely been drafted by or left to
the discretion of government scientists
and experts.

Decision-making and other
collaborative processes are iterative and
ongoing, not simply single-play
problem-solving efforts. The need for
passive formal public and adversarial
public hearings can be reduced through
citizen involvement and partnership, not
just public information programs to
inform passively.

Base Values. The concept of values is key to an understanding of how people
interact. Values are the medium of exchange which people strive to gain while they use
values or expend assets to gain them. Thus interactions between people, institutions,
agencies, and others involve the gain and loss of values. It is this interpersonal and/or
transactional tug-of-war of values that anyone interested in solving policy problems need
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to take into account (Brewer and deLeon 1983; deLeon 1988; Clark 2008). Indeed
environmental policy disputes are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact
that they are often masked in economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve
around technical issues (Layzer 2006).
What assets or resources do participants use in their efforts to achieve their goals?
What do they bring to the table? All values, including authority, can be used as bases of
power. What assets or resources should participants use to achieve their goals? The
Policy Sciences Framework suggests these include:
Power is to make and carry out decisions
Enlightenment is to have knowledge
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological
Skill is to have special abilities.
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships
Respect is to show and receive deference
Rectitude is to have ethical standards
Choices on ecosystem uses and stresses will turn on values. Whose values? The
answer is probably very different depending upon whether one is looking at the current
governance regime vs. our ideal system.
Traditional regulation was frequently based on a zero sum mentality - i.e. that the
interests of private economic interests in the business community inevitably conflict with
the broader economic interests of society. Business firms are often viewed as "amoral
calculators" with a commitment to economic gain above all over values. Thus the old
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approach was that regulation had to use a blunt hand consisting of legalistic and
deterrence-based regulation in order to effectively change industry behavior (Fiorino

2006).
The behavior of US federal and state agencies is often strongly influenced by
industrial interests and a desire to minimize or avoid loss of values such as power, wealth
(i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions involving potential adverse effects on important
industries (e.g. fishing in New England), agency value losses include decreased budget
allocations from unsympathetic legislatures so the costs of making decisions that
adversely affect various industries are often perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely
on the support of elected officials and support is often tied to the satisfaction of those
officials with the agency's contributions to or lack of interference with local or regional
gains. Backlash against strong conservation methods that may impact economic
productivity can be severe even at a local level (Wallace 2003). As Wallace (2003)
found when he reviewed the efficacy of efforts to preserve marine mammals under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act in the United States (MMPA 1972), values have a strong
impact on interrelated social factors impeding the cultures of participating organizations
from adopting measures that would protect marine mammals in a meaningful fashion:
The role of values in the behavior and interactions of program participants,
the quality of agency leadership, and communication skills and strategies
influence decision-making in every stage of the policy process. Even
where biophysical data strongly influence decision-making, the case
studies indicate that leadership, communication strategies, and values had
a profound effect on decision-making (Wallace 2003,112).
In contrast to the traditional model of resource management which reduces
agency and institutional (public institutions and private business interests) behavior into a
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constant quest for power and wealth as capital for the purchase of other values, the policy
sciences approach has consistently been focused on the intelligence relevant to an
integration of values derived from interpersonal relations which prizes not the glory of a
depersonalized state or the efficiency of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the
realization of human capacities" (deLeon 1988,37 - 38) Thus in an ideal society:

...citizens enjoy a full range of values, a state that has also been called 'a
commonwealth of human dignity.' A healthy society is possible only
when citizens enjoy a level of all eight values satisfactory to their needs
(Clark 2008,45).
In order to begin to achieve the kind of society described above, governance must
move away from its administrative rationalist underpinnings. Speaking broadly, the
values of power and wealth should be utilized to press demands for common interests of
human dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience (Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson
2002a; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Knowledge (enlightenment) should be a goal that,
as we have seen, is ideally gained from a variety of sources through a process of trial and
error as much as through traditional experimental science (Brunner and Steelman 2005).
The bottom line is that we need to move beyond the traditional approach that values
power and wealth as interrelated ends in themselves:
Rosa Parks' refusal to move to the back of the Birmingham bus released
the flood gates of the civil rights movement, not because she was
powerful, but because her act symbolized and tapped the deprivation of
respect felt by millions of others like her. Many other sympathetic values
were certainly involved, and later decisions sought to allocate them more
equitably than before. Power and wealth were not sought as ends nearly
so much as they were used as means to acquire access to other values:
respect (non-discrimination in jobs and housing), skill (job training and
educational opportunities), well-being (nutrition and health programs), and
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rectitude (realization of long-denied constitutional guarantees and simple
recognition as fellow human beings) (Brewer and deLeon 1983,16).
While transitioning to a broader and more collaborative governance process is
different from the genesis of the civil rights movement, there are similarities given how
society must adjust the priorities of our personal and institutional values. The
characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance demand a heavy reliance on
significant public participation, collaboration, resilience, and learning through trial and
error. The values necessary for the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach
must move away from the traditional goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves.
In order for implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a
chance there needs to be much more emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain
stronger inputs from the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trialand-error approach to management solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment
to the gathering and sharing of knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge
failures without the fear that funding will be lost. In addition, collaboration and
significant public participation will require a focus on the values of respect, affection,
rectitude and well-being. There is simply no way to gain the trust, credibility, and respect
necessary for problem-solving and planning collaboration and public and broad-based
community support without a shift more in the direction of these important values.
Thus our ideal system (Table 15) must be characterized by resource sharing and
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to
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identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and
restore ecosystem resilience.
Table 15 Base Values
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Traditional approach values power
and wealth as interrelated ends in
themselves.

The values of power and wealth
should be utilized to press demands
for common interests prioritizing
human dignity, ecosystem integrity
and resilience. Knowledge
(enlightenment) should be a goal that
is ideally gained from a variety of
sources through a process of trial and
error as much as through traditional
experimental science.

Agency and institutional (public
institutions and private business
interests) behavior is essentially a
constant quest for power and wealth
as capital for the purchase of other
values or die preservation of existing
power and wealth, e.g. Agency turf
or budget, private corporate profits,
non-profit organizations donations
and prestige. Other values are too
often secondary.

In order for implementation of an
ecosystem-based approach to
governance to have a chance there
needs to be much more emphasis on
utilizing power and wealth to obtain
stronger inputs from die values of
knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and
respect

Strategies. There are various strategies that people and institutions may employ
in order to pursue their values. The four basic strategies that will be included in this
study are:
•

Diplomatic strategies which use communication among and between the
leaders of any group or agency to foster collaborative opportunities to
problem solving which engage the multiple interests concerned;
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•

Ideological strategies that involve communications to a public that is
wider than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks,
newspaper and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda;

•

Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and

•

Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for
binding resolution by a third party7 (e.g. lawsuits and other legal action;
mediated or negotiated proceedings, etc.).

In the traditional governance scheme, strategies typically are built upon a
regulatory format and therefore rely upon regulation using economic or social
intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this intervention fails,
litigation provides the remedy (Fiorino 2006). Thus status quo strategies use litigation as
a principle weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004; Walker
and Salt 2006). Indeed it has been noted that the United States more often relies on
lawyers, legal threats, and legal maneuvering in implementing public policies and
attempting to hold governmental officials accountable, not to mention other civil and
criminal proceedings (Buhi and Feng 2009).

7 Most of the Policy Sciences literature sets forth four strategies, to wit: diplomatic, idealogical, economic,
and military deLeon, P. (1988). Advice and Consent: The Development of the Policy Sciences. New York,
Russel Sage Foundation, Clark, T. W., A. R. Willard, et al., Eds. (2000). Foundations of Natural Resources
Policy and Management. New Haven, Yale University Press, Clark, T. W. (2002). The Policy Process: A
Practical Guide for Natural Resource Professionals. New Haven, Yale University Press.. As the military
option is not typically a realistic strategy in the negotiation and resolution of environmental issues, I have
eliminated military as a strategy option and added litigation which, in my experience, is a strategy of last
resort employed relatively often in environmental disputes.
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From the time of the nation's formation commentators like Alexis de Toqueville
(2005) couldn't help but note that the American governance scheme

. .entrusted huge

political power to their courts..(Gross and Dodge 2005,120). A strong, death-grip
like reliance upon lawyers, judges, and the rule of law most likely stems from two
different and powerful elements: "first, a political culture (or set of political attitudes)
that expects and demands comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm,
injustice, and environmental dangers - and hence a powerful, activist government - and,
second, a set of governmental structures that reflect mistrust of concentrated power and
hence that limit and fragment political and governmental authority" [emphasis original]
(Buhi and Feng 2009,15).
America's obsession with litigation as a first-line strategy, however, does not
stem from any unique genetic or social/culture predisposition to "litigiousness:"
Rather, American adversarial legalism arises from political traditions and
legal arrangements that provide incentives to resort to adversarial legal
weapons. Such weapons are used far less frequently in parliamentary
democracies with different institutional mechanisms for addressing social
problems. Put another way, American adversarial legalism arises from the
relative absence of institutions that effectively channel contending parties
and groups into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving
disputes, ensuring accountability, regulating business, and compensating
victims of injury or economic misfortune [emphasis original] (Buhi and
Feng 2009, 34).
It would appear, therefore, that the general proclivity for Americans to use
adversarial confrontation or litigation as a strategy for redressing perceived wrongs and
for stopping or stalling regulatory efforts to implement, or not, environmental limitations
or regulations (Rosenbaum 2008), does not have to be the primary strategy. Different
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approaches and some institutional change, including greater use of mediation, facilitation
and other alternative dispute mechanisms can be developed and mandated.
An ecosystem-based approach, therefore, would requires movement away from
regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point sources and
problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms mandating change in
existing technologies or behavior (Table 14). Instead there should be a movement toward
cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes and raw materials,
sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other social and economic
goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies. Certainly there will always be a need
for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the state in order to keep firms in line and
not give unfair competitive advantage to environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison
1995). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with
the regulated public to a greater degree. This might mean that technical violations that
cause no harm and are no threat can be overlooked. It might also mean that plants or
industries with excellent environmental histories receive less attention than those with a
history of problems. These decisions, of course, would need to be made by field
inspectors and front line regulators that are well-trained and capable of exercising the
discretion necessary to implement a more flexible regulatory approach.
The presence of a bridging organization that connects and navigates the interests
of different stakeholders as well as across organizational levels should also be integral
part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. Bridging organizations have
become increasingly necessary as realization grows that conventional science is no longer
adequate to deal with the nonlinearity and complexities inherent in the management of
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activities that impact the environment (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Reid, Berkes et al.
2006). The Quincy Library Group, Henry's Fork, and the Applegate Partnerships,
discussed elsewhere, are examples of the creation of multiple interest bridging
organizations created to fill contentious management gaps existing in traditional
management laws and practices (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006;
Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007; Armitage and Plummer 2010; Brunner 2010a).
Farther to the north, a diverse group of interested parties came together to form the Arctic
Borderlands Ecological Knowledge Co-op in order to buttress traditional science with
local knowledge and to monitor and assess ecosystem changes in the traditional range of
the Porcupine Caribou herd - a range that transcends the political border between the
Canadian Yukon Territories and the U.S. state of Alaska (Artic_Borderlands 2012). The
bottom line is that it is increasingly evident that knowledge is contextual and that there
has been space created for considering other systems of knowledge in scientific
assessments, including political inputs, values, worldviews, and other options that need to
be recognized, negotiated and resolved (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006).
Such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and innovation. The collaboration that bridging
organizations initiate is strategic,; conditional on the goals to enhance the values from the
ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008).

In the final analysis (Table 16), strategies in an ecosystem-based approach should
be more goal-oriented and should have institutions and processes that enable and
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incentivize more diplomatic and ideological strategies and discourage the use of more
adversarial and/or litigious strategies.
Table 16 Strategies
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Strategies typically are built upon a regulatory
format and therefore rely upon bureaucratic
regulation and enforcement using economic or
social/punitive intervention to force
compliance with uniform rules.

Strategies are more directed toward
ideological and diplomatic practices. An
ecosystem-based approach would rely more
on ideological and diplomatic strategies,
moving away from regulatory enforcement
efforts geared toward targeted interventions at
point sources and problem areas which take
the form of commands to different classes of
firms mandating change in existing
technologies or behavior. Instead there would
be cooperation and collaboration in decisions
about processes and raw materials,
sustainability planning integrating
environmental goals with other social and
economic goals.
Litigation will play a role as there is a need for
basic rules to be backed by the coercive power
of the state in order to keep firms in line and
not give unfair competitive advantage to
environmentally noncompliant firms.
Litigation would, however, rely more upon
alternative dispute mechanisms, including
facilitation and mediation.
The existence of a bridging organization that
connects and navigates the interests of
different stakeholders across organizational
levels should be integral part of adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems.
Such organizations provide social incentives
by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and
innovation. The collaboration that bridging
organizations initiate is strategic; conditional
on the goals to enhance the values from the
ecosystems

Thus status quo strategies use litigation or the
threat of litigation as die principle weapon in
the management arsenal

Citations and enforcement are fragmented
under an array of bureaucracies at various
levels (local, state, provincial, and federal).
Compliance can be confusing and costly and
may not be consistent with overall goals.

Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes
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may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and
implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to
innovation and/or sustained attention to the situation of concern.
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public. If analysis of the
values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is being
accumulated by fewer entities, which would reflect a negative trend to those who seek to
move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance. If, on the
other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and structures
that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local knowledge,
and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes are headed in
a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance.
Thus in our ideal system (Table 17) we would simply be looking for progress on
the goals of the participants. Indicators of progress might include continuous or routine
conversation and sharing of intelligence through a process that can determine progress on
goals. In addition, there should be a movement toward structures and processes that
provide more accountability to the public and stakeholders. Another positive indicator
would be signs that regulatory activities reveal that institutions are more collaborative,
cooperative, and integrated as opposed to adversarial and litigious. Institutions and
governance should show signs of being able to innovate and learn from their experiences
with successes being scaled up to other regions and contexts.
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Table 17 Outcomes
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

If analysis reveals that more power
and wealth is being accumulated by
fewer entities it would reflect a
negative trend to those who seek to
move in the direction of a more
ecosystem-based approach to
governance.

Indicators of progress include
continuous or routine conversation
and sharing of intelligence through a
process that can determine progress
on goals. Progress also indicated by
a movement toward structures and
processes that provide more
accountability to the public and
stakeholders. Another positive
indicator would be signs that
regulatory activities are more
collaborative, cooperative, and
integrated as opposed to adversarial
and litigious.

Stubborn adherence to uniform topdown bureaucratic regulation with
continued adversarial strategies
would be indicative of a lack of
progress of transition toward
ecosystem-based governance.

Institutions and governance should
show signs of being able to innovate
and learn from their experiences
with successes being scaled up to
other regions and contexts.

Effects. Effects represent true change. They are the long-term outcomes in terms
of values, processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002). The characteristics of
ecosystem-based approaches to governance are set forth earlier in this chapter and
provide us with a shopping list of goals at which to aim. Outcomes would be changes in
governance that help to develop and implement those characteristics.
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative
measures that would transforming current governance entities and create new or modified
value institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and national standards. Indicators
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of effects that would evidence a change for the better in terms of a broader, more
accountable and adaptable ecosystem-based approach we expect to effects that would
foster greater respect and cooperation between regulators and regulated public and
increased knowledge among public to understand that their actions impact the
environment. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of
public and community input and decision-making (Table 18).
Table 18 Effects
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Continuation of status quo
governance with no or
insignificant change. Existing
institutions preserve values of
power and wealth and there is
continuation of failed policies and
processes of the past - although
sometimes under new names.

Transition toward a more adaptive
ecosystem-based approach to
governance. Innovative measures
are tried that transform current
governance entities and create
new or modified value institutions
that get beyond scientific
management and strict command
and control hierarchy of
bureaucracy using local input and
collaborative processes

The social process, and more specifically the outcomes and effects analyzed
within the social function, are necessarily dependent upon the problem orientation and
decision process functions. An examination of the effects element of the framework
assures that we do not neglect to look at the overall changes and cumulative impacts of
many changes implemented on a number of scales. With that acknowledgement of the
need to assess the larger picture, we can now turn to an examination of the decision
process and the characteristics that might be grounded therein in order to effectively
create much-needed change and innovation designed to improve existing governance.
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Decision Process

It bears repeating at this juncture that the purpose of this dissertation research is to
examine the governance processes in place in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region to
determine whether existing governance has the capacity adopt a more ecosystem-based
approach to the management of the human activities that impact the ecosystem. This
chapter has reviewed the literature that provides a compelling basis for the conclusion
that our current scientific management approaches are unable to effectively contain many
of the forces that are leading to an overall degradation of the ecosystem. The comparison
of the social process and problem orientation functions under traditional vs. ecosystembased governance in the above analysis shows us that newer governance trends require
the significant involvement of an educated public in governance structures that rely less
on the institutional top-down enforcement of regulatory laws and more on softer and
more local community efforts involving the collaboration of a broad spectrum of affected
parties and other participants.
The problem orientation and social processes of the current management
processes have been reviewed using the framework provided by the policy sciences See
Chapter II). In addition the framework has been used to present governance process and
content alternatives in terms of the problem orientation and the social processes that
society should be moving toward. In this manner a new governance regime is being
proposed component-by-component. We now turn our attention to the Decision Process.
No meaningful progress can be made toward environmental sustainability may
occur without an active and fully engaged public able to utilize a responsive, attentive
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governance system. "...[Wjhether society can move toward ecological sustainability will
depend on the health of our governance process" (Cortner and Moote 1999, xi) Thus
notions of human dignity and a fair distribution of values are integral to the ability and
willingness of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to clarify
and secure common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to healthy,
functional, and resilient systems that are able to sustainably supply the ecosystem
services upon which humans depend for their continued survival.
Natural resource policy and management are mostly often thought of as a process
of decision making. An examination of the decision process practiced in a given
ecosystem governance regime requires mapping the six interlinked functions of
intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation8, termination, and appraisal. This
systematic analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration plans
to fail. Knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work, participants can
maintain good practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision process can be a
way of reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies
through politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies
that reflect their particular, or "special", interests. In many cases, however, as in
sustainability management, people must reconcile interest differences to clarify and
secure their common interests. Investigation should reveal who establishes what the
common interests are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can
8

The policy sciences analytical framework generally includes an examination of seven interlinked
functions. For purposes of this study, I have combined the functions of invocation and application into one
function: implementation. In this manner enforcement and adjudicatory functions may be analyzed
together in a more meaningful and less redundant manner. This has been done in the examination of other
environmental conflicts using the analytical framework. See, e.g. Clark, S. G. (2008). Ensuring Greater
Yellowstone's Future. New Haven, Yale University Press.
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be determined that might indicate whether intelligence (see below) data is reliable and
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive
fashion. Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open
and transparent, not slanted toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of
ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that might indicate whether
intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem,
whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a meaningful
manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision makers to react
to intelligence in an adaptive fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal
of existing policies that will permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs.
Note that ecosystem-based governance requires a decision process that is open and
transparent, not slanted toward special interests and power (Clark 2002).
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process.
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists as
well as local knowledge. It may also come in the form of public preferences, i.e. beliefs
and priorities that give clues to the support of or opposition to given choices or outcomes
and the intensity of those positions. In other words, what groups are for or against a
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proposed policy and how much power do they have to influence the outcome (Ascher,
Steelman et al. 2010).
Earlier in this chapter there was discussion centered on the idea that our current
status quo of limiting the process of gathering of intelligence largely to scientists and
other experts who then confine transmission of research and data to members of their
own discipline needs some improvement. Knowledge disseminated through peer-review
processes may help to ensure some measure of reliability and assurance of rigor, but there
are also distributional consequences that have the effect of screening out knowledge that
policymakers should take into account (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
As opposed to the traditional way of dealing with the gathering, transmission, and
processing of intelligence, new more participatory and transparent approaches may be
more effective in making a difference and improving our environmental practices.
Intelligence, for instance, should be comprehensive and gathered at appropriate scales in
order to detect trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971;
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Intelligence
and information must then be made available to researchers, scientists and the public. In
order for the public to be interested and be able to understand the data and other
intelligence, significant public outreach and capacity building is required (Becker 1993)
Social capacity is also characterized in terms of capital, especially social capital (trust,
skills in collaboration, and conflict resolution), human capital (advancement in different
knowledge systems), and cultural capital (beliefs about how people, nature, and society
are related) (Fiorino 2006). Bridging organizations help bring these out, as well as help
to foster collaboration between social capacity and institutional capacity (Hahn, Schultz
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et al. 2008). Local groups able to inventory and sample the natural resources with results
communicated to a variety of actors, including the general public, using a wide range of
methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we have now that collects and
transfers knowledge only amongst a select group of peer review journal aficionados.
Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the guidance of a blend of scientific
and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the basis for feedback loops required
for the holistic and sustainable management of complex systems (Walker and Salt 2006).
Monitoring systems designed to detect the responses of both natural and social systems to
intervention are critical elements of such an intelligence system.
Broader public and community involvement in the gathering and transmission of
data is no longer a novel idea. There are numerous examples of collaborative groups of
scientists, government agency representatives, stakeholders and the public joining forces
to develop indicators, monitor conditions, and assess trends. In the McKenzie River
watershed straddling northern Alaska and the Yukon, the Arctic Borderlands Ecological
Knowledge Co-op, comprised of government scientists, local resource users (hunters and
fishers), state and territorial government representatives, and open to participation to
anyone who wishes to maintain and improve the program, has been operating since 1996.
It began when a rift developed between government scientists and community
representatives concerning the accuracy and value of different types of information. In
the past, the same situation would be handled at meetings run by government
representatives respectfully acknowledging the differences and then proceeding to
strengthen the science-based approach. At a meeting in the mid-1990's the community
decided to tackle the issue and developed a monitoring plan that sought to improve the
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collective understanding of conditions and trends by using local observations, traditional
ecological knowledge, science-based research and monitoring, as well as government
records. The 1996 meeting morphed into an annual gathering with members reporting on
a list of some seventy indicators. Led, but not owned, by Environment Canada, residents
and scientists meet to trade information and discuss trends and conditions and make
decisions by consensus on the Co-op's plans (Reid, Berkes et al. 2006).
Similarly, residents of the Applegate Valley watershed in southern Oregon lived
in crisis mode for most of the 1980s due to the polarization and conflict between loggers
and conservationists as a result of the spotted owl controversy. In the early 1990s,
however, two unlikely collaborators in the form of a life-long logger and a staunch
environmentalist began talking to one another. Their discussions planted the seed for
what ultimately became known as the Applegate Partnership. This community-based
partnership was comprised of representatives from industry, conservation groups, natural
resource agencies, and residents whose goal was to move away from the frustrating "my
opinion against yours; my expert against yours; my laws against your guidelines"
dynamic that had marked historic interactions. The partnership was able to rid
themselves of the "us" versus "them" mentality. Goals and a mission statement
developed with the assistance and input of the public drive the partnership. Local
knowledge is critically important. The partnership elected a board of directors whose
nominations were based not on affiliations but on their desire to work toward solutions
and put ecosystem health in front of private agendas. Their decisions and deliberations
involve significant public participation, formal and informal transparency, and
successfully focus on creating trust and working together to solve to solve problems and
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ease conflict (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000,140 - 141). Admittedly the ultimate
decisions on timber sales and fire suppression methods remain within the mandate of
national and state laws and agencies, but the information and input from the Applegate
Partnership has provided creative new ideas and methods of implementation that have
provided traditional management with effective "outside the box...prescriptions" and
have produced better information that "increases the legitimacy of agency decision
making" (Weber 2003,115).
Many more examples exist of community partnerships that have resulted in
effective and accountable governance and management with shared research and fact
finding as a pivotal element in their success. In central Michigan public monitoring is
critical to efforts to save the Kirtland Warbler populations. The Eel River Delta
Sustainable Agriculture Committee in Humboldt County, California, receives funding
from state and federal agencies to test water quality throughout the delta in order to
determine the impacts of land use to the water quality in the region. The bottom line is
that by using the public and stakeholders to assist with the gathering and sharing of
information, uncertainty is reduced and personal relationships among participants are
strengthened while trust is created (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).
In sum, in an ideal system that uses an ecosystem-based approach to governance,
there are common elements that we would expect to find in terms of the use of
knowledge and the gathering of data and information relevant to ecosystem and
socioeconomic conditions (Table 19). In the first place we would expect to find that
intelligence relevant to the goals of the community is being collected for all relevant
components of the ecosystem and from all affected people regardless of political borders.
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Intelligence must come from a broad array of participants that includes information from
scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the public at large. Intelligence must then
be communicated to appropriate institutions for analysis and coordinated action. There is
reliable monitoring and intelligence matched in scale to the multiple scales of the
ecosystem. Intelligence is communicated to an accountable entity, i.e. a person,
partnership, or other entity that has an obligation or responsibility to an authority, group,
standard, mandate or behavior norm external to that person or entity (Weber 2003).
Finally there should be overlapping governance structures that enhance the resilience of
social shocks and adds to the resilience of adaptive governance (Berkes, Colding et al.
2003; Gunderson 2003; Walker, Gunderson et al. 2006)
Table 19 Intelligence
Traditional
Intelligence function, including selection
of data to be collected, data collection,
monitoring, and analysis is the
responsibility of experts and scientists
within various government agencies with
fragmented jurisdictions.

Information is kept within agency or
department that collected and analyzed the
data or information and access may be
provided through data base or publication.
No bridging organization exists to view the
"big picture" and detect adverse trends or
make policy changes as a result of trend
data.

Information and analysis largely
communicated through publication in peerreview publications. Public and
community have limited access to
information and data. Public generally
uninformed unless or until there is a crisis
or "surprise."

Ecosystem-based Approach
System is facilitated by identification of
intelligence needs and enabled by
cooperative agreements among relevant
entities to assure reliability, compatibility,
timely analysis and accessibility.
Intelligence must come from a broad array
of participants that includes scientists,
academics, the regulated public, and the
public at large.
Intelligence must be communicated to an
accountable entity for analysis and
coordinated action, i.e. a person,
partnership, or other entity that has an
obligation or responsibility to an authority,
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm
external to that person or entity.
Intelligence and information must be made
readily available to researchers, scientists
and the public.
In order for the public to be interested and
be able to understand the data and other
intelligence, significant public outreach and
capacity building is required.
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Promotion. The gathering of intelligence utilizing a broad spectrum of
participating entities collaborating at a variety of scales within an ecosystem is vitally
important. But what should happen to that information? How should it be used and by
whom in order to decide upon the policy options that will best be able to achieve the
goals of the community?
Promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the function of recommending
and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves to define and even limit the
possible solutions to a problem. Thus promotion involves the development and analysis
of alternatives as well as the subsequent efforts to win support and enthusiasm for
collective action necessary in most cases to achieve needed change. Promotion
necessarily includes political parties, lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful
organizations of all types (including business and environmental groups) working to
shape and share values (Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While confusing and often frustrating,
democratic promotional outcomes that add "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a
value demand", are nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing
promotion exclusively in the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate
(Lasswell and MacDougal 1992,29).
It is difficult to get around the reality that promotion, or the generation,
transmission, and use of knowledge, not only comprise a technical process that creates
and compiles scientific and local knowledge, but also a political process. Politics is part
of the deal and can be a process that establishes goals to be implemented by policy.
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Certainly there is a significant concern that special interest or selfish politics
intrudes on the policy process with disappointing regularity. Healthy politics, however,
that includes "policy relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive public
involvement, and conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common
interest in knowledge generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher,
Steelman et al. 2010, 8). There should be open, honest debate about what to do. Further,
the decision process provides" a means of reconciling (or at least managing) conflict
through politics in order to find a working specification of a community's common
interests" (Clark 2002, 57).
Promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance differs markedly
from the traditional expert-driven planning model that relies almost exclusively on
science- and expert-based technology. Under the traditional view, only experts are
qualified to make and implement sound management plans. Promotion is done by
bureaucracies - bureaucracies that are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules
and regulations (Fiorino 2006).
The alternative under an ecosystem-based approach would require the
development of processes of promotion designed to get to the common interests over
special interests. This will include strong public education and outreach followed by
open debate about policy choices. Community-based initiatives can compensate for the
limitations of bureaucracies.9 This is very different from the notion that agency experts
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One example of a community-based initiative currently in use is the Exeter River Dam Removal Study
Process. This is a local initiative consisting of a working group with direct oversight of the study of the
removal of the Exeter River Dam. It is a joint effort among local, state, citizens, federal agencies and other
bureaucracies to determine whether the dam Exeter dam should be removed and the natural, social, and
economic impacts of removal vs. non-removal.
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formulate plans in order to solve problems. Further, social and cultural memory must be
mobilized by developing links between key persons and providing a direction for
adaptive governance. This can effectively build social capacity and therefore build
resilience in social-ecological systems (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Further, the
development of social networks can play a key role in giving practitioners the chance to
develop support, trust, and sharing of lessons learned which can facilitate processes of
change at multiple levels (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008).
Social memory or the captured experience with change and successful adaptations
embedded in a deeper level of values is actualized through community debate and
decision-making process into appropriate strategies for dealing with ongoing change.
Importantly, it links past experiences with present and future project and provides a
foundation for modification of rules, typically referring to decadal time scales as opposed
to months or a year (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008). Social learning processes are present that
link the ability of management to respond to environmental feedback and direct the
coupled social-ecological system into sustainable trajectories. Social learning and
memory provide context to social responses to ecosystem change, increases the
likelihood of flexible and adaptive responses, and seems exceptionally important during
periods of crisis, renewal, and reorganization (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003).
It is by using these ideas and methods that ranchers, state agencies,
environmentalists, anglers, miners, and others were able to establish the Upper Clark
Fork Steering Committee, a watershed initiative established in the early 1990s to solve a
resource conflict that was headed for litigation by looking beyond traditional water
management tools and fashioning a compromise agreeable to all parties (Brunner,
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Colburn et al. 2002). Similarly, in 1992 environmentalists, loggers, residents, and others
in Quincy, California simply lost patience with the rancor and division between
environmentalists and logging interests in the community in the wake of the spotted owl
decision. After numerous incidents of tree spiking, fist-fights, and finally gun shots
through a local environmental lawyer's windows, a group of traditional opponents began
to meet at the only location in town that was available, the public library, and ultimately
agreed on a Community Stability Proposal for the management of the national forests in
the surrounding area. When the plan met with disdain from the U.S. Forest Service as
well as with national environmental organizations, the Quincy Library Group took their
proposal to Congress and ultimately got their plan passed into law despite opposition
from the Forest Service, Audubon and others (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; USEPA,
NOAA et al. 2001). So what was the Quincy Library Group and who were the people
that formed the group, negotiated an acceptable resolution, and promoted it all the way
through Congress and, ultimately, to the President? Colburn (2001) described the
group's composition:
The Quincy Library Group stabilized at about thirty participants after the
town meeting in July 1993. They are employees of Sierra Pacific
Industries and Collins Pine, county supervisors, an environmental lawyer,
a biologist, a retired airline pilot, a forestry professor, moms, dads,
husbands, grandparents, business owners, and more. Most are residents of
Quincy, though a few live in neighboring towns. Participation is
voluntary - members are not appointed by the QLG, though some
members have actively encouraged others to participate. One
member.. .took the initiative to assume the role of unofficial liaison and
representative for ranchers, because the demands of raising cattle made it
difficult for them to attend the meetings.. .(USEPA, NOAA et al. 2001,
186)
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Thus a community-based initiative can work to clarify the common interest of
communities embroiled in ecosystem-based conflicts or priorities through the
development of a policy proposal. With persistence, community-based initiatives can
build social networks that can survive to bring resilience to governance issues.
Table 20 Promotion
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Only experts are qualified to make and
implement sound management plans
intended to manage resources for the public
good - often interpreted as for public use and
consumption. Promotion is done by
bureaucracies - bureaucracies that are also
responsible for enforcement of uniform rules
and regulations.
Special interest or selfish politics intrudes on
the policy process with disappointing
regularity to direct policy initiatives away
from common interests toward powerful
single or special interests.

Promotion and politics involve honest debate
using policy relevant science, pertinent local
information, constructive public involvement,
and conflict resolution - which can serve to
clarify and secure the common interest in
knowledge generation for environmental
decision processes.
Development of processes of promotion
designed to get to the common interests over
special interests. This will include strong
public education and outreach followed by
open debate about policy choices.
Community-based initiatives can compensate
for the limitations of bureaucracies. Further,
social and cultural memory must be
mobilized by developing links between key
persons and providing a direction for adaptive
governance. Social learning and memory
provide context to social responses to
ecosystem change, increases the likelihood of
flexible and adaptive responses, and seems
exceptionally important during periods of
crisis, renewal, and reorganization.

There is another valuable lesson that can be learned from the many communitybased initiatives that have been underway now for decades. Regardless of whether we
are debating intelligence, promotion, prescription, enforcement, or any other of the
decision process tasks, the public decision making processes should be perceived as
legitimate, fair, and wise. Asking the following questions may go far in determining
whether there is a perception of fairness that could enable successful initiatives:
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1. Is it Legitimate? Is the process tied to existing law and regulation through the
direct involvement of responsible officials? Does it provide for significant public
review and comment opportunities for those who care about the issues but are
either unable or uninterested in participating directly? If not, is it clear about how
it is addressing and the topic or problem and open to the concerns of
stakeholders?
2. Is it Fair? Does it involve credible representatives of those who will be affected
by its decisions and recommendations" Is it open, accessible, and transparent so
that no individual is excluded except by his or her own choice, and no decision is
imposed without agreement? Finally, are decisions made so that they encourage
consensus as opposed to capitulation (or at least provide acknowledgement of
minority perspectives)?
3. Is it wise? Does the process encourage participants to focus on the problems to be
solved? Does it promote creativity and flexibility? Is local knowledge used in the
process? Does the process ensure that decision process ensure that decision
making is consistent with scientific knowledge or highlight where it is not
(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000)?
The more of these questions that can be answered in the affirmative, the more
likely it is that traditional governance can give way to more collaborative efforts that
include community initiatives to solve the "wicked" problems that plague the health of
our ecosystems (Table 20).
Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, decisions concerning an
appropriate law, policy, or management option are chosen. Thus the data, information,
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and interests that were identified, debated and discussed in the first two phases are
converted into regulatory and policy choices. The decisions in this phase result in the
establishment of new rules or guidelines selected to solve a problem or deal with an
environmental conflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008).
It is beyond the scope of this study to propose a flurry of legislative and
regulatory changes that need to be made in order to secure a sustainable future for the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. I will attempt, however, to describe in broad terms
the kinds of changes that need to be made if the governance that affects the region is to
move in a more holistic ecosystem-based manner.
The traditional or "old" regulatory forms of prescription were designed with a
1970s view of environmental problems; more specifically, obvious pollution from large
industrial sources. Regulatory strategies that held polluters accountable through selective
intervention by government based on a strategy of bureaucratic control were generally
reasonable and effective tactics (Cortner and Moote 1999; Young 2002; Weber 2003). It
is time, however, to move on and to recognize that environmental problems have changed
to a significant degree:
We have moved from a concern with just controlling pollution to also
preventing it, reducing risk, promoting eco-efficiency, advancing
stewardship, and achieving a sustainable economy and society over the
long term. The environmental "problem" has continually evolved and
been redefined. This means that in addition to worrying about pollution,
we now want to use energy, materials, and water efficiently; design
environmentally friendly products; think about the impacts of products
over their life cycle; preserve habitat and species; protect the global
commons; and worry generally about the effects of today's actions on
future generations (Fiorino 2006, 81).
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Thus environmental concerns today are far more encompassing than simply
controlling pollution, rendering the traditional approach to regulation increasingly
irrelevant to ecosystem preservation and resilience. Traditional regulation does little, for
instance to address a variety of aspects of industrial performance that impact our
ecosystems, including the use of energy, materials, and water. There is also little
regulation over the effects of product use and disposal. This is not to say that
government must intervene in these activities, but creative ways need to be found to
balance the regulation using more cooperative and collaborative efforts (i.e. government
must be at the table).
The political debate over the last 40 years has been polarized along two disparate
lines of thought, both of which revolve around a "free market" vs. environmental
regulation mentality. In short, those who champion a free market and fear the potential
economic consequences that may accompany increased environmental regulation use a
variety of strategies to prevent such regulation. On the other side of the debate are often
those that believe that more stringent government regulation in the fashion of the
traditional government approaches are necessary to prevent increased harm to the
ecosystem at all scales. Our ideal system, however, promotes a different approach,
another way, in which new relationships, structures, and roles are fashioned by careful
planning with broad-based involvement and implemented on a trial and error basis in
order to facilitate learning (Fischer 2000; Fiorino 2006).
Further, while there is little question that some form of regulation and other
limitations will be necessary; society may simply not be able to afford the cost of the
traditional methods of environmental regulation and enforcement. Dryzek (1997) argues
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that the goals of cleaner air and water, fewer toxins and persistent organic pollutants
circulating in the human environment, a future that includes environmental security,
improving standards for urban, rural, suburban, and wilderness, collectively place
incredible demands on traditional government. He calls it the "implementation deficit - a
substantial gap between what legislation and high-level executive decisions clear will be
achieved and what is actually achieved at street level" (Dryzek 1997, 82). In short,
regulators working under traditional prescriptions simply cannot do everything that they
are required to do under their own laws, rules, and regulations.
Despite the problems inherent in traditional government regulation, it must be
made perfectly clear that the design and implementation of new prescriptions does not
mean doing away with the old one. Government will always play a crucial role in
regulatory matters. "The new governance arrangements are more of a supplement or
complement to existing institutions than a complete replacement for them" (Weber 2003,
245). Many elements of the traditional regulatory scheme will provide a core for new
initiatives. Government, for instance, will need to maintain core standards that place
pressure on industry and others to continually improve performance. Further,
government must have the legal authority and enforcement capability to hold participants
accountable for meeting the core standards (Fiorino 2006; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007;
Steelman 2010).
New regulatory approaches, however, must transition away from the premise of
the traditional regime that the regulated public will act for the common good only under
threat of legal sanctions. Further, new regulation should reject the assumption that
adversarial relationships are superior to collaborative ones. Although pressure on
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participants must come from government and the community whenever appropriate,
society must move beyond the habit of finding fault and assigning blame toward a search
for solutions (Fiorino 2006).
Much of the discussion of the need for collaboration and cooperation discussed in
the previous two sections are just as important for the adjustment and development of
prescriptions in the future. Thus the goals of the prescription as established with
significant public input should be clear. Prescriptions should then be consistent with
those goals (Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002). It is far more likely that
prescriptions will be consistent with community goals and norms if they are developed
with procedures that integrate local knowledge and significant local participation
(MilleniumEcosystemAssessment 2005a; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006; Seixas 2006).
Further, institutions created, consolidated or limited by prescription should be
amenable formally or informally to integration horizontally and vertically and their
jurisdictional impact should transcend political lines with mechanisms that authorize the
exercise of jurisdiction throughout regional and local ecosystem boundaries (Gunderson
and Holling 2002). Prescriptions should be flexible enough to allow for adaptive
measures - enabling learning by trial and error. This ultimately means prescriptions
should give those who enforce, apply, and review the regulations the ability to make
appropriate adjustments as experience and learning develop.
Finally, standards set forth within any new prescription should allow for, or at
least not preclude, the application of a precautionary approach when presented with
uncertainty. The 1992 Rio Declaration specifically laid out the foundation for the
precautionary approach in Principle 15:
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States, according to their abilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation" (UNCED 1992).
The Precautionary Approach developed out of the Precautionary Principle to deal
with systems that may be slowly reversible, but are difficult to control, not well
understood, and are subject to fluctuations in the environment and human values
(Restrepo, Mace et al. 1999). While the United States has lagged in the implementation
of the precautionary approach (Whiteside 2006), overall the United Nations has had a
huge influence on the international acceptance of this concept. Not only was it given
prominence in the Rio Declaration but it provided the driving force behind international
agreements and, to some degree, domestic natural resources regulatory statutes
(Rosenberg 2002).
The precautionary approach recognizes that the absence of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason to postpone decisions where there is a risk of serious or
irreversible harm. However, guidance and assurance are required as to the conditions
governing the actions that will be taken. Guidance and assurance are particularly needed
when a decision must be made regarding a risk of serious or irreversible harm about
which there is significant scientific uncertainty.
The plain language of Principle 15 highlights the need for national/international
guidance. For the precautionary approach to be triggered, for instance, there must first be
a situation where there is a threat of serious or irreversible damage. When that is present
there must next be a perceived lack of certainty about the impact of the threat. Finally,
affirmative action banning the release or preventing the harm may only occur if the
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measure is "cost effective." Who makes these decisions? How does an agency
determine whether a threat has the potential for "serious or irreversible" damage? What
should the guidelines be for the determination of whether a proposed measure is "cost
effective?" Finally, who should bear the burden of proof for any of these issues? These
are issues which must be considered by communities when they modify or adopt
prescriptions.
What may make the precautionary approach unique (i.e. different from traditional
risk analysis) is the notion that the burden of proof be on the proponents of any actions
that might prove harmful to human health or the environment to show that the impacts
will be benign, or at least that the harm caused will be outweighed by a 'greater good'
(i.e. "reverse onus"). It still begs the question of when the actors have to submit such
actions to an administrative body and what standards should apply to the decision process
thereafter. One key will be the level of protection that society chooses. The threats can
then be compared to society's expressed level of protection (e.g. ranging from zero
tolerance for persistent organic pollutants to some form of threshold limit values
combined with monitoring and control rules with prearranged management actions in
response to unanticipated monitoring results - for instance if a regulatory "total allowable
catch" ("TAC") is hit, by prior agreement the fishery shuts down).
Involvement of the public in the determination of the desired level of protection,
through outreach and education, could be expanded so that transparency and full public
input could give credibility to regulatory efforts. The bottom line is the need for
overarching law or policy that permits the application of the precautionary approach to all
relevant aspects of regulation. Guidelines and regulations developed in an agency-by137

agency fashion would have to meet certain requirements as defined by the legislation.
The approach can be flexible. It could provide a "balancing of interests" approach so
frequently found in law, that is, the magnitude of the threat of harm or irreversible
damage would be weighed against the value to society of the actor's planned act. The
greater the uncertainty, the more conservative would be the criteria before actions are
permitted. For example, the burden of proof may be difficult for industry to demonstrate
that the risk of irreversible harm of the release of dioxins by the pulp and paper mills into
the waters of Canada and the U.S. outweighs the social value of toilet paper that is whiter
in appearance than toilet paper manufactured without the need to discharge dioxins. By
the same token, the risk of genetically-modified foods might pale in comparison to the
possible starvation of millions in drought-stricken and war-torn nations of Africa and
Asia. Again, public input into these essentially value-based considerations is critically
important.
The United States is not unfamiliar with the precautionaiy approach. In fisheries,
the precautionary approach and its implementation have rather conveniently fallen into
the hands of regulators in a manner that facilitates conservation measures and contains
uniform implementation considerations. The precautionary approach has certainly been a
key component in a series of binding and non-binding international agreements since Rio.
These include the FAO International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (F.A.O.
1995a) and the UN Agreement for Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species
(United_Nations 1996). The United States is signatory to both these agreements (EPAP
1999).
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The Code of Conduct integrates the precautionary approach into all aspects of
fisheries management and explicitly admonishes parties that "States should apply the
precautionary approach widely to conservation, management, and exploitation of living
aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment." It
further emphasizes that "The absence of adequate scientific information should not be
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management
measures" (F.A.O. 1995a; Restrepo, Mace et al. 1999).
In sum, the prescriptions developed and/or modified in our ideal ecosystem-based
approach to governance would have a variety of characteristics (Table 20). Overall new
regulations would adopt principles of social-political governance and facilitate shared
responsibility and institutional arrangements that promote communication, transparency,
and dialogue. The traditional".. .strategies of control, commands, and deterrence, should
give way to a strategy based more on incentives, learning, and accountability" (Fiorino
2006,194). In addition strong, direct national governmental control of resources,
especially living marine resources, creates a form of top-down management that makes
enforcement of regulations and collection of reliable data difficult because of the
resentment and resistance in the regulated community (Pauly and Maclean 2003). It's
probably time to develop prescriptions that are consistent with a broader, more informed,
constituent base.
There are more specific elements that can be indicative of a movement toward a
more flexible, ecosystem-based approach to governance. A few can be listed here (Table
21), but there are as many combinations and strategies as a creative society can invent. In
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the first place, prescriptions should lend themselves to agency collaboration across policy
sectors and jurisdictions with a focus on integrated problem-solving.
Table 20 Prescription
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Regulatory strategies that hold polluters
and other environmental violators
accountable through selective intervention
by government based on a strategy of
bureaucratic control using adversarial tools
and techniques (inspections, fines,
penalties, etc.)

A transition away from adversarial
methods designed to punish violations
toward greater emphasis on cooperation
and collaboration between private and
public entities to prevent pollution, reduce
risk, and promote sustainability. New
relationships, structures, and roles are
fashioned by careful planning with broadbased involvement and implemented on a
trial and error basis in order to facilitate
learning
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are
not the only way to influence behavior.
Collaboration and cooperation with
partnerships designed to achieve economic
goals, can promote eco-efficiency,
innovation, and sustainability.
Community and regional involvement in
the development and enforcement of
environmental regulations can increase
learning, inform the public, and lead to
greater progress towards goals.

The regulated public will act for the
common good only under threat of legal
sanctions and adversarial strategies are the
only way to affect behavior and produce
positive outcomes.
Centralized top-down command and
control strategy of bureaucratic control is
the best way to achieve uniform
compliance.

Second, accountability should be built into any prescription. Thus agencies and
other institutions should at a minimum be required to report to the public and to each
other on status and progress on identified problems on a regular basis (Weber 2003).
New prescriptions should also be designed to promote learning as a route to innovation
and better performance. In order to accomplish this each new prescription will have to be
flexible though to enable government and industry to change their behavior based on
what they learn. This can be done by explicitly creating reliable monitoring, reporting,
and feedback mechanisms; using neutral third parties and forums to document and help
institutionalize lessons learned, including legal protections for good-faith efforts to
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innovate, and building trust that promotes the sharing of information and open
communication (Fiorino 2006). Finally, prescriptions should promote significant public
involvement. This can be done by the mandated utilization of public and local
knowledge, by strong public outreach designed to inform the public on the issues, and
involving the public in ongoing program evaluations and appraisals (Becker 1993; Weber
2003; Whiteside 2006; Steelman 2010)
Implementation. This task is a combination of the traditional policy analysis
framework categories of invocation and application (See, e.g. Clark 2008). Invocation
encompasses the initial actions that communities, governments and/or institutions take to
invoke, enforce, or otherwise implement a prescription. Application, on the other hand,
is the process that a community chooses to ultimately characterize the cited behavior and
determine whether the behavior is a violation of the prescription. Application also
generally provides the process that determines what, if any, sanction or consequence will
be applied for the violation. In the case of an inspector or field agent inspecting an
industrial facility, the initial decision to issue a citation to the regulated entity for a
perceived violation is an example of invocation, while the ultimate determination of
whether the regulated entity is indeed guilty of a violation and, if so, the nature and
amount of the penalty is an example of the application phase of the implementation
process (Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). Ideally implementation should be
perceived as "dependable, even-handed, realistic, and timely, and conflicts over the
implementation of policies must be resolved in ways that are deemed fair by consensus of
the participants" (Clark 2008, 53).
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Implementation under the U.S. constitutional framework is, by design,
fragmented. The framers of the constitution were concerned that too much power would
be concentrated in one branch of government or institution, so separation of powers
became the foundation of our nation's constitutional scheme (Plater, Abrams et al. 2004).
Unlike a parliamentary process, where legislative and executive powers are fused,
making consensus on environmental goals and priorities more likely, the "balance of
powers" in the U.S. results in separate elections for president and Congress, often
resulting in the executive branch and legislative branch coming under control of different
parties. As a result, the constitutionally-independent judicial branch is often a major
factor in the resolution of controversies and stalemates between battling government
branches. The existence of multiple layers of governance, with policy implementation
divided between federal, state, and local bodies, makes for an even greater challenge to
the creation of policy and the development of implementation schemes (Kjaer 2004;
Plater, Abrams et al. 2004; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
More specifically, the impact of our fragmented and divided governmental
implementation scheme is profound. One example is the tremendous reliance in the U.S.
on what has been described as bureaucratic rationality or, as discussed above,
administrative rationalism (Dryzek 1997). This describes the U.S. implementation
scheme's penchant for the use of bureaucracy for the implementation of environmental
prescriptions. Thus the U.S. system is marked by a system based on a division of labor,
subject matter specialization, technical expertise, uniform predictable rules, defined
procedures, and a defined hierarchy with upper management controlling the behavior and
activities of lower levels and field personnel (Hays 1959; Fiorino 2006). In essence:
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Congress passes laws and oversees their implementation by agencies,
which in turn prescribe rules and oversee the behavior of regulated firms.
Agencies are highly specialized, with engineers, biologists, chemists,
toxicologists, lawyers, economists, and statisticians, among others, in their
ranks. Elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as possible, define the
technology, monitoring, and other requirements that regulated entities
must meet (Fiorino 2006, 39).
Thus the rules and regulations relevant to enforcement in the U.S. are created and
implemented mainly through bureaucracies (Weber 2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005;
GLFA 1956). As a result, the implementation of laws passed by Congress and by state
legislatures through the promulgation of regulations by agencies, are generally narrower
in scope than in other parts of the world, emphasizing control over the manufacturing
process and specific categories of pollution (Fiorino 2006). Furthermore, in the U.S.
there is an enhanced focused on legal compliance and, unlike many other countries, less
emphasis on overall environmental performance. In Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, and
The Netherlands, for instance, governments set goals and design policies to achieve them
through negotiated agreements, partnerships, and other means (Buhi and Feng 2009;
GLFA 1956). In the United States, technology standards are routinely set forth in the
applicable statutes and the rules and regulations promulgated by the bureaucratic
agencies (Fiorino 2006). Thus U.S. businesses are constantly making decisions based
upon the ever-present threat of litigation. A great deal of time and resources are spent by
both agencies and regulated entities on "defensive science" striving to make decisions
that will withstand judicial scrutiny (Quinton 2011).
The United States, on the other hand, emphasizes policy implementation through
compliance and threat of sanction. Compared with Japan and several European countries
the U.S. regulatory system is significantly more legalistic, adversarial, and punitive, with
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a net effect of diverting the efforts of all sides to "pointless and dispiriting legal routines
and conflicts" (Fischer 2000,229). Indeed the United States regulatory and legalistic
implementation style, described by Kagan (2011) as adversarial legalism, "uses more
complex legal rules, more adversarial procedures, more punitive legal sanctions, and
more judicial interventions into administrative decisions" (Fiorino 2006,37). These
practices have implications:
.. .American forms of regulatory law, processes for making regulatory
policy, and methods of enforcing regulatory rules are more legalistic and
more adversarial. Adversarial legalism does not necessarily make
American regulation less effective than regulation in other economically
advanced democracies - although it sometimes does. But adversarial
legalism clearly makes American regulation more costly, more inefficient,
and more inflexible. That inefficiency and inflexibility, moreover, tend to
undermine the kind of government-business cooperation that is essential
for fully answering the public's regulatory prayers (Quinton 2011,182)
Much of the cost, complexity, inefficiency, and seeming inflexibility of
adversarial legalism results of the fact that, as discussed above, ecosystems and the
interplay between humans and their environment are complex, adaptive, and dynamic.
The human activities that impact the environment directly or indirectly are many and
varied. Those activities that are perceived to harm the health, safety, and security of
humans are limited or restrained by the rule of law. Laws require certain procedures, and
demand that regulations and laws be applied fairly, consistently, and uniformly, i.e. to
every violator. When uniform, consistent laws are applied across the board to the variety
of human activities that may or may not harm the environment, there is tension. It is
simply not possible to satisfactorily connect universal mandates of law and regulation
indiscriminately to the immense variety of possible interactions without repeated
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episodes of unreasonableness (Fiorino 2006; Buhi and Feng 2009). Often called "sitelevel unreasonableness" these particular encounters between regulated entities and
regulators encompass the individual and cumulative experience of being subjected to
inefficient, or unreasonable, regulatory action. "Site-level unreasonableness explains
much of the present political and social discontent with protective regulation"(Bardach
and Kagan 2010, 7). "Yet government must govern, and if it cannot do so by forging
perfect connections to the society it governs, then it will make do with imperfect
connections" (Bardach and Kagan 2010,3).
Thus traditional government regulatory implementation and enforcement relies
upon uniform rules and regulations applied across the board to the regulated population
resulting in inefficiencies and numerous cumulative incidences of unfair or unreasonable
application (Fiorino 2006; Buhi and Feng 2009; Bardach and Kagan 2010). Given that
regulators and the regulated public are often subject to uniform rulemaking and
enforcement, for example, a great deal of time is necessarily spent to inspect and evaluate
regulated entities. To regulated entities, it is a costly but necessary part of business to
spend a great deal of time and resources to avoid violations. There is no incentive to go
beyond the statutory minimums so while resources get squandered in order to develop
defensive science, creativity and innovation are stunted. Trust evaporates (Fiorino 2006).
In sum, commentators are consistently calling for a regulatory evolution away
from the old regulatory ways. As we have seen, the prescriptions and implementation
inherent in the old regulation strategy impedes innovation; it is legalistic, fragmented, and
inflexible; it is expensive; it has become largely irrelevant; and we are more and more
confronting a burgeoning implementation deficit (Wilson 2000; Fiorino 2006; Walker
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and Salt 2006; Whiteside 2006; Bardach and Kagan 2010; Steelman 2010; Quinton
2011).
It is unlikely that society can count on an overhaul of existing environmental
laws. Change away from old regulation and transitioning toward a more holistic,
ecosystem-based approach to governance will most likely have to come by way of
changes in implementation. There are simply too many entrenched forces, including
existing agencies, regulated entities, and NGO's all have a vested interest in maintaining
the status quo. Most every existing entity is more geared for litigation than for exploring
collaborative solutions. Change will have to "muddle through" with a large number of
small steps that move the pendulum slowly over time (Fiorino 2006).
For the implementation task, therefore, the trick will be moving both invocation
and application toward more community-driven, more voluntary, cooperative systems.
Government could assist with the identification and clarification of community goals as
well as develop measureable standards. It would be up to regional or community efforts
to develop solutions to bring environmental indicators into compliance with those
standards (Weber 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007).
Dryzek's (1997) discourse of ecological modernization borrows from many of
the practices used by governments in Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and
other nations viewed as having successful environmental policy performance to offer
some traits that might advance a government toward an ecosystem-based approach.
Included in the discourse, for instance, is a description of a National Environmental
Policy Plan, published every four years in the Netherlands, which identifies and
integrates environmental criteria for all departments of government. The plan, which
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relies on collaboration, not rules and penalties, focuses on a set of environmental quality
targets and establishes a timetable for achieving them based on a model of how pollutants
are generated in and travel through human social systems. The plan also looks beyond
"end of pipe" discharges to "identify and change activities that cause pollution in the first
place. The changes are identified in consultation with the relevant industry, citizen
groups, and responsible government officials, especially those departments dealing with
industry, agriculture, and transport" (Dryzek 1997,163). It would not be a total stretch to
envision a similar approach in the U.S. and Canada.
I am not suggesting that transition will be easy. There are plenty of bad apples in
operation that have a history of environmental violations and will have to be dealt with
using the conventional top-down deterrence model offered by old regulation. Traditional
command and control uniformity enforced with threats of sanctions could slowly be
replaced, however, by regional collaborative efforts utilizing partnerships, performance
agreements, and cooperative assistance. Novel cooperative arrangements, including site
specific environmental management contracts, could begin to be implemented with those
in the regulated public with the best track records on environmental performance (Dryzek
1997; Dietz, Ostrom et al. 2003; Fiorino 2006).
Finally, in order for there to be realistic transition to a more collaborative and
capacity-building system of implementation there needs to be an acknowledgement that
the change and uncertainty that would accompany a movement toward ecosystem-based
governance is significant. While innovation may be a process of "muddling through"
(Dryzek 1997) it is still a foray into relatively new and uncertain territory. Increased
discretion for field personnel, the use of partnerships and environmental performance
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agreements, the tension between the need for a governance system that is based on
learning and the need for some secrecy of trade secrets and other matters for commercial
enterprises, are some examples of areas that will require guidance and conflict resolution.
Thus there needs to be planning for increased use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques, including facilitation, mediation, and, perhaps, arbitration (Fiorino 2006;
Bardach and Kagan 2010). Further, for those issues that are not resolvable through
negotiation or alternative dispute resolution, there should be a specialized court created
with the exclusive jurisdiction to decide environmental issues. The United States
expressly rejected the creation of an environmental court system in the 1970's with the
start of the modern environmental era. New Zealand, on the other hand, made the
creation of a specialized environment court a critical component of its environmental
governance regime, with exclusive jurisdiction over all matters related to the environment
and sustainable development. While the disadvantages and advantages of the court can be
debated, it has had the effect of establishing a tribunal with environmentallyknowledgeable judges and staff as well as the creation of an exclusive bar of attorneys
and staff experienced in environmental advocacy. Issues are therefore more capably and
efficiently handled with less cost to the participants (Sproule-Jones 2002). These tools
should be readily available, credible, and inexpensive relative to the costs of traditional
litigation conducted in courts of general jurisdiction in state, provincial, and federal
courts in the U.S. and Canada.
In summary, therefore, the task of implementation for a governance regime
striving to move toward an ecosystem-based approach should first strive to reject the
notion that industry will act only if threatened with legal sanctions. Traditional sanctions
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Table 21 Implementation

Ecosystem-based Approach

Traditional
The U.S. system is marked by a system based
on a division of labor, subject matter
specialization, technical expertise, uniform
predictable rules, defined procedures, and a
defined hierarchy with upper management
controlling the behavior and activities of lower
levels and field personnel.

Transition is needed to move implementation
toward more community-driven, more
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government
could assist with the identification and
clarification of community goals as well as
develop measureable standards. It would be up
to regional or community efforts to develop
solutions to bring environmental indicators into
compliance with those standards

Narrow, elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as
possible, define the technology, monitoring,
and other requirements that regulated entities
must meet, emphasizing control over the
manufacturing process and specific categories
of pollution. Regulations relevant to
enforcement in the U.S. are created and
implemented mainly through bureaucracies.
Regulatory reliance upon uniform rules and
regulations applied across the board to the
regulated population resulting in inefficiencies
and numerous cumulative incidences of unfair
or unreasonable application. Adversarial
sentiment creates tension and is costly as
industry engages in costly "defensive science"
and incurs costs to avoid violations rather than
to reduce environmental impact.

Adversarial relationships should give way to
cooperative and collaborative ones with the
emphasis on interactions designed to solve
problems with strategies that are developed and
shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the
regulated community, and other interested
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen
groups, and government officials, plans created
through collaboration can look beyond "end of
pipe" discharges to "identify and change
activities that cause pollution in the first place.
Command and control could gradually be
replaced with incentives and learning through
trial and error.

Conflicts are resolved through costly traditional
litigation and judicial intervention.

More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If
court necessary there should be specialized
courts with knowledge of environmental factors.

would still be available but typically used for serious performance breaches or
historically bad actors. In addition, when possible adversarial relationships should give
way to cooperative and collaborative ones with the emphasis on interactions designed to
solve problems with strategies that are developed and shared with the input of scientists,
regulators, the regulated community, and other interested parties. In this way, command
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and control could gradually give way to incentives and learning through trial and error.
Further, improvement should be measured not in the number of administrative or
regulatory actions taken, but instead by environmental performance as measured against
measurable goals. Finally, conflict resolution should move away from traditional
litigation in courts of general jurisdiction toward the use of alternative dispute resolution
techniques. If those measures fail, then resolution should be through a dedicated court
with specialized jurisdiction designed to adjudicate environmental disputes (Table 21).
Appraisal. The appraisal function involves the assessment of a decision process
as a whole and of the success of particular prescriptions in achieving their goals. Thus
the basic criterion is the policy objectives that were originally sought. Appraisals are
therefore an important method of assessing whether a prescriptions and their
implementation have effectively met the goals set by the community and who is
responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Appraisal
provides a major opportunity for learning and course correction, for using the lessons of
experience to adapt failing practices into future changes (Clark 2002). The main criteria
for appraisals are dependability, comprehensiveness, continuity and independence
(Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Brunner and Lynch 2010b). Put more
succinctly, the appraisal function requires that:
Even when decisions are made on the basis of the best information and
with a high degree of consensus, they may not adequately address the
problem in the ways anticipated. Initial conditions may also change,
requiring shifts in policies. As time goes on, leaders and participants
should evaluate how well the selected alternative has solved the original
problem and, in larger terms, how well the overall decision process has
served in achieving common interest outcomes (Clark 2008,54).
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In order to accomplish thorough and unbiased appraisals, trend data from relevant
scales must be available and transparent. Local knowledge and scientific efforts need to
be combined. One example is a periodic public assessment of the state of the ecosystem.
This provides opportunity for meaningful public education and involvement. Further, it
is critical that appraisals be carried out by third parties, i.e. NOT the agencies that are
charged with programmatic responsibility (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
It is also important to view the appraisal function as the philosophical and
practical home of adaptive management, which is frequently proposed as a tool to frame
the management of the human activities that impact ecosystems (Holling 1986; Lee 1993;
Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). While appraisal is about the assessment of the success
of prescriptions and implementation schemes, adaptive governance goes one step further
to recommend that we have governance systems that are able to learn from the appraisal
process and change course if anticipated results fail to materialize. Included in appraisal,
therefore, is the need for trend data obtained through monitoring and other methods
designed to inform governance of the status and change in key indicators over time as a
Result of management actions (Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007;
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010; Steelman 2010). "As a given policy is implemented,
information gained is quickly fed back so that it can produce midcourse corrections in the
specific policy being studied, and the experience gained can add to the general stock of
environmental knowledge" (Steelman 2010,202). In short, if society is to insist on a
shift from regulatory strategies based on bureaucratic control to strategies based on
learning and trial and error, appraisal functions that involve a broad base of agency,
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stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment will be critical to the quest to achieve
common, as opposed to special, interests (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber 2003;
Fiorino 2006; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
Table 22 Appraisal
Traditional

Ecosystem-based

Approach

There is a community of
interests and agency protocols
built around any position. This
makes it difficult for appraisals
to be dependable and
independent when so many rely
on the continuation of a
program.

Appraisal provides a major
opportunity for learning and course
correction, for using the lessons of
experience to adapt failing practices
into future changes. The main
criteria for appraisals are
dependability, comprehensiveness,
continuity and independence

Trend data is usually gathered
at the direction of experts.
Periodic assessments, if any,
are generally performed by
experts with a possible
comment period after the
assessment is completed.

Trend data from relevant scales
must be available and transparent.
Local knowledge and scientific
efforts need to be combined and
included in a periodic public
assessment of the state of the
ecosystem.

Often assessments are
performed by agencies/entities
that are responsible for the
implementation of a policy.

It is critical that appraisals be
carried out by third parties, i.e. not
the agencies that are charged with
programmatic responsibilities.

Fragmentation is largely still
the rule. Decisions are made by
separate agencies with
jurisdiction over a narrow
component of an overall
ecosystem.

Existence of a collaborative entity
or single overarching body that can,
formally or informally, accumulate
the knowledge accumulated through
appraisals and implement change to
reverse adverse trends.

Therefore the key characteristics of the appraisal process in an ideal ecosystembased governance regime, therefore, include periodic appraisals by entities unrelated to
the agencies and institutions responsible for the regulation of the targets of the appraisals.
Appraisals should provide unbiased trend data and utilize both local knowledge and
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expert knowledge to deliver a thorough, dependable, and comprehensive product.
Further, appraisals should be shared periodically with the public. Finally, appraisals
should provide knowledge that can be utilized to learn from our regulatory efforts. A
system should exist through either a collaborative entity or a single overarching
governing body that can, formally or informally, accumulate the knowledge accumulated
through appraisals and implement change to reverse adverse trends (Table 22).
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a
problem is solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct (Clark 1997;
Clark 2008). Termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
Curiously, it seems that it is far from easy to terminate a policy action or
prescription. "Often, if a decision process is successful, the institutions that were formed
to address the problem remain, actively carrying out the duties assigned to them during
the process" (Clark 2008, 93). In fact, the accumulation of knowledge about the success
of a policy or even new discoveries do not in most cases cause the termination of old
policies and the adoption of new ones. There are a variety of reasons for this
phenomenon. In the first place, once a policy selection is made, it develops its own
momentum. Any "buildup of expertise among scientists makes them resist radical new
theories" (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010,94). In addition to the barrier of knowledge
coalitions, attempts at termination must deal with those that have an economic stake in
the continued existence of the policy and are therefore resistant to change or unlikely to
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admit error. Further, advocacy coalitions like environmental NGOs and others tend to
reject knowledge that runs counter to their interests causing policy debates to be
prolonged and acting as barriers to termination (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
Table 23 Termination
Traditional

Ecosystem-based Approach

Numerous factors combine to make it
difficult to terminate a policy or
prescription.

Ecosystem-based governance requires the
periodic public assessment of the
progress, status, and continued need for
any environmental policy prescription or
implementation scheme. The decision to
terminate should be made by a bridging
entity with knowledge of trend data.

It is clear that many of the concerns that apply to the need for dependable and
comprehensive appraisal. Thus ideal ecosystem-based governance would require the
periodic public assessment of the progress, status, and continued need for any
environmental policy prescription or implementation scheme. The decision to terminate
should be made by a bridging organization or entity with knowledge of trend data. This
organization should be comprised of diverse representation from scientific, regulatory,
private enterprise, environmental and public sectors (Table 23). There is no reason that
such a body or process necessarily be vested with a legal mandate to enforce its
decisions. It may be enough that parties follow recommendations of this overriding
entity out of respect for its processes and opinions.
Conclusion
Chapter III lays the groundwork and traces the literature that calls for a change in
the manner in which society governs the human activities that impact the environment.
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Every effort has been made to detail the problems with the current "mostly" centralized
command-and-control bureaucracy and to explain the potential transition to a more
holistic form of governance that moves into a more voluntary, collaborative, and adaptive
force.
Using the information developed in the first part of this chapter, the policy
sciences analytical framework was used to demonstrate how each task within the
framework might change if our governance regime moved away from old regulation
toward a more ecosystem-based approach. The framework also sets forth the
characteristics that should exist under each task within the problem orientation, social
process, and decision process in an ecosystem-based governance regime.
In chapters 4 and 5 the policy sciences analytical framework "ideal ecosystem
based approach" will be used to examine the governance regimes extant in the Great
Lakes Basin from approximately 1970 - 1992 (Chapter 4) and the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine Watershed (Chapter 5). We will attempt to determine how the governance
regimes examined in both cites compare with the ideal ecosystem-based approach
developed in this chapter. In this manner we will be better able to determine what
characteristics are present that might indicate whether the governance regimes are/were
capable of adopting or using an ecosystem-based approach to the management of those
human activities that impact the environment. Utilizing the methods described in
Chapter 2 and the logic outlined in Chapter 3, we will now turn to the analysis of the two
case studies.
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IV.

THE GREATLAKES BASIN

Introduction and Background
The Great Lakes Basin watershed is one of the world's largest freshwater
systems. The lakes themselves occupy more than half a billion square kilometers with a
shoreline of 17,000 kilometers (10,000 miles). More than 35 million people reside within
its basin and 23 million rely upon the lakes for fresh water. The basin includes area
within 7 U.S. states and 2 Canadian provinces (Figure 6) - and encompasses more land
than England, Scotland, and Wales combined. The fresh water system of the Great Lakes
basin comprise roughly one-fifth of the world's fresh surface-water supply (SprouleJones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The Great Lakes are essentially a closed but interconnected system. In essence, it
is one long river, (Evans and Regier 1990), and it is a 2,000 mile voyage from Duluth at
the western end of Lake Superior to reach the Atlantic Ocean (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The lake system was formed by glacial processes, and those that affected the lakes the
most took place during the Pleistocene era. Melting glaciers filled the basins until they
reached their current configuration approximately 4,000 years ago (Grady 2007).
Formed by glacial melt, only one percent of water in the Great Lakes is renewed
each year by rain and snow. Roughly the same amount flows into the sea. Thus
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Figure 3 Great Lakes Basin Watershed (Used with permission Great Lakes Information
Network)

pollution that winds up in the lakes mainly stays in the lakes (Dempsey 2004; Botts and
Muldoon 2005)
The up and down history of resource exploitation in the Great Lakes region is
well documented and a brief background and history of the evolution of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement is necessary at this point for context. Suffice to say, during the
18th and 19th centuries, the Great Lakes Basin was widely exploited for its natural
resources, including forest products and fisheries. Major cities were built, and even
rebuilt, on the back of Michigan and Wisconsin forests. By the late 19th centuries fish
populations had crashed due to overfishing and loss of habitat. Cholera and typhoid,
along with other water-related diseases, were major causes of death in lakeside
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communities10 (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). Laws and regulations relating to the
t
control of human activities that impacted the Great Lakes ecosystem were fragmented
between the U.S. and Canada and their respective states, provinces and local
governments. As a predictable result, overfishing and pollution continued unabated into
the 1960s, culminating in the public eye with the famous burning of the Cuyahoga River
in Cleveland, the declaration of Lake Erie as "dead," Love Canal, and other similar
crises (Dworsky 1988; Dempsey 2004).
It was during this period that an angry and determined public, acting through a
rapidly expanding list of citizens' organizations that had emerged to combat pollution
began to drive reform measures. The International Joint Commission (IJC), acting on a
reference, instructed both countries to take action on water pollution issues in the Great
Lakes. The initial 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) between the
United States and Canada was negotiated. It was essentially a water pollution agreement
but effectively introduced controls on phosphorous discharges and "an extensive set of
broad studies under the Pollution from Land Use Activities Research Group (PLUARG)
was initiated" (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990, xxv).
With increasing environmental degradation and active citizen involvement, the
agreement was ultimately amended in 1978 with the declared purpose to

..to restore

and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity .. .of the waters of the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem." The ecosystem was defined as "the interacting components of
air, land, water and living organisms, including humans." Further evidence of the fact
10

For instance, in 1854 a typhoid epidemic in Chicago causes the deaths of some 5,000 people, and in
1891, the rate of death due to typhoid fever ad reached 124 per 100,000 people. Fuller, K., H. Shear, et al.,
Eds. (1995). The Great Lakes: An Environmental Atlas and Resource Book. Toronto, Government of
Canada and US Environmental Protection Agency, ibid.
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that the 1978 agreements had morphed into the restoration of ecological integrity as the
major goal, not just improved water chemistry through pollution control, can be found in
the definition of the Great Lakes system as all of"...the streams, rivers, lakes and other
bodies of water that are within the drainage basin" (Becker 1993; GLWQA 1987).
The years of the 1970s through the mid-1980s, marked by open and transparent
decision making with significant public input at all levels, integrated governance task
forces and overlapping advisory boards, had an impact. The 1978 Amendments to the
GLWQA recognized the link between land-based activities and water quality (GLWQA
1987), explicitly acknowledging the role of non-point source pollution. It formally
adopted the ecosystem approach basin-wide (GLWQA 1987). The governance regime
under the GLWQA in the early years is widely thought to have been a success (Donahue
1988; Becker 1993; Young 1998; Jackson 2005).
While the GLWQA speaks mainly to water quality and the impacts of land based
activities, there is another critical component to the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem: the
biological system, including the fish. Fisheries in the Great Lakes, including a oncesignificant commercial fishery, had seen a complete collapse caused by overfishing, the
invasion of lamprey eels and pollution. In the 1950s, lake trout populations had been
reduced to 99% of their 1930s levels. This drove the ultimate formation of the Great
Lakes Fishery Commission (GLFC) through the ratification of a Convention between
Canada and the U.S. in 195511. Its charter recognized the value of 'joint and coordinated
efforts' to address fisheries conservation (Convention 1955; Dempsey 2004). The

11

Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries between the United States and Canada signed September 10,1954;
entered into force October 11,1955. 6 UST 2836; TIAS 3326; 238 UNTS 97.
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convention was implemented through passage of the Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956
(GLFA 1956). While the job of the GLFC was initially to formulate a plan to combat the
invasive lampreys, by the 1980s the Commissioners from both sides of the border, and
their staffs, had cultivated and begun to practice a protective ecosystem policy by
working closely with the UC and it's the Science Advisory Board (SAB). Collaboration
and coordination was also buttressed by the fact that members of the GLFC Board sat as
voting members on the SAB under the GLWQA (Prelli and Becker 2001). The
Convention further set the stage for an ecosystem approach to fisheries management in
the Great Lakes with an institutional design that incorporated a decision-making process
that promoted problem solving and a research based approach to the management of the
Great Lakes basin ecosystem fisheries (Prelli and Becker 2001). They often reviewed
land use and pollution impacts on fish, but stopped short of challenging the use and
release of contaminating chemicals on the fisheries or the people who consumed them
(Dempsey 2004).
The governance system under the IJC and the GLFC from 1978 until the early
1990s allowed for a social process that included a wide variety of actors, including
government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related institutions. In 1979 the UC
established a standing committee to assist in providing the public information service
called for in the 1978 agreement (GLWQA 1987) The basic concept was that citizens
have rights to participate in IJC activities and should be encouraged to do so.12 The
policy stressed that information should be provided while studies and activities were

12 Public participation in the governance of the Great Lakes had been mandated since 1909 by Treaty
(1909). Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the
United States and Canada. U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448..
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being carried out, not just after decisions were already made. The aim was to increase the
UC's credibility by taking public opinion into account (Becker 1993).
The UC was aware of the importance of public participation to the success of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance. It was also cognizant that the public would be
unable to participate meaningfully without education and increased understanding of the
ecosystem threats. In its 1980 report "Pollution of the Great Lakes Basin by Land Use"
the IJC advised that:
The PLUARG Public Hearings and the Public Consultation Panels which
preceded them demonstrated that most people are unaware of the extent to
which urban and rural land use activities affect the water quality of the
Great Lakes and of the fact that they themselves may be directly involved
and responsible for deteriorating ecosystem quality. The lack of awareness
of the effect of the various land use activities on water quality was
attributed mainly to the fact that there has been little or no public
education with respect to these diffuse sources of pollution. It was also
recognized that the acceptance and successful implementation of
PLUARG's recommendations would be possible only if there were an
informed public. A stronger educational program was recommended by
many witnesses at the public hearings as being the best way to create this
informed public. An informed and active public would also assist
Governments in reaching acceptable solutions to nonpoint pollution
problems and should be encouraged for this reason also. (IJC 1980,69)
While the details of ups and downs of the Great Lakes resource exploitation,
economic upheavals, and gyrations from ruin to recovery and back are oft-published
legacies of the region, the story is more personal to me. My family moved to St. Joseph,
Michigan, on the Southeast shore of Lake Michigan and at the mouth of the St. Joseph
River in the summer of 1960. My father was a career member of the U.S. Navy, so being
uprooted and moving somewhere every two years was no big deal, and I saw no reason to
be especially excited about this new place.
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Things changed. My first memories of our new home are all about the lake.
Swimming in fresh water for the first time was a jolt. I remember how clean it felt and
when you got out there was no residual stickiness that I associated with swimming in the
ocean. I could ride my bike from our home with a cane pole and catch perch that made
for incredibly tasty feasts. Ships could be seen transiting far offshore delivering iron ore
from the Lake Superior mines to the steel plants in Gary and East Chicago.
St. Joseph was a small, working class town. Most of my friends' parents worked
at a factory for Whirlpool, Auto Specialties, or one of many others in the area. There was
a thriving fishing industry. Many restaurants had weekly "all you can eat" perch specials
- a treat that was occasionally affordable for a family living on an enlisted man's wages.
As I grew up I watched the changes. Trips to the beach began to mean swimming
through brown foam floating where water met the land. The perch disappeared.
Mollhagen's fishery closed down and the odd fully enclosed lake fishing boats were no
longer visible heading out to the lake between the piers. Alewives (we called them
"shad") were everywhere in the lake, and swimming was now accompanied by seemingly
millions of dead alewives floating ashore to pile up on the beach. The only fishing I
could do was to submerge the end of my cane pole into the water and wave it around,
hook trailing, to snag shad and bring them home to bury under my mother's rose bushes.
The manufacturing plants began to close, moving their facilities to locations where, it
was said, labor was cheaper and costs were low. This meant "the south" at first; later
more plants closed as manufacturing moved off shore.
The town changed as well. Block after block of housing was torn down to make
way for a new courthouse here and a shopping mall there. The factory workers, to me,
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just faded away. The bowling alleys emptied. The annual picnic put on by Whirlpool for
its workers, the highlight of every summer, got smaller and smaller, then just stopped.
Too expensive, I suppose, and most of the workers were gone.
But in the early seventies, my high school years, the lake changed again. My
father would get me up at 5 am on many school days in the fall and spring and we'd be
off to put a small boat in the water and head out on the lake to troll for salmon and lake
trout before he went to work and me to school. My parents and neighbors complained
about having to buy phosphorous-free detergent, but the feasts returned and our freezer
was full, literally, of fish - fish that, years later, we heard we shouldn't eat because of
PCBs, mercury, and other persistent organic substances in their tissue. This advice we,
like many, simply ignored. Pointy headed scientists weren't going to tell us that our
fishing efforts were for naught. We had a freezer full of fish - always - and a dozen
ways to filet, steak, boil, and barbeque them. Besides, why would the government bother
to introduce salmon into the lake if you couldn't eat them when you caught them?
It was all there - on a very small scale. Right in front of my eyes I had
experienced the degradation of a fresh water ecosystem, the demise of our manufacturing
base and the humbling of an entire labor force. Yet news of these developments never
seemed to strike home. I remember hearing of Lake Erie's "death" and thinking that it
was a Lake Erie problem. The very real indicators of ruin and recovery through which I
swam and fished seemed somehow disconnected from those "other" problems that I
heard about on the news.
The fact is, however, that the Great Lakes were at a tipping point, precariously
close to thresholds that would have been devastating to cross. The story of their
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restoration, the governance changes, and the efforts of some very courageous and
dedicated groups and individuals that helped steer recovery, may provide lessons for the
present and the future. This is chiefly why the governance regime in the Great Lakes
Basin during the time period leading up to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, its
amendments, and protocols, roughly 1970 through 1992, was chosen as a comparative
case study for this project. It has personal meaning to me, and it also has many elements
in common with the current situation in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
Both are somewhat isolated bodies of water with many influences from land-based
activity. Further, many of the threats to the Great Lakes ecosystem are the same as those
thought to be threats to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine: Overextraction of marine
organisms, chemical pollution and eutrophication, together with toxic algae blooms,
alteration of physical habitat, invasive species, and global climate change (Steneck 2001).
Given this brief background, I will now examine the problem orientation, social
process, and decision process characteristics that evolved in the Great Lakes leading up to
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 and its subsequent adjustments through
1987 and some of the impacts thereafter. These characteristics can be compared to the
"ideal" characteristics developed through the use of the policy sciences analytical
framework as set forth in Chapter III. In Chapter VI will follow the same process for the
governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Watershed.
Ecosvstem-based Governance and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The ability to reconstruct the context of events and actions taken 30 to 40 years
ago in order to fit them within the analytical framework of the policy sciences is not
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without challenge. For instance, in hindsight, the problems in the Great Lakes in the
1960s and 1970s and their causes appear clear. It needs to be understood the actions
taken and policies developed were done in the moment. Thus while it may be clear to us
today that phosphorous and phosphates were an important factor contributing to
eutrophication in the Great Lakes, at the time no one could be sure that limiting
phosphorous inputs from water treatment plants and banning the use of phosphate
detergents would ultimately prove a turning point in the restoration of the lakes.
It is the intent of this project to make every attempt to approach and reconstruct
the goals, trends, conditions, actions and policy process from a perspective that may
prove helpful to the problems that exist today. Thus the fact that phosphates were banned
in the region through piecemeal state-by-state legislation after 1972 may well be less
important than the fact that there was a process that could be relied upon to explore the
possibility that phosphate releases should be banned and subsequent trends monitored
after the ban to learn whether it was a policy action that should be continued or adjusted
based on the objective data.
Problem Orientation
From the earlier discussion in chapters 2 and 3, it may be helpful to briefly
reiterate the role of problem orientation in the analysis of the Great Lakes Basin
watershed. Recall that the five tasks within problem orientation serve as an overall
"strategy to address problems and invent solutions (Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard
2000, 9). Thus:
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In problem orientation, the problems at hand must first be specified in
relation to the goals that people seek, thus permitting a clearer definition
of the problems than is otherwise possible. Historic trends must then be
described to see if events and decision making are moving toward or away
from the specified goals. Next, factors or conditions that have influenced
or caused these trends must be determined. When past trends and
conditions are adequately known, projections of future trends are possible.
Finally, after these four tasks have been completed and the necessary
information assembled, alternative courses of action for achieving the
stated goals can be invented; evaluated according to their effectiveness,
efficiency, and equitability in solving the problem (Clark 2008, 57).
Goal Clarification. Goal clarification involves the process by which goals are
determined for a given community. The emphasis on the protection and advancement of
human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the policy sciences approach
(deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the effects of human decisions
on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment capable of sustaining
human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human dignity begins to make
sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many cultural traditions
throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape and share power,
wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and respect" (Lasswell and
MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified that the policy sciences
strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human dignity for the many, not
the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since the goal is dignity for the
many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving equal opportunity for participation in
power, wealth, well-being, and the other important values (Lasswell 1971).
As discussed in chapter III the key goal clarification characteristics of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance are:
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process;
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2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness and
understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options, and
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of
ecosystem functions.

How does the governance regime during the early years under the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement stack up against our notion of an ideal ecosystem-based
approach to governance?
First we must look to the extent of public and/or community participation and
input into the goal process. As we know, the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem was a
polluted and degraded mess by the mid-1960s. The initial goals for the Great Lakes
Basin initially came from two powerful government sources. In the wake of the publicity
that followed the burning of Ohio's Cuyahoga River and a massive oil spill off the
California coast, the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act
(the Clean Water Act) were passed into law over the veto of President Nixon (Gross and
Dodge 2005). Under the 1972 Amendments, the objective was to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." 33 U.S. C. §
1251(a).
The 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act prohibited the discharge of
pollutants without a permit and set the stage for the clean-up of publicly owned treatment
works ("POTWs"). The Act, however, was applicable only to the United States and its
territories. On the Canadian side, Parliament enacted the Canada Water Act (1970).
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In the Great Lakes region, the International Joint Commission ("IJC"), a bilateral
body of six commissioners, three from each country that had evolved from the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the U.S. (1909) had been investigating
pollution problems in the region pursuant to references13 received from both Canada and
the United States (IJC 1970; IJCIRG 1978; IJC 1980). The IJC was responding not only
to the growth of public concern about pollution, and references made to IJC, but also to
citizen movements that..exploded with demonstrations and campaigns throughout the
late 1960s and early 1970s...public demands for actions increased as huge windrows of
decaying algae piled up on Lake Ontario beaches, and a massive alewife die-off in Lake
Michigan in 1967 not only interfered with swimming but threatened public water supplies
and caused a secondary die-off due to botulism of shorebirds who fed on the dead fish"
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,14).
The Great Lakes therefore had general goals and objectives initially from two
powerful sources - one stemming from treaty and the other from the Clean Water Act.
One word, integrity, however, was never defined in the Agreement and its meaning
continues to be debated (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). There is no question, however,
that the word took on a broad and significant meaning to many of those responsible for

13 One of the powers granted to the IJC by treaty to assist in its function to resolve disputes and avoid
conflicts involving the Canada/US boundary waters is the power to investigate specific situations and make
recommendations to governments based on a "reference" received from either or both of the parties. The
IJC began receiving references concerning pollution in 1946 and the GLWQA arose out of a 1964 joint
reference concerning pollution in the lower lakes (Erie and Ontario) Botts, L. and P. Muldoon (2005).
Evolution of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. East Lansing, MI, Michigan State University
Press.
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the development of the GLWQA.14 To some who participated in the GLWQA
investigation and development, including influential members of the Science Advisory
Board during these crucial debates, the notion of integrity15 was synonymous with
integration:

Integrity became a key word in thel972 Federal Water Pollution Act
[Amendments]. A senior ecologist George Woodwell... at Woods Hole...
who had been working on the effects of radioactive radiation on a pine
forest in on Long Island, NY... recommended to Senator Muskie to bring
in the word "integrity" as a good thing to which to strive in the federal
water pollution control. I suspect.. .1 never found out why he proposed
it.. .but, integration was a very good word in the '60s amongst activists.
Gender integration, racial integration, and to some extent there was an
emphasis on poverty. So, if you think integration, disintegration.. .that
was a concept that sort of perfused the whole politics of those days it was
a key consideration. It's actually related to justice. Integrity was related
to justice. And our Great Lakes to me, and Lee Botts, and George and
many more.. .we have got that. (Canadian Academic 2)
Policy and progress in the Great Lakes between the U.S. and Canada did not end
with the 1972 GLWQA. While the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and GLWQA of 1972 announced laudable broad goals (and in the case of the
Annexes to the GLWQA, some specific goals concerning particular contaminants), the
GLWQA also directed programs and other measures for the achievement of the water
quality objectives, including the development of measures for the abatement and control
of pollution from land use activities. Article VI of the initial GLWQA agreement

14 "Integrity" was added to the GLWQA by the 1978 Amendments (1987). Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S„ 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384. ibid.
15

Interestingly, Henry Regier once noted that: . .Proponents of the term "integrity" for the U.S. Federal
laws [and citing, inter alia, to Woodwell] apparently understood that a political process in which
benefit/cost ratios played a dominant role must threaten integrity..." Regier, H. A. (1993). The Notion of
Natural and Cultural Integrity. Ecological Integrity and the Management of Ecosystems. S. Woodley, J.
Kay and G. Francis. Ottawa, St. Lucie Press: 3 - 1 8 .
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authorized an investigation of pollution from land use activities, and mandated that the
Commission would set up boards16 and commissions and issue reports annually
concerning the progress of the parties toward the achievement of water quality goals and
the effectiveness of the programs (1972; Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005;
GLWQA 1987).
Annual reports concerning the progress being made toward water quality
objectives under the GLWQA were issued by the Boards and advisory groups to the IJC
from 1972 through 1978.
Direct citizen participation in the work of the UC under the provisions of
the 1972 Agreement was relatively limited between 1972 and 1975.
However, public interest in Great Lakes pollution problems continued to
be very high, and citizens increasingly demanded access to information
and a voice in Agreement work. Pressure for direct access to the
Commission's work was exerted by citizen action groups, such as the Lake
Michigan Federation, the United Auto Workers, and the League of
Women Voters on the United States side of the Basin. Canadian citizen
groups exhibiting an early interest in direct involvement included the
Conservation Council of Ontario, the Canadian Environmental Law
Research Foundation, and various local organizations, such as cottagers'
associations (Becker 1993, 244).
As citizen pressure mounted, the IJC and its Boards began to recognize the need
for public support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build
infrastructure, it took affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993).
The meetings between the boards and the IJC began to be made public in 1975 and . .in
time presentation of the board reports to the UC in public meetings became a mechanism

16

There were two advisory boards originally set up under the GLWQA in 1972. The Water Quality Board
and the Research Advisory Board (later the Science Advisory Board) (1987). Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S., 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384.
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for increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as well as for citizen
activism" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,23). In addition, the UC hired a professional public
relations staff to augment its Great Lakes Regional Office.
The UC reports and publication of documents and other measures increased
credibility and boosted public involvement in agreement-related activities, often in the
early stage of implementation (CUSIS 1991; Botts and Muldoon 2005). In addition, the
1972 GLWQA enabled the UC to create the International Reference Group on Pollution
from Land Use Activities (PLUARG) (Colbum, Davidson et al. 1990). The PLUARG
panels, like the panels created for the Upper Lakes Reference Group (ULRG) were
illustrative of the representation of a broad range of the public and interested parties in
the process used by the UC. Great Lakes Tomorrow was contracted by the UC for
outreach and pre-hearing educational workshops on issues relevant to the work of the UC
and its panels. The work of Great Lakes Tomorrow in these cases was:
...to prepare the public for the UC hearings on technically complex
reports. These UC boards required the contractor to: develop community
profile to systematically identify the groups and individuals whose
interests would likely be affected, prepare lengthy mailing lists of
individuals representing the target publics; and design and implement a
media campaign to reach others who might have an interest. Besides
recruiting participation from the public at large, those targeted publics
were recruited explicitly to elicit their participation in the workshops and
hearings (Becker 1993,242).
PLUARG ultimately established 17 public advisory panels throughout the
watershed. Representation on the panels went far beyond experts to include municipal
leaders, elected officials, farmers, academics, environmental activists, labor unions and
other interested individuals (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005). "PLUARG really
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did want to know what the panels thought. Panels met formally (at least) four times to
discuss and make recommendations on the social, environmental, and economic aspects
of the PLUARG study. Most panels also articulated their goals for the future of the Great
Lakes to provide a context for their deliberations" (Becker 1993,247). One significant
result of the panel process was that PLUARG's final report influenced the agenda of the
IJC (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005) and, as explained by a PLUARG
participant, helped usher in the adoption of the "ecosystem-based approach" language
incorporated into the 1978 protocol:
In 1978, when the PLUARG Report was going to come in, they asked us
to facilitate the public process, but the committee had decided that, "oh my
gosh, we're going to have to have a public process because the treaty says
we have to do this." They didn't do it at the beginning of PLUARG, they
did it during the last year... We reported directly to both the Commission
and PLUARG.. .the collective recommendations of what came up from all
of those panels, on both about the process of engaging the public and
about substantive issues. The general consensus was that the process that
PLUARG had run, which Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated, we
facilitated all the hearings that went on around the lakes on both sides.
We also reported as an organization on what we saw. The public
composition didn't matter because the panel was really diverse in terms of
the representation. They included industry.. .by then everybody's at the
table.. .the result was that they really liked that model of participation and
recommended that the Commission empower its reference toward another
initiative to use similar process. To my knowledge it hasn't happened
since... Because the outcome of the process was a significant change in
the Panel's report in terms of what ought to be done with respect to what
the references reported out. It was a very radical report in terms of what
needed to happen. That was the thread that Great Lakes Tomorrow kind
of ran through and realized, and when that report hit the fan, that we were
going to a) change the Agreement—in 78 the agreement was renegotiated
and the ecosystem approach was adopted, and so then that raised a whole
other flag about what we needed to do in terms of getting our heads
wrapped around it—what does this mean, how are you going to implement
it, and what does this mean for the people who have to make decisions
here, there and everywhere? That's where the "Decisions for the Great
Lakes Program" came from. It was to lay the groundwork for engaging
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the relevant stakeholders in restoring the health of the Great Lakes. (US
NGO/Academic)
It was not just PLUARG panel doing outreach in the Great Lakes. Another group,
the Lake Michigan Federation, was doing outreach in connection with the Great Lakes
Basin Commission (GLBC).17 When the Basin Commission requested public comment
related to a draft Framework plan designed to assess public sentiment on what was most
important in the region. In other words, what did the public prefer on the issue of
"environmental quality" versus "economic development?" The Lake Michigan
Federation held a series of meetings around the region in 1975. As its president at the
time recounts:
The mission of the Lake Michigan Federation was ... "citizen action to
save the Great Lake." So things continued and by 1975, '74/'75, the
GLBC had a draft framework plan getting ready to be presented for the
formal review that was part of the process laid out for it. One of the big
issues was that under the.. .1 can't remember if they were called standards,
rules, regulations or whatever, but the operating governance rules for the
Basin Commission was, that part of what the plan was supposed to do was
to say what was most important in the region. Was it economic
development or environmental protection? There might have been a third.
But, the real issue was between economic development and environmental
protection. So, there was.. .the Basin Commission set up a series of public
meetings to be held to pose that question, and because they were getting
the most noise from Lake Michigan.. .1 think they only had like four or six
or seven such things altogether...but, four of them occurred around Lake
Michigan... and this was a standard way we operated a lot in those
days.. .issues would come up and we would carry out, in effect, an
information or an education campaign to inform the local communities or
organizations about the issues from the perspective as a regional issue that
needed local input. (US NGO 2)

17

The Great Lakes Basin Commission was one of six regional "river basin commissions" that were created
by the 1965 Federal Water Resources Planning Act. Its mission was to coordinate water resource activities
between the 8 state and various federal agencies in the Great Lakes region.
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As a result of these meetings, public officials were "astounded by the strong
support expressed for "environmental quality: as a regional goal over economic
development" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,42).
From the above it is clear that goal clarification process utilized by the IJC was
intentionally designed to gather broad public input as part its efforts to restore the Great
Lakes under the GLWQA. Illustrative are the efforts of the PLUARG process, which
ultimately altered the goals and agenda for the 1978 amendments to the GLWQA and
ushered in the practice of using a basin-wide ecosystem-approach to the IJC's efforts in
the region. Also of note is the process used by the GLBC to gather input on priorities of
the public by holding public meetings to determine whether the public preferred
economic development or environmental protection as a focus of its new Framework
plan. The result of its public outreach, perhaps much to its chagrin, demonstrated that the
public was more interested in environmental quality than economic development.
Unfortunately the strength of the citizen involvement process fostered by
PLUARG began to fade after the final recommendations and the passage of the 1978
amendments to the GLWQA. The cohesive group of citizen experts and participants was
not used to monitor the actions of the Parties after the final Commission
recommendations (Becker 1993) The public involvement that drove PLUARG can fairly

take credit for the inclusion of the ecosystem-based approach in the 1978 amendments
(Botts and Muldoon 2005), but there has not been sufficient public pressure or political
will to follow through or implement other goals set out in either the 1978 amendments or
the 1987 protocol (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993). The 1978 amendments,
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for instance, adopt a "zero discharge" philosophy for achieving the standards for the
persistent toxic substances.18 Other than banning DDT, PCBs and dieldrin, no initiatives
have been successful in banning other persistent organic pollutants (Colburn, Davidson et
al. 1990).
The criteria for goal clarification under an ideal ecosystem-based governance
regime were as follows:
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process;
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to governance options
and ecosystem issues, and
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of
ecosystem functions.

The experience in the Great Lakes under the GLWQA seems to demonstrate that
the UC reacted to immense public pressure by seeking community participation in the
goal clarification process through its insistence on transparency, public meetings, and
public debate which, as demonstrated by PLUARG, resulted in meaningful expression of
community and public goals and interests (Table 24). The public outreach component of
goal clarification was present during the same period with Great Lakes Tomorrow, the
Lake Michigan Federation, and others traveling to venues around the watershed to
educate people on the issues confronting the IJC and, then, reporting back their
impressions and findings. Finally it would appear that the public participation in a
variety of significant topics was broad, well-informed, and placed a premium on
18

Persistent toxic substances are defined at Annex 12 (l)(a) as
. .any toxic substance with a half-life in water of greater than eight weeks.. .(1987). Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T.1384; Protocol to Amend the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement of 1978, Nov. 18,1987, Can.-U.S., 1987 Can. T.S. No. 32. 30U.S.T. 1384.
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environmental quality. As the work of the Lake Michigan Federation demonstrated, the
public preferred this attribute over economic development. In the case of PLUARG, the
results are clear that the public believed that the GLWQA should be expanded to include
the entire basin so that governance could be extended beyond the lakes into the watershed
where land uses were impacting water quality.
Table 24 Goal Clarification
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Governance

Meaningful public and/or
community participation and input
in the goal clarification process.
National goals may provide
guidance but community has broad
input into how to achieve goals.
Goal choices have broad community
acceptance

Public interest high in region in 1970s. Many
citizen action groups demanding direct involvement
and access. IJC recognizes need for public support.
PLUARG and UGLR panels and investigations
hold hearings and draft reports to IJC. Major force
behind 1978 addition of ecosystem-based approach
to GLWQA. IJC annual and biennial reports and
publications increase credibility and understanding
of public. Annual IJC meetings made public and
become mechanism for public understanding and
civic activism. Regional office opened and public
relations staff hired by IJC. Citizen participation
on IJC Boards and panels.
Wingpread conferences begin early-on with broad
participation. GLT contracted by IJC for outreach
and pre-hearing educational workshops throughout
basin. GLT also works with RAP facilitation.
Lake Michigan holds public hearings at request of
GLBC. Decisions for Great Lakes to educate and
train leaders in the ecosystem approach and its
implementation.
GLWQA articulates general goals and numerous
specific goals. Democracy fostered by increased
public participation, access and input to
government decision making.
Participants in GLWQA governance considered
ecosystem "integrity" to include justice and
equality.

Strong public outreach and
education provide ability to establish
community goals inclusive of human
dignity and democracy and provide
basis for clarifying common
interests. Human dignity includes
economic fairness and sustainability.
Multiple goals may be integrated
that embrace human dignity,
economic fairness for the many, and
equal access to governance with a
focus on maintenance and
preservation of the integrity and
resilience of ecosystem functions.

It is sad, however, that the PLUARG group of knowledgeable citizens was
allowed to lapse. This was despite the fact that the UC urged the parties to continue and
expand the public participation component and to increase overall education and outreach
(IJC 1980). The goals of the region are still in place - qualitatively to restore and
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maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters. While
the original individuals involved in the development of the GLWQA Agreements may
have intended for "integrity" to have a broader meaning that included basic human
dignity and democracy (CUSIS 1991), the interpretations since that time have been far
narrower.
So the involvement of the public in goal clarification has waxed and waned under
the GLWQA agreements and protocols. It is important, however, to remember how
public involvement made change possible for a significant period of time, and how
difficult implementation has become without a galvanized citizenry. It is also important
to realize the extent of public outreach and education and how instrumental such efforts
were in creating a knowledgeable public capable of offering valuable local knowledge
and input to regulators and UC officials.
The final characteristic of the goal clarification task is whether there are multiple
goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to governance with a premium
placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. The key,
again, may be the notion of integrity.
The GLWQA has numerous goals different from but related to water quality. The
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement establishes the overall environmental goal:
"restoring the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem" to achieve healthy populations of plant, fish, and wildlife populations
and to protect human health. The Agreement mandates the protection and restoration of
habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of plants, fish, and
wildlife, with an emphasis on interjurisdictional fish and wildlife habitats, wetland
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habitats, and those habitats needed by threatened and endangered species. Further, the
GLWQA recognizes that in order to restore the biological integrity of the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem self-sustaining populations of fish and other aquatic organisms must be
protected (USEPA 1992; GLWQA 1987). Finally, the institutional mandate and structure
of the GLFC enables it to collaborate and generate deliberations that identify interrelated
components of the "fish system" and thereby determine catch limitations based on the
needs for restoration and the health of the ecosystem. The focus, therefore, in
collaboration with the UC and the federal, provincial, and state agencies with
responsibility for fisheries is on the common goal..to sustain the functional integrity of
ecosystems while producing desired resources and environmental services; any practices
contrary to that goal are viewed as illegitimate" (Prelli and Becker 2001,481)
Thus the goals and objectives extant under the GLWQA governance regime
appear to have had multiple goals and objectives that embraced human dignity (via
human health and greater access to decision-making) and that placed a premium on the
integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. Again, the goals and objectives may be
satisfactory and sufficient, if achieved, to foster a sustainable governance system. The
achievement of these goals, however, relies upon the Parties to the GLWQA. An
examination of the trends of public participation, public outreach efforts, and toward the
restoration and protection goals of the GLWQA will help determine whether progress is
trending toward those goals.
Describing Trends. In order to assess the trends for the governance regime under
the GLWQA, it is necessary to view the situation from the perspective of a time traveler
transported to the late 1960s. Trends need to be examined in the context of what became
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known to participants in the governance system under the GLWQA, its amendments, and
the 1987 protocol, through the early 1990s.
The trends task in an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance has been
discussed and may be characterized by:
1) Collaboration and the use of reliable methods and data in order to measure
whether socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals,
2) The open and transparent communication of the progress and trends data to
policy makers and to an informed public with significant opportunities for
community members to be involved with scientists in the assessment of trends
using local knowledge and local preferences (Table 25).

Table 25 Descibing Trends
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Governance

The use of reliable methods to measure
whether a suite of socioecological variables are
moving closer to, not away from, goals
established with significant input from
community.

1972 GLWQA successful at stemming
eutrophication due to phosphorus overloading.
PLUARG key in expanding later agreements to
include land-based activities. Emphasis in later
GLWQA amendments and protocol shifted to
toxic contamination. Collaborative efforts
between IJC, WQB, SAB, GLU, GLBC, and
the Lake Michigan Federation work to identify
problems and sources and put pressure on
toxics issues. Great Lakes Fisheries
Commission collaborates with SAB and IJC on
water quality, habitat, and fisheries issues.
Introduction of Pacific Salmon as experiment
rebuilds fish populations in the lakes. Trends
show increasing threats from toxic
contaminants.
GLWQA emphasis on cooperation and
collaboration with interlocking directors,
citizen participation on boards and panels,
biennial public meetings, active NGOs, IJC
biennial reports and other publications.
Biennial "state of the lake" reports published
with assistance from citizens and NGOs. GLIN
on-line resource established in 1998 creating
public access to data, assessments,
publications, and reports relevant to the GLB.
Use of GLT and other NGOs for public
education and outreach to create a
knowledgeable base of "citizen scientists."

Open and transparent communication of the
progress and trend data to policy makers and to
an informed public through frequent meetings,
accessible information, and other techniques.
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In other words, trends are examined in terms of the movement of governance
toward a more participatory and holistic ecosystem-approach; and whether the
socioecological trends are moving toward more sustainable and resilient ecosystem
functions.
As the previous chapter discussed, during the PLUARG process under the
GLWQA, there was open and transparent communication by the UC and its Boards to a
public made more knowledgeable by extensive and effective outreach efforts. There was
also laudable opportunity for community members to be involved with scientists and
regulators in the assessment of trends through panel meetings, regular annual (then
biennial) meetings of the IJC, and participation of knowledgeable citizens on IJC Boards
and panels (UCIRG 1978). The question that remains is whether there was evidence that
trends moved closer to, not away from, the goals the period examined by this research.
The trend toward public action and participation under the PLUARG and UGLR
processes, a trend that made the 1972 GLWQA and, to some extent, the 1978
amendments possible, began to fade after the 1978 amendments:
Unfortunately the IJC and the Parties 'dropped the ball' and never took
advantage of the PLUARG's potential. The Commission failed to make
use of the pool of expert and committed citizens to monitor the Parties'
actions in response to the IJC's recommendations. The Parties failed to
respond directly to the Commission's PLUARG recommendations in any
formal way, although amending the Agreement in 1978 to formally adopt
an ecosystem approach could be interpreted, in part, as a response. The
Parties also failed to allocate resources to the IJC for follow-up on the
public consultation process in PLUARG. Further, the knowledgeable
citizen veterans of the PLUARG initiative didn't see any direct and
substantive results in the GLWQA compliance activities of their own
governments in response to the Reference Group's report. As a result, the
citizens lost a certain amount of faith in the ability of both the IJC and the
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Parties to work collaboratively with their constituencies. This 'critical
mass' of advocates for early and decentralized implementation of the
ecosystem management aspects of the 1978 Agreement was not cultivated
further and the momentum was lost (Becker 1993,248 - 249)
The 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA did not end public involvement in the
Great Lakes Basin governance scheme, however. Great Lakes Tomorrow, the non-profit
group headquartered in Hiram, Ohio, that had taken such an active role in public outreach
and education throughout the basin, was kept busy and, among other projects, was asked
to conduct a workshop in 1983 supported by the IJC, the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission (GLFC), and others. The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate the
movement toward the ecosystem approach mandated by the 1978 Amendments.
Attendees included Commissioners and staff of the UC, major corporations, foundations,
local and regional elected officials and others. After identifying potential obstacles to its
attainment, including rationalist thinking and lack of holistic perspective, the participants
drafted a set of 33 strategies for implementation (Becker 1993).
Public participation thereafter began to coalesce more within established
environmental organizations. The Lake Michigan Federation became an umbrella for
most of the groups around Lake Michigan, while advocating for Great Lakes Basin-wide
issues on behalf of its members. Another group, Great Lakes United (GLU), was formed
in May, 1982, in a now mildly famous emergency gathering on Mackinac Island funded
by the Joyce Foundation and arranged by agreement between "Save the River," from the
Thousand Island region of New York and the Michigan United Conservation Clubs
(MUCC). The purpose of the meeting was to consider MUCC's proposal to form a
"Great Lakes Federation" and was attended by representatives from the UAW as well as
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staff and members of local and national environmental organizations. GLU was formed
and played a huge role in the negotiations for the 1987 protocol amending the GLWQA
(Francis 1990). Convening some 19 citizens' hearings around the basin in 1986, the GLU
ultimately published "Unfilled Promises," a report that called for faster and stronger
measures to stem toxic contamination and laid out the argument for greater involvement
of the public and more accountability for governments under the agreement. GLU also
played key roles in organizing its binational membership to play roles in IJC's biennial
meetings, and in fact meets once a year to develop consensus for positions to be advanced
to the IJC (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The extent and influence of public involvement in the governance of the Great
Lakes Basin under the GLWQA has waned from the intense days after the original 1972
agreement and before the 1978 Amendments. While citizen involvement remained a
potent force in many ways, the momentum built by the PLUARG and ULRG efforts was
diminished somewhat following 1978. The trend after the 1987 protocol was for the
greater participation of NGOs, mostly those national environmental organizations that
had begun to join the movement in the 1980s. They were joined at biennial meetings of
the IJC, starting in 1989, by numerous (and sometimes raucous) grassroots organizations
concerned about toxic contamination. Their presence transformed IJC biennial meetings
from dry exchanges of information into major demonstrations of public opinion. "The
increased activism enhanced political support for the Great Lakes programs and led to
new, strong U.S. legislation in support of the agreement in the United States, and to
major policy developments in both countries" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,136).
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There was, however, still a governance regime, with two powerful governments
linked by the GLWQA and a fragmented, multi-jurisdictional domestic legal scheme
presiding over the binational Great Lakes Basin and its watershed. How well did
governance perform? Were socioecological measures moving in the direction of goals?
The general goal agreed to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the Great Lakes
through the 1987 Protocol is to "restore, and maintain the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem (1987, Article II)"
The ecosystem is defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and living
organisms, including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River"
(1987, Article I (g)). As we have seen additional goals called for the protection and
maintenance of self-sustaining fish populations and aquatic organisms and for protection
and restoration of habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of
plants, fish, and wildlife. The water quality trends will be examined first.
More specific goals and implementation strategies set forth in the GLWQA
evolved through the 1972 Agreement, the 1978 Amendments, and the 1987 Protocol.
The 1972 Agreement was concerned mainly with the elimination of phosphorous inputs
via water treatment facility upgrades and a phosphate detergent ban. It also provided that
the discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts was prohibited, and the list of toxic
substances has grown to over 400 in the 1987 Protocol (1987, Article II, Annex 10,
Appendix 1-2), was prohibited. The 1978 Amendments included revised and more
stringent water quality target loadings for phosphorous (1987, Annex 3). Since the
PLUARG studies demonstrated the connection between water quality and land-based
nonpoint sources the IJC, after a preliminary meeting with the GLFC, endorsed the
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ecosystem-based approach for inclusion in the 1978 amendments. Finally, the 1978
Amendments introduced 'virtual elimination' as either a goal or philosophy.19
The demonstrated trends pertinent to this litany of goals and objectives have been
mixed. Recall that the primary culprit for eutrophication and algae growth in the lakes,
especially Lake Erie, was phosphorous. The primary purpose of the initial 1972 GLWQA
was to reduce phosphorous and improve waste water treatment. This was largely based
on a 1970 report in which the IJC highlighted the serious pollution problems in the waters
of Lakes Ontario and Erie and the St. Lawrence River which was causing injury to health
and property. The report also noted that 70% of the phosphorous in U.S. sewage and
50% of the phosphorous in Canadian sewage originated from detergents and
recommended improved sewage treatment by municipalities and industry and a reduction
in the phosphorous content of detergents "to the maximum practicable extent at the
earliest possible time" (IJC 1970) As one member of the of the Research Advisory Board
at the time described the situation in Lake Erie:
There was just severe gross pollution. There was nothing subtle about it.
And then the lower lakes had all of the eutrophication as one form of
nutrient enrichment, so they had all that to deal with, and that was pretty
gross when you look back at it now. (Canadian Academic 1)
In fact, untreated sewage pouring into the lakes had been a problem for decades,
as the following recollection from a former SAB member illustrates:

19

There is disagreement. Article 11(a) of the GLWQA states: "The discharge of... any or all persistent
toxic substances be virtually eliminated..." while, at Annex 12(2)(a)(i) the GLWQA sets forth: "The intent
of programs specified in this Annex is to virtually eliminate the input of persistent toxic substances in order
to protect human health and to ensure the continued health and productivity of living aquatic resources and
human use thereof...
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In 1943, as a thirteen year old swimming in Lake Ontario Just west of the
mouth of the Niagara River, Four Mile Creek. Four Mile Creek was a
famous well-known, very productive seining site. In 1943 we were
swimming in Lake Ontario, my family had moved there, and at that time,
soon after that they started urging people not to go into the lake because of
polio, and it was the raw untreated sewage coming down from St.
Catharines. I knew people who got polio. So Lake Ontario was a
dangerous place. (Canadian Academic 2)
Over strong opposition from the Soap and Detergent Association, led by Proctor
and Gamble, the UC adopted strong phosphorous abatement recommendations in the
1972 GLWQA. Citizens and environmental advocates then pressed their state and
provincial lawmakers to implement strict limitations through legislation. One by one
Ontario and the states passed laws requiring the removal of phosphates from detergents.
The USEPA reversed its previous stand and in 1977 joined with the UC and its Water
Quality Board to recommend that all states in the Great Lakes Basin adopt a detergent
phosphate ban (USEPA 1977). The movement toward improved water quality received a
boost from the provisions of the Clean Water Act that paid for 75% of costs for
municipalities to improve their waste water treatment (1972). Spending on treatment
plant projects in the Great Lakes alone exceeded $8 billion from the late 1970 to the 1990
(USEPA 1991). As a result of these measures, by 1991 the USEPA was able to report to
the U.S. Congress that nutrient levels in the Great Lakes Watershed had significantly
diminished, and that "[t]he two nations have achieved a world-class success in abating
nutrient-related algae problems in Lake Erie. Levels of many targeted contaminants have
declined drastically in fish and wildlife, resulting in clear improvements in the health of
many species" (USEPA 1991, i)
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One key member of an NGO in the Great Lakes at the time described the impact
of the GLWQA on water quality:

Q:
Why do you think.. .when you say it was successful of the
GLWQA process, what happened that made you think it was successful?
What changed? Did the Great Lakes get cleaner? Did the water quality
improve?
A:
Yes. The water quality improved. For one thing, when we started,
you could smell it, see it, and taste it.
Q:
There's a correlation.. .there's a cause and effect between the
agreement and the cleanup?
A:
Oh yes. Absolutely. Because, the agreement at that time was so
essential in driving action and the allocation of resources to build strategic
plans, we had planning going on all over the basin for dealing with the
point source stuff, you had all kinds of action on the part of both citizens
and politicians on getting the phosphorous detergent bans. (US
NGO/Academic)
While the waters of the Great Lakes visibly improved in a relatively short period
of time, and basking in the glory of these improvements, additional monies poured in for
Great Lakes research and monitoring. From 1975, the annual full RAB report was
supplemented by increasing numbers of separate reports describing a proposal to
combine the study of the structure and activity of persistent bioaccumulative toxic
contaminants. As early as 1975 a monitoring and surveillance plan was in place to
monitor the lakes, their tributaries, and other areas for pollutants, including persistent
toxic substances (IJCWQB 1975). Reports thereafter began to express a growing concern
about the number and extent of discoveries of toxic contaminants (UCIRG 1978; USEPA
1980a). These discoveries were being made at about the same time that newspapers were
trumpeting stories of Michigan dealing with the contamination of water supplies by
polybrominated biphenyls (PBBs). Further groundwater contaminated with toxic
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substances were being found in Great Lakes states, raising additional concern about
preservation of the water quality in the lakes as a future source clean drinking water
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). When high levels of PCBs were found in fish tissue
from a small lake on Isle Royale in northern Lake Superior it became obvious that
chemicals were being transported long distances through the atmosphere as there were no
other possible sources in this location. The RAB report also set forth the number of
chemicals found in the Great Lakes that were persistent organic compounds and pointed
out their ability to bioaccumulate. By the late 1970s nearly a thousand chemicals had
been found, "though the list for priority action would be refined to 11 criteria substances"
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,47). Thus water quality trends in the Great Lakes were a
mixed bag. Pollution due to nutrient overloads had vastly improved in a short time while,
during the same time, monitoring efforts were revealing the existence of persistent
organic compounds, including PCBs and PBBs in sediments and fish tissue, was
escalating. As one individual involved in the RAB investigation at the time put it:
...they [had] made good grounds in cutting the phosphorus out of the
water, and cutting back on eutrophication, and of course we've started
finding more toxic contaminants of various kinds, and at least they tried to
deal with them as they came across them as best they could, but then the
more they got into...or agencies got into looking into the water and the
sediment and the fish, the more they found, and of course as the detection
levels became more sophisticated in the more you can find. So that threw
it into the whole mode of trying to deal with toxic contaminants, and
particularly in trying to identify the key ones, the ones that are known to
be widespread within the lakes, and also have biomagnification properties
and therefore potential for health effects. It revealed first in fish and
wildlife, but then there's some sense that there may be some human
concerns. So that evolved through the '80's and '90's... (Canadian
Academic 1)
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Thus the growing toxic contamination became the focus of the efforts of the IJC
through the 1978 amendments and the 1987 protocol, including the call for "an
ecosystem approach to management" based on "virtual elimination" of toxic
contaminants (GLWQA 1987).
The trends in water quality in the Great Lakes have, like the trends in public
participation, waxed and waned. The binational approach to governance so essential to
achieving the goals of the GLWQA has deteriorated over the last 20 years (Jackson and
Sloan 2008). The critical engagement of the public in Great Lakes issues and the
accompanying sense of community has also largely fallen away over the same period
(Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007). But what about healthy fish populations - another
important indicator in a region devoted to clean water and healthy ecosystems?
Stories of the bounty of Great Lakes fisheries in the 18th and 19th centuries
abound. Boat loads of sturgeon were not uncommon near the Wisconsin shore where
they were treated as nuisance fish and cast aside to die after being pulled from nets.
When their value for caviar was discovered, the few remaining sturgeon were decimated.
In the early 19th century boatloads of trout were not uncommon around Sault St. Marie.
By the mid-1880s that commercial fishery had all but disappeared. In 1830 the Maumee
River in Ohio was famous for its abundance of fish - some thirty odd varieties, including
"[mjaskinonge, pike, white and black bass, and catfish were caught, salted and sold fresh
each year for food, amounting to some thousands of barrels yearly" (Dempsey 2004, 38)
Landlocked Atlantic salmon, once prolific in Lake Ontario, were extirpated by 1903.
Finally, whitefish, the delectable staple of Great Lakes commercial fishing, began to
decline precipitously, with whitefish harvests falling from 24.3 million pounds in 1879 to
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9 million pounds in 1899 (Dempsey 2004; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). The story of the
demise of the whitefish fishery bears resemblance to many other similar stories around
the globe:

The stunning advancement of nets and fishing gear, as well as the
increasing number of commercial anglers, fueled ever-growing fears about
the fate of the fishery. In the early 1800s most fishing was conducted
close to shore and fish caught were sold to local markets. But the second
half of the nineteenth century revolutionized fishing techniques, enabling
harvesters to target more species, capture fish in deeper waters, and fish
during a greater portion of the year (Dempsey 2004,42)
Not surprisingly, the decline in whitefish caused attention to turn to lake trout and
hearing. More elusive and greater populations kept this fishery robust well into the
twentieth century before collapsing (Dempsey 2004). But, as a former Commissioner of
the GLFC notes in this exchange, fishers in the Great Lakes can be persistent:
A:
There's always been active commercial fishery on the Canadian
side. On the U.S. side, [three] things caused the commercial fishery to go
downhill fast. One of them was unionization of the fishermen. And
secondly it was the sportfishermen. And the third one was the
environment. A small commercial fishery still persists on the U.S. side.
Q:

The commercial fishery in Canada was it for walleye?

A:
Well, the blues but they disappeared, and then the walleye. And
smelt was pretty important. Not necessarily on the US side, but the
Canadian side in particular. The trawling that was done then and with
strong federal subsidies, the smelt fishery was really quite effective for a
long time. It wasn't as lucrative as, comparatively speaking, as the white
fish industry. The walleye was never as important on the Canadian side as
it was in the U.S. But they were important. And yellow perch came along.
Yellow perch and walleye, particularly, were preadapted to succeed
reasonably well in a highly eutrophic environment. They are preadapted
to the way Lake Erie became. (Canadian Academic 2)
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Unfortunately, the few lake trout and whitefish that survived until the 1930s
became targets of lamprey eels, an invasive species that made it through the Welland
Canal from the Atlantic and lived by feeding on fish - attaching themselves to the body
of a larger fish and slowly draining them of life (Ashworth 1987). By the time that
Canada and the U.S. ratified a Convention that created the Great Lakes Fisheries
Commission in 1955 it was estimated that lake trout production was 99% lower than the
average annual commercial catch in the 1930s. Commercial fishing was history. Sport
fishermen abandoned the lakes (Dempsey 2004).
To add misery to the Great Lakes situation, a small silver fish, the alewife, began
to sweep into the Great Lakes. Although it was forage for larger fish when there were
larger fish, after predator populations crashed with the lamprey eel invasion, the
population soon exploded in size. One of their most memorable traits was the mass dieoff that occurred every spring, starting in the 1960s, when water temperatures began to
rise. It was in response to the alewife issues that Michigan sought and received
permission from other Great Lakes states and Ontario to try a field experiment. Thus in
1966 they released some 650,000 Coho salmon smolts into rivers around Lake Michigan
and crossed their fingers. The same fall, young salmon returned to their streams of
origin, filling the heads of recreational fishermen with dreams of a salmon fishery. The
autumn of 1967 was better than anyone had could have dreamed (Dempsey 2004).
Salmon fought ferociously when hooked and, from personal experience, earned
those who landed one bragging rights on the pier or back at the dock. Needless to say a
powerful recreational fishing industry developed around the Coho and Chinook salmon
introductions. Lake trout are now not an uncommon catch in the lakes as well.
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Some disagree with the methods used, considering the introduction of salmon as
simply unleashing another invasive species. Many, especially on the Canadian side of the
lakes, thought that more effort should have been put forward to restore self-sustaining
stocks of native fish. It was their belief that the introduction salmon was just another
invasive species that crowded out lake trout and whitefish (Dempsey 2004). A former
member of the Science Advisory Board as well as an advisor to the Great Lakes Fisheries
Commission explained the different salmon introduction perspectives to me this way:
Q:
idea?

What about the introduction of salmon...coho and chinook, good

A:
Well it represents just a different notion of what fisheries is or
even what the lakes are, you could argue, and at one time there was a little
bit of a difference of views I'm told that was told between the people
coming from one side of the lake or the other. It's a good idea if you just
use the lakes as essentially a holding tank, and you have plenty of put and
take fishery, which creates economic benefits for the marina owners and
all the other people that live in these little towns that are all upstate in
terms of the geography of the jurisdiction. So you have these little upstate
towns, you've got a little tourism going on, and everybody's happy and it
seems to work. For a long time the people in Ontario Ministry of Natural
Resources really much preferred to have self-sustaining stocks of native
species. And they only wanted to put that as what we should be aiming
for and that's where the lake trout come in was going to be the icon fish.
And you can see that difference a little bit in some of the wordings in the
visions for the Great Lakes that come out of the fisheries commissions,
something like yes, they want self-sustaining stocks and so on with these
fish, but one word in there, something like "judicious planting" that
someone who is a lawyer might enjoy it, these visions statements that
come out of these fisheries commissions. Which I think is a sense of
saying okay, we agree to disagree. And then I suppose if you catch a fish
where you put them in that would seem all right, but they don't always
stay there. I used to spend a lot of time around Long Point on the north
shore of Lake Erie. There's a tremendous sense of place there. Some of
those Pacific Salmon used to spend the summer in the deep water right off
the end of that point. So, locals would come out with their charter boats or
their own boats, just around the villages around there at Long Point, and
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they would catch these fish. The Americans put them in, we pick them up,
and it seems like a sense of justice. (Canadian Academic 1)
Thus the demise of the Great Lakes fishery that included lake trout and whitefish
from the 1800s through the 1960s was countered with a somewhat daring experiment by
planting Pacific salmon. They took. Healthy populations of Pacific salmon flourished,
foraging on alewife and other available food sources.
The recreational fishing industry in communities around the Great Lakes boomed.
The emerging surprise, however, was the discovery that salmon and other fish had
accumulated persistent toxic compounds in their tissue.
The first sport fish advisory was issued in the Great Lakes in 1971 for people
consuming fish caught from the lakes (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995). Thus while there were
populations of sport fish making themselves a new home in the Great Lakes, it would be
a stretch to label them 'healthy' populations. Again we see that trends wax and wane.
Increasing the biomass of recreationally popular sport fish only to discover that the
flourishing populations had become indicators of the toxic contaminants in the Great
Lakes was perhaps a mixed blessing. Time will tell.
Conditions. In an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an iterative
effort by scientists and community members to determine the causes or factors
influencing trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort
out the various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any
negative ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem
factors. Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic
activity. Thus special interest activity that detracts from the common interests of resilient
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ecosystems may give rise to conditions that need to be investigated and, if necessary,
abated.
The most harmful threat to the health and resilience of the ecosystem of the Great
Lakes Basin under the GLWQA scheme is a possible trend away from the goal of
restoring and maintaining the "chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" and the fading interest in the 'virtual elimination' of
the discharge of persistent toxic chemicals (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; GLWQA 1987).
In order to understand the causes for the trends of increased discovery of toxic
contamination in the Great Lakes Basin, as well as other positive and negative trends, any
conditions analysis must incorporate not only the processes that permit collaboration and
open discussion of causes and possible solutions, but the existing physical and biological
characteristics of the region. As a starting point it was pointed out early in this chapter
that the Great Lakes Basin was formed and shaped during the Pleistocene Epoch as
glaciers sometimes 2,000 meters (6,000 feet) thick scoured the surface of the earth,
retreating only to return several times. As the climate warmed, the glaciers melted, the
land began to rise, and the water drained into the basins now known as the Great Lakes
(Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Grady 2007). Formed by glacial melt, only one percent of
water in the Great Lakes is renewed each year by rain and snow. Roughly the same
amount flows into the sea. With a flushing time from Lake Superior to the Gulf of St.
Lawrence of some 600 years, pollution that winds up in the lakes mainly stays in the
lakes (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
While there is no question that passage and flow through the lakes is slow, with
time periods of decades to up to 600 years for a particle to pass from the innermost lakes
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to the Atlantic (Dempsey 2004), the Great Lakes are not large vessels of still, uniformly
mixed waters. There is movement. The lakes are large enough for the gravitational pull
of the moon to cause tides in Milwaukee and Chicago of 4 - 5 centimeters (1.5-1.8
inches) (Grady 2007). Winds can push surface waters from one side of the lakes to the
other, lowering the water on the leeward shore while raising it to windward, sometimes in
waves, called seiches, that can inundate a shore with sudden surges up 6 to 8 feet high
(Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Dempsey 2004).
In addition to the mainly horizontal effects of surface water movement, the lakes
are subject to vertical mixing in nature of stratification and turnover. Essentially heat
from the sun and changing seasons cause water in the lakes to become stratified, or
layered. The density of water increases as temperature decreases, causing the lakes to
form distinct layers in the summer months when increased sunlight warms up surface and
coastal waters while deeper waters stay cool and more dense. As summer progresses,
temperature differences increase and a middle layer, the thermocline, develops between
the deep cooler waters and the warm surface waters (Figure 4).
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Figure 4 Stratification and Turnover
The warm surface and coastal layer is where most photosynthesis and algal
production occurs. This productivity is magnified by the increased oxygen in the surface
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layer due to mixing with the atmosphere. In the fall, surface waters cool and become
denser, sinking to displace deep waters and causing a mixing or turnover of the entire
lake. This sinking of oxygen rich surface waters to the deeper portions of the lake helps
to prevent oxygen depletion, anoxia, in the lower levels (Grady 2007). Stratification in
the summer months also tends to limit dilution of pollutants from land runoff and other
inputs, concentrating pollution in the surface layer (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995). Another
unique feature of these huge freshwater lakes is a the appearance of a sharp temperature
gradient, a vertical thermal bar, that prevents mixing of nearshore waters with open
waters until early summer. This thermal bar concentrates pollutants close to shore until
increasing sunlight allows for mixing (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Grady 2007).
The physical processes of the Great Lakes set the stage for the living resources
that fill out the ecosystem of the region, or the "the interacting components of air, land,
water and living organisms, including humans" (GLWQA 1987).
The living resources of any ecosystem begin with sunlight. Light energy from the
sun is essential for photosynthesis of green plants. When sunlight and essential nutrients
like phosphorus and nitrogen combine with oxygen, water, and inorganic carbon, water
plants can survive. Plant material is consumed in water by zooplankton. Energy is
transferred to the next step by organisms that feed on other animals (carnivores) or those
that feed on both plants and animals (omnivores) (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995).
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Figure 5 Simplified Great Lakes Food Web (U.S. EPA Great Lakes National Program
Office)
In the Great Lakes, primary producers are largely comprised of Rhodophyta (red
algae) and Phaeophyceae (brown algae). The most dominant variety of zooplankton, or
primary consumer, is diporeia hoyi, although the invasive zebra mussel is making inroads
as a primary consumer. Bottom animals such as mayfly nymphs also fulfill the role of
primary consumer where the water is clean enough to support populations. Sculpin,
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chub, alewife, and smelt are secondary consumers in the ecosystem, while cormorants
and gulls along with the sport fish are tertiary consumers. At the top of the food chain
are eagles and humans (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995) (Figure 5).
As the food web shown graphically in Figure 6 depicts, organisms at the higher
trophic levels depend on the stability of the lower trophic levels in the web. If something
goes wrong at lower levels, the effect at higher levels can be catastrophic. Phosphorus
overloading in the Great Lakes, for example, caused massive algae growth at the bottom
of the web, causing the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) created by decomposing
algae to threaten the survival of the entire web (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
The food chain also demonstrates that some substances introduced into the food
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Figure 6 Bioaccumulation (EPA Regional Office)

chain can get consumed or absorbed and are retained in their tissue. The organism that
consumes the substance is then consumed by predator in next higher food chain, and so
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on. As this process continues up the food web, persistent organic substances become
increasingly concentrated, or biomagnified. The GLWQA (GLWQA 1987) requires the
Parties to maintain a list of substances known to have toxic effects and to continually
revise the list as new substances become known. The Agreement also requires the Parties
to monitor the lakes for the presence of persistent toxic substances (GLWQA 1987)
While a certain amount of dynamic change may be expected of any ecosystem
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002), humans have forced a
great many unnatural changes on ecosystem dynamics in the Great Lakes. Overfishing,
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Figure 7 Sources and Pathways of Pollution (EPA Regional Program Office)

habitat destruction, and invasive species nearly destroyed most native fish species.
Pollution, in the form of nutrient loading and toxic contaminants add stress to fish
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populations and may pose threats to human health (Fuller, Shear et al. 1995; Carson
2002). The Great Lakes, being very nearly a closed system, manages to accumulate
pollutants from a variety of sources that ultimately inter the lakes in any number of ways
(Figure 7). The conditions are almost ideal for the continued escalation of pollution,
especially persistent toxic chemicals, in the Great Lakes Basin. As a former president of
the American Fishery Society stated:
.. .if you think of it as a great river, and the lake's a great whirlpool, then
it's kind of a watershed phenomenon, and what can threaten a watershed?
Change in that watershed is a big thing. Things that can be concentrated
downstream as a result of water: contaminants, nutrients, stuff like that.
Land use practices generally, lots of different aspects of land use practices
impact downstream. So, the whole...it's.. .when you take a watershed
approach and seeing it as a river, that kind of focuses for me a regional
thing, and then what kind of things are the rivery behavior actually
predisposed. (Canadian Academic 2)
An examination of conditions must not be limited to the natural ecosystems, and
their potential for degradation, however. While the sections above have outlined some of
the most significant natural processes, their susceptibility to further degradation, and
detailed some of the more relevant legislation that have attempted to control and alter the
behavior of humans toward their environment, the analysis of overall conditions requires
us to look at the more general socioeconomic situation extant in the Great Lakes Basin.
Over the last century or more citizens in the Great Lakes Basin have seen several
sides of a dynamic Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. Clear, clean water with a variety of
healthy flora and fauna have changed when fish stocks have collapsed and beaches have
become clogged with dead fish, oil, grease, debris, and ugly foam. Shoreland has been
transformed in many cases from forest and wetland to golf courses, marinas, factories,
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and homes. Legislation and regulation have helped to stem some of the abuse, but new
threats continue to find a home in the Great Lakes Basin. The changes and trends over
the last century have, however, been related to decisions made by officials in Washington
D.C., Ottawa, and the capitals of one province and eight states. Well known Great Lakes
historian Dave Dempsey (2004) captured the essence of these trends when he wrote:

While the multiplying problems of the last decade can be traced in great
measure to a growing gulf between citizens and their governments, there is
nothing unique in kind about this period. A close look at the history of the
Great Lakes since the mid1800s reveals that the same governments have
always done only what the public permitted, or pressured, them to do.
When exploiting the lakes for immediate riches seemed the wisest course,
when the struggle for survival distracted the public, or when the faith of
the electorate flagged in the ability of governments to solve the problems
of individuals as well as the collective, the lakes frequently deteriorated.
But when the full-throated voice of the citizen rang true, both individually
and in great numbers, the lakes recovered (Dempsey 2004, 3)
In terms of this research, it is abundantly clear that common interests only prevail
over special interests when the voice of the people collectively demand that the 'powers
that be' rise in the face of pressure from single or special interests to act for the public
good.
In truth, the pressure brought to bear on behalf of economic special interests since
the early 1970s has been compelling. Once known as the manufacturing heart of
America, the Great Lakes region is now better known as America's 'rust belt'. It has
historically been the manufacturing center of the North America. Consider for a moment
that in 1955 4 out of every 5 cars in the world were made in the US - mostly in the region
in and around Detroit and northern Ohio. The combination of globalization and the oil
crisis of the early 1970s, however, made smaller cars the rage. Innovation was left in the
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dust as US manufacturers refused to consider changing costly and comfortable assembly
lines. The economy of the manufacturing heartland went into a tail spin as the many
industries that relied on automobile manufacturing, including parts manufacturers and
steel mills felt the pinch. Flint, Michigan, for instance once had 100,000 workers
employed by General Motors. In 2007 that number was down to 6,000 (SchifFeres 2007).
The water quality of the Great Lakes was not a priority to policymakers. Indeed, one
individual involved in the evolution of the GLWQA believes that much of the initial
success of Agreement was due to the economic meltdown in the region:
In the absence of deindustrialization the [the] water quality agreement
would have never got off the ground. If Cleveland and Lackawanna,
there's a big steel complex there, if these hadn't decided to deindustrialize,
like Gary Indiana, also, back in Lake Erie, in the '50's and '60's there
would have been trouble. (Canadian academic 2)
The economy in the rust belt did not improve from the 1970s through the 1990s.
Neither, as we've seen, after the initial success of the phosphorus removal and water
treatment plant upgrades of the 1970s, has the environment in the region (Dempsey
2004). When employment plummets and residents struggle to survive, it is difficult for
governments to feel that water quality is a priority.
Thus when the ecosystem health in the Great Lakes is an issue, it must be
remembered that the GLWQA documents are simply agreements between Canada and
the U.S., known in diplomatic parlance in the documents as the "Parties." The Parties are
in fact two sovereign federal governments who, by agreement, established the IJC as an
entity with limited jurisdiction designed to supervise the observance of obligations
assumed by treaty under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (1909; Caldwell 1988). Both
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Parties are, however, comprised of many different government agencies, each being
pressured by often powerful, and sometimes desperate, special interests, which can
override environmental prudence. To put it another way: The US and Canada together
with "[t]he eight states and Ontario are answerable primarily to their own constituencies.
So who speaks for the lakes? Hardly the governments" (Caldwell 1993,20).
The debilitating economic story in the Great Lakes region had operated to put a
damper on measures that might be protective of the ecosystem. As a general rule, the
conditions relating to the willingness of federal and state agencies to lead with innovative
or environmentally enlightened efforts also waned after more conservative governments
took the reins in both Canada and the U.S. in the 1980s. In the United States, President
Reagan abruptly dismissed all three of the IJC Commissioners from the U.S. within two
months after taking office. Abandoning the previous practice of appointing qualified
candidates who were not replaced with every change in the presidency, Reagan appointed
two individuals who had been state campaign chairmen in the election, and a third who
was a former Republican congressman from New York. His administration also
disbanded the Great Lakes Basin Commission, whose role had been to coordinate federal
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and state government agencies on matters related to the Great Lakes, and reduced funding
for university and agency research and for regulatory programs. On the Canadian side,
Brian Mulroney took office and promptly named political allies to the Canadian posts.
None of the new commissioners from either side had any prior experience with Great
Lakes issues or knowledge or understanding of the traditions that were critical to the
IJC's status as an independent advisory body committed to binationalism (Botts and
Muldoon 2005). Or, as one commentator noted: "Observers inclined to cynicism see the
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IJC today as a front for politically conservative governments that have no real
commitment to the water quality agreements" (Caldwell 1993,20).
An influential government regulator in the Great Lakes region put it another way:

You also have the phenomenon I believe that started in the 80's with the
Reagan administration where government was declared to be, for reasons
of political expediency, the enemy. That message was, I think, conveyed,
and trumpeted by more and more people who found it politically
expedient to just say, very cavalierly, that government is an obstacle,
government is interference with your rights, government doesn't serve
you, it harms you. I think we've had a generation or so of that kind of
attitude that really has sort of affected public perception, public beliefs,
and ultimate public values. (U.S. State Employee 3)
Apparently, the weakening and marginalization of the powers of the IJC was not
cause for grief with the U.S. agencies with jurisdiction over components of the Great
Lakes ecosystem:
The preference for partially decentralized implementation through duly
constituted conventional units of government has been perceived by some
observers as a bias of relatively conservative administrations in Ottawa
and Washington against centralized regional governance and institutional
innovation. This bias, to the extent that it exists, is congenial to the line
agencies, especially in the United States. The United States Army Corps
of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Coast Guard, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior, and the Department of State would hardly act in
character if they welcomed the growth of a coordinative authority for the
Great Lakes to which their own planning and decision-making might be
subordinated (Caldwell 1993,18)
In the final analysis, the documents, committees, boards, and transparency of the
IJC allowed for the existence of collaborative research, monitoring, and progress on
environmental issues. In our ideal system, materials indicative of ecosystem trends are
present and available. There are positive indications that a process for collaboration and
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basin-wide cooperation existed even after neoconservative attempts to thwart the
GLWQA esprit de corps.
There are still research laboratories in the region dedicated to the study of the
natural processes at work in the Great Lakes Basin. NOAA maintains the Great Lakes
Environmental Research Laboratory (GLERL) in Ann Arbor. The USGS has
responsibility for the USGS Great Lakes Science Center, with a mission of "Advancing
scientific knowledge and providing scientific information for restoring, enhancing,
managing, and protecting the living resources and their habits in the Great Lakes basin
ecosystem" (USGS 2011). The Great Lakes National Research Laboratory is run by the
EPA. In Canada, the Canada Centre for Inland Waters, maintained by Fisheries and
Oceans Canada (DFO), staffs the Great Lakes Laboratory for Fisheries and Aquatic
Sciences. There are numerous universities in the basin and beyond who work on Great
Lakes issues. They are all linked through the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN),
an internet web site that permits participants and the public to access data and articles that
have been published relevant to the Great Lakes. In addition, the International
Association of Great Lakes Researchers (IAGLR) is an active binational organization of
Great Lakes Researchers, scientists, regulators, NGOs, citizen and watershed groups,
First Nations, and others, which publishes a monthly journal and holds annual meetings
open to participation and presentations from all researchers, NGOs, watershed groups,
and interested parties. Thus the scientific community has maintained a spirit of
cooperation, certainly stronger during the early years, but still in existence and still
apparently a galvanizing force for researchers in the region.
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There is, however, an underlying trend in the economics and political
developments since the 1970s. The divisive forces that undermined the UC traditions in
the 1980s have played a role in attempting to return the Great Lakes region to governance
by traditional fragmented scientific and governmental units. Budgets for research and
collaboration have been slashed. As one regulator familiar with the evolution of the
environmental regulatory scheme in Michigan described it:
Q:
No, you misunderstood. I meant, the political pressure, the
backlash, has to be a practical... is it a practical impediment to doing....
A:
To doing our jobs? To carrying out our missions? Yes,
absolutely, it's more than that, because it's...in Michigan, here's what
happened. In order to respond to the articulated dissatisfaction with the
time it takes to issue a permit within the state, two years ago the
legislature modified our environmental code to require that, if we didn't
issue a permit declaring application administratively completed within 30
days and issue it within a timeline, which can vary under program, then
we had to refund a portion of the application fee, which had the following
consequence: When we have fewer people to issue more permits and
more authorizations, which is our current status quo, we have this selffulfilling prophecy of being unable to meet our mission. Fewer people,
fewer resources, requirements by law to make decisions quicker, in fact,
the consequence of doing that has led us to probably deny more permits as
the intended decision deadline came, based...where prior to having this
deadline imposed upon us.. .we had more opportunity to work with the
applicants on trying to design a ... project permitting some of the
programs from being a dialogue and interaction between the applicant and
the regulator. So, that's one consequence. The more pernicious
consequence is now we find ourselves administering an entirely new
program, obviously without any new resources, and that's the permit
application fee return program. (U.S. State Employee 3)
It is clear that there have been special interest efforts that have come together to
dampen the efforts of a lot of dedicated people who have been trying to focus again on
water quality and ecosystem health issues. The prescriptions are present in the Great
Lakes governance regime to collaborate, cooperate, and, with input from the interested
206

public, begin to experiment with solutions to the problems that exist (Table 26). In the
years since the rise of public outrage in the 1970s, however, the pressure seems to have
been removed from governments, and the door has swung open for special interests to
dominate over those who would advocate for the public good. These developments are
examined more closely in the next section.
Table 26 Conditions
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Conditions analysis is iterative
with collaborative efforts by
scientists and community to gain
and share knowledge necessary to
determine the conditions that are
factors in any negative trends.
Conditions analysis explores more
than ecosystem factors and
examines social and economic
factors in order to understand
whether economic or other special
interests are overriding common
interests and the public good.
Collaboration between scientists,
regulators, and citizen participants
jointly work to identify causes and
conditions responsible for negative
trends.

Spirit of collaboration and cooperation
between scientists, regulators, NGOs,
regional commissions (GLFC,
GLBC/GLC). Biennial meetings of the
IJC provide opportunity for
social/natural scientists, economists,
regulators, NGOs, and public to
exchange information. GLU has biennial
meetings to develop an agenda of
concerns amongst its many NGO
members to take to the IJC biennial
meetings. Annual meetings of IAGLR
provide opportunity for presentation and
discussion of social, natural sciences,
economics and related issues. GLIN on
line service provides access to basinwide information and data.

Projecting Developments. This task is about the use of accurate and reliable data
about trends and conditions in order to project developments in the future, even if those
projections are resisted by powerful special interests. History tells us that often policy
makers are knowledgeable about trends and conditions, yet are either unwilling to buck
political hazards or are blocked by special interest opposition (Clark 2002).
In our ideal system, reliable knowledge must underpin the projection of
developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected developments appear to
take a community away from its goals, away from progress toward human dignity, and
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toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be a system that will reward
those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers. There also must be a way
for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an attempt to reverse negative trends
without fear of retribution from a system more concerned with power and wealth than
long-term environmental viability. Strong public participation is a requirement for
reliable assessment and projection of developments (Table 27).
Table 27 Projecting Developments
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Through regular public
education and outreach, an
involved public collaborates
with academic institutions,
scientists, and policy makers to
understand reliable data and
project developments.

With the input of
knowledgeable public, scientists
and policy makers can
acknowledge mistakes or policy
failures, learn from them, and
make adaptive changes, to
reverse negative trends without
fear of retribution from the
governance system.

Public education and outreach
favored and recommended by
IJC. IJC philosophy: people
must be made aware of the
existing local problems and their
impact on the Great Lakes
ecosystem, and be encouraged
to participate in solving these
problems. Also education of
government officials and other
decision-makers advocated and
implemented via educational
programs such as GLT's
Decisions for the Great Lakes
Problem-solving was the focus
of IJC and SAB efforts. All
ideas accepted. Public input
critical. Scientists and agency
board members worked on
problems in their personal and
professional capacity - no
retribution for unpopular ideas.
Binationalism - focus was on
the good of the GLB, not
necessarily the interest of
respective federal or state
governments or agencies.

From the discussions above, it should be apparent that there has been strong
public involvement in the governance regime in the Great Lakes Basin under the
GLWQA, especially during the early years. It perhaps bears expanding on the fact that
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the UC used outreach and education groups like Great Lakes Tomorrow to educate the
public about the serious issues facing the water quality in the Great Lakes. After the
PLUARG panel reports were completed, we have seen that the IJC and its boards
gradually left the knowledgeable public galvanized by significant involvement with
PLUARG and IJC out of the process after the 1978 amendments. Thereafter, when the
Parties submitted a reference to the IJC to reevaluate the issue of regulating lake levels,
the IJC commissioned a study group with participation by scientists, academics, and
members of the public, to examine the issue. Four of the eleven board members were
from the general public and the Study Board was advised by an 18 member Citizen
Advisory Committee (CAC) appointed by the UC (Becker 1993). The public, whose
participation is mandated by the 1909 treaty, was also intended to play a large role in the
remediation and restoration of the 42 localized "areas of concern" identified in the 1987
GLWQA Protocol (Becker 1993).
In addition to forceful public participation, another strength of the GLWQA
process in the early years was the focus on collaboration among scientists, agencies, and
the public. While this topic will receive more detailed attention in the discussion on the
decision process, it is important to note the IJC tradition of binationalism. In 1911, at its
very first meeting after adoption of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the U.S. co-chair
proclaimed that the commission members were neither Canadians nor Americans, but
representatives of all the people on both sides of the border. In 1972 Charlie Ross, a
commission member under five presidents, affirmed that the Commission acted as a
single body, without interference from the governments of the United States and Canada
(Botts and Muldoon 2005).
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Collaboration was also critical to the ecosystem approach built under the IJC
GLWQA approach. Interlocking directors, acting on behalf of the good of the Great
Lakes and not necessarily on behalf of a participant's agency, played a critical role in the
ability of the LFC and its principle boards, together with the GLFC, to solve problems.
One of the early participants explained it to me this way:

A:
Let's step back a bit. In the '60's and '70's, the three main
commissions, which were then the UC, the Great Lakes Basin
Commission and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, all collaborated.
The IJC, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, and the Great Lakes Basin
Commission which preceded the Great Lakes Commission which was
interstate and expanded to international to pick up what was left hanging
when Reagan closed down the Great Lakes Basin Commission. While I
was a Commissioner for the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, I served as
an advisor to IJC on the Science Advisory Board, and I worked with Mike
Donahue on the Great Lakes Commission...all at the same time.
Q: So there were interlocking commissioners, members, advisors.
A: Yes. I was a commissioner on one, a scientific advisor on another, and
Donahue and I co-sponsored some of CUSIS - George Francis mentioned
Canada US Interuniversity Seminars yesterday. Donahue and I were
leading a CUSIS initiative which was being managed out of the Great
Lakes Commission. So, precisely at the same time, I was working in three
different capacities. And not only I, I didn't do it by design; it's just the
way it happened. So, the progress in the 80's came partly because each of
the other commissions had connections with the IJC... It was the closest
thing to a free market, you know, what people think of as a free market, in
concepts and ideas. But, now this free market was constrained by
concepts like justice, equity, things like that. Aesthetics. George is very
sharp with aesthetics. And secondary to justice. I'm justice I think
primarily... There were far more people who were involved locally, and
then there were all sorts of ad hoc arrangements, intergovernmental
arrangements between states. Something came together in the 70's and it
worked. It was not formal and not informal, it was extra-constitutional
that played a bigger role than the Constitution. (Canadian Academic 2).
Another key participant in the early GLWQA governance scheme explained the
collaboration under the regime in a similar vein:
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Well, the strengths I think were [the GLWQA scheme] provided the
occasion, if you will, to let the water quality board, the science advisory
board, [and] the IJC have people come together, whether they're
representing jurisdictions or just representing people interested in aspects
of the lakes. An awful lot just came about getting to know who they are
and chatting and so on, and just following up the way you and I are doing
right now. So there is a sharing of knowledge. So that sort of knitting
together a little larger sense of the lake and what we might be able to work
together to do is a strength. (Canadian Academic 1)
So collaboration took the form of commission members who could put the good
of the Great Lakes in front of allegiance to government, agency, or special interests. It
also came in the form of working with the public and listening to all ideas - the free
market of concepts and ideas. Biennial UC meetings provided valuable engagement
between the SAB* the WQB, and the press with the public present in a very public
discourse in open sessions. These efforts were buttressed by an interdisciplinary Great
Lakes science community. In the late 1960s concern about fishery and lamprey eel
problems and the reference on phosphorus spawned the establishment of the International
Association for Great Lakes Research (IAGLR) in 1967. Its journal and well-attended
annual meetings became venues for a greater flow of information within the binational
Great Lakes community. Although begun by physical and biological scientists, by 1971
academic political scientists and others interested in natural resource management issues
began to participate in earnest (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
From the above it appears that collaboration between the public and scientists to
understand and even act on data was not a problem in the early years of the GLWQA.
The concept of binationalism, the esprit d' corps within the scientific and regulatory
community, the outreach efforts and related participation of the public in a variety of
significant ways, and the willingness to share and discuss information all paved the way
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for water quality improvement in the early years. There can be no question that these
same factors also contributed to the ability to stand up to special interests and arrive at
proposed solutions and policies that centered on the public good. The state-by-state
effort to adopt a detergent phosphate ban over strong objection of industry is one
example. As one participant said while explaining what integrity meant to many of those
who were active in the early years of the GLWQA:

So, if you think integration, disintegration.. .that was a concept that sort of
perfused the whole politics of those days...it was a key consideration. It's
actually related to justice. Integrity was related to justice. And our Great
Lakes to me, and Lee Botts, and George and many more.. .we have got
that. (Canadian Academic 2)
Integrity, fairness and justice were obviously important to those who were
involved in governance and policy decisions under the GLWQA regime. Similarly,
writing in 1991 as part of the CUSIS gathering, Dr. Mimi Becker wrote about the
importance of community as opposed to individual rights as they related to governance of
resources shared by the United States and Canada:
We talked a lot about using different words, but underneath is the issue of
community as a fundamental value versus the issue of individual rights.
That difference tends to cover a lot of the discussion about how we
approach regulation, negotiation, and what kinds of institutional
arrangements need to be redesigned and how. This also is reflected in
different attitudinal perspectives about the role of constitutional rights or
prerogatives versus community obligations and litigation versus
negotiation (CUSIS 1991,39).
Dr. J.R. "Jack" Vallentyne, Senior Scientist for Canada's Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO) as well as a member of the Great Lakes Research Advisory Board,
which evaluated the Agreement when it came up for review in 1977 and 1978, was
quoted by historian Dave Dempsey as citing a more specific reason why the early
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GLQWA regime could stand up for the common good and include notions of fairness,
integrity, and community despite the opposition of special interests:

The International Joint Commission's tradition that persons serving on its
advisory boards represent not the organizations that employ them, but
their own capacities as citizens and experts, helped draw the best, least
selfish, least compromised advice from its advisors... (Dempsey 2004,
192-93).
Thus, in the early years of the GLWQA, a host of knowledgeable citizens,
scientists, and regulators, buttressed by a galvanized public and working in their personal
and professional capacity, were able to set aside personal agendas and make some bold
moves to reverse the negative trends that were surely killing the Great Lakes Basin. It
would appear that the ideal characteristics for the projecting developments task of an
ideal ecosystem approach as set forth in Table 28 appear to have been met in the early
years of the GLWQA.
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. As pointed out above, an
ecosystem approach requires that participants be emboldened to experiment and not face
punishment if failure results from a well-conceived attempt. An integral part of
governance is that there is a learning approach that focuses on improving policy and
practice in the face of uncertainty. Governance and management strategies are
considered experiments. Learning in our ideal world is promoted through both structural
experimentation and management flexibility (Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Governance,
and the ability to invent, evaluate, and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and
Baskerville 1986; Francis and Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza,
Low et al. 2001; Kjaer 2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Whiteside
213

2006; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a; Brunner and Lynch
2010b).
Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are
treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating,
expanding successful interventions and terminating failed policies instead of expertdriven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and
error (Francis 1993; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Gunderson 2003; Brunner, Steelman et
al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Steelman 2010).
Thus alternative experimentation in our ideal system must employ social and
decision making processes that make use, inter alia, of broad participation, rapid
feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate value trade-offs to
create a process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems. No particular set of
practices or governance tools can regulate human impacts so as to guarantee a resilient
and productive ecosystem. In chapter III it was noted that really all we can do is attempt
to design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient information to be
generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes and continually
adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits (Francis 1993;
Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Holling, Gunderson et al. 2002; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al.
2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a). These characteristics are many and varied, and
for the governance regime under the GLWQA, the collaborative, citizen participation
fueled, bold measures taken in the early years are illustrative of this task as part of an
ecosystem approach. What hasn't been discussed above will be explained in the next two
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sections involving the social and decision-making portions of our ideal system. So I will
move on to discuss the social process in the Great Lakes GLWQA governance regime.
Social Process
In this section the social process under the GLWQA governance regime will be
examined. It should be understood that this analysis is a product of one person and that a
detailed study of the social and institutional scheme in the subject study areas was not
possible. Obviously countless individuals and institutions are involved in some level in
decisions and impacts on the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. This project attempts to gain
a rough, mile-high view of some of those key actors. In addition, much information and
research concerning the social process was presented in the preceding section on problem
orientation in order to give the reader a better context of the challenges present in the
Great Lakes during the pertinent time period. Every effort will be made to avoid
duplication in this section.
It might help to be reminded that in the social process we must be cognizant that
every participant in the use of resource services and every player with a potential say in
the governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem employs strategies in
order to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. People tend to improve their wellbeing by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off than if they had
acted otherwise and therefore engage in an interplay of human value trade-offs.
Generally no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective" scientists, no
amount of "education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic inherent value
differences or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this realization should not
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take away from the fact that there are common interests and the need to attempt to clarify
and secure them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000; Clark 2002). To the degree
possible we will now turn to an examination of the participants in the GLWQA
governance regime.
Participants. As a reminder of the participant characteristics in ideal ecosystem
management regime, discussed in Chapter III, there is an expectation or at least the
opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad segment of the regulated
population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and
Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993;
Francis 1993; Francis and Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson
2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Participation must be open to
almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjaer
2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and allow
softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Berkes,
Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen involvement and
partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public information programs
to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better governance and enhanced
accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem management i.e. the ongoing,
collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive coalitions of the unalike
(citizens, government regulators, small businesses, environmentalists, commodity
interests, and others) come together to resolve policy problems affecting the environment,
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economy, and communities of a particular place (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Walker and Salt 2006; Clark 2008; Steelman 2010).
We have already examined the somewhat remarkable history of public outreach,
education, and significant participation from the early years of governance under the
GLWQA (1987). But was the process open to any person or group with a significant
interest in the issues? And did regulatory agencies participate in a coordinated and
integrated fashion?
Ironically, citizen influence and the power of NGOs, beginning with the
involvement of the Great Lakes Basin Commission (GLBC), the Lake Michigan
Federation and the League of Women Voters (LWV), began even before the 1972
GLWQA was adopted:
And so, at any rate, in 1971,1 believe it was late spring...1 know it wasn't
cold weather.. .1 get a phone call from a staff member of the GLBC, and
he tells me about a meeting that's going to place on Mackinac Island, at
the Grand Hotel.... and that I need to go to this meeting... And the reason
I should was because.. .he explained.. .that there was.. .the purpose of this
meeting on Mackinac, was that it was a meeting of the governors and
premiers in effect to ratify the GLWQA that had been negotiated and was
going to be signed. This must have been early spring because the
agreement was signed in April, and it was going to be signed.. .and so this
was the ratification meeting, and there was a move afoot to omit coverage
or inclusion of Lake Michigan.
I go up to the meeting and I find that there was a...and I can't remember
all the names... but,.. .and there were a couple of local LWV members,
because.. .by local I mean Michigan LWV.. .because in those days,
because water management and water resources was an ongoing concern
of the League, as a practice, they tried to send two League members to any
kind of public meeting that occurred related to water resources or water
management, so.. .and me.. .and we were the citizens that were present at
that meeting. So, I arrive on one day and right away I pick up that there
had been an executive meeting the day before, before governors for Lake
Michigan where they had agreed, or at least there had been a majority
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vote.. .at that point I didn't know whether there was agreement among all
four governors or not, but...to lobby that Lake Michigan should not be
covered under the agreement for the obvious reasons.. .being entirely
within the U.S. and so forth. So, anyway, there were sessions and
presentations, and.. .the formal meeting was convened and Governor
Milliken presided, and so the afternoon of the first full day of the formal
meetings.. .and I don't remember what exactly caused me to stand up at
that period of time, but I use this as an example when I'm telling young
people, don't be afraid to do things because there are a lot of things I've
done in my life that I know better now I shouldn't have done, but I'm glad
I did, and this was one of them. So, I stood up, in the middle of the
meeting, I said, Governor Milliken, excuse me, but you're forgetting Lake
Michigan.. .Then I made a little speech, it's one system that's all
connected, blah, blah, blah. He soon after adjourns the meeting for the
day. There was a big formal meeting that evening, a fancy dinner, and so
on and so forth, and as the meeting adjourned and broke up, thenGovernor Pat Lucey of Wisconsin came to me and said, I agree with you,
now let's figure out how not to let this happen. And so, we worked out a
game plan, and the next day we instituted the game plan, and I think it's
described in the book, and it was successful. And so, Lake Michigan, and
if you want more details about it, I'll tell you what the game plan was and
how we carried it out, was an enormous a lot of fun and I learned a lot
from it. At any rate, so Lake Michigan got included under the GLWQA.
(US NGO 2)
Thus one NGO and a couple of interested citizens managed to save the day for
Lake Michigan and keep it included in the GLWQA. The IJC, shortly after the adoption
of the 1972 Agreement, began to rely heavily on citizen involvement and scientific
coordination. The initial Wingspread conferences at the Johnson Wax Convention Center
in Racine, Wisconsin, are illustrative:
A:
We made recommendations for some legislative change that came
out of that. Then in 1976-77 there were a series of Wingspread
conferences at the Johnson Wax Conference Center in Racine, Wisconsin
- one of which was to assess the extent to which there was a need for a
binational citizen organization that would focus on the Great Lakes.
Q:

Who set up the Wing Spread conference?
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A:
That one was instigated by the Lake Michigan Federation, and it
was funded by the Joyce Foundation of Chicago. Lake Michigan
Federation was a group that the Lake Erie Basin Committee of the League
had been working with over a period of time, because it was a
collaboration of different organizations on Lake Michigan.
And, initially, the Lake Michigan Federation, because they had taken the
lead to enable this, was kind of the lead organization for pulling people
together and, if I recall correctly, that enabling group included some of the
subsequent directors of Great Lakes Tomorrow.. ..Frances, Regier, Dick
Robbins, who was the then Executive Director of the Lake Michigan
Federation; Arthur Timms, who was the Exec Director of the
Conservation Foundation in Ontario, and Grant Merritt, who was head of
pollution control in Minnesota....A state agency. So there was a mix of
people there. There were some other Canadians....Oh, and John Yolton,
who was the VP of the UAW, and he had a counterpart from Canada.. .the
name escapes me.
There was no industry involved...They weren't invited. It was an attempt,
because of the politics of the times, to form a coalition between labor and
the environment so that industry could not succeed in getting the jobs
versus the environment conflict going, which at the time, under the
politics of the era, was their strategy. At the time that this thing occurred,
this might have been '75/'76 maybe, the only way that we were dealing
with industry was in court. It was very adversarial because of the
accumulated muck.
There were... [also] First Nations present at that..., Henry Likkers from
the Mohawk tribe up on St. Regis reservation....Canadian.. .was there.
So, that was the first Wing Spread conference. The result from that
meeting was the formation of the binational citizen group Great Lakes
Tomorrow. Its mission was to educate and engage the citizens of the basin
in decisions about its recovery and future direction.. .The first thing we
took on was a contract with the IJC to hold a series of public meetings to
brief the public on the results of the upper lakes reference groups studies,
and train them in how to participate in the IJC hearings. So, it was
basically an education facilitation function. We published a newspaper.. .1
think it was called The Great Lakes Tomorrow.. .as background
information, and that was widely distributed. We also used that particular
initiative as a way of beginning to develop the mode that we used with
designating a local coordinator, local planning committee, and working
with them to enable development of local capacity, so that we weren't
controlling it, it was more facilitation and a way of engaging citizens
locally in learning about their lakes and in having a say about how to
move forward with solutions.
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Q:
Was this participation important in the Great Lakes, in the
development?
A:

It would never have happened without it. (US NGO/Academic)

It seems, then, from the above, that no efforts were spared to bring on board all
those who had an interest. The only exception was industry, which was challenging the
phosphate restrictions set forth in the 1972 Agreement at that time. With Decisions for
the Great Lakes industry was invited in, as they were for the Hiram Conference.
There were a number of institutional players. The IJC has been discussed in the
previous sections and an explanation of their role and importance is unnecessary here.
There were two boards advising the UC: The Research Advisory Board (later the
Science Advisory Board) and the Water Quality Board (Figure 11). The Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission also played a huge role in coordination with the IJC and its boards.
There were regional coordinating bodies as well, chiefly the Great Lakes Basin
Commission (GLBC) and the Great Lakes Commission (GLC).
The composition and duties of the IJC have been discussed in the previous
section. The IJC is comprised of three commissioners from the United States and
appointed by the President and three from Canada appointed by the Prime Minister.
Historically, commissioners were appointed because of their unique knowledge or
expertise or else as rewards for public service. Since 1980, however, appointments have
generally gone to political allies of the President or Prime Minister. Further,
appointments are not for a specified period of time and before 1980 there had never been
a wholesale turnover in the panel of commissioners at the same time. Since 1980,
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however, every president has dismissed the entire panel and replaced them with his own
appointees (Botts and Muldoon 2005).

Figure 8 The IJC Administrative Structure 1972 - 1979

From its inception the IJC lacked the jurisdiction on issues of water quality to
compel the U.S and Canada, the Parties to the GLWQA, to do anything.20 Their role was
to investigate and make recommendations. The annual and then biennial reports of the
UC were made available to the public and recommendations set forth in the reports were
often acted upon by the Parties out of credibility and respect for the UC and its Boards
.(Dempsey 2004; Botts and Muldoon 2005)
The Water Quality Board (WQB) was created by the GLWQA to be the principal
advisor to the commission. Its official membership included the heads of provincial and
state environmental agencies. By tradition, the WQB is co-chaired by the director of the
Ontario Regional Office of Environment Canada and the Director of EPA Region 5

20

It has always had authority to make decisions pertaining to water diversion and consumptive use issues.
(1909). Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the
United States and Canada. U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448.
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(Botts and Muldoon 2005). One participant during the early days explained the WQB's
function:

The Water Quality Board came as a representative of the agencies
involved with water management or pollution control, and in a way it was
argued that made a lot of sense, because they're the ones who ultimately
have to do something, so they got involved in the discussions and
consultations about what it is that you should do in setting general
priorities there's more likely to be a follow-through on it. So, in that
sense, they were using it as a forum to try and get things together, which
would otherwise help maybe do what they're doing back home. So, that
in a sense would be the positive side. It did look like it was a little bit of a
closed shop sometime, and it even gave them the kind of special privilege
role as chief advisory to the UC and the science advisory group was more
a matter of people coming from various agencies and organizations, I
think, largely in their individual capacity, or because of the expertise they
brought into it. So, they had a role as well. I don't know how the LJC
balanced all of them in terms of what they were hearing from one against
the other... (Canadian Academic 1).
The Science Advisory Board (SAB) is the body chiefly responsible for advising
the Board on science-related matters under the GLWQA. The name was changed from
the Research Advisory Board in 1978. The SAB included managers of Great Lakes
research programs, scientists, social scientists, representatives of industry, environmental
activists and others (Botts and Muldoon 2005). As the quote immediately above
suggests, the Science Advisory Board was comprised of a wider array of participants with
a broader perspective.21

21

Illustrative is the Terms of Reference for the Establishment of a Research Advisory Board, part of the
original 1972 GLWQA, which provided:
4. The International Joint Commission shall determine the size and composition of the
Research Advisory Board. The Commission should appoint members to the Advisory
Board from appropriate Federal, State and Provincial Government agencies and from
other agencies, organizations and institutions involved in Great Lakes research activities.
In making these appointments the Commission should consider individuals from the
academic, scientific and industrial communities and the general public. Membership
should be based primarily upon an individual's qualifications and potential contribution
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The Council of Great Lakes Research Managers, sometimes called the IJC's
"Third Board" was never designated in the GLWQA, but it was formed by the IJC in
1984 and ultimately granted full board status in 1994, taking over the functions of the
SAB (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
Another important participant under the GLWQA scheme in the early years was
the Great Lakes Regional Office. Set up under Article VII of the 1972 GLWQA, the
GLRO was to "provide a public information service for the program." The office was
furnished with a binational staff and also functioned to provide clerical tasks for the UC
in its Great Lakes functions, and to its advisory boards. It was located in Windsor,
Ontario in order to give it a convenient centralized location. It was also the function of
the GLRO to coordinate activities with the GLFC, IAGLR, and others (Botts and
Muldoon 2005).
The material immediately above discusses the participants that were in essence
created by the GLWQA. But the GLWQA is basically an executive agreement or
protocol. The Parties, as has been discussed, are actually the governments of Canada and
the United States. Without the participation of federal and state government entities the
GLWQA would be meaningless. The lead federal government agencies are the USEPA
on the U.S. side and Environment Canada for the Canadian side. Thus a discussion of
those participants who fall within the federal, state, and provincial jurisdictions is
merited.

to the work of the Advisory Board. [Emphasis added] (1972). Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement, with Annexes and Texts and Terms of Reference, Between the United States
of America and Canada: 79.
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The US EPA is the lead federal agency on the U.S. side. It was established by
executive order of President Richard Nixon in 1970. It directs the U.S. federal activities
implementation of the GLWQA mostly by virtue of its jurisdiction to enforce and
implement the Clean Water Act (1972). The Great Lakes obligations were handed by the
EPA to its Region 5 district headquartered in Chicago. Thereafter, in 1976,
Congressional support was received and the Great Lakes National Program Office
(GLNPO) was opened (Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
On the Canadian side, Environment Canada, established in 1971, took the federal
lead on GLWQA agenda items in Canada. In some ways, EC had it a little easier than the
EPA as phosphates had already been banned in Canada in 1970 by the Canada Water Act
(1970). It has been suggested that Canada may have used their own reductions in
phosphates to their advantage in persuading the U.S. to adopt a ban in the 1972 GLWQA
(Botts and Muldoon 2005). EC, through the negotiation of the Canada-Ontario
Agreement (COA) handed off many of the Canadian federal responsibilities to the
Province of Ontario. Under the COA Ontario became responsible for implementation of
the GLWQA provisions, with the federal government paying for the capital
improvements needed to update sewage-treatment facilities in the province while the
Ontario EPA is used to impose effluent standards on all point sources discharging into the
basin (Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The states bordering the Great Lakes have played a role to a great degree,
sometimes for more of a role than they bargained. Under the U.S. Constitution, states
can't negotiate treaties with foreign governments. Thus while the U.S. federal
government negotiated the GLWQA with Canadian authorities, it was the states that
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ultimately carried much of the burden to follow through with obligations made by the
federal government. The role of the states was not all bad, however. There was pride
taken in the massive improvement of municipal sewage-treatment plants as part of the
Clean Water Act and GLWQA mandates, although when water treatment grants began to
dry up after the 1977 Clean Water Act, and as more and more persistent organic
chemicals were being revealed, some states began to balk at their clean water burdens.
Some, especially Michigan, were unhappy at not being permitted to participate in
negotiations for the 1977 Amendments and 1987 Protocol of the GLWQA (Botts and
Muldoon 2005).
To their credit, however, states, provinces, and First Nations found ample
opportunity to cooperate. Some notable achievements include the 1985 Great Lakes
Charter and the Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement of 1986 (GLTSCA).
Both are voluntary agreements, initiated by the Council of Great Lakes Governors,
designed to facilitate the sharing of information and to take a unified stance to protect
Great Lakes resources. The Charter was motivated chiefly by threats of massive water
transfers out of the Great Lakes Basin and prevents any diversions that would have a
significant, adverse impact on lake levels, in-basin uses, or the Great Lakes ecosystem
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). It "commits the parties to develop a common data base
on water resource use and a cooperative management program that includes an inventory
of surface water and groundwater resources" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,213) By the late
1980s eight states and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec had signed the Charter. The
data base was established by the Great Lakes Commission by 1988. (Colburn, Davidson
et al. 1990; Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
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With so many players in the GLWQA governance scheme, there has been a need
for regional coordination in order to facilitate the cooperative arrangements found
frequently in the basin and to help overcome institutional fragmentation (Colburn,
Davidson et al. 1990). In this light, attention will briefly be turned to the GLBC, the
GLC, and the GLFC.
The Great Lakes Basin Commission was created on the U.S. side in 1967 to
provide a coordinating mechanism for federal and state agencies as well as public
participation in matter involving the great lakes. The commission was one of six river
basin commissions established under the Federal Water Resources Planning Act in 1965
(1965). The Federal Water Resources Planning Act was established to coordinate state
and federal policies and plans for the development of water resources.22 It did this by
permitting the President to form River Basin Commissions. When the GLBC was
established water quality was by far the chief issue. It immediately began work on the
development of a regional framework plan for water resources in the great lakes
watershed (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The Basin Commission consisted of 8 state members and 12 federal members.
The Department of State was involved to make sure that Canadian Interests were taken
into account. The Ontario Ministry of the Environment sent a representative to attend
Commission meetings. In addition staff members of the ministry and other federal

22

More specifically, the Preamble to the Federal Water Basin Commission Act of 1965 provides:
AN ACT To provide for the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources
through the coordinated planning of water and related land the establishment of a water
resources council and river basin commissions, and by providing financial assistance to
the States in order to increase State participation in such planning. 42 U.S.C. §1962
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Canadian Agencies regularly participated in workshops and conferences that involved the
Commission. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was signed in 1972 and the
Commission provided planning and analysis that were funded partly by grants and
agreements with the US EPA. The Commission was shut down by the Reagan
administration in 1981. When it was still in effect the Basin Commission provided a
collaborative policy forum as well as technical analysis for GLWQA-related issues (Botts
and Muldoon 2005; Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007)
An example of one of its projects was helping to develop modeling techniques
used in creating target loadings for phosphorous in the great lakes. Yearly meetings were
held and attended by state heads of the Soil Conservation Service in the US Department
of Agriculture. These meetings served as a forum where skeptics about the value of
conservation tillage are said to have become advocates. US Coastal Zone Management
and Canadian Shoreline Management (Binational Coordination) did not directly relate to
this agreement but influentially expanded the Great Lakes Community. The Binational
Coordination was made known through publication funded by a combination of the Basin
Commission, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife, and
Environment Canada. These publications called for new strategies including the use of
vegetation to stabilize shorelines instead of the use of engineered structural erosion
control measures (Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The Basin Commission requested public participation and comment on a draft
framework plan in 1975 through a series of public meetings. The very strong support for
"environmental quality" over economic development was altogether astounding as was
the general public turnout. All in all the GLBC played an important role in coordinating
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state and federal agencies. The GLBC

. .was disbanded by the Reagan administration

in 1981." (Botts and Muldoon 2005,42).
The Great Lakes Commission (GLC) is another regional body and was created by
a U.S. compact in 1955 (Dempsey 2004). Its original purpose was to represent state
navigation and shipping interests with the completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway.
Although it was originally a member of the Great Lakes Basin Commission and focused
on Great Lakes navigation issues, it negotiated a compromise with the states and agencies
formerly coordinated by the GLBC to expand its role into a broader agenda that included
environmental issues and the coordination of state and federal agencies. As a source
familiar with the transition explained:
The authorizing legislation provided that, if a River Basin Commission
was dissolved, the states could decide where the resources would go, and
because the Basin Commission wasn't immediately dissolved...1
participated in over about 6 months' time in a number of meetings, and the
division within the GL states about whether or not to give the funding to
the GLC. There had been controversy.. .not all the states had supported
the GLC. One of the things I had to do as Chair was.. .there were certain
state legislatures.. .and I had to go to every year and convince them they
should get funds to the GLBC and the GLC, but there were certain states
that did not want to give the resources to the GLC. So, the compromise
that emerged.. .you know in our system everything is a compromise.. .the
compromise that emerged was, yes, they got the resources.. .1 was mad as
hell.. .1 had gotten a million dollars through OMB to work on energy
conservation issues.. .and it all went to the GLC, but the compromise was
that it was going to move beyond shipping and navigation issues. (US
NGO 2).
So the GLC mandate expanded to include coordination of environmental issues
for the state and federal agencies that the GLBC had formerly provided. As a source
within the GLC and very familiar with the role of the GLC after the elimination of the
GLBC explains:
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We have a really broad mandate. We're fortunate in that the Compact that
created us gives us broad authority to advise the governments that created
us which are the states as well as the federal government on matters of
Great Lakes use, development, and protection. It's very broad. We were
created in the 1950s at the time that the St. Lawrence Seaway was being
created and developed so I'm sure that a prime motivation was to manage
water resources in the interests of commercial navigation, including water
levels, water quantity, dredging - promoting maritime commerce and the
shipping industry. The mandate in the Great Lakes Basin Compact is
much broader than that. It includes water quality, conservation, tourism,
recreation. Of course over time with the dawning of environmental
awareness our portfolio has shifted much more towards environmental
protection and restoration. We still have this history and emphasis on
maritime commerce but it's shifted from commerce, water levels,
dredging which is now maybe 20% of our portfolio and the balance over
time has shifted toward environmental protection. (US Federal Employee
2)
So with the termination of the GLBC, which had been a remarkable vehicle to
promote state, federal, and to some extent, international cooperation and collaboration,
the GLC began to step forward to fill the gap.
The final Great Lakes Basin regional body that will be examined is the Great
Lakes Fisheries Commission (GLFC). In order to understand the role of the GLFC it
must be understood that while an international border runs through the middle of all of
the Great Lakes except Lake Michigan, no international waters exist in the Great Lakes
(Piper 1967). This is because the states and tribes in the region have the established
authority to manage fish within their boundaries (Piper 1967; Nielsen 1999). Unlike
oceanic coastal borders where state jurisdiction normally extends to a three miles from
the shore, the fact that state borders in the Great Lakes extend to the international border
makes it possible for states to assert their authority over federal jurisdiction and control
the lake beds, waters, and fish of the waters of the Great Lakes (Piper 1967; Gaden,
Krueger et al. 2008). Thus the GLFC is the binational entity that attempts to integrate
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and coalesce the separate but complementary sectors of the non-federal governments
(states, provinces, and two U.S. intertribal agencies) and the federal governments, and the
GLWQA entities to integrate and take a coherent approach to what would otherwise be a
hopelessly fragmented Great Lakes fishery (Prelli and Becker 2001; Gaden, Krueger et
al. 2008). They are able to manage this by facilitating Joint Strategic Plans between all
involved entities that include cooperation, consensus, accountability, information sharing,
and ecosystem management (Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008).
Finally, no assessment of the Great Lakes institutional and governance regime
would be complete without mentioning the powerful role played by the public both as an
entity to themselves and through the work of environmental organizations. The role of a
public unhappy about environmental trends in the late 1960s through the early 1990s has
already been discussed in the Problem Orientation section above. There has also been
some discussion of the role of environmental organizations like the League of Women
Voters, the Lake Michigan Federation, and Great Lakes Tomorrow, and Decisions for the
Great Lakes, a basin-wide leadership training program run by Great Lakes Tomorrow and
funded by EPA, Environment Canada, the Joyce Foundation and others.23 What remains
is to note the importance of organizations that were able to bring together many separate
environmental groups and form politically powerful political forces.

23 The "Decisions for the Great Lakes" program trained volunteers around the basin with a 40 hour course
designed, inter alia, to create an informed binational constituency for the Great Lakes, to build public
understanding of existing management structure and process and encourage better decision making through
citizen access and participation; to organize a continuing network of citizens, scientists, educational
institutions and agencies to share and use information and data to better manage the Lakes.. .GLT (1985).
Decisions for the Great Lakes: A :Program to Improve Decisions for the Protection and Wise Use of Our
Binational Resource Through Informed Citizen Participation. Great Lakes Tomorrow. G. L. Tomorrow.
Hiram, OH.
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The Michigan United Conservation Clubs (MUCC), for instance, brought together
many diverse constituencies and led the lobbying effort that resulted in a phosphate
detergent ban in that state (Botts and Muldoon 2005). But more was needed, and citizens
needed a basin-wide organization. It was the joint effort of MUCC and the New York
NGO Save the River, a combination that had led the fight against an Army Corps of
Engineers proposal to allow winter navigation on the Great Lakes, that finally got
together to form a basin-wide organization. MUCC's Tom Washington and Save the
River's Abbie Hoffman, were backers of such an organization, but frankly didn't see eyeto-eye. After a series of meetings on Mackinac Island, a new basin-wide group, Great
Lakes United (GLU), emerged. GLU became a united voice for hundreds of
organizations throughout the Great Lakes dedicated to preserving and restoring the Great
Lakes and St. Lawrence River ecosystem, representing a diverse group of organizations
that include labor unions, environmental groups, hunters, fishers, community groups, and
citizens of the United States, Canada, First Nations, and tribes (Jackson and Sloan 2008).
GLU holds annual meetings that seek the advice of these groups to develop by consensus
an agenda to pressure Congress, the IJC, and other policy makers to collaborate and put
the common good of a healthy Great Lakes Basin (Dempsey 2004; Jackson 2005).
Another key NGO, the National Wildlife Federation, coordinated all litigation
through its Ann Arbor offices:
Q:
The NWF, were and are they the principle litigation strategy
component in the Great Lakes?
A:

Yes.

Q:

Is that still the case?
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A:

Yes.

Q:
So if GLU or Lake Michigan Alliance or one of those groups has
an issue that they want to litigate, do they typically go to NWF for help?
A:

Not exclusively but there's always coordination.

Q:

But there is a coordination mechanism they provide?

A:
Yes. Absolutely. And that just developed. It's not necessarily
formal and NWF isn't always the plaintiff for all the environmental issues
that come up.
Q:

But somehow they play a coordinating role even there?

Q:
Informally, yeah. I mean, they're not always in the lead, though....
If you were somebody on water quality issues you would talk with NWF
first, and if NWF didn't take the case, then GLU might go to another law
firm. (U.S. Federal Employee 2)
Another source familiar with the litigation strategy verified that the NWF
coordinated litigation efforts during critical periods in GLWQA governance regime:
Q:
One last question. Remember the National Wildlife Federation when they established the GL Resource Center, through the NWF, they
basically did all of the legal activity that was required. Is that your
understanding...?
A:
Most of it. I would say...yeah, after it was established, they did do
that, and actually, Cam Davis.. .well, yes.. .that's true...
Q:
How did the NWF get in the position of coordinating all of the
litigation?
A:
Because they specifically.. .they had the resources.. .they were by
far had the largest paid membership of any environmental
organization.. .and they specifically.. .oh, God, to get into that, you had to
go back to the history of legal litigation in the environmental movement as
a whole.. .The way it was structured...they had...what they called
chapters, affiliated organizations and so forth, but, they.. .those centers
were created for the purpose of providing legal resources. That was their
purpose. (US NGO 2)
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Table 28 Participants
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Significant, meaningful public
participation is required. The expectation
is for significant meaningful participation
and input of a broad segment of the
affected population in decision making
processes. Participation must be open to
almost any person or group with a
significant interest in the issue. Active
outreach to develop citizen involvement
and partnerships and build "civic science"
base

Regulatory agencies must participate in
coordinated and integrated fashion and
allow softer local and regional input into
governance.

IJC actively encourages recognizes the
need for an informed and active public.
Encourages broad education plans
because a knowledgeable public. IJC
stresses that public involvement in t h e
solution of local problems should be
developed within the perspective of the
overall Great Lakes ecosystem. GLT and
other NGOs outreach and education. The
Decisions for the Great Lakes program
trains citizen leaders throughout the basin.
GLIN, biennial reports, annual/biennial
IJC meetings, citizen participation on IJC
boards and panels, all serve to educate and
engage the public. All participants
welcome. Unions, NGOs, academics,
environmental groups, agencies, hunters,
fishers, and First Nations involved from
the beginning.
Coordination and Collaboration of
agencies by SAB and IJC. Binationalism,
dedication to GLB, and participation in
"personal and professional capacity"
important. GLWQA, as amended,
provided targets and goals, parties, and
with 1987 AOC development,
communities played large role in
restoration efforts.

The participants in the Great Lakes governance regime were many and varied.
The fact that there was a critical mass of institutional and public support was important to
the restoration of the Great Lakes during the early years of the GLWQA regime. It took
more than the mere existence of an array of participants, however (See Table 28). The
perspectives of those who participated were also important.
Perspectives. All participants have perspectives. Such perspectives can include
conflicting ideas, feelings, and beliefs about a problem and often rest on basic beliefs.
Social groups may coalesce around a perspective, but participants are individuals with
their own beliefs, interests, loyalties, and faith. The way they see themselves, or their
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identifications as members of some group, are important to explain their actions (Clark
2008). The actors that coalesced around the governance regime of the GLWQA in the
1970s and 1980s shared a deep and enduring concern for the overall health and integrity
of the Great Lakes. There were moving quotes presented in prior sections of this paper
from people who were involved in the GLWQA process during its early years. For
awhile, anyway, people who put the good of the GLB ecosystem before other more
parochial interests shared a belief in collaboration, cooperation, and citizen
empowerment, became the "we/us" (as opposed to "they/them") in the political and
social system.
Perspectives under an ecosystem-based approach to governance requires a
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common
interests (Lasswell 1971; Brunner 2002; Clark 2002; Steelman 2010). One common
interest in ecosystem-based governance is to enable management to focus on the natural
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function while recognizing the
need for human and institutional involvement at every level of the ecosystem
(Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995; Costanza, Andrade et al. 1998; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000;
Gunderson and Holling 2002; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). The
common interest of maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh
parochial interests in preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. In
addition, the perspective necessary for ecosystem-based governance should be more
universal and open to new ideas and experimental approaches rather than parochial and
institutionally resistant to innovation.
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Table 29 Perspectives
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Perspective requires a governance structure
that looks to find common ground on
policies that advance common interests. In
addition, the perspective necessary for
ecosystem-based governance should be
more universal and open to new ideas and
experimental approaches rather than
parochial and institutionally resistant to
innovation.
Problem solving should be viewed as a
flexible process with broad participation and
a variety of perspectives and should be
cognizant that environmental, social, and
economic systems are related with problems
that overlap and need to be approached with
a concern for human dignity and a respect
for democratic access.

During the first decade of the GLWQA
there was strong support by the IJC and its
Boards and panels to pursue common
interests and interests of the health of the
GLB ecosystem were paramount. Problemsolving approach to SAB and related IJC
panels was to solicit and listen to all ideas a universal approach - in order to make sure
no potential innovation was overlooked.
IJC, SAB and other GLWQA participants
shared an implicit commitment to the basin
and to the equity and justice. Equity,
fairness, and human health reached the
operational levels under the GLWQA and
were factors in the early years. Also,
information and input was gathered from
broad base of participants, overlapping
board members, and knowledgeable citizens
Language of the GLWQA and the Preamble
to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries
requires parties to focus on the entire
ecosystem as a basis for sustaining the
fisheries. The goal of the GLFC is to
sustain the functional integrity of
ecosystems while producing desired
resources and environmental services.
Dedication, commitment, and service in
their personal and professional capacity
enabled early participants to make difficult
decisions that favored the common interests
of the health of the GLB over other more
narrow interests.

Common interest in ecosystem-based
governance is to enable management to
focus on the natural processes necessary to
sustain ecosystem structure and function
while recognizing the need for human and
institutional involvement at every level of
the ecosystem. The common interest of
maintaining and supporting ecosystem
integrity should outweigh parochial interests
in preserving bureaucratic turf or command
and control hierarchy.

Problem solving should be viewed as a flexible process with broad participation
and a variety of perspectives and should be cognizant that environmental, social, and
economic systems are related with problems that overlap and need to be approached with
a concern for human dignity and a respect for democratic values (Dryzek 1997). Finally,
perspective involves more than governance but extends to the expectations and demands
of people. In an ideal world, citizens would have the knowledge necessary to adopt
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collective, community-oriented values instead of the selfish materialism of consumer
values (Becker 1993; Dryzek 1997; Clark 2002) (Table 29).
The governance regime under the GLWQA between the late 1960s and early
1990s thrived on a perspective that included a dedication to collaboration, cooperation,
inclusion, and a desire to do good for the Great Lakes Basin that was stronger than the
desire to profit or otherwise drain it of resources or resilience. Several factors accounted
for this overall perspective. The first operating principle of the IJC requires that meeting
locations are alternated on each side of the border and that the costs of joint activities are
shared equally. In this manner since its inception the Commissioners have demonstrated
that the symmetry demanded of the UC offset the asymmetry in sheer size between
Canada and the U.S. (Botts and Muldoon 2005)
The IJC's historic insistence on the binationalism of its Commissioners, described
in the problem orientation section of this chapter, was certainly relevant to the
perspective of activities by the DC and its Boards and panels. This tradition of
independence from consideration or interference from national interests is found nowhere
in the treaty, yet it was essential to achieving the goals of the GLWQA (Jackson and
Sloan 2008). Charles Ross, a Commissioner under five presidents, explained that the UC
acted "as members of a single body," with independence from the United States or
Canadian government interference, even though appointed by the heads of each country
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,11). Thus independence and collaboration marked the process
followed by the UC and its boards.
Another operating principle that reflects the perspective of the UC and its boards
and panels was the principle that required each commissioner to operate "in his (or her)
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own professional capacity and expertise" rather than as a representative of an agency,
NGO, or any other special interest (UC 1975; Botts and Muldoon 2005,12). Independent
of the constraints that might be placed on individuals who might have to act within their
roles as agency employees, this operating principle helped assure that attention and
expertise was focused on the challenges of the Great Lakes Basin without worrying about
their agency interests and limitations. Thus officials of various agencies crossed over and
served on different Boards and panels within the UC scheme. The affiliation of the
participant was not important - the focus was on using knowledge and expertise to solve
problems. As one member of the Science Advisory Board explained:
A:
And at the staff level, a number of GL Fishery Commissioners
were on IJC boards. And Great Lakes Commission had similar
arrangements. Mike Donahue for years was co-chair of UC's Science
Advisory Board. And so at staff level, there were some senior IJC staff
that just consider themselves a cut above, they were quasi-diplomats and
so on. But, generally at the staff level, it was like in CUSIS, people
participated and the way we ran those meetings, when people participated,
you couldn't tell from where they came.
Q:
People were there under their personal and professional capacity,
not necessarily as representative of their agencies?
A:
And to this implicit commitment to the basin and to the equity and
justice. And they all shared that, and so you didn't know where they came
from, and of course they didn't keep verbatim records. (Canadian
Academic 1)
The process was independent early on under the GLWQA process. No one on the
Water Quality Board or especially the Science Advisory Board really cared where their
fellow board members were from or what agencies employed them. Their implicit
commitment was to the basin and notions of equity and justice were important.
As the Commissioners explained in the 2nd Annual Report of the UC (1975):
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The Commissioners act, not as separate national delegations under
instruction from their respective Governments, but as a single body
seeking common solutions in the joint interest and, most important, in
accordance with the agreed rules or principles set out in the Treaty.
Significantly, all Commissioners make a solemn declaration in writing that
they will faithfully and impartially perform the duties imposed under the
Treaty. The effect of this declaration is to give the Commissioners a sense
of the primary loyalty they have to the treaty system while they are
serving (IJC 1975,1).
Another characteristic of perspective in an ideal system is the willingness and
ability to examine many different viewpoints - a universal approach to problem solving
rather than a linear, parochial approach. One participant in the GLWQA process in the
early years explained how this perspective helped to introduce him to the ecosystem
approach:
We had a working group...we met regularly over two years, and put
together our understanding. We started by saying that we were going to
take every explanation...anybody who had any claim to expertise we'll
take their hypothesis ...we'll listen to accusations.. .before we bring in any
of our own personal hypothesis. And we checked out every one of them.
And to our surprise we found people who were using the same evidence to
support different kinds of causal claims. We even had Barry Commoner
arguing that Lake Erie's problems were due to atmospheric testing of
nuclear weapons. We didn't take that one very seriously. But we took all
the rest seriously. I was also very much struck by the fact that there was
evidence out there that wasn't diagnostic of any particular problem. There
was ambiguous evidence. So we started asking, what kind of evidence is
diagnostic for a particular causal approach and which evidence was non
diagnostic. And that is how I got into the ecosystem approach. Even my
expert colleagues were doing the same thing. People who had expertise in
eutrophication were blaming all sorts of things on nutrient overload.
People who knew about fishing like I did were blaming all sorts of things
on overfishing. The people like Huxley, who knew about erosion were
blaming erosion for lots of things. And we said well if we take an
ecosystem approach you're obligated to sort these things out and try to
attribute the cause where you have evidence, diagnostic evidence. That is
one way of how I got interested in the ecosystem approach. (Canadian
Academic 2)
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Finally, an ideal ecosystem-based governance regime perspective requires a
governance structure that looks to find common ground on policies that advance common
interests.
Under the GLWQA scheme the IJC has no jurisdiction to force a Party to act in
any particular way. It is chartered with the purpose of resolving disputes and avoiding
conflicts. The IJC, and its related Boards and panels, have the ability to investigate only
"such subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem as the Parties may from time
to time refer to it" (GLWQA 1987, Article VII(l)(g)). Even upon reference, the IJC only
has the power to hold hearings, make recommendations and draft reports and comments.
While the IJC has the power upon request to arbitrate a dispute between the parties, in the
more than 100 years of its existence this provision has never been invoked (IJC 1975;
Botts and Muldoon 2005). Thus it appears that the perspective of the IJC has been to
look for common ground that works for the good of the GLB in order to resolve disputes.
They simply lack the power or authority to do anything but attempt through common
fact-finding, collaboration and diplomatic efforts, to convince the Parties to act in the best
interest of the Great Lakes Basin.
The participants in the Great Lakes overall governance scheme, as we learned in
the section immediately above, go well beyond the UC and its Boards. They include
regional commissions and the federal governments of Canada and the U.S., as well as the
state and provincial interests.
The Great Lakes Basin Commission and their role and perspectives were
examined in the Participants section above. The Great Lakes Commission, as was
discussed above, broadened its mandate to begin to take in the state and federal
239

coordination function previously fulfilled by the GLBC before it was shut down in 1983.
Since its days as a mainly navigational compact in the 1950s the GLC has been not only
broadening its mandate but it has also been honing its collaborative skills and building a
process for US and Canadian interests to cooperate on a number of levels:

A:
The compact that created us gave the Commission the authority to
advise and consult with Canada and the provinces. That was what the
states wrote into the compact. Congress said: "Thank you very much but
we'll take care of the relationship with Canada."... they said that they
didn't want a regional organization like us negotiating or consulting or
anything involving direct consultation with the Canadian government... So
Congress said no you can only be a US organization created by the
involved States - you know the way compacts work - they have to go to
Congress under the Constitution. We, however, recognize that there's
another side to the border so we created by resolution a category of
membership for the provinces called "associate commissioners" and
basically treat them just like U.S. Commissioners. Technically they don't
have a vote but we generally operate by consensus. So they sit at the table
with our Board of Directors. They participate in all deliberations. We just
had our annual meeting up in Quebec city. Quebec and Ontario are very
active but technically they're not part of the Compact and technically they
don't actually have a vote.
Q:

But in all other respects?

A:
It was a way for us to get around what Congress did when they
took it up. (US Federal Employee 2).
So the GLC has made inroads into forging a solid relationship between US and
Canadian federal, state, and provincial entities and now provides another forum where the
participants can discuss issues and priorities. In this manner, the GLC has developed an
innovative and flexible process with the broad participation of governments and entities
on both sides of the international border. They are able to cope with a variety of
perspectives and by their efforts and mandate must be cognizant of environmental, social,
and economic influences. One example is the way that the GLC facilitates the various
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entities around the Great Lakes to press the US Congress for funds for Great Lakes
i
restoration efforts:

A:
See we play very nice in the same sandbox. And the other thing
about the Great Lakes is that we have a number of regional organizations
and I am quite proud of the fact that since I came here one of my motives
was to bring the regional organizations together so that when we do things
like go to Washington we speak with one voice. In fact one of the things
that I've heard from people in Washington with my work is that you guys
come down here every year and you've got your list, you're ready for
what some call the annual "begathon." And all those lists look a little bit
different.
A:

And you're all together on it?

No, we weren't. But now we are. Now we've actually done a one pager
and that's kind of just a vehicle for getting all the organizations on one
sheet of paper in terms of our annual legislative and appropriations
priorities to Congress. And that was, I mean, I made that happen.
Q:

How did you do that?

A:
Just got everybody around the table and everybody had their
longer, more comprehensive lists and we still have our four page summary
of what we're asking for, and we just got together and looked at where the
ven diagrams overlapped and found what we all agreed with, and we argue
over every single word and then talk about what color paper it should be
on and what pictures should be used and we actually divide up which
organization is going to take the lead on each of the four or five elements.
We bring the tribes in and we run it by our board of directors and we make
sure all the states and all of our constituents can live with it.
Q:

Is everyone at the table that needs to be there in order to...

A:
I think we've done a pretty darn good job. I mean we have the
Commission and our representation of the states. We have the Council of
Great Lakes Governors and their more direct access to the governors. We
have the cities through the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.
We have the fishery commission. We have the NGOs through NWF and
Healing Our Waters. We now have the Council of Great Lakes Industries
at the table on our web page and the annual legislative agenda. And we
have the tribes. (U.S. Federal Employee 2)

241

The above fairly characterizes the perspectives of the GLWQA entities and the
GLC. The perspectives of the GLFC, federal agencies, and state agencies were discussed
above in the problem orientation section of this chapter and will not be repeated here.
Situations. Participants to an ecosystem governance process may interact in
formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly or only during crises.
Thus the examination of the situations in which participants interact may have temporal
elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may also have spatial
issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the participants. There
may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is centralized or
decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or decreasing.
Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize participants to
alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve the crises (Clark
2002).
In an ecosystem-based approach we would expect that there would be ample
opportunity, or situations, for participants to communicate and collaborate (See Table
30). There has been a great deal written about the opportunities for communication,
collaboration, and citizen involvement presented in the sections above, specifically the
Problem Orientation and Participants sub-section. We have seen that there was a great
deal of public outreach sponsored by the UC and others during the 1970s and 1980s that
resulted in a public prepared to question policy and participate in panels and decision
making processes. We have also seen that the IJC held meaningful annual and, later,
biennial meetings and, during the pertinent time period, gave the public chance for
significant input.
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The collaborative efforts of the GLWQA entities do not tell us much, however,
about the conduct of the parties in the enforcement of domestic legislation like the U.S.
Clean Water Act after the early years. All indications are that after the collaboration and
cooperation shown during the first 10 years under the GLWQA, cooperative activity
began to wane as conservative governments on both sides of the border began to isolate
the IJC and its participatory decision-making model.
There has been little indication of movement towards a governance system that is
heading toward partnerships with innovative techniques for working with industry other
than the traditional confrontational methods. This is discussed further in the Effects
portion of this section.
Table 30 Situations
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Collaboration, communication and cooperation
between government, stakeholders, and the
public allow for governance that works more
with participants than on them. This means
more frequent collaborative interaction
between government and participants at all
levels. Further, agencies need to be less geared
toward enforcement and more willing to be
used as resources for local involvement and for
solving problems where they arise.

GLWQA provides targets for Parties to reach,
including toxic contaminant reduction and
standards for monitoring and reporting. IJC
advocates and encourages collaboration as well
as education and outreach for public and for
local government officials so they can better
understand the nature of non-point source
impacts and cumulative effects. IJC and
GLWC work together, with continuous
deliberations to evaluate conditions and trends
in the entire ecosystem.

Decision-making and other collaborative
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply
single-play problem-solving efforts. The need
for passive formal public and adversarial public
hearings can be reduced through citizen
involvement and partnership, not just public
information programs to inform passively.

IJC publishes regular reports, including state of
the lake and basin-wide reports to the Parties.
These are public documents and widely
distributed. Governments respond to
challenges raised in IJC reports. Biennial
meetings set stage for presentation of Board
reports to the IJC with public attendance and
participation (especially in early years). Strong
emphasis on education and outreach to
empower a knowledgeable public. All
information transparent and readily available.
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Base Values. In Chapter III it was pointed out that environmental policy disputes
are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact that they are often masked in
economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve around technical issues (Layzer
2006).
The values that we will discuss in terms of the GLWQA governance regime
include the typical assets or resources that participants use in their efforts to achieve their
goals. All values, including authority, can be used as bases of power. Brewer and
deLeon (1983) have listed the values pertinent to this inquiry:
Power is to make and carry out decisions
Enlightenment is to have knowledge
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological
Skill is to have special abilities.
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships
Respect is to show and receive deference
Rectitude is to have ethical standards
The characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance include a heavy
reliance on significant public participation, vertical and horizontal collaboration,
resilience, and learning through trial and error. The values necessary for the
implementation of an ecosystem-based approach must move away from the traditional
goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves. In order for implementation of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a chance there needs to be much more
emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the values of
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knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trial-and-error approach to management
solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment to the gathering and sharing of
knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge failures without the fear of
punishment or the loss of funding.
Table 31 Base Values
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Values sought should be consistent
with goals of promotion of broad
collaboration with emphasis on
ecosystem resilience. The values of
power and wealth should be utilized
to press demands for common
interests prioritizing human dignity,
ecosystem integrity and resilience.
Knowledge (enlightenment) should
be a goal that is ideally gained from
a variety of sources through a
process of trial and error as much as
through traditional experimental
science.

Goals under GLWQA defined
broadly with emphasis on ecosystem
approach and resilience of ecosystem
function. CWA goals consistent.
Goals include reduction of pollution
and virtual elimination of toxic
contaminants. Broad coalition of
scientists, agencies, IJC, SAB, and a
knowledgeable public collaborate to
solve problems using principles of
binationalism and a free flow of
ideas to experiment with policies and
monitor results, with transparent
communication fostering trust and
accountability. Participants aware of
and dedicated to human dignity,
health, fairness and democratic
traditions.
Values of knowledge, rectitude,
well-being and respect gained
through strong ethic fostered by
binationalism, freedom and open
exchange of ideas, and the
participation of experts and citizens
in their personal and professional
capacities. Pressure applied by
public, labor unions, NGOs and
coordinated by umbrella groups like
GLU help apply pressure to policy
makers to utilize power public, not
private, interests.

In order for implementation of an
ecosystem-based approach to
governance to have a chance there
needs to be much more emphasis on
utilizing power and wealth to obtain
stronger inputs from the values of
knowledge, rectitude, well-being,
and respect

In addition, collaboration and significant public participation will require a focus on the
values of respect, affection, rectitude and well-being. There is simply no way to gain the
trust, credibility, and respect necessary for problem-solving and planning collaboration
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and public and broad-based community support without a shift more in the direction of
these important values.
Thus our ideal system must first be characterized by resource sharing and
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to
identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and
restore ecosystem resilience. In an ecosystem-based approach to governance, base values
come into play in both the goals for the governance of the ecosystem and in the
implementation processes that seek to implement the goals (Table 31).
As set forth above in the discussions about goal clarification and trends in the
GLB, the goals for the Great Lakes Basin, have largely been articulated by GLWQA and
the Clean Water Act. The general goal agreed to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the
Great Lakes through the 1987 Protocol is to "restore, and maintain the chemical, physical
and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" (1987, Article
II). The ecosystem is defined as "the interacting components of air, land, water and
living organisms, including humans, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River"
(1987, Article I (g)). As we have seen additional goals called for the protection and
maintenance of self-sustaining fish populations and aquatic organisms and for protection
and restoration of habitats vital for the support of healthy and diverse communities of
plants, fish, and wildlife. Other, more particular goals and objectives have been
discussed earlier in this chapter (toxic chemicals, virtual elimination, etc.).
These goals rely heavily on the base values of knowledge (enlightenment), wellbeing, respect, and rectitude for their achievement. In the discussions above there has
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been ample evidence of the various ways that knowledge has been sought and acquired
under the GLWQA scheme. In the early years we have seen how the public was involved
in key aspects of learning, especially through PLUARG and UGLR studies. We have
also seen how participants in the process fostered a 'free market of ideas' and all were
welcome. As such the goals of the GLWQA regime seem to parallel with the goals
necessary for an ecosystem approach to governance.
The second characteristic of the ideal ecosystem approach involves the
implementation of the goals of an ecosystem-based approach to governance and the need
to place emphasis on utilizing the base values of power and wealth to obtain stronger
inputs of the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. The transition from
goals to implementation is a bit tricky.
We have seen that during the early years of the GLWQA regime there was a
strong esprit de corps that was created by the tradition of binationalism, freedom and
open exchange of ideas, and the participation of experts and citizens in their personal and
professional capacities (as opposed to representatives of agencies or institutions), the
loyalty all shared for the betterment of the GLB ecosystem, strong public participation,
public outreach and education, and education of local and other government officials.
These characteristics and more gave participants in the GLWQA the ability to focus on
the problems of the Great Lakes and a feeling of loyalty and allegiance to a healthy
ecosystem in the GLB, complete with concern for integrity, justice, and democracy. The
use of common fact-finding and reliance on transparent and reliable data added
credibility to the IJC's efforts (Becker 1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005).'
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The IJC, as has been discussed, acts mainly in an oversight capacity in the GLB.
True implementation must come from the Parties. In an ideal ecosystem-based approach
there should be an emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from
the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect as steps are taken to
implement activities and policies that further societal goals.
The behavior of US federal and state agencies is often strongly influenced by
industrial interests and a desire to minimize or avoid loss of values such as power, wealth
(i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions involving potential adverse effects on important
industries (e.g. virtual elimination), agency value losses include decreased budget
allocations from unsympathetic legislatures so the costs of making decisions that
adversely affect various industries are often perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely
on the support of elected officials and support is often tied to the satisfaction of those
officials with the agency's contributions to or lack of interference with local or regional
gains. Backlash against strong conservation methods that may impact economic
productivity can be severe even at a local level (Kagan 2001; Wallace 2003; Armitage
and Plummer 2010; Brunner 2010a).
Despite the differences between the IJC and the Parties to the GLWQA, there is a
legacy of frequent and often innovative cooperation and collaboration between them.
There have also been others, including labor unions and NGOs, especially when
galvanized under the umbrella organization of Great Lakes United, that have often
applied pressure when necessary to see that the trade-offs in base values were in the
direction of accumulating knowledge and well-being, as disclosed by this former member
of the SAB:
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And so, people kind of didn't know what to do, especially since these
things crossed so many political boundaries jurisdiction. So, we had a
whole series of consultations. They had roundtable discussions around the
basin. They had a series of initiatives to try to get a handle on it. Great
Lakes United was formed between '78 and '87, to be the activist group,
because Great Lakes Tomorrow was a facilitation and education group.
But, we needed some group that was going to hold politicians' feet to the
fire, and that was Great Lakes United. So, a couple of things happened in
that period, one of which was Green Peace's zero discharge tour of the
lakes, where they went about touting the only way to deal with toxic
contaminants [was zero discharge] but, that occurred after GLU held a
series of public hearings around the basin to get input from whoever
wanted to show up and testify. They published a report, which I have on
the shelf...a justification for why that probably needed to be really
explicit and that there needed to be... Also during that period, and while I
was on the science advisory board, there was a lot of interest in getting a
mass balance assessment of the contaminants. It started with PLUARG,
but then it went on after that. In order to get mass balance, you need to
know sources, causes, etc. So, there was a lot of that research going on in
the system at that time. It became very clear that the only way that these
watershed groups were going to be able to do what had to be done was to
have a strategic approach. (US NGO/Academic)
And rectitude was a trait shared amongst many of those involved in the early
years of the GLWQA agreement, typified by this comment from an individual who was
one of the leaders within the GLWQA regime for many years:

Nothing I've ever done has been divorced from justice, so far as I know.
My deontological ethic ranks higher than my commitment and objective
interest in policy and science. (Canadian Academic 2)
Others tried to foster these value trade-offs that sought knowledge and well-being
rather than wealth and power for power's sake. The Great Lakes Basin Commission, as
discussed earlier, was a powerful coordinating force. And while it took a while the Great
Lakes Commission ultimately evolved an active role in filling the gap left when the
GLBC was shut down.
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The governance system of the Great Lakes during the time frame of the early
1970s through the early 1990s was essentially overseen by the UC. The prescriptions, or
laws and regulations that were in existence were ample to provide base value trade-offs
that gave priority to well-being, knowledge, respect, and rectitude. The GLWQA and the
Clean Water Act provide ample justification and enforcement capacity to implement
these priorities. The problem, as we have seen, is that as interpreted and enforced by the
Parties, when not receiving pressure from an angry or galvanized public, there is a need
to guard against the trend to place a premium on activities that procure wealth and power
for the sake of wealth and power (Caldwell 1993; Dempsey 2004).
Strategies. Thus far in the analysis of the social process at work in the Great
Lakes in first two decades of the GLWQA we have examined the participants, their
perspectives, the situations in which they interact, and the base values that are used to
achieve the goals of the participants. The strategies employed by the participants will be
examined next.
The four basic strategies that were identified in Chapter III may be listed
as follows:
•

Diplomatic strategies use communication among and between the leaders
and/or elites of any group or agency;

•

Ideological strategies involve communications to a public that is wider
than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks, newspaper
and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda;
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•

Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and

•

Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for
binding resolution by a third party.
In Chapter III the need to move toward a governance system that moves

away from regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point
sources and problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms
mandating change in existing technologies or behavior was discussed at some length. In
place of coercive command and control regulatory conduct, at least to some degree,
should be a movement toward cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes
and raw materials, sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other
social and economic goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies (Table 33).
Certainly there will always be a need for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the
state in order to keep firms in line and not give unfair competitive advantage to
environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison 1995; Kagan 2001; Kjaer 2004; Fiorino
2006). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with
the regulated public to a greater degree.
In addition to the need to move away from coercive regulatory conduct and
litigation, the literature and case studies discussed in chapter III suggest the need for a
bridging organization that connects, navigates, and/or coordinates the interests of
different institutions and stakeholders across organizational levels should also be an
integral part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. As was pointed out
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earlier, such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and innovation. The collaboration that bridging
organizations initiate is strategic, conditional on the goals to enhance the values that may
tend to promote the sustainability and resilience of the ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al.
2008).
Table 32 Strategies
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

An ecosystem-based approach would rely
more on ideological and diplomatic
strategies, moving away from regulatory
enforcement efforts geared toward targeted
interventions at point sources and problem
areas which take the form of commands to
different classes of firms mandating change
in existing technologies or behavior. Instead
there would be cooperation and collaboration
in decisions about processes and raw
materials, sustainability planning integrating
environmental goals with other social and
economic goals.

At the binational level ideological and
diplomatic strategies are the only strategies
available to the IJC and the GLFC. Biennial
as well as relevant special reports are issued
to raise issues and challenge the Parties.
NGOs through GLU hold biennial meetings
to develop an agenda of concerns among its
many NGO members to take to the IJC
biennial meetings. Decisions for the Great
Lakes trains citizen leaders and promotes
lasting networks. Annual meetings of
IAGLR provide opportunity for presentation
and discussion of social, natural sciences,
economics and related issues. GLIN on-line
service provides access to basin-wide
information and data. Interlocking boards.
Litigation is a not the preferred option.
Diplomacy and ideological efforts should act
to bring parties together to resolve
differences in a collaborative manner.
Litigation is last resort and is conducted by
the Parties to the GLWQA or stakeholders,
not the IJC or GLFC. NGO litigation
conducted or coordinated by NWF.
IJC and GLFC act as bridging organizations
and provide direction, coordination, and
accountability to actions of the parties. SAB,
WQB, and other IJC panels and Boards work
to analyze basin-wide data and advise parties
as to trends and potential ecosystem
problems. Also identifies bigger picture
needs and assists stakeholders and interested
parties to collaborate, anticipate, and resolve
issues. Parties with an issue may ask for
objective investigation and assistance from
IJC via reference.

Litigation will play a role as there is a need
for basic rules to be backed by the coercive
power of the state in order to keep firms in
line and not give unfair competitive
advantage to environmentally noncompliant
firms. Litigation would, however, rely more
upon alternative dispute mechanisms,
including facilitation and mediation.
The existence of a bridging organization that
connects and navigates the interests of
different stakeholders across organizational
levels should be integral part of adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems.
Such organizations provide social incentives
by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and
innovation. The collaboration that bridging
organizations initiate is strategic-, conditional
on the goals to enhance the values from the
ecosystems
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Thus in a traditional governance scheme, strategies typically are built upon a basis
laid by formal laws and rules. Reliance is therefore generally upon regulation using
economic or social intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this
intervention fails, litigation provides the remedy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino 2006). Thus
status quo strategies use litigation, and by extension enforcement with the threat of
litigation, as a principle weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al.
2004; Walker and Salt 2006; Bardach and Kagan 2010). With no alternatives, litigation
becomes a tactical and strategic weapon employed by all sides to a policy conflict. It is
the courts that become another political venue for the losers in prior policy battles fought
in Congress, or in the agency regulatory process, can launch another assault. In this way
litigation provides a stalling mechanism to the policy process and creates a bargaining
chip to be bartered for concessions from opponents (Rosenbaum 2008).
The strategies employed under the governance regime of the Great Lakes Basin
vary depending upon the policy level. This section will discuss the binational
prescriptions that apply to the governance in the basin. These prescriptions include the
GLWQA, the GLFC, and the Great Lakes Charter (GLC). An examination of the federal,
provincial and state institutions and their roles in the governance of the activities that
impact the GLB will be set forth in the decision process analysis which follows later in
this chapter.
It is important to understand that the binational governance regime in the Great
Lakes Basin, with contributions by the IJC, GFLC, and a cast of frequently unified NGOs
and citizens groups, is designed to stress diplomatic and ideological approaches as
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opposed to the traditional enforcement/litigation model. Because the consequences of
preventing ecosystem harm from happening are invisible to the untrained eye, and the
benefits of an ecosystem approach are not readily discerned, public outreach was critical.
Great Lakes Tomorrow and others traveled the basin to educate create a knowledgeable
public (Christie, Becker et al. 1986). The Decisions for the Great Lakes program trained
citizens to be leaders through a 40 hour course, presented around the Lake Ontario
watershed, designed to educate the public and build lasting networks between
government, scientists, regulators, and the public (GLT 1985). The principle governance
mechanisms, together with their binational boards and supporting casts at work in the
Great Lakes Basin, had the potential during the relevant time period to channel
contending parties and groups into less expensive and more efficient ways of resolving
disputes than litigation.
The UC is an important bridging organization despite the fact that they lack
formal powers of enforcement. There is no mechanism by which they can compel
compliance under threat of sanction. The purpose set forth in the GLWQA, for instance,
is for the Parties "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." To achieve this purpose the
Agreement provides that the Parties, defined as the Government of Canada and the
Government of the United States,..agree to make a maximum effort to develop
programs, practices, and technology necessary for a better understanding of the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent practicable the
discharge of pollutants into the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. II).
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The GLWQA is overseen and to some degree coordinated by the IJC. As
discussed, the Agreement gives the IJC no direct enforcement powers. The powers and
responsibilities of the UC are set forth in the Agreement. Its primary role is to "assist in
the implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it may inter alia collate, analyze,
and disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State and Provincial
Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes
System..." It may also ".. .tender advice and recommendations to the Parties and to the
State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters related to the quality of the
boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations concerning the General and
Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other regulatory requirements, programs
and other measures, and intergovernmental agreements relating to the quality of these
waters." There are a variety of other responsibilities that are crucial to the function of the
UC, including the ability and discretion to publish any report or statement related to its
reference, the ability to conduct investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem when referred to it by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report
to the Parties and to the State and Provincial Governments no less frequently than
biennially concerning progress toward the achievement of the ...objectives...This report
shall include an assessment of the effectiveness of the programs and other measures
undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, and advice and recommendations."
Significantly, the IJC may "at any time make special reports to the Parties, to the
State and Provincial Governments and to the public concerning any problem of water
quality in the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII). Thus the IJC uses its powers to
assess the state of the ecosystem in the Great Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable
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through biennial reports and public meetings. Other reports and investigations deemed a
part of their role are also published and challenge the Parties to remedy or further
investigate perceived threats to ecosystem resilience (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990;
Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
In addition to the IJC, ideological and diplomatic strategies may be found nested
within other bilateral governing bodies. The Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries was
adopted by Canada and the U.S. in an effort to develop solutions to fisheries issues
related to the lamprey eel introduction and to other water quality issues that impacted a
shared fishery. Like the GLWQA, no direct enforcement tools were granted to the Great
Lakes Fishery Commission, but its preamble stresses that..joint and coordinated efforts
by the United States of America and Canada are essential in order to determine the need
for the type of measures which will make possible the maximum sustained productivity
in Great Lakes fisheries of common concern" (CGLF 1954; 1956). The institutional
scheme and procedural mechanisms developed by the Parties to the Convention enabled
them to by-pass costly and time-consuming international litigation over the establishment
and division of total allowable catches and related issues. Instead, the Parties were able
to deliberate and continuously compare the results of their consensus policy decisions
with findings related to the condition of the entire ecosystem (Prelli and Becker 2001).
With the CGLF institutional arrangement it became possible:
... for parties to "find" for the ecosystem over and against parochial
economic or political interests that might otherwise seep into
deliberations. Accordingly, they can work to formulate responses to the
problem of sustainable fisheries that could lead to recovery and long-term
maintenance of both the ecosystem and of those who depend upon it for
food and jobs (Prelli and Becker 2001,481).
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Thus during the years pertinent to this project the IJC and the GLFC shared the
leadership role in the development and implementation of governance and management
through the use of diplomatic and ideological strategies. With no ability to bring formal
enforcement actions to compel environmental compliance, there were few realistic
alternatives. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the IJC and the GLFC are
dependent upon the efforts of the Parties, including states and provinces, for
implementation of recommendations and policy developed on a binational level. Thus
potential solutions and policy developed by an impressive array of scientists, citizens, and
regulators using a transparent ecosystem-based approach can be dashed on the shoals of
political and regulatory reality at the federal, state, and provincial levels. These entities
are, of course, bound by formal, fragmented laws, rules, and regulations created by
political systems on both sides of the "dotted line" that divides the United States and
Canada. This fragmentation and the problems that are inherent in the current regulatory
regime will be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter describing the
decision process and will not be explored further here.
Before we move on, however, it is important to mention one additional source of
binational diplomatic and ideological strategies. The GLWQA as it existed after 1978
not only represented a binational commitment between the governments of the U.S. and
Canada, but it also spawned a movement toward cooperation and coordinated action by
the governments of the states and provinces in the Great Lakes Basin. The Council of
Great Lakes Governors, formed first by six states in the Great Lakes Basin in 1983 and
shortly thereafter by New York and Pennsylvania, took it upon themselves to negotiate
various agreements that are extremely relevant to the diplomatic and ideological
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advancement of cooperative efforts to protect and restore the Great Lakes Basin
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
In 1985, the eight governors from the United States and the Premiers of Ontario
and Quebec signed the Great Lakes Charter. The Charter obligated the states and
provinces to, among other things..."to conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes
and their tributary and connecting waters; to protect and conserve the environmental
balance of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem; to provide for cooperative programs and
management of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin..(CGLG 1985). The
Great Lakes Charter also included a provision calling for the development of a common
data base on water resource use. This provision was carried out by the Great Lakes
Commission and exists today as the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN), a fully
operational on-line tool available to researchers, regulators, as well as the general public24
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
The Governors and Premiers went further the following year by signing the 1986
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement (GLTSCA). The GLTSCA has been
described as an

. .extremely ambitious document that commits the signatories to

reducing toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
Signed by the Great Lakes Governors in 1986, and endorsed by the Premiers of Ontario
and Quebec via a memorandum of understanding in 1988, the GLTSCA called for the
integration of permitting process for discharges to different media, interstate cooperation

24 The Great Lakes Commission is an interstate compact consented to by the U.S. Congress. In the 1970s
and 80s it was comprised of representatives from the eight GLB states and focused on collective concerns
surrounding transportation, economic development, resource management, and environmental quality. As
was pointed out earlier in this chapter, the GLC evolved to include representatives of federal governments
and agencies as well as representation from the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
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in hazardous waste management planning, development of common health advisories on
fish contamination, and in general provide for greater consistency between the provinces
and the states in the GLB (CGLG 1986; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
With help from NGOs and the Great Lakes Governors and Premiers, the
governance regime under the GLWQA during the 1970s and 80s relied to a great extent
on ideological and diplomatic efforts. This section has described the strategies mandated
by the binational instruments. In previous sections, we have discussed how ideological
and diplomatic strategies were employed by citizens groups, panels, NGOs and others.
While implementation is left to the Parties, and top/down enforcement and litigation
strategies have played a significant role at the federal, state, and provincial levels, the
spirit of cooperation and collaboration promoted by the binational entities in the early
years of the GLWQA accomplished a great deal without resort to more coercive judicial
intervention. This will be discussed further in the Decision Process analysis.
Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes
may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and
implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to
innovation.
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public. If analysis of the
values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is being
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accumulated by fewer entities, this would reflect a negative trend to those who seek to
move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance (Table 33). If,
on the other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and
structures that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local
knowledge, and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes
are headed in a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance (Brewer and
deLeon 1983; deLeon 1999; Clark 2002; Clark 2008).
Table 33 Outcomes
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Transition toward a more adaptive ecosystembased approach to governance. Innovative
measures are tried that transform current
governance entities and create new or modified
value institutions that get beyond scientific
management and strict command and control
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and
collaborative processes.

Negotiation and adoption of the GLWQA in
1972. Negotiation and amendment of
GLWQA in 1978 specifically adopting basin
wide ecosystem approach to governance.
Board and commission structures that
encouraged collaboration and problemsolving without regard to agency or national
affiliations. Adoption of Great Lakes
Charter. Adoption of 1987 protocol to
GLWQA. Strong public involvement and
transparent collaboration. Negative outcome
of closure of GLBC met with increased role
of Great Lakes Commission.

There have been a variety of important outcomes, both substantive and symbolic,
associated with the evolution of the GLWQA governance regime. One important
outcome is the emergence of the ecosystem-based approach to governance and the
ultimate inclusion of language mandating ecosystem-based governance in the Great
Lakes Basin in the 1978 Agreement (1987; Becker 1993). The original 1972 Agreement
laid the groundwork by seeking input and involvement from the public in investigating
the possibility that water quality was impacted by land-based activities. The innovative
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educational outreach methods, strong public participation, and compelling local input into
the UC's reference concerning the impact of land-based activities certainly produced an
outcome of public and institutional awareness of the value of local input and the need for
change away from traditional fragmented command-and-control enforcement and toward
more collaborative processes (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Jackson
2005).
There have been many other outcomes that have spun out of increasing access to
governance under the GLWQA. These include the goal of virtual elimination of toxic
substances along with a zero tolerance for the release of toxic substances from the 1978
Protocol to the GLWQ. Perhaps the most important outcome of the early GLWQA
regime, however, was the development and use of a process that included a far greater
role for the public and for public education and outreach, greater collaboration between
government agencies at various levels of government, greater cooperation between and
among NGO's, and other examples described in this chapter. There is, however, a flip
side to the outcome component. There are often negative outcomes for some governance
participants or outcomes that have negative impacts on progress toward the goals of
participatory ecosystem-based governance. Clark (2008) describes how opening up
decision-making in the greater Yellowstone region, for example, caused problems among
some: "For people whose livelihoods are based on the expectation of certain kinds of
decision-making power over the use of resources...In other words, opening up the arena
to other participants will likely seem very threatening to those few who had previously
had exclusive power" (Clark 2008,49).

261

One of the most active individuals involved in the governance regime in the early
years of the GLWQA reflected on the impact that at least some government agencies had
on the ecosystem-based approach when he was asked about the nature of ecosystembased governance:

The ecosystem approach is maybe like that tapestry with maybe a dozen or
two dozen different fibers working in different ways. And any particular
practitioner of the ecosystem approach may have competence or oldfashioned rationalist expertise, in several of them. And nobody has
competence on the whole thing. But, in the Great Lakes, until the neocon
revolution pretty well destroyed remediative measures in the '90s, many
different people from many different interest groups could operate, could
contribute to that mosaic and were welcome. Nobody understood it
rationally. It's not understandable rationally. It's complex. It's not
understandable in a linear rational way. You can't write a linear
algorithm, a closed linear algorithm to explain, to define the ecosystem
approach. It's kind of like a democracy - applied in a particular way.
(Canadian Academic 2)
Thus one strategic outcome of collaboration, cooperation, public involvement,
and ecosystem-based governance, put simply, was the effort to keep GLWQA activities,
especially those related to public involvement, under the radar of federal agencies on both
sides of the border, as this example from the former Chair of the Great Lakes Basin
Commission demonstrates:

A: Among the things that I did, that I instituted at the Basin Commission
was, there was a prohibition by OMB of citizen advisory committees,
because there's been such a proliferation of them with the environmental
explosion in the early '70s, that OMB had officially prohibited citizen
advisory committees, so I set up something that we called PIWG—Public
Involvement Work Group, we called it.. .didn't call it an advisory group,
but that's what it was.
Q:

Now why did OMB ban...how could they ban citizens groups?

A:
They banned official citizen advisory groups to federal agencies as
a budget concern.
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Q:

So, you set up the working group?

A:
Yes, we set up PIWG, and then I worked with the states...1 asked
all the state members to suggest members, and that's how the State of New
York suggested Abbey Hoffinan, only we didn't know he was Abbey
Hoffman.
Q:

Right, right, I've heard the story.

A:
So, we formed this group and it functioned. I never heard any
feedback from any agencies. Bureaucrats aren't very imaginative.. .most
of them are, but not all.. .so, the public involvement work group had the
effect of bringing together people from all the 8 Great Lakes states and
setting the stage for greater involvement with the GLWQA, so that's what
I can sum up to tell you. (U.S. NGO 2)
Negative outcomes were often more direct. The federal governments on both
sides of the border were clearly threatened by the public involvement and collaboration
that came out of the GLWQA and especially the PLUARG initiatives in the 1970s, as
described by this veteran of Great Lakes Tomorrow and the PLUARG process:
We reported directly to both the Commission and PLUARG.. .the
collective recommendations of what came up from all of those panels, on
both about the process of engaging the public and about substantive issues.
The general consensus was that the process that PLUARG had run, which
Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated, we facilitated all the hearings that went
on around the lakes on both sides. We also reported as an organization on
what we saw. The public composition didn't matter because the panel was
really diverse in terms of the representation. They included industry.. .by
then everybody's at the table...the result was that they really liked that
model of participation and recommended that the Commission empower
its deference toward another initiative to use similar process. To my
knowledge it hasn't happened since. Because the outcome of the process
was a significant change in the report in terms of what ought to be done
with respect to what the references reported out. It was a very radical
report in terms of what needed to happen. I don't think that the EPA was
ready for it. And also it was at the beginning of the Reagan
Administration. The guys who had worked so hard on that [PLUARG]
report... who were from the soil conservation service, got sent to Siberia,
and the chief guy, Robertson, who I think was the head, came from
Washington, went back one weekend and his office was locked, and he
suddenly found himself in North Dakota just like that. Just about the time
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that was ready to really hit the fan in terms of next steps, Reagan took over
and tried to systematically disembowel the Great Lakes initiative. (U.S.
NGO/Academic)
In sum, the outcomes of the GLWQA regime in the early years included
governance that was innovative, oriented toward problem-solving, and courageous.
Perhaps most important was that it led to the adoption of participatory ecosystem-based
governance under the auspices of the UC, its boards and panels, and to some degree, the
Parties. The educational outreach of Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great
Lakes, the Lake Michigan Federation, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, Great Lakes
United, and others led to strong and persuasive public involvement in critical basin-wide
restoration efforts. Ecosystem-based governance was not only developed and nurtured it
was ultimately included in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement as a formal
binational prescription. For a period of time this outcome meant that the public was
galvanized and pressure was successfully applied to state legislatures to defeat special
interests and pass bans on phosphates in detergents.
The positive outcomes, however, set the stage for other more negative reactions
and outcomes. As suggested by Clark (2007), those who typically had exercised
exclusive power over environmental regulation began to "hear the footsteps" and slowly
began to chip away at the progress made by the innovative and progressive outcomes of
the GLWQA regime of the 1970s and 1980s. The outcomes, therefore, both positive and
negative, morphed into more enduring effects discussed in the following section.
Effects. The effects of decisions and social process must be anticipated. Effects
refer to the long-term changes in the value positions and institutions in the relevant
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community. They are outcomes writ large, i.e. long-term outcomes in terms of values,
processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002).
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative
measures that transform current governance entities and create new or modified value
institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and consistent with national
standards. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of public
and community input and decision-making (Table 34).
Table 34 Effects
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Transition toward a more adaptive
ecosystem-based approach to
governance. Innovative measures
are tried that transform current
governance entities and create
new or modified value institutions
that get beyond scientific
management and strict command
and control hierarchy of
bureaucracy using local input and
collaborative processes

Principle effect was the
acceptance and success of the
outreach and public education
efforts culminating in PLUARG
and related reports. These effects
led to explicit incorporation and
implementation of basin-wide
ecosystem approach into the 1978
amendments. Other effects
included the push-back from
entrenched government and
private interests threatened by the
change in governance.

In the discussion concerning outcomes from the GLWQA the focus was on one
overall critical outcome: The emergence of the ecosystem-based approach to governance
applied throughout the Great Lakes Basin. As we know, the original 1972 Agreement
laid the groundwork by seeking input and involvement from the public in investigating
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the possibility that water quality was impacted by land-based activities. The innovative
educational outreach methods, strong public participation, and compelling local input into
the IJC's reference concerning the impact of land-based activities certainly produced an
outcome of public and institutional awareness of the value of local input and the need for
change away from traditional fragmented command-and-control enforcement and toward
more collaborative processes (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Jackson
2005). As a result, the ecosystem-based approach was specifically defined and formally
adopted as part of the 1978 protocol amending the GLWQA:
(g) "Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" means the interacting components of
air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, within the
drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at
which this river becomes the international boundary between Canada and
the United States (1987, Art 1(g)) [Emphasis original].
Thus the notion that humans were an integral component of the ecosystem, a
relative outcome of efforts of PLUARG and the references set forth in the 1972
GLWQA, became a became a truly lasting effect and legacy via the 1978 language.
Another related effect was the recognition of the manner in which human activities
interacted with other components of the ecosystem. Henry Regier, a former
Commissioner of the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission and key participant in much of
the GLWQA Science Advisory Board activities in the 1970s and 80s summarized this
interrelationship in the simplest of terms:

We recognize two polarities or subsystems within the Great Lakes basin
ecosystem: the natural and the cultural. These can only be distinguished
in a general way; we see no clear boundary between them. Abstractly, the
whole system may be viewed as a dynamic self-organizing network in
which the human and nonhuman are connected in countless ways. On
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balance, these two subsystems in and around the Great Lakes are
interacting adversarially rather than mutualistically (Edwards and Regier
1988,19).
Thus the broad primary outcome of the early years of the GLWQA regime, the
ecosystem-based approach to governance, evolved into a lasting change in the Great
Lakes Basin. The notion that humans were but one component of a larger ecosystem and
that their activities needed to be factored into notions of ecosystem health and resilience
was an effect that required fundamental change in institutional attitudes. Integrity was
recognized as a complex attribute that was comprised of the individual acts of a multitude
of actors, with impacts that influenced the welfare of many in ways that are not
immediately apparent. It was also recognized that ecosystem integrity, including natural
and cultural ecosystems, could not be assured through the simple intervention by some
level of government, be it federal, state, provincial, or local (Edwards and Regier 1988).
This evolution of thought and attitude was and is a primary lasting effect of the GLWQA
regime evolution.
There was a progression to this evolution. The whirlwind of change that began
with public dissatisfaction and demonstrations over social and environmental issues in
the 1960s and led to legislative initiatives like the National Environmental Policy Act
(1970a), the Clean Water Act (1972) and the Clean Air Act (1970) in the United States.
As discussed previously, the deteriorating environmental conditions in the Great
Lakes led to the adoption of the GLWQA by the United States and Canada in 1972. With
public involvement and focused efforts of scientists and others on both sides of the
border, information and data gathered at a variety of scales led to the amendment of the
GLWQA in 1978. Thereafter, with increasing harm caused by invasive species and the
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elevated threats posed by persistent organic pollutants often emanating from land-based
activities, the GLWQA was amended by protocol in 1987 (1987).
Some argue that the 1978 amendments, and later the 1987 protocol, in some ways
had the effect of reducing the credibility of the DC process. The argument is that by
adding the virtual elimination/zero tolerance provisions to the amendments that the
provisions became too aggressive. As a member of the Science Advisory Board of the
IJC at the time described it, these were goals that were simply unattainable from the start:
Q: Does the fact that [the ecosystem approach to governance] made it into
the 1978 agreement; did it change anything in the approach in reality?
A: Well, remember, the '78 agreement came right before 1980, of course,
and you know what happened in 1980.
Q: Keenly aware.
A: And the point is what happened the U.S. sooner or later happened on
the Canadian side. We were in synch. The '78 agreement, especially as a
substitute, subsequently the '87 protocol, irritated the hell out of industry.
And the concept of zero discharge virtual elimination was I think just not
credible. The industry balked. Just to make a point: no chlorine, no table
salt, end of discussion. I can never understand.. .1 used to say well, okay,
they're using it as a code word for doing what they want. An unattainable
idea out here, that if you could do it, then that's what you aim toward. I
could never understand zero discharge/virtual elimination, other than that
everybody recognized that this is an unattainable idea. The anticontaminant campaign—chlorinated hydrocarbons—as code word for
chlorinated or brominated, that whole campaign never had support of the
public health establishment as such. It had individual public health
experts. But the public health establishment never came to favor it.
Because they were using chlorinated hydrocarbons all the time for sanitary
purposes in the house. The public health said you're not going to use
chlorine to clean up a mess in your sink or something? Give me a break.
And also, the public health people never got behind it to any extent at all
and the clinical health people were, of course, sold up to here in
chlorinated pharmaceuticals. And they weren't about to want to get rid of
halogenated pharmaceuticals then. And there were all sorts of reasons but
they irritated the hell out of the chlorine industry, and the chlorine industry
just got the senior decision makers to turn if off. They got a reprieve. Our
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side, and I'm fighting chlorinated hydrocarbons right here in Elmira. But,
Commissioner Durnill when G. H. W. Bush first appointed him to the
International Joint Commission, he didn't know that guy had a family
harmed seriously by some halogenated hydrocarbon. So, Durnill had a
personal stake in getting rid of them. I think if this had been known to the
Bush Administration, Bush wouldn't have put him on the commission.
But, they got a breath of life then in the late '80's, early '90's. But that
faded out and the chemical industry just closed it down. So, effectively,
the '87 protocol, was never implemented. (Canadian Academic 2)

So the inclusion of the virtual elimination/zero discharge provisions in the 1978,
though perhaps popular with the public and with environmental groups, had the practical
effect of weakening the impact of the entire Agreement. Thereafter, after declining
support and outright animosity from the conservative national administrations on both
sides of the border, the 1987 Protocol was negotiated. One of the results of the 1987
Protocol was the creation a Binational Executive Committee (BEC). Under the new
Protocol, the BEC was constituted with members from Environment Canada and the EPA
and tasked with assisting the Parties with meeting the requirements of the GLWQA.
There is a solid group of activists and veterans of the GLWQA process that believes that
the creation of the BEC effectively thwarted efforts to continue the strong public
participation tradition of the GLWQA regime by reducing transparency and placing GLB
ecosystem decision into the hands of experts within the given federal agencies, by
passing public and broader community involvement (Krantzberg, Manno et al. 2007).
Thus the effects of the initial GLWQA of 1972 were powerful. Initially the
concept of including humans and land use activities within has had a powerful and lasting
effect - few would question this reality in this day and age. Also important was the
introduction of the notion that broad public participation, adaptive and flexible
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governance, transparency, and officials acting in a personal and professional role rather
than as representatives of nations or agencies, could function to solve problems and
restore ecosystems damaged by human activity. These are strong and positive effects in
the realm of ecosystem-based governance.
Other realistic effects were, though predictable, not advantageous the quest for
ecosystem integrity, including clean water and air. One effect was that public
participation waned. In addition there seems to have been a reaction of entrenched
government agencies and private corporate interests designed to thwart the effectiveness
of changes in governance. The 1987 Protocol that amended the GLWQA is an example
of a provision that, while on its face appeared to enlist the expertise of EC and EPA in the
UC governance scheme, in reality laid the formal basis for the unraveling of the
participatory governance scheme originally contemplated by the Agreement.25

25

In fairness, at least one of the interviewees who has been involved in the GLWQA evolution believes that
public support has not waned but has merely evolved:
Q:
What's happened to the public participation?
A:
What's your point? Is your point that it has diminished?
Q:
Yeah.
A:
No I would say it's evolved.
Q:
Okay. Explain...
A:
Well it's not focused on water quality or the water quality agreement per se; it's focused now on
aquatic invasive species and Great Lakes restoration.. .And that has less of a direct connection to the water
quality agreement. The IJC and the water quality agreement haven't been able to adapt and evolve as
quickly for a lot of reasons that are very obvious to you - going to the Department of State and External
Affairs. So the movement now and the push from public advocacy standpoint is to do something about
ballast water and releases from other vectors and make this Great Lakes regional collaboration and
restoration plan real by providing funding. And that's where the citizen energy is focused right now.
Q:
No more of these meetings though where you actually get the Science Advisory Board in front of
the IJC with a huge audience. That doesn't happen anymore?
A:
Well, it's evolved. There is a Great Lakes restoration annual conference that's sponsored by the
Healing Our Waters coalition which is modeled after the Everglades coalition and is focused on the issues
of the Great Lakes. (U.S. Federal Employee 2)
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The effects of governance change, therefore, may be positive or negative in terms
of trends that lead communities and regions either toward or away from their goals. The
longer term effects of the GLWQA experiment are still playing out - even as those active
in the coordination and implementation of strategies strive to stay "below the radar" of
the federal governments on both sides of the border. As one representative of a regional
compact described it:
A:
The compact that created us gave the Commission the authority to
advise and consult with Canada and the provinces. That was what the
states wrote into the compact. Congress said: "Thank you very much but
we'll take care of the relationship with Canada."
Q:

In what form?

A:
Well they said that they didn't want a regional organization like us
negotiating or consulting or anything involving direct consultation with
the Canadian government...
Q:
So can we now understand why the $475 million pot from the
Great Lakes Restoration Initiative is a total US initiative?
A:
Not exactly. There's a little bit more to the story. So Congress said
no you can only be a US organization created by the involved States - you
know the way compacts work - they have to go to Congress under the
Constitution. We, however, recognize that there's another side to the
border so we created by resolution a category of membership for the
provinces called "associate commissioners" and basically treat them just
like U.S. Commissioners. Technically they don't have a vote but we
generally operate by consensus. So they sit at the table with our Board of
Directors. They participate in all deliberations. We just had our annual
meeting up in Quebec city. Quebec and Ontario are very active but
technically they're not part of the Compact and technically they don't
actually have a vote.
Q:

But in all other respects?

A:
It was a way for us to get around what Congress did when they
took it up. (U.S. Federal Employee 2)
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Clearly the lasting effects of the GLWQA are a complex and mixed-bag. On the
one hand, and I believe most importantly, there was once a governance regime that, for a
time, was characteristic of an adaptive, inclusive, transparent ecosystem-based approach
to governance. The significance of this fact cannot be overstated. On the other hand, the
successes of that governance regime created push-backs in the form of entrenched
interests devising ways to water-down the characteristics of the ecosystem-based nature
of the GLWQA regime.
There are lessons here. In the first place it is apparent that the social process for
an ecosystem-based approach to governance can be created. Meaningful broad-based
public participation combined with governmental processes that focus on problemsolving, knowledge, and rectitude can exist with the assistance of courageous actors who
perceive the value of a resilient ecosystem to be more important than gains in power
and/or wealth so long as there are government agencies that accommodate these values.
Another lesson, however, is that even where a social process can be established that
nourishes and fosters an ecosystem-based approach the participants must be proactive
and take steps to preserve the processes that led to the initial success.
Decision Process
The third and final portion of the policy sciences framework that needs to be
discussed is the decision process. Much of the information, background, and data
concerning the decision process has been set forth and absorbed within the prior sections
involving problem orientation and the social process. Every effort will be made to avoid
unnecessary duplication.
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Natural resource policy and management are generally analyzed on the basis of
the decision process employed in the execution of the agency's mandates. An
examination of the decision process practiced in a given ecosystem governance regime
for this study involves the mapping of six interlinked functions of intelligence,
promotion, prescription, implementation, termination, and appraisal. This systematic
analysis can turn up flaws in the decision process that cause restoration plans to fail.
Knowing how a decision process works, or doesn't work, participants can maintain good
practices or correct a poorly functioning one. A decision process can be a way of
reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies through
politics. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies that reflect
their particular, or "special", interests. In many cases, however, as in sustainability
management, people must reconcile interest differences to clarify and secure their
common interest. Investigation should reveal who establishes what the common interests
are or should be. In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that
might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales
within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers
in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for
decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive fashion. Note that ecosystembased governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted
toward special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of ecosystem-based
governance, trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is
reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such
intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and,
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ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to
intelligence in an adaptive fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal of
existing policies that will permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs (Clark,
Willard et al. 2000; Wilson 2000; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). Note that ecosystembased governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted
toward special interests and power (Clark 2002).
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process.
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists or
it can come from other sources, including local knowledge. Intelligence is simply the
process used to gather information about the problem(s) at hand and the relevant context
and should incorporate characteristics like timeliness, dependability, and creativity (Clark
2008). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability turns on whether
intelligence is comprehensive and gathered from appropriate scales in order to detect
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971; Gunderson and
Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Data gathering and analysis
should, in an ideal world, be inclusive and open to honest debate. Policy makers, as we
have seen in the prior sections, must be willing to put special interests and bias aside and
make decisions based upon the available data. The data, and the decisions, should be
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understandable to the public. Intelligence that reveals trend direction should lead to
policy responses through an adaptable and accountable process (Busch and Trexler 2003;
Gunderson 2003; Brunner 2010a).
Earlier in this chapter there was discussion centered on the idea that our current
status quo of limiting the gathering of intelligence largely to scientists and other experts
who then confine transmission of research and data to members of their own discipline
needs some improvement. Knowledge disseminated through peer-review processes may
help to ensure some measure of reliability and assurance of rigor, but it also has the effect
of screening out knowledge that policymakers should take into account (Ascher,
Steelman et al. 2010).
Intelligence and complex natural science information cannot simply be dropped
on an uninformed public. The public must be informed and interested and therefore be
able to understand the data and other intelligence. Thus the groundwork necessary to
create an informed public is necessary before significant public outreach and capacity
building can be meaningful (Becker 1993; Fischer 2000; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003;
Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). Local groups able to inventory and sample the
natural resources with results communicated to a variety of actors, including the general
public, using a wide range of methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we
have now that collects and transfers knowledge only amongst a select group of peer
review journal aficionados. Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the
guidance of a blend of scientific and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the
basis for feedback loops required for the holistic and sustainable management of complex
systems (Walker and Salt 2006).
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In the Problem Orientation and Social Process sections of this chapter, many
aspects of the Decision Process were absorbed and discussed within the analysis. I will
attempt to limit the discussion, as much as possible, to the time period of the initial years
of the GLWQA governance regime - meaning from 1970 through the early 1980s. It is
my view that this was the period in which the major reforms in governance were
developed and implemented - before they were slowly eroded and discredited by
unsupportive government administrations on both sides of the border.
Water quality monitoring began early in the Great Lakes and an alarming 1970
report by the IJC (IJC 1970) set in motion the process that culminated with the signing of
ft
the original 1972 GLWQA (1972). As discussed earlier, the original 1972 Agreement
called for enhancement and restoration of "water quality in the Great Lakes System" and
for the prevention of "further pollution of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem owing to
continuing population growth, resource development, and increasing use of water..."
(1987,1). Annex lof the original agreement set forth specific water quality objectives
covering a broad range of conditions and constituents, including targets for dissolved
oxygen, total dissolved solids, pH, Iron, phosphorous, radioactivity, along with interim
objectives for temperature, mercury (and other heavy metals), and persistent organic
contaminants.26 As has been discussed, the 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA expanded
on the elimination of the targeted compounds and pollutants and adopted the ecosystem
approach to the entire Great Lakes Basin (1987).

26..persistent

organic contaminants that are toxic or harmful to human, animal or aquatic life should be
substantially absent in the waters" (1972). Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, with Annexes and Texts
and Terms of Reference, Between the United States of America and Canada: 79.
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Thus specific goals and targets for the reduction of contaminants in the Great
Lakes were initially supplied by the original 1972 Agreement (1972). What remained
was to undertake the task of designing a process designed to provide reliable intelligence
that would indicate whether enviromhental conditions were trending toward or away
from the objectives of the Agreement.
It took time. During the first five years of the GLWQA governance regime, the
UC, through input from its boards and from those involved in references like the Upper
Lakes Reference Group and the Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group
("PLUARG"), wrestled with the options for the development of a monitoring plan
agreeable to the Parties and adequate to cover the Great Lakes. PLUARG, for instance,
the entity set up by the IJC to research the effects of land use activities on the water
quality of the Great Lakes, began their work early. A 1973 workshop brought together
voices from around the basis to discuss their knowledge of problems and monitoring
issues in the Great Lakes (PLUARG 1973). In February, 1974, PLUARG27 submitted to
the International Joint Commission a "Study Plan to Assess the Great Lakes Pollution
from Land Use Activities." The plan set forth four principle tasks: an assessment of the
problems, an inventory of land use activities, an intensive study of selected watersheds,
and lake (open water) studies (PLUARG 1974). On the Canadian side, a detailed study
plan was submitted to the UC designed to determine the extent and sources of
contamination from agricultural watersheds. These watershed studies sampled waters in

21A

description of PLUARG's inclusive basin-wide approach to the challenges posed by the original 1972
GLWQA is set forth in the Problem Orientation and Social Process sections of this chapter.
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the nearshore of the Canadian shoreline as well as sampling near agricultural run-off
areas and at the mouths of rivers (PLUARG 1975).
The development and implementation of these various plans was constantly
monitored by the UC and its Boards. Reports from PLUARG as well as state/provincial
and federal agencies were provided on a regular basis. The efforts of the monitoring
groups extended beyond the threats posed by phosphorus and other nutrients. Illustrative
is the concern expressed by the UC in its 1975 Annual Report to the Parties concerning
biomonitoring results:
The Commission again in 1975 expressed its deep concern to governments
about the concentration of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) in the Great
Lakes. Contamination by PCB's continues to be extensive and it is
obvious that a voluntary program by the sole North American
manufacturer to limit sales has not resulted in a decrease in PCB burdens
in fish (UC 1975)
Clearly the UC and its Boards were receiving intelligence relevant to the goals
and objectives of the GLWQA of 1972. The problem was that data was coming in from a
broad array of participants, protocols were not uniform, and there were gaps that made it
difficult to understand the state of the broader ecosystem and often impossible to detect
trends. One member of the Research Advisory Board at the time described the process
during those years:
We had a working group...we met regularly over two years, and put
together our understanding. We started by saying that we were going to
take every explanation...anybody who had any claim to expertise we'll
take their hypothesis ...we'll listen to accusations...before we bring in any
of our own personal hypothesis. And we checked out every one of them.
And to our surprise we found people who were using the same evidence to
support different kinds of causal claims ... [W]e took.. .all the rest
seriously. I was also very much struck by the fact that there was evidence
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out there that wasn't diagnostic of any particular problem. There was
ambiguous evidence. So we started asking, what kind of evidence is
diagnostic for a particular causal approach and which evidence was non
diagnostic. And that is how I got into the ecosystem approach. Even my
expert colleagues were doing the same thing. People who had expertise in
eutrophication were blaming all sorts of things on nutrient overload.
People who knew about fishing like I did were blaming all sorts of things
on overfishing. The people like Huxley, who knew about erosion were
blaming erosion for lots of things. And we said well if we take an
ecosystem approach you're obligated to sort these things out and try to
attribute the cause where you have evidence, diagnostic evidence. That is
one way of how I got interested in the ecosystem approach. (Canadian
Academic 2)
The UC highlighted the somewhat scrambled intelligence process in its 2nd
Annual Report (1973):

.. .progress toward meeting the agreed objectives cannot yet be confirmed
on the basis of the scientific data and information supplied to the
Commission. Aside from the difficulties of collecting water quality data
on such immense bodies of water under variable natural conditions, the
sampling and analytical procedures employed in the several jurisdictions
are not consistent and as a result the data made available from these
sources is not comparable and does not lend itself to "collation, analysis
and dissemination" by the Commission (IJC 1973, 1).
It took five years, but in 1975 Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was adopted through
the Water Quality Board and the IJC (WQB 1975). Figure 9 summarizes the evolution of
surveillance strategies over those first five years using comments in early IJC reports.
The Surveillance Plan has not been static. It has evolved as the flow of data
disclosed new trends or fresh environmental threats. In 1976, with the increasing threats
posed by toxic contaminants and the development of new technology, the IJC challenged
the Parties to commit to increased funding to include basin-wide biological monitoring
(UC 1976). Similar challenges to buttress surveillance monitoring were issued the
following year in anticipation of the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to
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governance for the entire Great Lakes Basin - which would include land-based activities
due to the findings and recommendations of PLUARG (UC 1978). In 1983 the IJC
revisited and modified the surveillance plan to reflect additional concerns.
1972

1973

1974

1975

1975
1976

1977

GLWQA mandates "monitoring, surveillance.. .necessary to ensure compliance" with requirements for
abatement and control of pollution and substantial elimination of "discharges of toxic persistent organic
compounds (1972)"
. .progress toward meeting the agreed objectives cannot yet be confirmed on the basis of the scientific
data and information supplied to the Commission.. .Moreover, insufficient resources of qualified personnel
have been assigned by the government agencies to assessment and interpretation of the basic data obtained.
The Water Quality Board is now endeavoring to develop the basis for the necessary coordination of the
agencies' monitoring programs so that over-all water quality and trends in the Basin may be assessed on a
continuing basis (IJC 1973,1)
Data from labs and state/provincial agencies show levels of mercury, dieldrin, and PCBs detected in fish in
excess of FDA tolerance levels. DDT levels declining. "Water quality surveillance programs are currently
being conducted by governments at a level that does not provide adequate information. Surveillance plans
recommended by the IJC's Water Quality Board and described in its 1974 Annual Report will require
increased commitments of funds and personnel" (IJC 1974,3).
Each year since the signing of the Agreement, the Commission has advised governments that it could not
report accurately on progress, or lack of it, toward achieving the goals of the Agreement because existing
surveillance programs were inadequate. The Water Quality Board has now developed a comprehensive
surveillance program which when implemented would overcome the shortcomings of the present programs.
The Commission fully endorses this program .. .Because of the critical need to launch the program as soon
as possible and recognizing time constraints of the budgetary cycle in the United States and Canada, the
Commission has already taken action on this matter. In a separate communication ... to the Parties, the
Commission has urged them to ensure that fiscal programs over the next 10 years provide ongoing funds at
the level proposed ($16 million annually), for the Agencies of federal, state and provincial governments
having responsibility for water quality surveillance and monitoring activities in the Great Lakes. The
Commission now reiterates its concern and urges once more the recommended actions (IJC 1975a, 4).
Great Lakes International Surveillance Plan forwarded by the Water Quality Board and adopted by the IJC
(WQB 1975; IJC 1976).
The Commission notes with satisfaction the report of the Water Quality Board that
Governments are now providing adequate funding for point source monitoring within the current Great
Lakes International Surveillance Plan. It is imperative that efforts by the two Governments should continue
to support this international surveillance program, at least to the levels presently established, and that
Governments ensure that funds appropriated for this purpose are fully expended-The Commission also
believes that there is a need for a greater and early emphasis on biological monitoring and on the
monitoring of biologically sensitive nearshore areas. While aspects of biological and nearshore monitoring
are included in the Surveillance Program, their present scope appears to be insufficient to assess the
effectiveness of the revised Water Quality Objectives... which are based on the protection of the most
sensitive beneficial use of the Great Lakes, usually aquatic life or human health. This need is also inherent
in a growing overall concern for the impact of Great Lakes pollution on biological resources and human
health. While this matter will be subjected to a more detailed study.. .in order to provide further advice to
Governments, the Commission recommends that Governments undertake to ensure an adequate level of
funding as soon as possible for the additional monitoring necessary to complement adequately the present
chemical and physical monitoring programs in the Great Lakes (IJC 1976,3).
Although the Commission notes that remedial programs have begun to show limited results in the reduction
of phosphorus concentrations and levels of PCBs, DDT, DDE, mercury and Mirex in some parts of the
lakes, it is aware that these improvements have not yet reached substantial proportions, nor are they basin
wide. The Commission .. .recommends:.. .that the International Great Lakes Surveillance Plan be funded in
full, at least through 1987

Figure 9: GLWQA Evolution of Surveillance: The First Five Years
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Given the above it would appear that the first decade or so under the governance
structure and process of the GLWQA agreements matches well with the characteristics of
the Intelligence function of the ideal system (Table 35). There was active surveillance
from a variety of sources at representative scales gathered with the assistance of a broad
base of participants. The surveillance, while conducted by the parties, was ultimately
coordinated by the IJC and its Boards. The results of the surveillance activities were
reported out each year in a various forums, including annual meetings of IAGLR, the
biennial IJC meetings and formal reports to the Parties, and beginning in the late 1980s
on-line through the Great Lakes Information Network (GLIN). The active and at times
raucous involvement of the public at IJC meetings has been described in prior sections.
Table 35 Intelligence
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

System is facilitated by identification of
intelligence needs and enabled by
cooperative agreements among relevant
entities to assure reliability, compatibility,
timely analysis and accessibility.
Intelligence must come from a broad array
of participants that includes scientists,
academics, the regulated public, and the
public at large.

The original 1972 GLWQA sets out targets
and objectives for water quality in the
waters of the Great Lakes. PLUARG uses
inclusive basin-wide panels to set forth and
implement activities that include
monitoring at a variety of scales -- from
land-based to open lake sampling. Great
Lakes Surveillance Plan adopted in 1975
and reviewed and updated periodically
thereafter provides for coordinated basinwide monitoring plan.
PLUARG data and reports submitted and
available to IJC, RAB, WQB, and all
participants and the public. Ultimately all
documents and information made available
on-line (late 1980s) through the Great
Lakes Information Network (GLIN).
GLWQA library and office in Windsor,
Ontario provides public information and
direction until closed in the 1980s.

Intelligence must be communicated to an
accountable entity for analysis and
coordinated action, i.e. a person,
partnership, or other entity that has an
obligation or responsibility to an authority,
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm
external to that person or entity.
Intelligence and information must be made
readily available to researchers, scientists
and the public.
In order for the public to be interested and
be able to understand the data and other
intelligence, significant public outreach and
capacity building is required.

PLUARG, Great Lakes Tomorrow, the
GLBC, Lake Michigan Federation, engage
in public education and outreach to develop
an informed public.
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The fact that the UC and its Boards continued to alter and amend the Surveillance
Plan demonstrates both adaptability and accountability. In almost every respect,
therefore, the characteristics of our ideal ecosystem-based governance regime were met
in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement regime - at least as far as
the intelligence function was concerned. We next look at how well the promotion task
measured up to our ideal standards.
Promotion. Using data and information gathered as part of the intelligence
function, recall that promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the "thoughtful
assessment of options and alternatives" (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 83). Promotion serves
the function of recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves
to define and even limit the possible solutions to a problem. It is the stage where
information and data gathered as a result of the intelligence task are debated and
discussed and alternatives and options are recommended and debated (Clark 1997).
As we have seen, promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance
differs markedly from the status quo-, that is, expert-driven planning models that rely
almost exclusively on science- and expert-based technology. We have noted that under
the traditional view, generally only experts are qualified to make and implement sound
management plans. Promotion is largely the role of bureaucracies - bureaucracies that
are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules and regulations (Fiorino 2006).
Promotion also includes politics, bringing with it an array of political parties,
lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful organizations of all types (including
business and environmental groups) working to shape and share values. (Lasswell 1971;
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While it has been noted that the
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participation of a broad range of promotional actors, many with opposing interests and
values creates an "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a value demand", it is
nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing promotion exclusively in
the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate (Lasswell and
MacDougal 1992,29). Politics, as was discussed earlier in Chapter 3, need not be
divisive and polarizing. Indeed, in an ideal world, healthy politics that includes "policy
relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive public involvement, and
conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common interest in knowledge
generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010, 8). The
politics of promotion should include honest debate about what to do. Further, the overall
decision process must provide " a means of reconciling (or at least managing) conflict
through politics in order to find a working specification of a community's common
interests" (Clark 2002, 57).
Promotion during the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality regime
incorporated many of the aspects thought consistent with ecosystem-based governance
(Table 37). We have seen that in the early years under the GLWQA, intelligence was
funneled to the UC from broad-based surveillance, research, and monitoring activities
conducted under the GLWQA by the Water Quality Board, the Research Advisory Board
(later the "Science Advisory Board") the GLFC, PLUARG, as well as federal and
state/provincial agencies on both sides of the border (IJC 1976; PLUARG 1978; IJC
1980; Regier and Baskerville 1986; Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Dempsey
2004).
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The approach to problem-solving and policy-making utilized by the IJC in the
early years had many characteristics of an ecosystem-based approach to governance and
we have discussed many of those characteristics earlier in this chapter. Consistent with
the notion of promotion in an ideal ecosystem-based governance regime, during the first
decade of the GLWQA there was strong support by the IJC and its Boards and panels to
pursue common interests and the health of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem were
paramount. The problem-solving approach of the SAB and related UC panels was to
solicit and listen to all ideas being promoted from multiple interests - a universal
approach - in order to make sure no potential innovation was overlooked. IJC, SAB and
other GLWQA participants shared an implicit commitment to the basin and to the equity
and justice. Equity, fairness, and human health reached the operational levels under the
GLWQA and were factors in the early years. Also, information and input was gathered
from broad base of participants, overlapping board members, and knowledgeable
citizens.
Of course, any examination of the promotion task in the Great Lakes must
recognize that decisions and policy making at the level of the UC must consider the
somewhat limited role played by the UC as the coordinator and overriding organizer
whose function under the various iterations of the GLWQA is to cajole and informally
pressure the Parties to meet their obligations under the Agreement (1909; 1972; UC
1973; UC 1974; UC 1975; UC 1975a; UC 1976; UC 1978; PLUARG 1978; UC 1980;
1987). Despite differences between the UC and the Parties to the GLWQA, however,
there is a legacy of frequent and often innovative cooperation and collaboration between
them. There have also been others, including labor unions and NGOs, especially when
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galvanized under the umbrella organization of Great Lakes United, that have often
applied pressure when necessary to see that the trade-offs in base values trended in the
direction of educational outreach and accumulating knowledge and well-being, as
demonstrated by the comments of a former member of the SAB during the early years
under the GLWQA:

And so, people kind of didn't know what to do, especially since these
things crossed so many political boundaries jurisdiction. So, we had a
whole series of consultations. They had roundtable discussions around the
basin. They had a series of initiatives to try to get a handle on it. Great
Lakes United was formed between '78 and '87, to be the activist group,
because Great Lakes Tomorrow was a facilitation and education group.
But, we needed some group that was going to hold politicians' feet to the
fire, and that was Great Lakes United. So, a couple of things happened in
that period, one of which was Green Peace's zero discharge tour of the
lakes, where they went about touting the only way to deal with toxic
contaminants [was zero discharge] but, that occurred after GLU held a
series of public hearings around the basin to get input from whoever
wanted to show up and testify. They published a report, which I have on
the shelf...a justification for why that probably needed to be really
explicit and that there needed to be... Also during that period, and while I
was on the science advisory board, there was a lot of interest in getting a
mass balance assessment of the contaminants. It started with PLUARG,
but then it went on after that. In order to get mass balance, you n6ed to
know sources, causes, etc. So, there was a lot of that research going on in
the system at that time. It became very clear that the only way that these
watershed groups were going to be able to do what had to be done was to
have a strategic approach. (US NGO/Academic)
Under IJC leadership in the early years, therefore, promotion took many forms,
including a focus on galvanizing public participation and fostering honest discussion and
debate on issues relevant to the health of the ecosystem28 (Becker 1993; Jackson 2005).

28

The importance of organizations such as Great Lakes Tomorrow, the Lake Michigan Federation, Great
Lakes United, Decisions for the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, and others in their efforts
to provide outreach and education and build capacity in the form of an educated public has been
highlighted in the social process section of this chapter. In addition, the importance of the annual and
biennial meetings of the IJC, with the open reporting of the progress made by the Parties under the
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Promotion activities under the GLWQA regime allowed for a social process that included
a wide variety of actors, including government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related
institutions. Thus, during the early years, promotion was relatively a "bottom up" effort.
In recognition of this blossoming process, in 1979 the IJC established a standing
committee to assist in providing the public information service called for in the 1978
agreement (GLWQA 1987).

International JointCommision Great LakesF&ieryCommizion

United States

Federal-Provincial
• FedefaWrarincW
Agreement

Federal-S«e
• Great lakesBastnComm'n

(1965-1981)
• Great LafcesGommbrian

Promotion Municipaitie% NGQ^ industry Ctountie* Municipal We*NGG*
IndustyClttatt
Citizens

Promotion

Figure 10 Great Lakes Promotion Paths
The basic concept was that citizens have rights to participate in IJC activities and
should be encouraged to do so. The policy stressed that information should be provided
while studies and activities were being carried out, not just after decisions were already
GLWQA by the SAB and the WQB before an audience that, in the early years, often included an interested
and actively engaged public that was allowed to pose questions and challenge policy makers, as discussed
earlier, added to the transparency and credibility of the GLWQA process. The role of the annual meetings
of IAGLR and, beginning in the late 1980s, the public dissemination of Great Lakes related research and
events through the Great Lakes Information Network, both fully discussed earlier, also provided valuable
promotion-related opportunities.
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made. The aim was to increase the UC's credibility by taking public opinion into account
(Becker 1993). Figure 10 summarizes the promotion directions extant in the early years
of the GLWQA governance.
Thus the task of promotion in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement approach was broad-based and relied upon citizen participation, problemsolving decision processes that welcomed and examined the views of a wide variety of
scientists and other participants. In this fashion, debate was open and transparent and
those decision-makers who were either at the IJC or Board-level had access to honest and
transparent debate from a wide variety of interested parties. This process stands in stark
contrast to traditional promotional activities and provides us with a worthwhile model for
honest promotional efforts for use in future problem-solving (Table 36)
Table 36 Promotion
Ecosystem-based Approach
Promotion and politics involve honest
debate using policy relevant science,
pertinent local information, constructive
public involvement, and conflict resolution
in order to clarify and secure the common
interests (as opposed to special interests)
and secure knowledge generation for
environmental decision processes. Hard
questions are asked and "difficult" data is
not neglected. Constructive, honest, debate
helps to promote trust and cooperation and
equitable outcomes are pursued through the
open sharing of knowledge and open debate
with broad participation.

GLWQA Approach
By Treaty, Agreement, and Protocol, the
governments of the United States and
Canada agreed to undertake mutual
obligations to protect, restore, and preserve
the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem
Promotion efforts are on two levels: 1) the
pressure of the public on the IJC and the
Parties to preserve, restore and protect the
GLB ecosystem, through public
involvement (e.g. PLUARG) and biennial
meetings, and 2) the ability of the IJC to
persuade the Parties to fund and act upon
their obligations under the GLWQA. IJC
processes demanded that problems,
including hard problems and "difficult
data," and competing interests be openly
debated with full sharing of knowledge,
broad participation, and decision principles
that put the well-being of the GLB
ecosystem ahead of other interests. Open
information sharing and debate fostered by
mandated public participation. Emphasis on
public outreach and education are an
integral part of decision process.
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Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, the data, values, and
interests distilled from the intelligence and promotion tasks are used to select appropriate
law, policy, or management options appropriate to the targeted challenge. The activities
and process used in this phase result in the establishment of new rules or guidelines to
solve a problem or deal with an environmentalconflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008).
In the case of the Great Lakes Basin, during the 1970s and 1980s the processes created
under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement gave extensive authority to the policy
prescriptions developed by the IJC and its Boards (1972; Valiante 2007)
The problems inherent in the governance and management of the human activities
that impact the Great Lakes Basin are many. The GLB is essentially a binational
bioregion containing the world's largest fresh water ecosystem and accounting for more
than 20% of the world's available surface water (IJC 1973; Donahue 1988; Becker 1993;
Caldwell 1993; Valiante 1997; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Valiante 2007). During the
years pertinent to this project the IJC and the GLFC shared the leadership role in the
development and implementation of governance and prescriptive management through
the use of diplomatic and ideological strategies. As has been noted, with no ability to
bring formal enforcement actions to compel environmental compliance, there were few
realistic alternatives.
The IJC and the GLFC are, as we know, dependent upon the efforts of the Parties,
including states and provinces, for implementation of recommendations and policy
developed on a binational level. These entities are, of course, bound by formal,
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fragmented laws, rules, and regulations created by political systems in both the United
States and Canada.
During the 1970s and 1980s, however, the processes called for by the GLWQA
seemed at critical times to trump the fragmentation inherent in the binational domestic
regulatory scheme. As we have seen, citizens were actively involved and were able to
help galvanize the IJC and its Research Advisory Board to take meaningful action.
The initial 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) between the
United States and Canada was negotiated. It was essentially a water pollution agreement
but effectively introduced controls on phosphorous discharges and "an extensive set of
broad studies under the Pollution from Land Use Activities Research Group (PLUARG)
was initiated" (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990, xxv). As set forth above in the discussions
about goal clarification and trends in the GLB, the goals for the Great Lakes Basin, have
largely been articulated by GLWQA and the Clean Water Act. The general goal agreed
to by the Parties to the GLWQA for the Great Lakes through the 1987 Protocol is to
"restore, and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the waters of the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem" (1987, Article II). The ecosystem is defined as "the
interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans,
within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River" (1987, Article I (g)). As we have
seen additional goals called for the protection and maintenance of self-sustaining fish
populations and aquatic organisms and for protection and restoration of habitats vital for
the support of healthy and diverse communities of plants, fish, and wildlife. Other, more
particular goals and objectives have been discussed earlier in this chapter (toxic
chemicals, virtual elimination, etc.).
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With a strong public outreach effort, an active and informed citizenry, a
coordinated NGO community and a Research Advisory Board and IJC personally and
professionally committed to the restoration of a healthy GLB ecosystem, bold measures
were taken. Striking successes in the reduction of nutrient pollution were achieved
through cooperative and collaborative deliberations and efforts and, in 1978, the
GLWQA was amended to mandate an ecosystem approach to governance (Caldwell
1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005; Valiante 2007). Working in
conjunction with the GLFC, a healthy fish populations were restored to the waters of the
basin (Donahue 1988; Prelli and Becker 2001).
Table 37 Prescription
Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

A transition away from adversarial
methods designed to punish violations
toward greater emphasis on cooperation
and collaboration between private and
public entities to prevent pollution, reduce
risk, and promote sustainability. New
relationships, structures, and roles are
fashioned by careful planning with broadbased involvement and implemented on a
trial and error basis in order to facilitate
learning
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are
not the only way to influence behavior.
Collaboration and cooperation with
partnerships designed to achieve economic
goals, can promote eco-efficiency,
innovation, and sustainability.

Community and regional involvement in
the development and enforcement of
environmental regulations can increase
learning, inform the public, and lead to
greater progress towards goals.

IJC and GLFC promote collaboration and
cooperation between private and public
sectors, NGO's, and federal,
state/provincial, and local governments.
Key individual and institutional
participants put public interest of water
quality and ecosystem health in the basin
ahead of private interests. Science used to
suggest problem-solving strategies and
new strategies (e.g. phosphorous ban)
implemented and monitored to determine
suitability.
Participants and governance, led by IJC,
GLBC, with help from citizen groups (e.g.
Great Lakes Tomorrow, League of Women
Voters) use diplomacy and negotiation to
collaborate on issues and limitations of
importance to GLB sustainability.
Litigation used sparingly and citizen suits
coordinated by NWF.
Citizen outreach and participation (e.g.
PLUARG, GLT, Decisions for the Great
Lakes, Lake Michigan Federation) creates
an informed public capable of monitoring
and advocating together to drive change
and promote progress toward ecosystem
restoration.
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Thus, for a time, prescriptions in the form of binational agreements with no
intrinsic enforcement authority were instrumental in driving citizens, NGO's, government
agencies, industry, and others, to cooperate for the good of the Great Lakes Basin
ecosystem (Table 37). Rather than require compliance, the binational agreements
relevant to the Great Lakes Basin gave participants the opportunity to collaboratively
solve problems. It is apparent that the prescriptions were flexible enough to allow
participants devoted to an outcome consistent with the public interest of a ecosystem
resilience and sustainability were able to find the will and the authority to implement
changes for the good of the system. We will next examine the implementation of these
prescriptions and whether implementation aided or blocked restoration efforts.
Implementation. As we have discussed, implementation combines the policy
analysis framework categories of invocation and application. Invocation includes the
initial actions that communities and institutions to invoke, enforce, or otherwise
implement a prescription. Application is the process that a community chooses to
ultimately characterize the subject behavior and determine what behavior violates the
prescription and how such behavior should be sanctioned(Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Clark 2002).
Table 38 highlights the some of the "ideal" characteristics of implementation for
an ecosystem-based governance approach. With respect to the processes that were
developed during the initial years of the GLWQA regime, it is important to remember
that the Agreements between the parties provided prescriptions, goals, targets, and
monitoring requirements, but left the implementation of the Agreements to the domestic
governments and institutions within Canada and the United States. Thus implementation
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of water quality initiatives under the GLWQA fell to the EPA and the and their state
equivalents in the United States, largely utilizing the provisions of the Clean Water Act,
while Canada relied upon Environment Canada and the prescriptions of the Canada
Water Act and, to a large part, on the provisions negotiated between the federal
government of Canada and the Province of Ontario under Canada Ontario Agreement
(COA).

Ecosystem-based Approach

GLWQA Approach

Transition is needed to move implementation
toward more community-driven, more
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government
could assist with the identification and
clarification of community goals as well as
develop measureable standards. It would be up
to regional or community efforts to develop
solutions to bring environmental indicators into
compliance with those standards

IJC actively promotes public outreach and
education. Citizens groups form to demand
restoration measures. PLUARG and related
citizen group efforts provide critical push
resulting in increased monitoring and
recommendation of standards and indicators in
1978 amendment and 1987 (zero tolerance for
persistent toxic substances, etc.), and results in
inclusion of ecosystem approach in 1978
amendment.

Adversarial relationships should give way to
cooperative and collaborative ones with the
emphasis on interactions designed to solve
problems with strategies that are developed and
shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the
regulated community, and other interested
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen
groups, and government officials, plans created
through collaboration can look beyond "end of
pipe" discharges to "identify and change
activities that cause pollution in the first place.
Command and control could gradually be
replaced with incentives and learning through
trial and error.

Lacking formal enforcement capabilities, the IJC
relied upon diplomacy and the cooperative and
collaborative efforts of federal, state, provincial,
First Nation, and NGOs, all as an educated and
interested public pushed for change. The IJC
and its Boards used operating procedures that
stressed the good of the Great Lakes Basin over
private interests. Participants shared an esprit d'
corps that permitted open sharing of ideas and
promoted problem-solving. The public was
educated with the assistance and blessing of the
IJC and kept informed through transparent
hearings and related processes.

More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If
court necessary there should be specialized
courts with knowledge of environmental factors.

Diplomatic processes centered around problemsolving, collaboration, and cooperation, were
used as the major tool often in lieu of litigation
and confrontation.

Table 38 Implementation
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It should be pointed out that local governments, at least in the early years, were only
marginally included in the implementation process under the GLWQA, an unfortunate
issue which has only recently begun to change (Valiante 2007).
In the early years the UC was keenly was aware of the delicate nature of their
task. They are charged with overseeing the restoration of a binational ecosystem with no
political or policing (i.e. enforcement) authority. The need to use the power of a
galvanized and educated public as one way to get beyond the fragmentation inherent in
two federal bureaucratic systems and their subdivisions was recognized by the IJC (UC
1975; Caldwell 1993). Thus the importance of public participation has been highlighted
by the UC from the beginning. It has consistently been cognizant of the need for
meaningful participation by the public and the reality that meaningful participation was
impossible without education and increased understanding of ecosystem threats. This
fact was emphasized by the IJC especially after the results of the PLUARG public
consultation panels and public hearings, when it was noted that".. .the acceptance and
successful implementation of PLUARG's recommendations would be possible only if
there were an informed public." The IJC went on to report that "[a]n informed and active
public would assist Governments in reaching acceptable solutions to nonpoint pollution
problems and should be encouraged for this reason also" (UC 1980,69).
As Professor Becker (1993) reminds us:
Direct citizen participation in the work of the UC under the provisions of
the 1972 Agreement was relatively limited between 1972 and 1975.
However, public interest in Great Lakes pollution problems continued to
be very high, and citizens increasingly demanded access to information
and a voice in Agreement work. Pressure for direct access to the
Commission's work was exerted by citizen action groups, such as the Lake
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Michigan Federation, the United Auto Workers, and the League of
Women Voters on the United States side of the Basin. Canadian citizen
groups exhibiting an early interest in direct involvement included the
Conservation Council of Ontario, the Canadian Environmental Law
Research Foundation, and various local organizations, such as cottagers'
associations (Becker 1993,244).
Other names can easily be added to the list. Great Lakes Tomorrow facilitated
hearings and public meetings across the basin well into the 1980s. The Lake Michigan
Federation provided public outreach in connection with the Great Lakes Basin
Commission. Decisions for the Great Lakes trained leaders around the basin. Clearly the
early years of the GLWQA governance process demonstrates a marked transition from
fragmented top-down command-and-control governance to a more community-driven
and collaborative process that involved the public in a meaningful fashion. The
accomplishments of PLUARG and other cooperative, problem-solving initiatives have
been adequately document above and will not be extensively revisited here. They include,
however, the linking through community and public hearings, pollution from land-based
activities to water quality in the waters of the Great Lakes Basin. These efforts ultimately
triggered the decision by the EPA to recommend the banning of the use of phosphates
throughout the basin (USEPA 1977) as were the incorporation of the ecosystem approach
in the 1978 amendments to the GLWQA (1987).
There is more, however, to implementation than the involvement of an active and
educated public. Our ideal ecosystem governance model requires that there be a move
away from fragmentation and adversarial relationships toward more cooperative and
collaborative ones with the emphasis on interactions designed to solve problems with
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strategies that are developed and shared with the input of scientists, regulators, the
regulated community, and other interested parties.
Again we are forced to come back to the point that under the GLWQA scheme the
UC has no jurisdiction to force a Party to act in any particular way. It is chartered with
the purpose of resolving disputes and avoiding conflicts. The IJC, and its related Boards
and panels, have the ability to investigate only "such subjects related to the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem as the Parties may from time to time refer to it" (GLWQA 1987, Article
VII(l)(g)). Even upon reference, the UC has only the power to hold hearings, make
recommendations and draft reports and comments. They simply lack the power or
authority to do anything but attempt through common fact-finding, collaboration and
diplomatic efforts, to convince the Parties to act in the best interest of the Great Lakes
Basin.
Certainly the IJC's public outreach and education initiatives played a role in
driving the Parties toward processes that resulted in valuable cooperative initiatives. As
citizen pressure mounted, the UC and its Boards began to recognize the need for public
support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build infrastructure, it took
even more affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993). The
meetings between the boards and the UC began to be made public in 1975 and

. .in time

presentation of the board reports to the IJC in public meetings became a mechanism for
increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as well as for citizen activism."
(Botts and Muldoon 2005,23). The IJC biennial reports and the publication and
distribution of documents arid other measures also increased credibility and boosted
public involvement in agreement-related activities, often in the early stage of
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implementation (CUSIS 1991; Botts and Muldoon 2005). To help foster this
l
:
involvement, the IJC hired a professional public relations staff to augment its Great Lakes
i
Regional Office (Dworsky 1988; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Valiante 1997).
The UC also fostered collaboration through its operating principles. The IJC's
historic insistence on the binationalism of its Commissioners, described in the problem
orientation section of this chapter, was certainly relevant to the perspective of activities
by the UC and its Boards and panels. This tradition required independence of IJC
members from consideration or interference from national interests is found nowhere in
the treaty, yet it was essential to achieving the goals of the GLWQA (Jackson and Sloan
2008). As described earlier, Charles Ross, a Commissioner under five presidents,
explained that the UC acted "as members of a single body," with independence from the
United States or Canadian government interference, even though appointed by the heads
of each country (Botts and Muldoon 2005,11). Thus independence and collaboration
marked the process followed by the UC and its boards.
Another operating principle that reflects the perspective of the UC and its boards
and panels was the principle that required each commissioner to operate "in his (or her)
own professional capacity and expertise" rather than as a representative of an agency,
NGO, or other special interest (UC 1975; Botts and Muldoon 2005,12). Independent of
the constraints that might be placed on individuals who might have to act within their
roles as agency employees, this operating principle helped assure that attention and
expertise was focused on the challenges of the Great Lakes Basin without worrying about
their agency interests and limitations. Thus officials of various agencies crossed over and
served on different Boards and panels within the IJC scheme.
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It is also worth noting again that those participants who were interviewed for this
study credited the tradition of independence and binationalism for creating a strong esprit
de corps that fostered freedom and an open exchange of ideas, and the participation of
experts and citizens in their personal and professional capacities (as opposed to
representatives of agencies or institutions), the loyalty all shared for the betterment of the
GLB ecosystem, strong public participation, public outreach and education, and
education of local and other government officials. These characteristics and more gave
participants in the GLWQA the ability to focus on the problems of the Great Lakes and a
feeling of loyalty and allegiance to a healthy ecosystem in the GLB, complete with
concern for integrity, justice, and democracy. The use of common fact-finding and
reliance on transparent and reliable data added credibility to the UC's efforts (Becker
1993; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
Looking back at the early years of the GLW.QA regime it is clear that states and
provinces found ample opportunity to cooperate. Some notable achievements include the
1985 Great Lakes Charter and the Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement of
1986 (GLTSCA). Both are voluntary agreements, initiated by the Council of Great Lakes
Governors, designed to facilitate the sharing of information and to take a unified stance to
protect Great Lakes resources. The Charter was motivated chiefly by threats of massive
water transfers out of the Great Lakes Basin and prevents any diversions that would have
a significant, adverse impact on lake levels, in-basin uses, or the Great Lakes ecosystem
(Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990). It "commits the parties to develop a common data base
on water resource use and a cooperative management program that includes an inventory
of surface water and groundwater resources" (Botts and Muldoon 2005,213) By the late
297

1980s eight states and the provinces of Ontario and Quebec had signed the Charter. The
data base was established by the Great Lakes Commission by 1988 (Colburn, Davidson et
al. 1990; Sproule-Jones 2002; Botts and Muldoon 2005).
The Governors and Premiers went further the following year by signing the 1986
Great Lakes Toxic Substances Control Agreement (GLTSCA). As noted previously, the
GLTSCA has been described as an

. .extremely ambitious document that commits the

signatories to reducing toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin (Colburn, Davidson et
al. 1990). Signed by the Great Lakes Governors in 1986, and endorsed by the Premiers
of Ontario and Quebec via a memorandum of understanding in 1988, the GLTSCA called
for the integration of permitting process for discharges to different media, interstate
cooperation in hazardous waste management planning, development of common health
advisories on fish contamination, and in general provide for greater consistency between
the provinces and the states in the GLB (CGLG 1986; Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990).
We have now seen that implementation during the early years of the IJC's
GLWQA regime was guided by broad and flexible prescriptions and driven by an
increasingly active public to employ diplomatic efforts, including operational protocols to
cajole and pressure the Parties, including states and provinces, often guided by the Great
Lakes Basin Commission and, later, the Great Lakes Commission, to take bold measures
in order to achieve the goals set forth by the GLWQA. Two other categories of
collaboration and cooperation that emerged during these early years merit comment. The
first is the emergence of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission as a binational force and
the second is the coalescence of NGOs in the basin around common goals and strategies.
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As we have noted previously, the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission (GLFC) was
formed through the ratification of a Convention between Canada and the U.S. in 1955.
Its charter expressly recognized the value of 'joint and coordinated efforts' to address
fisheries conservation (Convention 1955; Dempsey 2004).. The convention was
implemented through passage of the Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956 (GLFA 1956).
While the job of the GLFC was initially to formulate a plan to combat the invasive
lampreys, by the 1980s the Commissioners from both sides of the border, and their staffs,
had cultivated and begun to practice a protective ecosystem policy by working closely
with the IJC and its Science Advisory Board (SAB).
Like the IJC, the GLFC has no formal enforcement authority. Given that state
borders for state and provincial borders extend to the middle of the border lakes they are
able assert their authority over federal jurisdiction and control the lake beds, waters, and
fish of the waters of the Great Lakes (Piper 1967; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). Thus the
GLFC is the binational entity that attempts to integrate and coalesce the separate but
complementary sectors of the non-federal governments (states, provinces, and two U.S.
intertribal agencies) and the federal governments, and the GLWQA entities to integrate
and take a coherent approach to what would otherwise be a hopelessly fragmented Great
Lakes fishery (Prelli and Becker 2001; Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). They are able to
manage this by facilitating Joint Strategic Plans between all involved entities that include
cooperation, consensus, accountability, information sharing, and ecosystem management
(Gaden, Krueger et al. 2008). Once again, the prescription provided by the Joint
Strategic Plans must be enforced through diplomatic collaboration and cooperation.
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The last form of collaboration and cooperation that strongly influenced
governance and enforcement in the Great Lakes Basin during the early years of the
GLWQA era was the relationship that coalesced between and among NGO's. One of the
many ways that a growing regional consciousness in the early years of the GLWQA
regime was reflected was in the activities of nongovernmental organizations. Unlike
some areas, where a seemingly endless list of NGOs attack problems in a fragmented
and uncoordinated cacophony of disjointed effort, groups in the Great Lakes began to
coordinate their activities. There has already been some discussion of the role of
environmental organizations like the League of Women Voters, the Lake Michigan
Federation, and Great Lakes Tomorrow. In addition, however, it is important to note the
efforts of a group of non-profits that banned together under the Michigan United
Conservation Clubs (MUCC). It was largely the MUCC that consolidated these diverse
constituencies and led the lobbying effort that resulted in a phosphate detergent ban in
that state (Botts and Muldoon 2005). But more was needed, and citizens needed a basinwide organization. It was the joint effort of MUCC and the New York NGO Save the
River, a combination that had led the fight against an Army Corps of Engineers proposal
to allow winter navigation on the Great Lakes, that finally got together to form a basinwide organization. After lengthy confrontations and spirited meetings discussed earlier,
Great Lakes United (GLU), emerged. GLU became a united voice for hundreds of
organizations throughout the Great Lakes in both the United States and Canada dedicated
to preserving and restoring the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River ecosystem (Colburn,
Davidson et al. 1990). The organizations that were included under the umbrella of GLU
when it was formed in 1982 included labor unions, environmental groups, hunters,
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fishers, community groups, and citizens of the United States, Canada, and First Nations
(Jackson and Sloan 2008). GLU holds annual meetings that seek the advice of these
groups to develop by consensus an agenda to pressure Congress, the UC, and other policy
makers to collaborate and put the common good of a healthy Great Lakes Basin
(Dempsey 2004; Jackson 2005).
One other unique aspect of the way that NGOs coordinated their activities should
not go unmentioned - the role played by the National Wildlife Federation (NWF). As
was related in more detail earlier in this chapter, the NWF provided the legal resources
and coordinated much of the litigation under the GLWQA regime. In this manner,
litigation was designed and utilized in a manner that was consistent with the overall goals
of the GLWQA. This is in stark contrast to the manner in which environmental groups in
other regions file piecemeal lawsuits involving various components of environmental
compliance - often resulting in inconsistent judicial rulings and regulatory confusion.
Thus we see that the enforcement activities under the UC in the critical early
years, though lacking formal jurisdiction, proceeded through the coordinated and
dedicated diplomatic activities of a variety of active participants - including federal,
state, provincial, First Nation, and NGO representatives. What might be considered a
weakness, therefore, was turned into strength as the GLWQA prescriptions were pursued
by an active and informed public and implementation and enforcement efforts coalesced
through collaborative and cooperative efforts at many levels.
Appraisal. As discussed more fully in Chapter III, appraisal involves the task of
assessing whether relevant prescriptions and their implementation have effectively met
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the goals set by the community and who is responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971;
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
Table 39 GLWQA Appraisal
Ecosystem-based

Approach

GLWQA Approach

Appraisal provides a major opportunity
for learning and course correction, for
using the lessons of experience to adapt
failing practices into future changes.
The main criteria for appraisals are
dependability, comprehensiveness,
continuity and independence

Despite no formal enforcement
authority IJC and GLFC able to use
operational protocols, diplomacy,
collaboration, and cooperation to
conduct reliable appraisals.
Appraisals made public through
biennial reports to the Parties, special
reports, biennial public, GLIN and
annual meetings of IAGLR.

Trend data from relevant scales must be
available and transparent. Local
knowledge and scientific efforts need to
be combined and included in a periodic
public assessment of the state of the
ecosystem.

Adaptable and inclusive Monitoring
Plans began in the late 1960s by IJC.
Data collected from broad range of
sources and coordinated by IJC and
Boards. Data easily available to
public through GLIN, Annual Reports
and Meetings, and IAGLR.

It is critical that appraisals be carried
out by third parties, i.e. not the agencies
that are charged with programmatic
responsibilities.

IJC and its Boards provide
independent appraisal of the Parties'
progress toward goals and report
biennially.

Existence of a collaborative entity or
single overarching body that can,
formally or informally, accumulate the
knowledge accumulated through
appraisals and implement change to
reverse adverse trends.

IJC, its Boards, and the GLFC
collaboratively accumulate
knowledge and through biennial and
other reports (as needed) give
recommendations to Parties on ways
to reverse adverse trends. Trial and
error efforts not uncommon in early
years.

Table 39 sets forth the characteristics for appraisal under an "ideal" ecosystembased approach to governance. At its most basic, the ideal model requires that there
simply be a mechanism for appraisal of policies and actions to determine whether
progress is being made toward the prescribed goals. Further, appraisal should utilize
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trend data appropriate to the task and include a periodic public assessment of the state of
the ecosystem. It is important that appraisal be performed by third parties to enhance the
dependability and creditability of the conclusions. Finally, appraisal should be
undertaken by an overarching body with the ability to use the knowledge gained to
implement change in order to reverse adverse trends.

As has been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, particularly in the section
discussing Intelligence, it is clear that the process set forth under the GLWQA requires
appraisal. Any appraisal under the GLWQA provisions necessarily involves an
assessment of the actions of the Parties and whether or not those actions are resulting in
progress toward the goals of the prescription.
As we know, the original GLWQA was essentially a water quality initiative. The
purpose set forth in the GLWQA is for the Parties "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." To
achieve this purpose the Agreement provides that the Parties, defined as the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United States,".. .agree to make a maximum effort
to develop programs, practices, and technology necessary for a better understanding of
the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent
practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. II).
Clearly water quality monitoring is pivotal to any effort designed to accomplish the goals
of the GLWQA. Indeed, as data has been accumulated by the UC, the scope of the
GLWQA has had to be expanded.
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Annex lof the original agreement, as we know, set forth specific water quality
objectives covering a broad range of conditions and constituents, including targets for
dissolved oxygen, total dissolved solids, pH, Iron, phosphorous, radioactivity, along with
interim objectives for temperature, mercury (and other heavy metals), and persistent
organic contaminants. Following monitoring in accordance with the LTC's monitoring
plan, 1978 Amendments to the GLWQA expanded on the elimination of the targeted
compounds and pollutants (more fully explained in the Intelligence section of this
chapter). Evolving appraisal led to the 1987 protocol which again expanded the scope of
the initiatives under the GLWQA.
There is no need to look beyond the four corners of the GLWQA to see that the
IJC is an appropriate body for the appraisal of the progress being made toward the goals
of the GLWQA. Under the GLWQA, the primary role of the IJC is to "assist in the
implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it may inter alia collate, analyze, and
disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State and Provincial
Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes
System..." It may also "...tender advice and recommendations to the Parties and to the
State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters related to the quality of the
boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations concerning the General and
Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other regulatory requirements, programs
and other measures, and intergovernmental agreements relating to the quality of these
waters."
The role of the IJC under the GLWQA, therefore, is to continually assess progress
and recommend policy and action. This role includes the ability and discretion to
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publish any report or statement related to its reference, the ability to conduct
investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem when referred to it
by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report to the Parties and to the State and
Provincial Governments no less frequently than biennially concerning progress toward
the achievement of the ...objectives.. .This report shall include an assessment of the
effectiveness of the programs and other measures undertaken pursuant to this Agreement,
and advice and recommendations." Significantly, the IJC may "at any time make special
reports to the Parties, to the State and Provincial Governments and to the public
concerning any problem of water quality in the Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII).
Thus the IJC uses its powers to assess the state of the ecosystem in the Great
Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable through biennial reports and public meetings.
Other reports and investigations deemed a part of their role are also published and
challenge the Parties to remedy or further investigate perceived threats to ecosystem
resilience (Colbum, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Prelli and Becker 2001; Botts
and Muldoon 2005). The IJC, therefore, is tasked not only with monitoring the progress
of the Parties and making recommendations, it is also obligated to biennially report to the
public through reports and biennial public meetings and reveal the extent or lack of
progress made by Parties pursuant to such recommendations. Further, the IJC, at least in
the early GLWQA years, was an independent body that, as has been discussed, held
themselves to operational protocols that required them to put the interests of the
ecosystem of the Great Lakes ahead of national or special interests.
In sum, the IJC Appraisal process during the early GLWQA years met the
requirements for ecosystem-based governance. For the first two decades, progress
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towards limiting nutrient overloads was made and, as we have seen, the waters of the
Great Lakes showed marked improvement. Further, the monitoring schemes adopted by
the IJC were able to detect the increasing threats posed by persistent organic pollutants
and other environmental factors that require attention by the parties. We will now turn
briefly to the last decision process function: Termination.
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a
problem is either solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct or data
analysis reveals that the prescription or course of conduct has been unsuccessful at
moving the toward the goals of the community (Clark 1997; Clark 2008). As we noted in
Chapter III, termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Thus much of the discussion of the
Intelligence, Strategies, and Outcome functions earlier in this chapter is relevant to the
termination task.
The termination function in an ecosystem-based governance regime requires that
there be an independent bridging entity with overall knowledge of trend data that
provides periodic public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the
addition or elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward
the goals specified by prescription (Table 40).
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Table 40 GLWQA Termination
GLWQA Approach

Ecosystem-based Approach
Ecosystem-based governance requires the
periodic public assessment of the
progress, status, and continued need for
any environmental policy prescription or
implementation scheme. The decision to
terminate should be made by a bridging
entity with knowledge of trend data.

The GLWQA gives the IJC, as the
coordinating body, the ability to monitor
and disseminate data received pertaining
to the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem and
recommend Termination by the Parties of
failed programs and/or prescriptions. The
Agreement also requires the parties to use
maximum effort to adhere to measures
that promote progress toward GLWQA
goals.

As we have seen, the GLWQA prescription articulates a broad goal to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes
Basin Ecosystem (1972; 1987). The powers and responsibilities of the UC are set forth in
the Agreement. As we set forth in the Strategies section of this chapter, the UC's primary
role is to "assist in the implementation of this Agreement." In doing so, it is required to
collate, analyze, and disseminate data and information supplied by the Parties and State
and Provincial Governments "relating to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great
Lakes System..." Importantly, the UC must also "...tender advice and recommendations
to the Parties and to the State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters
related to the quality of the boundary waters.. .including specific recommendations
concerning the General and Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other
regulatory requirements, programs and other measures, and intergovernmental
agreements relating to the quality of these waters." There are a variety of other
responsibilities that are crucial to the function of the IJC, including the ability and
discretion to publish any report or statement related to its reference, the ability to conduct
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investigations on subjects related to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem when referred to it
by the Parties, the requirement to make a "full report to the Parties and to the State and
Provincial Governments no less frequently than biennially concerning progress toward
the achievement of the ...objectives.. .This report shall include an assessment of the
effectiveness of the programs and other measures undertaken pursuant to this Agreement,
and advice and recommendations" [emphasis added].
The IJC may also "at any time make special reports to the Parties, to the State and
Provincial Governments and to the public concerning any problem of water quality in the
Great Lakes System" (1987, Art. VII). Thus the IJC uses its powers to assess the state of
the ecosystem in the Great Lakes Basin to hold the Parties accountable through biennial
reports and public meetings. Other reports and investigations deemed a part of their role
are also published and challenge the Parties to remedy or further investigate perceived
threats to ecosystem resilience (Colburn, Davidson et al. 1990; Becker 1993; Prelli and
Becker 2001; Botts and Muldoon 2005). Implicit in this mandate is the role of
recommending termination of domestic programs or prescriptions when the UC
concludes from the data that a program or prescription has failed to reverse or moderate
negative environmental trends.
It should be noted, that while the GLWQA requires the IJC to act as the bridging
authority that recommends measures to the Parties, the Agreement conversely requires
the Parties to respond. Thus in order to achieve purpose of the Agreement, the
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States made a commitment to
"...agree to make a maximum effort to develop programs, practices, and technology
necessary for a better understanding of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to eliminate
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or reduce to the maximum extent practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great
Lakes System" (1987, Art. II). The Agreement, therefore, is a two-way street with duties
and obligations flowing two ways between the Parties and the UC. Clearly, therefore, the
IJC has the ability and the authority to recommend termination of programs or
prescriptions that it deems have failed to produce results. The Parties, on the other hand,
have committed to use maximum effort to create and, where appropriate, terminate
programs in order to achieve the goals of the GLWQA.
It would therefore appear that the prescriptive language of the GLWQA expressly
gives the IJC the authority to recommend termination of a plan or prescription that it
deems unnecessary or unsuccessful and that the Parties are obligated to pay attention and
take measures to terminate programs in accordance with the recommendations of the IJC.
The failure of the Parties to do so would be addressed by the UC in a diplomatic fashion
and any recalcitrance by the Parties would be drawn to the attention of the public and
other interested participants via the UC's biennial report, public meetings, annual IAGLR
meetings, etc. The role of the IJC, and the measures and accountability afforded by the
GLWQA process, appear to be consistent with the characteristics for Termination under
the ideal ecosystem-based approach.
Conclusion
Chapter IV has attempted to compare the governance regime in the Great Lakes
Basin in the early years of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement regime with the
characteristics of an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance using the framework
provided by the Policy Sciences. The case study provides some insight into the difficulty
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posed by implementing enforceable controls over an ecosystem bounded by two
sovereign nations and their various bureaucracies and administrative subdivisions.
Policy development and implementation in transboundary regions are generally
affected by national political considerations and by problems impacting different regions
in diverse ways. The interests and concerns of natural sovereignty, jurisdictionally
fragmented state and provincial governments, and the bureaucratic interests of federal
agencies have historically limited the effectiveness of transboundary institutions. Therein
lies the fundamental paradox of binational policy in any boundary water situation in
general and in the case of boundary waters shared by the United States and Canada in
particular: The goals of policy that may be best for the health and resilience of the
ecosystem are only achievable through a significant degree of coordinated action that is
typically absent in existing institutional arrangements (Regier and Baskerville 1986;
Becker 1993; Caldwell 1993; Young 1998; Prelli and Becker 2001).
By using the Policy Sciences framework it is possible to track some of the
characteristics of the GLWQA governance to help shed light on whether the process that
emerged from the Agreement has helped the governments, institutions, and residents of
the region begin to overcome the nationalistic and bureaucratic limitations that tend to
impede cooperation. Thus this chapter has looked at the problem orientation, social
process, and decision process in order to better understand the overall context of the
situation in the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.
An examination of the problem orientation function highlighted the deterioration
of water quality and fisheries in the Great Lakes Basin under the legal scheme prior to the
passage of the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act (1972) in the United States and
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the Canada Water Act (1970) in Canada. With Lake Erie declared "dead" and fires
breaking out on the Cuyahoga River in Ohio, the governments responded to the explosion
of demonstrations and the demands of an angry public. The GLWQA (1972) was
negotiated by the parties, and the IJC and its boards responded. The IJC recognized the
importance of capitalizing on public anger and took compelling measures to assure that
the public was educated and included in a meaningful fashion in investigations and
remedies promoted through the GLWQA.
An examination of the social process reveals the significance of the inclusion of a
broad range of participants, their values, perspectives, and strategies. It makes
abundantly clear how important the significant participation of the public was to the
efforts of the UC and the Parties under the GLWQA. It also shows the importance of
meaningful public participation, including the pivotal role of PLUARG, as well as
aggressive public outreach guided by such entities as Great Lakes Tomorrow and the
Lake Michigan Federation. Further, collaboration and cooperation facilitated initially by
the Great Lakes Basin Commission caused state and federal agencies in the U.S. to work
together to achieve water quality goals prescribed by the GLWQA. Finally, it reveals the
importance of strategies and perspectives by highlighting the courageous efforts of
individuals who put the public interest and health of the Great Lakes ecosystem ahead of
special and financial interests.
Finally, an evaluation of the decision process shows the importance of the IJC and
how its operating protocols and traditions of the IJC in the 1970s and 1980s perpetuated
an esprit d' corps that promoted a primary allegiance to the health and resilience of the
ecosystem over and above nationalistic or bureaucratic agency self-interest. This freed
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participants to adopt a problem-solving approach with a free and open flow of ideas. It
also highlights how problem-solving efforts were implemented on a trial-and-error basis
with participants learning from both their successes and their failures.
The unique series of factors that coalesced in the early years of the GLWQA
approach resulted in a wave of reform and innovation. There are few parallels.
Unfortunately this chapter has also showed that the "Camelot" era began to unravel as
conservative governments on both sides of the border began to systematically dismantle
the delicate balance of courageous leadership, public education and involvement, and
collaboration at all levels.
As a final, and perhaps personal note, it must be stressed that the success of
governance under the GLWQA in the early years turned on a relatively few number of
critical factors. First, despite the fact that the UC had no jurisdiction to enforce the
mandates of the GLWQA, it was able to get positive results due to the courage and
leadership of individuals who, buttressed by UC operating principles, were willing to put
the public good ahead of special or national interests. As the quotes of those interviewed
for this study reveal, these individuals believed that human dignity and integrity deserved
equal billing with ecosystem resilience. Further, the IJC recognized the importance of an
educated public and capitalized on that concept by funding outreach and education and
then including the public in a meaningful manner (e.g. PLUARG). It was this kind of
leadership and courage that translated prescription into action in the early years and it is
unfortunate that the contribution of the many individuals who played pivotal roles in the
GLWQA scheme in the early years have largely been ignored. We now turn to another
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ecosystem shared between Canada and the U.S. - the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed.
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V.

THE BAY OF FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE WATERSHED

Introduction and Background

There is no way to distill the story of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region into
one chapter of a dissertation. There are too many stories. Within the pear-shaped bowl
that is the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine there are multiple habitats with deep basins, calm
estuaries, rocky coves, and numerous banks and shoals. Shoals and underwater features
with names like Seal Island Grounds, Browns Bank, and smaller areas like Grand Manan
Bank, German Bank, Jeffreys Bank, Cashes Bank, Fippenies Bank, Stellwagen Bank give
hints as to the many cultures and experiences that passed through this region and
recorded their early presence by filling in the blanks on the charts of their time. These
banks and ledges also provided the breeding grounds for valuable commercial fish
species - cod, haddock, cusk, hake, pollock, halibut, and others. "A very striking and
peculiar body of water is this Gulf of Maine, markedly different in character from any
other of the bays on the coast line of the eastern United States (Rich 1994,1).
The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region (BoF/GoM) is known as one of the most
biologically productive marine regions on earth. Within the watershed there are an
extraordinary variety of ecological features that offer habitat diversity for a broad
spectrum of flora and fauna. The geologic history of the region is rich with mountain314

building episodes stemming from volcanic activity, tectonic collisions, and the constant
force of erosion as molten masses cooled and the region was scoured by wave after wave
of glacial activity (Conkling 1995).
The present BoF/GoM is a product of the sand, mud, clay, and other sediments
that made their way toward the ocean as tall coastal mountains fractured and eroded. The
temporal scale of tectonic collisions, mountain building, and erosion takes us back
between 600 to about 350 million years ago with the creation of the supercontinent of
Pangea. The breakup of Pangea left a layer of metamorphic rocks that are considered the
foundation of much of the present structure of the Gulf of Maine. The finishing touches
to the current day structure of the basin were provided some 13,000 years ago as rising
seas from glacial ice melting flooded into the Gulf of Maine basin. These complex
processes worked in a variety of ways depending on the properties of the bedrock
ultimately forming an incredible diversity of bays, headlands, islands, and ledges, shoals,
and basins (Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995).
This tumultuous geologic history resulted in the formation of a sea within a sea.
The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine itself is some 36,000 square miles (90,700 square
kilometers). Within the Gulf there are 21 deep basins, the deepest being Georges Basin
at a depth of 1,236 feet (377 meters) The Northeast Channel, a deep trough 38 miles (61
kilometers) long and 22 miles (35 kilometers) wide running between Georges and Brown
banks, is the only deep-water connection between the Gulf and the open waters of the
Northwest Atlantic.
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Figure 11 The Bay of Fundy/Gulf ofMaine Watershed (USGS)
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It is Georges and Browns Bank that nearly isolates the BoF/GoM from the
Atlantic Ocean (Figure 11). Georges Bank is less than 200 feet (60 meters) deep in over
most of its structure. In some places it rises to within 13 feet (4 meters) of the surface
(Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995). These prominent banks are thought to serve as nutrient
trapping barriers. The shape of the basin, narrow in the north and wider in the south,
drives fast tidal currents (Richert and Incze 2003). The tides combine with upwelling
currents, strong lunar tides, stable water temperatures and storm activity to create ocean
circulation patterns that constantly mix deep-water nutrients into the photosynthetic zone,
resulting in high primary productivity (Jennings, et al. 2001).
The high tides and cold, nutrient rich waters of the Gulf ofMaine support several
thriving ecosystems which are both complex and diverse (Conkling 1995). The nearshore ecosystem is characterized by variety: rocky coasts, salt marshes, fjords, estuarine
regions, greater temperature extremes, and salinity changes. The near shore coastal
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system also includes the shallow (< 50 m) coastal waters and well mixed embayments
found in the U.S. and Canada (Smith 1997).
The region on the terrestrial side of the land/water interface provides inhabitants
with a watershed overlaid with soil capable of sustaining lush forests and, in many places,
agriculture, combined with a coastal sea within a sea. This semi-enclosed body of water
and its surrounding watershed have nurtured a complex array of valuable hardwoods and
softwoods and produced a supply of fish that has nourished populations on both sides of
the Atlantic as well as the Caribbean for centuries (Kelley, Kelley et al. 1995).
Of course, no study of this region would be complete without mention, however
brief, of the historic richness of the fishery in the BoF/GoM. From early times
adventurers from the nations of western Europe have visited the region - Basques,
Bretons, Northman, Spaniard, French, and English have fished these waters and there is
no question that the marine resources of the region have played a large part in feeding the
nations bordering the western Atlantic as well as providing a powerful inducement for the
exploration of the New World (Rich 1994).
Cod has been the primary target of fishers and adventures since the first days of
exploration. John Smith's early reports helped to establish the early fishing pressure in
Massachusetts Bay and, upon his return to Europe following his first exploration trip, he
took with him some seven thousand salted cod and forty thousand dried cod that his crew
had caught off Monhegan Island. The popularity of cod grew and for a period in the age
before refrigeration sixty percent of the fish eaten in Europe was salt-cured cod
(Kurlansky 2008). Walter H. Rich, the Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries in
the early 20th century, recorded in 1929 that the banks that border the Gulf of Maine
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annually produced 400,000,000 pounds of fishery products landed in the United States
and, that annually "about 1,000,000,000 pounds of cod are taken on these banks and
landed in the United States, Canada, Newfoundland, France, and Portugal" (Rich 1994,
intro). One study that examined 19th century ships logs from downeast Maine and other
Gulf of Maine ports speaks of steady catches of cod in the 50 - 60 pound range and of
halibut the size of men. (Alexander, Leavenworth et al. 2009). Of course, cod stocks
have collapsed repeatedly from fishing pressure, most recently in the early 1990s (Dobbs
2000; Weber 2002). After various closures and measures designed to rebuild the stocks,
cod populations have never recovered in the northern gulf and Bay of Fundy, and on the
U.S. side of the Gulf cod are still overfished as overfishing continues (NMFS 2011).
While cod may have been king, the stocks of other species were routinely
exploited. Haddock, cousin to the cod, were fished hard and their population halved in
the early 1930s when demand exploded due to pressure from a burgeoning market for
frozen fish. Halibut, the largest flatfish, were abundant in the region until the mid-1800s.
Full-grown halibut ran 4 - 5 feet long and weighed 200 - 300 pounds. Their populations
collapsed after demand for the fish developed in Boston and New York in the 1830s. In
the first years four men with hand lines could catch 400 fish in two days. By 1850
halibut near the shore or in the nearer parts of Georges were all but gone. By 1890
practically all of the halibut landed at Gloucester were coming from Ireland (Kurlansky
2008).
While for centuries the resources of the BoF/GoM watershed appeared
inexhaustible, the saga of their exploitation is well known. The human population of the
watershed increased rapidly. Fish populations have collapsed time after time. The
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expanding population increased stress on the ecosystem in a variety of ways. To put this
into perspective, consider that as of 2007 nearly 10.8 million people lived in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. This can be broken down between states and provinces.
In the United States, populations within the watershed can be summarized as of2007
with Massachusetts at 6.45 million, Maine with 1.32 million, and New Hampshire with
1.32 million. On the Canadian side, the population of New Brunswick within the
watershed is .94 million people and, in Nova Scotia, .75 million (CoML 2012).
Chapter IV provided an exploration of the governance regime encompassed under
the International Joint Commission's oversight and coordination of the GLWQA, in
collaboration with the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, during the early years under
that regime. In Chapter V we will attempt to gain some insight into the manner in which
two sovereign nations, three states and two provinces attempt to govern the human
activities that impact the binational ecosystem of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region.
Thus we move from an examination of a governance system in a different location and
during an earlier time to the analysis of the present-day, real world regime in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
It must be cautioned that this investigation is the product of one person. It is
simply not possible for one individual to thoroughly examine the social and decision
processes that include literally thousands of individual actors, most of whom are carrying
out their functions within well-defined government structures. Thus programs that exist
and may in fact be valuable to governance are likely to have been overlooked. In
addition, the last of the interviews that were conducted for this research occurred more
than four years ago. Although some effort has been made to stay up to date on the
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programs and processes that have occurred or changed since that time, there have almost
certainly been advances and retreats in efforts to make governance more responsive to the
needs of the ecosystem since that time. Finally, the author has been an attorney in the
United States for over 30 years. Thus in matters of law and prescriptions there is more
detail about the laws and prescriptions in the U.S. than in Canada. This is because I
simply have not learned as much about the Canadian legal framework as I have through
my career about U.S. law and precedent.
Thus the value of this research should be seen as an effort to raise some general
questions about the capacity of the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
region and provide some insight into the direction that governance needs to take in order
to foster a more sustainable future for the region's ecosystem and, by extension, its
residents. Like the process used in Chapter IV, I will analyze the governance regime in
the region through the lens provided by the Policy Sciences analytical framework. Using
the framework, however, in this chapter results in a bit of front-end loading, meaning
much of the story is told through the tasks in the first section for Problem Orientation. In
order to provide context necessary in the first section, much will be said about
participants, prescriptions, perspectives, and other issues usually set forth in later sections
devoted to the Social and Decision Processes. I will therefore not try and repeat what is
said in Problem Orientation in the latter sections but may instead often ask the reader to
refer back to the Problem Orientation section for information that overlaps with the
Social and Decision Processes.
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With those caveats we may now proceed to view examine the BoF/GoM region to
attempt to determine whether there is the capacity to move to a more ecosystem-based
approach to governance of this precious shared watershed.
Problem Orientation
As a reminder, problem orientation serves as a guide to the learning process
fostered by the decision and social process inquiries. As such the five tasks within
problem orientation serve as an overall "strategy to address problems and invent solutions
(Lasswell 1971; Clark and Willard 2000,9). To begin the examination using the
framework approach we will look at the characteristics of goal clarification under our
"ideal" ecosystem-based approach to governance.
Goal Clarification. Goal clarification involves the process by which goals are
determined for a given community. The emphasis on the protection and advancement of
human dignity has historically been a fundamental quest of the policy sciences approach
(deLeon 1988). When we consider that we are examining the effects of human decisions
on human lives, which require a healthy, resilient environment capable of sustaining
human life, commencing any investigation with a goal of human dignity begins to make
sense. As to the goal of democracy, it is "well-rooted in many cultural traditions
throughout history.. .for all people to have full opportunity to shape and share power,
wealth, enlightenment, well-being, skill, affection, rectitude, and respect" (Lasswell and
MacDougal 1992; Clark 2002, 89). Further it should be clarified that the policy sciences
strives to achieve an overriding goal of the realization of human dignity for the many, not
the dignity of the few at a cost of indignity for the many. Since the goal is dignity for the
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many, decision outcomes must aim at achieving equal opportunity for participation in
power, wealth, well-being, and the other important values (Lasswell 1971).
As discussed in chapter III the key goal clarification characteristics of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance are:
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process;
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness and
understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options, and
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and
resilience of ecosystem functions (Table 41).
Table 41 Goal Clarification
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Meaningful public and/or
community participation and input
in the goal clarification process.
National goals may provide
guidance but community has broad
input into how to achieve goals.
Goal choices have broad
community acceptance

No meaningful public or
community participation in goal
clarification for BoF/GoM. Some
watershed groups and citizen
organizations are making inroads
into defining community
environmental and/or economic
goals, e.g. Annapolis River
Watershed Alliance, ACAP. Nova
Scotia seeking public input after
publication of 2009 State of the
Coast Report
There are some public education
efforts in the region - cod tagging
programs through NEFMC, EPA's
National Estuary Program,
NOAA's Coastal Program, etc.
Human dignity and democracy are
not stressed in any government
program, but appear to be factors
in Saltwater Network and ACAP.
There is no collaborative or
cooperative mechanism or entity
capable of embracing the multiple
goals of human dignity, economic
fairness for the many, and equal
access to governance.

Strong public outreach and
education provide ability to
establish community goals
inclusive of human dignity and
democracy and provide basis for
clarifying common interests.
Human dignity includes economic
fairness and sustainability.
Multiple goals may be integrated
that embrace human dignity,
economic fairness for the many,
and equal access to governance
with a focus on maintenance and
preservation of the integrity and
resilience of ecosystem functions.
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The governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region has no
accountable overarching entity coordinating the goals, promotion, implementation and
evaluation of regulatory efforts (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002; Pesch and Wells 2004).
As a result, policy, including the task of goal clarification, is left to traditional,
fragmented, bureaucratic regulation by two federal governments, three state and two
provincial governments, and a legion of local jurisdictions. Indeed it has been noted that
to say that authority is fragmented understates the enormity of the challenge to creating a
coherent policy in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region (Pesch and Wells 2004).
This means that policy, including goal clarification, by-passes or ignores the first
requirement for goal clarification: meaningful public and/or community participation and
input into the goal process. Goal clarification is determined piecemeal by legislation or
rulemaking by the relevant regulatory bodies and agencies with jurisdiction over those
human activities that impact some component of the ecosystem. In the United States for
example:
Congress passes laws and oversees their implementation by agencies,
which in turn prescribe rules and oversee the behavior of regulated firms.
Agencies are highly specialized, with engineers, biologists, chemists,
toxicologists, lawyers, economists, and statisticians, among others, in their
ranks. Elaborate rules, applied as uniformly as possible, define the
technology, monitoring, and other requirements that regulated entities
must meet (Fiorino 2006, 39).
Thus the only way that goal clarification can be analyzed for the BoF/GoM
watershed is to somehow examine the goals and actions of the agencies that are given
jurisdiction under law and statute to manage the various human activities that impact the
ecosystem. While an examination of the missions and goals of each and every agency
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involved in some management aspect related to the BoF/GoM would be out of the
question, we can highlight the goals and missions of some of the more important
governance institutions.
One example of legislation and rules that supply goals in the region are those in
prescriptions related to water quality. It would be difficult to deny that water quality
sufficient to support the goods and services upon which humans and other organisms rely
is an important goal. National water quality standards in the U.S. are set out in the 1972
amendments to the Clean Water Act. The CWA institutes uniform technology-based
standards with the objective to "...restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the nation's waters" (1972, Section 101(a)).29 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Administration is the principle agency responsible, in
conjunction with state environmental agencies, responsible for the administration and
oversight of efforts to achieve this goal (Adler, Landman et al. 1993; Plater, Abrams et al.
2004).
On the Canadian side, the goals for water quality are generally set forth in the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEPA"). The goal of CEPA is to
contribute to sustainable development - development that meets the needs of the present
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. Environment Canada is the agency responsible for the coordination and

29

It has been argued that the standards under the CWA are better defined in relation to human use by
Section 101(a)(2): . .it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and provides for
recreation in and on the water..." This is the so-called "fishable-swimmable" rule. (1972). Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. U.S.C. 33 U.S.C. §§1251 -1387, Hughes, E., A. R. Lucas, et
al. (2003). Environmental Law and Policy. Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd.
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enforcement of the CEPA, but their responsibilities go far beyond the CEPA mandates as
new frameworks have been adopted by the agency:

Q: Are there goals or objectives that are somewhere within your
department on how deal with these threats or how to deal with the
ecosystem threats...
A: The goals that we have or the desired outcomes at the government
level are pretty large scale.
Q: For instance...
A... protecting an enhanced biodiversity, improve water quality so it's
safe, healthy and enables competitive industry.
Q: Is this Environment Canada-wide?
A: Yes. Actually Environment Canada is going through, I mean we've
been around since 1971, in the last two years we've got this new results
framework called Competitiveness and Environmental Sustainability
Framework. This for the first time is really articulating much more clearly
the desired outcomes. Before it's kind of been like, we control pollution,
protect habitats, look out for species, and so on. It was admittedly quite
vague. We had legislative and policy instruments to do that, but we'd
been lacking and what we're almost finished putting in place now, is this
clear results framework. So, at the top, let me just refer to it. This is kind
of an example of the results. We have...
JRC: (Looking at a chart).. .so this would be a goal at the top.. .and I'm
reading "Canada's Natural Capital is Restored Conservation?"
A: Yes, we have....there are like six outcomes at the highest level.
There's a highest order one for the Competitiveness Environmental
Sustainability Framework, to maintain and enhance environmental quality
is sort of the basis for . .to protect of human health, well-being,
environmental assets, and competitiveness in the Canadian economy." So,
below that, there's about five or six levels of outcome that all relate. So,
for instance, under that one of the goals under "natural capital is restored,
protected and enhanced" down below that one of the components is
".. .biodiversity is conserved and protected," another would be ".. .water is
clean, safe, and secure," and "...Canadians adopt approaches that ensures
sustainable use in management of natural capital in the working
landscapes." Then you can drill down further: wildlife, land and
landscapes, and then getting down further: species at risk, protection,
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regulation, and so on. So, this is our new framework in terms of what we
do and the kind of results that we want to achieve. Now while this is still
Environment Canada framework, the objective is it'll be national. And
when we say national I mean throughout the federal government and the
provinces with the territories... (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
So the goals of the federal agencies responsible for water quality in the watershed
of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine are relatively comprehensive on both sides of the
Hague Line. Both have objectives consistent with ecosystem resilience and integrity.
The fact remains, however, that the goals and objectives have been shaped for the most
part by Congressional or Parliamentary bodies and federal agencies, with little if any
meaningful public input. Further, their mandates are pretty much confined to end-of-pipe
discharges - nutrient and other pollution that run-off from land-based activities are
generally not controlled by federal regulatory authorities.
Water quality is but one aspect of the ecosystem in the BoF/GoM region. There
are many more. There will be increasing pressure on the coastal margin, with resulting
pressures on the ecosystem. In the United States there has been more than a decade of
work to develop an Ocean Policy. There has been no lack of high-profile and headlinegrabbing attempts to explore and develop such a policy. Two separate efforts (Pew
Ocean Commission and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy) waded into the ocean
policy debate. The Pew Ocean Commission's report, America's Living Oceans: Charting
Course for Sea Change (Pew 2003) was released in 2003. The U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy released its "Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century in 2004 (USCOP 2004).
Six years later the President issued Executive Order 13547, establishing the ocean policy
for the nation (2010).
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With the issuance of Executive Order 13547, the U.S. had an ocean policy. That
policy is set forth, in part, as:
Sec. 2. Policy, (a) To achieve an America whose stewardship ensures that
the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes are healthy and resilient, safe
and productive, and understood and treasured so as to promote the wellbeing, prosperity, and security of present and future generations, it is the
policy of the United States to: (i) protect, maintain, and restore the health
and biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems and
resources; (ii) improve the resiliency of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes
ecosystems, communities, and economies; (iii) bolster the conservation
and sustainable uses of land in ways that will improve the health of ocean,
coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems; (iv) use the best available science
and knowledge to inform decisions affecting the ocean, our coasts, and the
Great Lakes, and enhance humanity's capacity to understand, respond, and
adapt to a changing global environment; (v) support sustainable, safe,
secure, and productive access to, and uses of the ocean, our coasts, and the
Great Lakes; (vi) respect and preserve our Nation's maritime heritage,
including our social, cultural, recreational, and historical values; (vii)
exercise rights and jurisdiction and perform duties in accordance with
applicable international law, including respect for and preservation of
navigational rights and freedoms, which are essential for the global
economy and international peace and security; (viii) increase scientific
understanding of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems as part of the
global interconnected systems of air, land, ice, and water, including their
relationships to humans and their activities; (ix) improve our
understanding and awareness of changing environmental conditions,
trends, and their causes, and of human activities taking place in ocean,
coastal, and Great Lakes waters; and (x) foster a public understanding of
the value of the ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes to build a
foundation for improved stewardship.
(b) The United States shall promote this policy by: (i) ensuring a
comprehensive and collaborative framework for the stewardship of the
ocean, our coasts, and the Great Lakes that facilitates cohesive actions
across the Federal Government, as well as participation of State, tribal,
and local authorities, regional governance structures, nongovernmental
organizations, the public, and the private sector; (ii) cooperating and
exercising leadership at the international level; (iii) pursuing the United
States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention; and (iv) supporting
ocean stewardship in a fiscally responsible manner (2010).
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Thus the U.S. now has an oceans policy with impressive goals and objectives. It
has yet to take effect, however, as the Draft National Ocean Policy Implementation Plan
is out for public comment (NOC 2011). In the meantime, existing law and policy march
on to attempt to manage the many issues confronting the sustainable use of ecosystem
goods and services, including those in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
An example of a pressing problem in the region is the overall issue of biodiversity
- or how many organisms and what types inhabit and contribute to a healthy ecosystem
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. Biodiversity is dependent on a number of factors
including water quality, harvest pressure, habitat, water temperature, and water
chemistry. What are the goals? To a large degree the management of the ocean and
coastal issues in the U.S. falls to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
("NOAA") and, in Canada, to Fisheries and Oceans Canada ("DFO"). Goals for the
moment are left to them and their state and, to some degree, provincial partners.
The mission of NOAA is to "understand and predict changes in the Earth's
environment and to conserve and manage ocean and coastal resources to meet the
nation's economic, social and environmental needs" (USCOP 2004,75). While NOAA's
duties are spread across five line offices, the two that are most relevant to this study are
the National Ocean Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS").
The National Ocean Service is the home of NOAA's Coastal Services Center
("CSC"). The vision of the CSC is for coastal communities to become more resilient
through informed decision-making. The objective is that "[t]hrough collaborative efforts
and the partnerships that the Center cultivates, managers of the nation's local and
regional coastal ecosystems are enabled and empowered with the knowledge, tools, and
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skills needed to make informed and balanced planning and conservation choices, and
decisions to enhance resilience and adapt to changing climate" (NOAA 2010, 5). As one
participant familiar with the CSC put it, however, NOAA suffers from a lack of funding
and, further, there may be a need for the science and knowledge developed through CSC
and other sources to become more practical and relevant to management needs:

I'd like to see that whole thing switched so that management is driving the
science that needs to be done, because we can be doing science until the
cows can come home and we don't have the resources right now to really
do a comprehensive job anyways. So that's been my major frustration is
for NOAA to actually get serious about management driving science. (US
Federal Employee 4)
The second NOAA division that has goals particularly relevant to this study is the
National Marine Fisheries Service. NMFS is responsible for the stewardship of the
nation's living marine resources and their habitat. It is the responsibility of NMFS to
manage, conserve, and protect the living marine resources within the United States'
Exclusive Economic Zone (the maritime zone from three to 200 miles offshore). It's
goal, to the extent relevant to this study, is set forth in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, as amended (1996). The Magnuson-Stevens Act
requires that fishery management plans ("FMP's") be developed by regional fishery
management councils established under the Act. For the U.S. portion of the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the New England Fishery Management Council was established
(1996, Section 302). The Act also sets out goals in the form of "National Standards" for
FMP's adopted by the Council. Perhaps the most significant for our quest for goals is the
first requirement that "Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing
while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the
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United States fishing industry" (1996, Section 301(a)(1).) As one individual involved
with the New England Fishery Management Council commented with respect to the
seemingly conflicting goals of conserving fish stocks while promoting industry to obtain
an optimum yield from the fishery:

What's the goal? To make sure that we make good decisions to rebuild
stocks and have a sustainable fishery. My personal opinion is that the
Magnuson is both economic and conservation of biological. I'd like to
keep it that way. I think it's important to have healthy fisheries from an
economic standpoint. We shouldn't just do away with that. I don't think
that's a bad thing to look at the economic and social aspects of the
business. But I think that we paid too much attention to that over the years
and now we're moving toward the biological conservation part of it. I
think we need to strike a balance. Once we have the stocks rebuilt we
need to keep them there. I don't want to see an all-biological act. I like
this balance rebuilding stocks, healthy stocks and a healthy fishery. (US
Federal Employee 3).
Thus the one of the key goals of the NEFMC under its mandate from MagnusonStevens is to balance the needs of the fishing industry to harvest an "optimum yield"
from the territorial waters of the United States with the need to sustain fish populations.
In Canada, with the passage of the Oceans Act in 1996, the nation made a legal
commitment to conserve, protect and develop the oceans in a sustainable manner (1996).
Canada's Oceans Act provides a unified national oceans policy and relies upon three
important principles: sustainable development, integrated management, and the
precautionary approach (1996, Section II). Canada's Oceans Strategy (DFO 2002) and,
later, the Ocean Action Plan (DFO 2005), translated the government's vision and
direction for modern oceans governance into a tangible approach. The overarching goal
of the strategy is ensuring healthy, safe and prosperous oceans for the benefit of current
and future generations of Canadians (DFO 2002).
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Discussing the balance between the economics of exploitation and extraction and
the value of conservation within the terms of the Oceans Act and the subsequent plans
and strategies, one person familiar with the practical implications commented:

Q: The goals that are in the ESM draft plan, and for that matter in...
Oceans Act, are they pretty much reflective of the goals that you've heard
that the community wants? Or are there additions that you've discovered
in your field?
A: There's been some tweaking. It's useful for you to reference the
report proceedings of a workshop we had in December 2004, Human Use
Objectives Workshop, and unfortunately I don't have it in front of me
right now, but we can get it later. Basically, there's an
overarching.. .there's almost a vision really that we set out at that
workshop. It introduced the notion of cultural, social, economic
sustainability that is not really reflective... those notions are not really
strongly reflective in the goals that were derived from the Preamble of the
Oceans Act. The Oceans Act really kind of talks about the integrated
management plans within measures or the activities in the area, or for
activities occurring outside the area. And then the second one talks about
responsible sustainable use or conservation of resources, and also ocean
space. The third goal relates to maintenance of productivity and
protection of biodiversity. And then the fourth goal is more the economic
development side of the Ocean's Act. The first three are kind of the green
part of the act, if you can imagine conservation, biodiversity, that kind of
thing.. .but then you've got the fourth one that talks about the sustainable
wealth generation, economic diversification, as being the primary drivers
of the act. That's the balance, I guess, of environment and economics and
economy that are in the Act set out in those four goals, and it's a great
challenge to achieve that balance. What we're trying to do.. .the plan is an
objectives-based plan and with conservation objectives to protect the
ecosystem, but also as users of that ecosystem, human use objectives that
relate to community well-being, economic well-being, and then
development of industrial capacity and an aspect that provides the
economic well-being in a sustainable way. (Canadian Federal Employee
1)
The goals, again, are completely provided by parliament or DFO. It is noteworthy
that the balance between economic interests and conservation seems, valid or not, to
provide significant tension in efforts to govern the human and economic activities that
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impact the BoF/GoM ecosystem. Further, both nations sharing the ecosystem are federal
political systems - the United States more so than Canada as we shall see later. Thus
while the prerogatives set forth in Canadian federal legislation are valuable, there still
exists a great deal of reliance upon collaboration with provincial governments for
consistency with goals and implementation. In addition to the goals and objectives
expressed at the federal level in Canada and the United States, other goals and objectives
abound at the state and provincial levels. No attempt will be made to extract the goals of
every agency at the state/provincial level with management authority over some
component of the ecosystem. There are a few that deserve attention, however.
In the U.S. the goals and policies of NOAA Coastal Services Center include
activities in support of state coastal management plans under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (1972). The Maine State Planning Office, for example, coordinates
coastal and environmental policy in that state, including activities funded by the federal
CZMA. When queried about the goals, one person familiar with the function of the
Planning Office described both goals and practical limitations:
Q: So, what's the goal?
A: The goal of Coastal Zone Management in Maine to...it's balance. It's
really hard to explain to people and it's even harder to measure. How do
you conserve important coastal resources while having a vibrant, healthy,
lively coastal zone for people to live in? It's to balance the conservation
development of the coast and its resources.
Q: But, primarily, that responsibility falls to the towns?
A: In Maine, yes. (US State Employee 2)
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Planning involving one state, however, can only do so much in terms of the larger
ecosystem. Further, as the above demonstrates, there is a great deal of regulatory
responsibility that devolves to municipalities and other local government entities.
In Canada, provinces similarly work with the federal government to develop
policy consistent with national goals and legislation. New Brunswick, with its newly
combined Department of Agriculture, Aquaculture, and Fisheries, has a mandate to
deliver "... public policies and programs to optimize the value of aquatic resources while
strategically promoting sustainable growth of the fish and seafood industry"
(New Brunswick 2010). Similarly, in Nova Scotia a Department of Fisheries and
Aquaculture, a management official described the department's goals in terms of
promoting development for the good of the province:
In general the bottom line is that we provide services to industry for the
betterment for coastal rural communities in all of Nova Scotia. So we
actually look at development in a practical way. We're trying to
encourage development, but we want it to be obviously ecologically
sustainable, but also sustainable in the sense that this is good for Nova
Scotia. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1)
With respect to the possibility of conflicts in goals even between departments
within Nova Scotia, apparently there the potential exists:
Q: So, there was an issue that each department maybe had different goals?
A: Oh, yeah. Think about like tourism, right? That is a really good
concrete example. Tourism is actually led by the Tourism Industry
Association of Nova Scotia, partnered with our Department of Tourism
Culture and Heritage. They're developing a coastal tourism strategy
which is essentially aiming for a goal of doubling tourism in the next ten
years, most of that focus is coastal, because Nova Scotia is Canada's
ocean playground. We have to be careful how we develop it because you
don't want to harm the very thing that people are coming to tour. So
they're developing this strategy, and I don't really know the details of it,
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but clearly there is a tourism focus. At the same time, my office, my
department, is coming up with the aquaculture framework, promoting and
developing aquaculture, which I assume, and I don't know the details of it,
will be to grow aquaculture and increase aquaculture. (Canadian
Provincial Employee 1)
So conflicts in goals between departments and agencies are real. Still, it seems,
the scale is tipped toward viewing the ecosystem as a vehicle for economic gain, i.e.
extraction and harvest for human needs and economic gain. This would run counter to
the ecosystem-based governance characteristic which requires management with the
resilience and health of the ecosystem, not human-set economic targets, guide the
governance of human activities that impact the environment:
Q: But, again, your chief goal is to help folks get into the [fishery and
aquaculture] business and do it right.
A: That's exactly right. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1)
It would appear that from the governance side, there is federal and state/provincial
legislation and rules that require regulators to balance the demands of industry against the
goals of ecosystem health, resilience, and integrity. The fact that the goals set forth in the
law of both nations requires such balancing means quite simply that decisions on how
proposed activities are balanced are open to influence from industry interests and political
persuasion that favor activities that benefit business and industry to the detriment of
ecosystem integrity.
In addition to the governmental players in the region, it is worth noting that there
are numerous NGOs operating within the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
Casual observation of their activities over the last several years would seem indicate that
there is no coordination of the goals or actions of the NGO community. One employee of
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the local office of a national NGO was asked in October, 2007, about their goals as part
of this study:

Q: Are there goals that you have been able to articulate for the ecosystem
or for the region?
A: Short answer is no. Part of the purpose of our eco-regional assessment
is to define conservation goals such as that, including ecosystem-based
management principles. So, right now we are doing our eco-regional
assessment for the Gulf of Maine, actually for the whole east coast, and so
we will be developing more concrete conservation and ecosystem goals
through that process, which is expected to take another year. So the short
answer, no. (US NGO 3)
When asked about the impact of NGOs and Foundations on governance in the
region, another state employee familiar with the BoF/GoM governance regime has an
interesting take on the role they play in the region:
A: The difficulty is that long term governance has to have a long term
stable funding source. I would say that the NGOs and the Foundations are
as much a special interest as anybody else involved in this process. I
mean they have their goals. They have their milestones.
Q: And why can't they work together?
A: Because they compete as much as we do. I have a colleague who was
in an intern position and he was in a room, this was a long, long time ago,
where a number of the leaders of the major ocean groups were getting
together, the proverbial smoke-filled back room although I doubt they
smoked, where they divided issues up based on income generation and
member retention. That's their return for unit effort. (U.S. State Employee
1)
There are numerous other players in the BoF/GoM region. There are watershed
groups and citizen alliances. There are organizations of agencies like NROC and the
Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, which will be discussed later. The
point is, however, that the goals that drive the various governance participants in the
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region are fragmented and, at times, conflicting. From the vantage point of a casual
observer, there is a certain amount of distrust between the players in the region. One of
the reasons may be that all are competing for increasingly scarce dollars - whether from
members or donors as in the case of NGOs, or from government budgets, which are
increasingly trimming the agencies and functions that are discretionary in nature.
Regardless of the reason, however, there are too many goals that drive regulators and the
public in different directions. This is not conducive to the kind of collaborative and
cooperative effort required of ecosystem-based governance.
It would appear that governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is based on a
series of acts and regulations promulgated by lawmakers and regulators that share the
purpose of compromising between resource conservation and economic interests. Our
ecosystem-based goals clarification characteristics call for meaningful public and/or
community participation in the goal clarification process. There appears to be little
attention paid to public or community participation in the region. Further, our ideal
model calls for strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising awareness
and understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options. Other than some of the
examples discussed later in this chapter, there is little indication that there is either the
desire or the funding for truly strong public outreach or education. Finally, our model
calls for multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and resilience of
ecosystem functions. In the BoF/GoM there is certainly evidence of multiple goals.
Unfortunately they are agency-by-agency goals and may or may not be related to the
maintenance of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem functions. As we have seen,
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often the language of the legislation or regulation speaks to "sustainability" or
"restoration" but, in practice, are often interpreted or implemented to promote economic
or private interests to the detriment of the integrity and resilience of ecosystem function.
Having examined at least some of the goals in the region, we will now move to
look at the trends.
Describing Trends. The trends task in an ideal ecosystem-based approach to
governance has been discussed and may be characterized by:
1) Collaboration and the use of reliable methods and data in order to measure
whether socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals,
and
2) The open and transparent communication of the progress and trends data to
policy makers and to an informed public with significant opportunities for
community members to be involved with scientists in the assessment of trends
using local knowledge and local preferences (Table 42).
In other words, trends are examined in terms of the movement of governance
toward a more participatory and holistic ecosystem-approach; and whether the
socioecological trends are moving toward more sustainable and resilient ecosystem
functions. With this in mind, therefore, this section must explore collaboration and the
reliability of methods being used to determine trends. It must also examine at least some
of the important ecosystem processes or components and determine whether they are
trending toward or away from the goals. Finally we will examine whether there is a
process in place to openly and transparently communicate the trend information to the
public and policy makers and if such communication opens the door tq significant
opportunities for community members to be involved with scientists in order to assess
trends with local knowledge and preferences (Table 42).
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Table 42 Trends
Ecosystem-based Approach
The use of reliable methods to
measure whether a suite of
socioecological variables are
moving closer to, not away from,
goals established with significant
input from community.

Open and transparent
communication of the progress and
trend data to policy makers and to
an informed public through
frequent meetings, accessible
information, and other techniques.

#

BoF/GoM Approach
Goals are fragmented. The
methods used to measure whether
variables are moving closer to or
away from goals are difficult to
determine because there is no
overarching authority or uniform
reporting process. Evaluations of
trends, to the extent they are
performed, are generally done by
separate agencies and involve only
matters in their jurisdiction.
Ecosystem processes and
components appear to be trending
away from the various goals set by
responsible agencies.
There are a variety of separate,
often fragmented, sources of
information. There are no annual
or regular meetings designed to
inform the public and policy
makers about trend data. There is
no accessible website or source of
information available to the public
and policy makers that contains
comprehensive trend data or
opportunities for input or
participation. GoMCandBoFEP
websites are helpful but not
comprehensive.

The first issue in the examination of trends is the characteristic that an ecosystembased governance regime needs to use reliable methods to measure whether a suite of
socioecological variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals established with
significant input from community. This issue presents problems in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed for a variety of reasons. It might be recalled from the
Goal Clarification discussion above, for example, that there are no overriding goals for
the region and certainly none that were established with significant input from

,

community. The goals in the region are largely set forth in the missions, goals, and
338

objectives of a variety of federal, state/provincial and local governments and agencies.
Similarly, the methods used to accumulate data are generally department or
agency-specifip. There is no universal, standardized, monitoring or surveillance plan.
There is no annual conference where scientists, regulators, policy makers, and members
of the public could share information and data. Indeed, data and information relevant to
trends in the BoF/GoM region are often stove-piped in agencies or published in peerreviewed journals safe from the eyes of the general public. As one author lamented:
The situation in the Gulf of Maine is further complicated because the
region is controlled by hundreds of municipalities, dozens of counties and
metropolitan regions in two countries. To say that authority is fragmented
understates the enormity of the challenge to creating a coherent.. .policy.
The difficulty inherent in collecting Gulfwide data for this report, alone, is
an illustration of the complexity of the task without taking into
consideration differences in land use law, culture, and traditional use
(Pesch and Wells 2004).
The only entity that has the potential capacity to provide a consistent and reliable
platform for collaborative work between and among the fragmented array of geographic
and subject-matter jurisdictions in the region is the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment ("GOMC")- The GOMC was formed by a small group of middle-level state
planners and provincial resource managers who had, essentially, become frustrated at the
slow pace of federal response to regional threats during the Reagan administration in the
U.S. and the Mulroney Government in Canada. This group morphed into the first Gulf
of Maine Council Working Group and meets were held around the basin beginning in
Portland in June, 1988, to negotiate a binational agreement (Springer 2002).
Drafted largely by members of the Maine State Planning Office and negotiated in
working group meetings, the "Agreement on the Conservation of the Marine
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Environment of the Gulf of Maine" was signed by the premiers of New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia and the governors of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Maine in 1989
(Young 1998; Springer 2002; Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). Since both Canada and the
United States have constitutional prohibitions that prevent provinces or states from
entering into international agreements, the 1989 agreement is in essence a compact to
cooperate. But it is a political agreement that requires little of the parties (Ricketts and
Hildebrand 2011). Indeed, there is consensus within the Council that "whatever authority
the Council currently has flows from the powers of the individual agencies which
participate in it" (Springer 2002,29).
The Council's ability to serve as the principle forum to employ reliable science to
credibly inform the public, regulators, scientists, and regulators is not without limitation.
The original agreement, while employing phrases like "sustainable development" and
"ecological integrity" ended where the water hit the shore - land masses and the landbased ecological systems were beyond the scope of the agreement. Further, there is no
mention of fish or fisheries in the original agreement. Despite the fact that fishing is the
economic center of the regional economy and overfishing and regulatory conflict are
hallmarks of life in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, political reality has forced the
Council to generally avoid issues related to the "f-word" (Springer 2002).
The Council is now working under its recently adopted its 5th Action Plan. It is at
first blush very similar to its 4th Action Plan. An excellent summary of the development
of the Council from the 1990s to the current 2007 - 2012 Action Plan may found
elsewhere and will not be repeated here (See Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). Pursuant to
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its 4th, and carried through with the 5th Action Plan, the GOMC has essentially articulated
three goals:

1. Coastal and marine habitats are in a healthy, productive, and
resilient condition.
2. Environmental conditions in the Gulf of Maine support ecosystem
and human health.
3. Gulf of Maine coastal communities are vibrant and have marinedependent industries that are healthy and globally competitive
(GOMCc 2007,17; GOMC 2012).
The Action Plans also set forth the four principles that the Council and
participating agencies adhere to in their decisions involving the Gulf of Maine ecosystem:
1. Ecologically sustainable development
The Council seeks to meet the region's current social, cultural, and
environmental needs without compromising the needs of future
generations. Working in partnership with others, it strives to sustain
ecological processes and enhance the region's quality of life.
2. Ecosystem-based planning and management
The Council supports collaborative management that integrates
economic, social, and ecological values and objectives, emphasizing
natural rather than political boundaries.
3. Environmental protection through precaution
The Council supports conservation of the coastal and marine
environment, and urges its members to proceed with caution to avoid
environmental degradation.
4. Public information and participation
The Council is committed to a participatory process that informs and
engages the public in setting priorities. (GOMCc 2007,5; GOMC
2012)
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Thus the language of the 4th and 5th Action Plans articulate goals and principles
consistent with ecosystem-based governance. The issue, though, is whether there are
reliable methods to measure whether a suite of socioecological variables are moving
closer to, not away from, goals established with significant input from community. Often
indicators of ecosystem resilience and integrity are helpful. Since at least 2003 the
GoMC, through its Ecosystem Indicator Partnership ("ESIP"), has been working on
establishing indicators that would provide a web-based reporting system encompassing
coastal development, contaminants, eutrophication, aquatic habitat, fisheries and
aquaculture, and climate change (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). ESIP's core principles
are set forth below:
The core principles established for the gulf-wide indicators and reporting
program ensure the production of a high-quality product that is relevant
for its users and is developed through a transparent, science-based process
that engages a wide group of partners.
Partnerships. This effort will build on existing monitoring, indicator, and
reporting programs within and encompassing the Gulf of Maine. Strong,
robust partnerships between these programs and other organizations will
be vital for a region-wide indicators and reporting program to succeed.
Science-based. Indicators will be selected based on the best natural and
social scientific understandings of the structure and functions of the
ecosystem, including its human components.
Audience-relevant. Indicators will be responsive to audience needs, and
information will be presented in formats that are clearly understood by the
target audiences.
Necessary and sufficient. This effort will track the minimum set of
indicators necessary to determine whether ecosystem goals and objectives
associated with specific management issues are being achieved.
Transparent. The selection, development, and interpretation of the
indicators will be conducted and documented in a manner that ensures
transparency such that each indicator can be evaluated by users and
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replicated by other programs or in future iterations of this initiative.
(GOMC 2011)
Thus there is adequate language within the mandate of ESIP in particular and
GOMC in general to use reliable methods to gather data by way of meaningful
monitoring and evaluation and, once the data is obtained, to have processes whereby the
results are transparent and shared with the public. While the language may be adequate
to permit these activities, it is unclear how much the structure of the GOMC, once
described as "fragmented incrementalism" (Springer 2002,29), acts as a practical barrier
to credible, comprehensive, and collaborative measurement. There may also be nagging
questions of funding that prevents monitoring and the evaluation of the data gleaned from
monitoring effort. Funding, which has been "a serious and perennial challenge for the
Council" (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011, 371) may also prevent the creation and
implementation of a reliable monitoring program:
The lack of long-term funding and consequent budgetary uncertainty has
made life difficult for Council committees, who are unsure whether to plan
for a worst-case situation or to continue generating new and potentially
costly ideas... Overall... the tight budget has forced member
governments and agencies to re-examine Council priorities and recommit
themselves to the work of the organization... The tight budget has also
encouraged greater emphasis on the development of inexpensive, cost
effective approaches to both monitoring and management, which may be
crucial to the organization's long-term success. In addition, it has
reminded the Council of the need to remain sensitive to the priorities of
state and provincial agencies in the way it defines problems to be
addressed in the action plan. (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011, 372-73)
Put another way, a participant familiar with regulatory efforts in the BoF/GoM
interjected a bit of practical experience into the relationship between funding and
monitoring in the region:
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A : . . . when there are budget cuts, historically, monitoring is often among
the first things to go. It's viewed as somewhat of a luxury. Considering
how much emphasis there is on accountability and getting environmental
results, it doesn't make sense. But, it's...if you're a regulating agency,
you're regulating. If you have money to monitor, great, but if you don't,
well you're still going to regulate and assume that you're doing some
good. But, you can see all the things that we do, but hardly any of them
do we do entirely by ourselves, in fact, none of them. (US Federal
Employee 1)
It appears, therefore, that there may be real obstacles along the way to a reliable
and credible monitoring scheme for the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. First there is
a problem with the fragmented nature of the Council and, second, there are funding
issues. This may explain why the Council has been operating for some two decades and
there is still no basin-wide monitoring or surveillance plan. Then again, ESIP is
progressing and there may be sufficient collaboration such that, even without funding,
member agencies will cooperate on a region-wide surveillance plan with costs being
absorbed within each agency and results shared and communicated to the public and
policy makers. Overall, however, governance presently falls short of the goal of
collaboration and use of reliable methods and data in order to measure whether there has
been progress in moving toward goals.
We have seen that there is an overall lack of cooperation and collaboration in the
governance regime in the region. But are trends in the BoF/GoM moving toward the
goals of the agencies that govern the various components of the ecosystem? Without
going into great detail, the trends can be summarized.
Trends are by definition driven by the threats to the regional ecosystem. To help
put threats into context we must remember that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine provides
valuable services and resources to the region. Some of these services are visible, others
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are not so apparent. Commercial and recreational fishing industries in the Gulf of Maine
employ many thousands and provide the social and economic lifeblood for a significant
number of towns and villages along the Gulf coast of Canada and the United States. The
Gulf also provides an outlet for tourism and recreation, shellfish harvesting, marine
transportation, cultural identity, coastal economic development and other important and
tangible products. The land around the Gulf is sought after for valuable agriculture as
well as for residential, commercial and industrial value. There is abundant evidence that
human population will continue its migration to the coast for a host of reasons, not the
least of which is the intrinsic appeal of many coastal landscapes and habitats (NHEP
2000; M.S.P.O. 2001). Further, as climate change impacts make life in urban centers
south of the Gulf less and less pleasant, the Gulf region will come under increasing stress
from those desiring to "escape" from those densely populated regions.
Q: But, going back to the four threats that we mentioned earlier, what are
the trends? Are we getting better or are we moving further away from our
goals?
A: Well, that depends on how good your indicator systems are and that's
an issue. I think you have a lot of different groups that are trying to
understand the state of the environment and Gulf of Maine Council is one
through their Ecosystem Indicator Partnership. Every office, again, looks
at its own indicators. I don't think that anyone.. .1 know that NOAA
doesn't have a system in place where we actually understand a whole suite
of indicators. So, for instance, coastal development wise, we know that
the Northeast is the most highly populated region of the US and it's
getting more populated, so that trend is going up. The non-point source
pollution is getting worse due in large part to increased development.
Now fisheries has their set of indicators where they're measuring fishery
stocks and it's very difficult to put that picture together in terms of an
ecosystem where some stocks are going up, some stocks are going down,
and where you have trophic cascades going on. You might not be able to
speak for the entire ecosystem but they're trying to put that picture
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through individual stocks or suites of stocks. Again, that's not in an
ecosystem context. (US Federal Employee 4)
It seems we know trends are moving away from the goals, but we really don't
know a lot of specifics in terms of the health of the overall ecosystem. If, however,
environmental trends are not moving toward the goals of the agencies that manage the
various components over which they have jurisdiction, then all of these valuable services..
are in peril. We should first recall the primary threats to the health and resiliency of the
GoF/GoM ecosystem. Those threats appear to be posed by overharvesting, pollution,
shoreland development, invasive species, and global climate change (Steneck 2001; Clark
2002; Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004).
With respect to the harvesting of living marine resources, decades, some say
centuries, of resource extraction and exploitation by humans has taken a toll on Gulf of
Maine (Pauly, Christensen et al. 1998; Jackson, Kirby et al. 2001; Steneck 2001). While
there was marginal improvement with rebuilding some stocks, continued harvest pressure
stocks are again down30, and landings of key commercial species generally continue to
suffer and continued overcapacity perpetuates the paradigm of too many fishers chasing
too few fish (Hanna, Blough et al. 2000). Diversity in the Gulfs marine ecosystem has
been markedly reduced over millennia and historic food webs have been transformed into
food chains due to the serial targeting and depletion of finfish and other top consumers.
Some commentators have asserted that the cascading consequences of overfishing have
30Data and conclusions from

the 2005 Groundfish Assessment Review Committee ("GARM"), a regional
review peer-review process designed to provide stock assessment updates for the 19 stocks managed under
the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan ("Multispecies FMP") demonstrate the mixed results
of multispecies management efforts since 2001. Of the 19 stocks assessed, for instance, only 6 showed an
increase in stock biomass over the last four years. GARM (2005). More recent data from the Study of 19
Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2007 shows further stock deterioration with 13 of the 19 groundfish
stocks overfished, with overfishing occurring in 11 of those stocks. NEFMC (2008). Report of the
Groundfish Assessment Review Meetings (GARM III). Gloucester, NMFS.
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resulted in a phase shift that has replaced cod with European green crab as the apex
predator in the Gulf of Maine (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). Others warn that without
the restoration of ecosystem food webs and improved water quality marine ecosystems
will lose resilience and become increasingly vulnerable to global climate change and
other unforeseen future threats (Pandolfi, Jackson et al. 2005). Despite the continued
threat of overfishing, stock rebuilding timetables and restoration efforts are under siege
from both Congress and the judiciary (Safina, Rosenberg et al. 2005). Recent evidence
reveals that populations of cod, a keystone species in the gulf ecosystem, are again
overfished, that overfishing is continuing31, and that the populations are perilously low:
"Currently, the Gulf of Maine cod stock appears to be at a very low biomass, which will
likely affect harvests of other groundfish stocks from the nearshore Gulf of Maine"
(NMFS 2011,1).
All is not bad news, however. Viewed from the perspective of someone involved
with the New England Fishery Management Commission, and looking at the full suite of
stocks managed by the NEFMC, there have been positive trend indications:
Q: How are we doing? What are the trends?
A: We're doing better. The trends are all up. Scallops are doing very
well. Monkfish and herring are doing very well. Groundfish, of the 19
stocks, 13 are rebuilding, 3 are staying the same, and 3 are declining.
Overall, if you look in aggregate there's definitely an increase in the
groundfish complex stocks. For the first time probably in New England
history in 2005 we stayed under our TACs. And I think in 2006 we were
31 An overfished stock or stock complex is one whose size is sufficiently small that a change in management
rules is required in order to achieve an appropriate level and rate of rebuilding. The Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act currently mandates that overfished stocks be rebuilt as soon as
possible and within a timeframe not longer than 10 years.
Overfishing relates to the rate at which a stock of fish is harvested and occurs when that rate exceeds an
acceptable level, eventually resulting in the stock becoming overfished.
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under on all of them except one, and I think that was Gulf of Maine cod.
So things are moving in the right direction on ground fish and there are a
number of success stories in other stocks. So we're doing better. (US
Federal Employee 3)
It should be noted that this interview occurred before more recent data on
groundfish stock rebuilding became available. The conclusions of GARM III report
published in 2008 entitled Assessment of 19 Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2007
paints a bleaker picture:
• Four stocks were classified as not overfished and not experiencing
overfishing.
• Thirteen stocks were overfished and six were not.
• Eleven groundfish stocks were both overfished and experiencing
overfishing. (NEFMC 2008)
Thus more recent trend information indicates that there may be as many as 13 of
the 19 groundfish subject to the regulation via the New England Fishery Management
Council's Northeast Multispecies or Groundfish Plan are showing significant signs of
decline - 11 of those so seriously that action must be taken to rebuild stocks immediately
(1976; NEFMC 2008).
Stresses impacting the Gulf of Maine extend beyond the pressure put on it by the
fishing industry. Toxic contaminants found in the waters of the Gulf region, for instance,
have been linked to endocrine system harm in humans and wildlife (De Guise, Shaw et
al. 2001). Commercial fish that are harvested from the Gulf are increasingly subject to
Fish Consumption Health Advisories because of their high burdens of mercury, PCBs,
dioxins, and other toxins (Rich 1994). Trends in some of the persistent organic pollutants,
endocrine disruptors, pharmaceuticals, are unknown because there is no monitoring for
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the presence of these types of constituents (Wells 2010). This was driven home by an
employee familiar with existing monitoring efforts for pollutants on the U.S. side of the
gulf region:

Q: One of the concerns also is that we don't know about this next
generation of pollutants—endocrine disruptors, the pharmaceuticals, the
things that might be out there—but right now are posing problems in the
Great Lakes because they're being looked at. We don't know what's out
there. Is that a fair statement?
A: I think that's a fair statement. On the other hand I think that at the
ORD sort of level, at Offshore Research and Development, that those
things are being looked at, but the information generated by this research
hasn't reached a point yet that it can used to guide management
decisions...regulatory decisions. We still are having a hard...with the
resources we have at our disposal having a hard enough time controlling
sources of pollution that we know about, like nutrients, never mind
worrying about.. .1 mean yea, we think about it, we're concerned about it,
do we do anything about it? No. But, like I said, we barely have the
resources to deal with the problems we know about, never mind the ones
we don't really know about. (U.S. Federal Employee 1)
In addition to the point source and air deposited pollutants that impact the
environment in the BoF/GoM region, there is an additional problem with nutrients. These
pollutants are a result of increasing population pressure and development in the coastal
margin. Contaminated shellfish beds, loss of eelgrass, reduced water clarity, coastal
development, habitat loss, hazardous waste and pollution have been present with varying
intensity along the coast for decades and are a direct result of the population growth in
the region. Contaminants include microorganisms from storm water runoff and other
nonpoint sources, nutrients (point and nonpoint sources), improperly treated sewage,
legacy pollutants (and sediments), and emerging toxic contaminants (NHEP 2000;
Sowers 2010; Washburn 2010).
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The situation in the Great Bay, located in the southern gulf bordered by New
Hampshire and Maine, is an example for many of the environmentally important
estuaries and salt marshes in peril around the region. A 2009 Piscataqua Regional
Estuaries Partnership ("PREP") Report sets out the negative trends in the Great Bay.
Total nitrogen load (N) in the estuary increased by 42% in the last five years due largely
to greater storm water runoff and non-point source pollution loads during recent high
rainfall years. Dissolved inorganic nitrogen, a major component of total N, has increased
by 44% in the last 28 years. Water clarity has declined as a result of increasing nutrient
loads and increasing concentrations of suspended solids and chlorophyll-a. Eelgrass
habitat in the estuary has disappeared from tidal rivers, Little Bay, and the Piscataqua,
and is in steep decline in Great Bay, Portsmouth Harbor, and Little Harbor. Dissolved
oxygen concentrations consistently fail to meet water quality standards in the tidal rivers.
Anadramous fish returns to the estuaries are limited by water quality, passage around
dams, and flooding. Oyster and clam populations remain depressed compared to historic
abundance. Toxic contaminants affect nearly one-quarter of the estuarine sediments and
concentrations of compounds associated with petroleum products are increasing in the
tissues of shellfish from the Piscataqua River. Bacteria concentrations are no longer
declining but water quality standards for swimming and shellfishing are not being met in
all areas. Increasing pollutant loads are clearly a problem (PREP 2009).
It also bears mentioning that increased nutrients in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region have been implicated in the increasing outbreaks of Alexandrium
fundyense, or red tide as well as increased beach and shellfish area closures (Jones 2011).
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In the U.S. the regulation of non-point source pollution is difficult because it
normally involves regulations impacting land use - a regulatory area usually reserved to
municipalities. Thus land use measures require municipalities that understand the
cumulative impact of their actions - and work together rather than compete with one
another to bring in additional businesses. As one federal regulator put it:

A: But the federal government's never going to get explicit with land use
regulation. The states are even leery of it. Connecticut is one state that,
the only state I think in the country that has ground water.. .all states have
surface water quality standards, Connecticut has ground water
standards.. .pretty advanced. They also have aquifer protection area
regulations that are in effect.. .land use regulations for areas that overlay
their drinking water aquifers.
Q: You're talking about where?
A: In Connecticut. It took them over ten years to get the regulations from
start to finish. So, there's a lot of resistance to that. And then you know
the story here in New England with home rule... what are those territories
in the North...
Q: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont
A: Every one of them acting pretty much independently of each other for
their own interests, and there's usually economic interests.. .bring in more
business and with it more people, and you just keep piling it on and
eventually there's nowhere else to develop, and I don't know what you do
then. (U.S. Federal Employee 1)
The ecosystem processes and properties in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
region are clearly trending away from the goals espoused by the agencies responsible for
regulating the human activities that impact the environment. Despite the gains of the in
the 1970s under Clean Water Act and CEPA, water quality in the region still suffers.
Coastal development and concomitant nutrient overloads are increasing and there is
really very little data on the proliferation of many of the modern emerging persistent
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organic pollutants. Overharvesting may have been slowed or even turned around for
some species, but overfishing continues and some long depleted fish stocks are showing
little sign of recovery. Further, the rapid introduction of invasive species in the Gulf of
Maine has "profoundly changed the structure and functioning of...coastal marine
communities" (Steneck 2001). To date at least 64 marine invasive species have been
documented in the Gulf of Maine (Pappal 2010). It may be that society will have to cross
their collective fingers and recognize marine invasions as the cbst of doing business in a
global market with related shipping and transportation vectors.
The final environmental trend that we will examine is the threat to the BoF/GoM
region posed by global climate change. The functioning of the Gulf of Maine, however,
and the ability to provide the services asked of it are jeopardized by the impacts of global
climate change. The Earth's climate has warmed by @ 0.6 degrees C over the past 100
years with two main periods of warming, between 1910 and 1945 and from 1976
onwards. The rate of warming during the latter period has been approximately double
that of the first and, thus, greater than at any other time during the last 1,000 years. There
has been a 10% decrease in snow cover and ice extent since the late 1960's (Walther, Post
et al. 2002).
Despite its topography, the Gulf of Maine is a connected westward extension of
the North Atlantic Ocean, and problems detected and foreseen for the North Atlantic have
relevance for the Gulf region. Signals of change due to climate change are being detected
in the waters of the North Atlantic. One of the impacts of climate change, for instance, is
that the water of the higher latitudes, including the North Atlantic, is freshening (the
impact has been detected at higher i.e. over 50° N and 60% S) or becoming less salty
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while salinity is increasing at lower latitudes. This is thought to be a sign that the Earth's
hydrologic cycle is changing (Curry, Dickson et al. 2003). Another factor that might
signal a decrease in salinity for the North Atlantic is the revelation that the volume of
fresh water discharged into the Arctic Ocean from rivers is also increasing (Peterson,
Holmes et al. 2002). When this is added to the additional fresh water likely to enter the
Gulf from melting ice via the Labrador Current and the increasing amounts of fresh water
likely to flow from the major river systems due to the escalating rate of moisture received
from the tropics via the hydrologic cycle it is clear that salinity changes are likely in the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine.
These trends could conceivably affect the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine marine
ecosystem at all trophic levels and spell more bad news for a commercial fishing industry
already reeling as a result of overfishing. Fish recruitment has been known to be a key
process strongly influenced by climate variability. In one example from the Bering Sea,
variations in atmospheric circulation, though interactions with ocean currents, influenced
transportation of juvenile Pollock away from adults, increasing the intensity of
cannibalism and, ultimately, year class strength (Walther, Post et al. 2002). It is
unknown what impact these changes will have on the ultimate abundance and distribution
of fish species in the Gulf of Maine, but it is disturbing to think of the magnitude of
change the may lie ahead. Fish are simply not that good at acclimation to new or even
gradual changes in temperature (Stillman 2003). To make matters worse, commercially
significant groundfish species in the Gulf of Maine, especially cod, have evolved to live a
long adult lifespan in order to buffer the impact of recruitment failures. Overfishing,
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however, has shortened the age structure of the population and rendered some groundfish
species vulnerable to the adverse effects of global change.
The news for other trophic levels is not good either. The direction and flow of
water into the Gulf of Maine is controlled to a significant degree by the location of the
North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). The position of the NAO determines whether inputs
into the Gulf come more from the cold, nutrient-poor Labrador Current or the richer,
warmer Scotian Shelf slope water. It now appears that human-introduced greenhouse
gases are influencing sea level pressure by increasing it over the subtropical North
Atlantic and decreasing it in the higher latitudes. This may lead to an upward trend in the
North Atlantic Oscillation index (Gillett, Zwiers et al. 2003). Such positive anomalies of
the NAO have modified marine primary and secondary production, meaning that the
availability of planktonic food for fish larvae may be diminished, resulting in reduced
recruitment (Walther, Post et al. 2002). Whether from NAO influence, or from
increasing intermediate flows of reduced nutrient-laden fresh water from increasing rates
of glacial melting, the phytoplankton assemblage is being altered (Balch, Drapeau et al.
2007; Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Changes at the bottom of the food chain cannot be
good for secondary and tertiary consumers. Other species important to New Englanders,
like blue fine tuna and striped bass, may change their migration patterns due to climateinduced changes in prey abundance.
Climate change is influencing the abundance and distribution of species. Whether
the influence has started in the Gulf is unknown. There is just too much "noise" because
of the overfishing issues that have taken the time and attention of marine scientists and
policy makers. The influences that might be anticipated include changes in the density of
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species as they shift their ranges either poleward or up in elevation (terrestrial or tidal) in
order to occupy areas suited to their metabolic temperature tolerances. In addition,
because many natural history traits are triggered by temperature-related cues, changes
could occur in the timing of events, such as breeding, migration, and seasonal
phytoplankton blooms. Changes in temperature can also lead to changes in species
morphology. Thus body size or even behavior may be affected (Root, Price et al. 2003).
Temperature, for example, was found to be the primary factor in the differences of
weight-at-age of cod sampled from 17 stocks across the North Atlantic (Brander 1995).
Extinction may be the ultimate price that some species pay for human-induced climate
change (Thomas, Cameron et al. 2004).
One other possible impact of global climate change is a change in the currents and
upwelling in the Gulf. Temperature (air and sea surface) and salinity changes could have
a negative impact in the physical movement and vertical mixing of water in the Gulf
region. The ecosystem dynamics of the Gulf depend greatly on the physical mixing
mechanisms that continually serve to bring nutrients up from deeper water to the
shallower water where light is available for photosynthesis. Some of these mixing
mechanisms are driven by the difference between the temperature of the water and the
air, e.g. winter convection, thermohaline circulation, etc. Others depend upon mixing of
fresh and salt water. If the air warms in the winter to a more moderate temperature it
could restrict coastal ocean circulation, vertical mixing and upwelling. The result would
be few nutrients delivered to the photic zone, with a concomitant reduction in primary
productivity and the cascading consequences that would follow through all trophic levels.
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It has also been suggested that climate change could impact the timing of the
spring phytoplankton blooms both inshore and on the Banks. Spawning success for many
commercially valuable species in the Gulf is thought to be linked to the delicate timing of
the seasonal phytoplankton blooms (Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Fish larvae need
available plankton on which to feed as they emerge and begin their lives. Warmer
climate conditions may cause phytoplankton to bloom earlier in the season. The
organisms that graze on these primary producers might develop at their normal seasonal
times, cued by the length of daylight that is thought to control their natural cycles. Such
a mismatch could lead to significant disruption for the Gulf of Maine ecosystem up and
down the trophic levels (Root, Price et al. 2003). The difference in timing between
phytoplankton blooms and the natural cycles of primary consumers could also change the
pattern, timing, and amount of the exchange of carbon dioxide. The mismatch could lead
to a higher fraction of organic carbon being recycled by bacteria and through
photooxidation, resulting in a greater fraction of photosynthetically-fixed carbon
returning to the atmosphere as carbon dioxide (North and Duce 2002).
Focusing on the near-coastal environment, the impact of climate change on the
coastal ecosystem could also be drastic. Things could be made worse if the offshore
component of the Gulf of Maine ecosystem begins to show sustained loss of function and
fishing and related harvesting effort moves inshore. Extinction risk is a real possibility
for those creatures that live in the tidal and estuarine areas of the coastal margin.
Although many terrestrial plants and animals and marine organisms might be able to shift
their ranges and distributions poleward, extinction risk might impact most heavily on
those species of fauna (chiefly ectotherms) and flora that form part of salt marsh and
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coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of Maine. Species adapted for this peculiar environment
simply may not be able to compensate for the rate of increase in temperature and salinity
changes.
These systems play a key role in the ecosystem by filtering out sedimentation and
run-off, serving as a buffer between land and sea, and as a productive habitat and nursery
for a broad spectrum of species. Seagrasses are a critical component of these ecosystems.
Short and Neckles (1999) have suggested that increased atmospheric temperature will
alter growth rates and other aspects of these species' physiology. Air temperature rise
could also increase disease in these systems (Dionne 2002).
Another threat to the coastal estuaries and salt marshes in the Gulf of Maine is the
rise in sea levels that results from temperature increase (Karl and Trenberth 2003). The
global average sea level rise is thought to be in the neighborhood of 1.2 mm/yr. While
salt marshes and tidal wetlands have managed to keep up with the gradual sea level rise
that has occurred over the last 3,000 years, they are reaching the limit of their ability to
accrete peat and thereby gain elevation at rates to match the modem rate of rising water
(Dionne 2002). Furthermore, intensification of the hydrologic cycle may increase
precipitation in the Gulf region (due to increasing evaporation at low latitudes and
redistribution to higher latitudes), leading to decreased salinity in estuarine regions and
salt marshes. Increased precipitation could lead to increased run-off and the possibility of
nutrient overload on these fragile coastal systems. If run-off causes an increase in
nitrogen in the system, for instance, algal blooms could develop and deny needed
sunlight to sea grasses and related organisms. An uptick in eutrophication would likely
result. This has definite implications for the continued productivity of these systems.
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In addition to the above, many coastal areas around the Gulf will be affected by
increased erosion, flooding, and sea water intrusion into fresh water systems (DPCCa
2001). Coastal communities are threatened. Significant ports in the region may have to
retreat. Those whose structures might be safe because of elevation may still be impacted
as the intrusion of salt water into fresh water aquifers will present particular problems for
the thousands of human residents around the coast who rely upon fresh water from wells,
municipal and private, that are located near the coast.
The situation in the coastal estuaries and salt marshes is exacerbated by the fact
that development of marsh-upland perimeters means there's no way for wetland species
to expand their range by migrating inland. We know that between 1780 and 1980 the
Northeast lost nearly 40% of its wetlands (USEPA, NOAA et al. 2001). Coastal species
confronting the increased stresses of temperature and salinity change have no place to go
- their migration increasingly blocked by coastal roads and shoreline development.
Unimpeded retreat, the best mechanism to replace inundated wetlands with the creation
of new ones inland, is rapidly becoming unavailable as an option (IPCCa 2001).
A great deal of time has been spent exploring the nature of the collaboration and
reliability of methods and data that are used to determine whether socioecological
variables are moving closer to, not away from, goals, Even more time has been spent
tracing trends toward or away from goals that can be described as good water quality,
healthy and diverse fish populations, and smart development. As we have seen,
ecosystem conditions are not trending toward the goals.
Given the magnitude of the threats to the BoF/GoM ecosystem it is important to
look at whether there is a positive trend toward the open and transparent communication
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of the progress and trends data to policy makers and to an informed public with
significant opportunities for community members to be involved with scientists in the
assessment of trends using local knowledge and local preferences. It would seem fairly
obvious that unless the public and policy makers are aware of the nature and extent of the
threats to the system there will be little public pressure or policy innovation to turn the
trends around.
We have already seen that there is no overarching accountable entity that has the
capacity to coordinate, evaluate, and act upon data. Further, there is no regular process
for reporting data to the public. While there is a web site for each agency, and for the
Gulf of Maine Council where interested parties who know where to look can find a great
deal of information related to the health of some components of the ecosystem, no
common, publicly accessible web site exists that could provide a forum for all data and
information for the watershed and/or an opportunity for comment and input. "A linked
network of the many existing and developing repositories is required to offer direct
searching capability and retrieval of information" (Wells 2010,13).
More and more information about the regional ecosystem has been forthcoming.
The Gulf of Maine Council, for instance, has been publishing the first ever "State of the
Gulf of Maine" report beginning in 2010. It appears that it is being written chapter-bychapter by authors selected by the GOMC. The information contained in the report is
generally well-documented and extremely helpful. There is no indication, however, that
the public was involved in any meaningful way in the preparation of this valuable report
(Thompson 2010). Further, there is no indication that the report is being used as an
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outreach tool to help form a base of an educated public. It is, at this point, available to
those who are interested.
Given the above, and despite the best intentions of the many hard-working
employees of governments and agencies, the jurisdictional fragmentation seriously
impairs the ability of governance in the BoF/GoM to provide an ecosystem-based version
of developing information related to overall trends or, when information is available,
getting that information out to the public or to communities in a manner that would be
consistent with the development of a public that is knowledgeable about the
environmental threats to the region.
Conditions, hi an ideal system, condition analysis should be part of an
iterative effort by scientists and community members to determine the causes or factors
influencing trends. Resources should be available to permit scientists and others to sort
out the various environmental signals and determine what conditions are factors in any
negative ecosystem trends. The inquiry, however, should not be limited to ecosystem
factors. Trends can be affected by the individual and institutional effects of economic
activity. Thus special interest activity that detracts from the common interests of resilient
ecosystems may give rise to conditions that need to be investigated and, if necessary,
abated (Table 43).
From the previous section describing the environmental trends in the region we
know that the CWA goal of restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the waters in the region is threatened by nutrient overloads along the coastal margin and,
to an unknown extent by industrial pollution and persistent organic pollutants to some
extent not clearly understood. We also know that the goal of a sustainable and resilient
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ecosystem is threatened by overfishing, shoreland development and related habitat
destruction, and by invasive species (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004). In order to put these
threats into context there is a need for at least a limited understanding of the current
conditions extant in the BoF/GoM. Thus, as we did in Chapter IV, this section will
begin with a description of the physical and biological characteristics of the region.
Table 43 Conditions
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Conditions analysis is iterative
with collaborative efforts by
scientists and community to gain
and share knowledge necessary to
determine the conditions that are
factors in any negative trends.
Conditions analysis explores more
than ecosystem factors and
examines social and economic
factors in order to understand
whether economic or other special
interests are overriding common
interests and the public good.
Collaboration between scientists,
regulators, and citizen participants
jointly work to identify causes and
conditions responsible for negative
trends.

The natural biological components
of the GoM/BoF ecosystem appear
to be weakening due to
anthropogenic factors. There
doesn't appear to be any
meaningful iterative conditions
analysis done through the
collaborative efforts of scientists
and community. Information about
conditions is generally published
by scientists in peer-reviewed
publications or used within their
respective agencies. Some articles
make it onto the GOMC web site.
There is no mechanism for
collaborations between scientists,
regulators, and citizens that would
enable them to jointly work to
identify causes and conditions
responsible for negative trends.

The Gulf of Maine is a semi-enclosed sea extending from Cape Cod to the Bay of
Fundy and southwestern Nova Scotia. It is bordered to the South and West by the United
States, to the North and Northeast by Canada, and to the East and Southeast by prominent
underwater Browns Bank and Georges Bank. Georges and Browns Banks effectively isolate
the Gulf from the open Northwest Atlantic Ocean, forming a semienclosed continental shelf sea
(Table 12). At depths greater than 100 m, the exchange of waters between the Gulf and the North
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Atlantic is confined to the deep (>300 m) Northeast Channel separating Georges Bank from
Browns Bank and the Nova Scotian Shelf (Hildebrand 2009).
As discussed in prior sections, strong tides combine with upwelling currents,
strong lunar tides, stable water temperatures and storm activity to create ocean circulation
patterns that constantly mix deep-water nutrients into the photosynthetic zone, resulting
I
in increased primary productivity (Jennings, et al. 2001).

Morphological
Features of the
Gulf of Maine and
Georges Bank
•Jordan Basin —J
•Georges Basm^J
•Wilkinson Basin,

Isolated from Open
North Atlantic by:

Browns Bank
Georges Bank —•"

Figure 12 Morpholgical Features of the Gulf of Maine. Used with Permission of David
Townsend.

Cold, relatively fresh water from the Labrador Current flows into the Gulf over
Browns Bank. Fresh water also flows into the bank from river systems around the Gulf.
Finally deeper, saltier Atlantic Slope Water seeps into the Gulf basin along the bottom of
the Northeast Channel (See Figure 13). The dense, cold, deep slope water tends to lay at
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Figure 13 Morphology Important to Water Mass Flows into and out of the Gulf of Maine.
Used with permission of David Townsend.

the bottom of the deep basins. Cold intermediate continental slope water lies between the
deep slope water and the warmer surface water in the summer and is the layer that is
generally loaded with nutrients (See Figure 14). On the surface, there are a variety of
currents that are active in the Gulf of Maine and the Bay of Fundy. The Eastern Maine
coastal current moves surface water south along the Maine coast. Above the deep basins
baroclinic currents move in a counter clockwise direction, while surface water over the
banks moves clockwise (Figure 15). The coastal current system in the Gulf of Maine is
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Figure 14 Cross-section of Gulf of Maine with typical summer water density fields (Used
with Permission of David Townsend)

likely the most important for the overall nutrient budget of the Gulf. Vertical nutrient
fluxes driven by tidal mixing in the northeastern Gulf, especially via the eastern Maine
coastal current, create an offshore plume feature of nutrient-rich water critical to species
composition and abundance of plankton in the offshore waters of the Gulf (Kitthananan

2006).
It is important to understand that at any moment the source of water surging into
the Gulf is dependent upon a variety of environmental factors, including the location of
the NAO, Gulf Stream and the amount of fresh water flowing out of the Gulf of St.
Lawrence (Hildebrand 2009).
It is the morphology and current movement that help make the waters of the Bay
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine well known for their productivity. Although it was discussed in
the preceding section, it bears repeating that productivity is dependent upon a variety of

364

other factors, including light and nutrients (Valiela 1995; Mann and Lazier 1996;
Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001; Apollonio 2002; Norse and Crowder 2005).

NOVA SCOTIA

Figure 15 Residual Surface Circulation (Used with permission of David Townsend)

Nutrients in this system come from a variety of sources. The five significant river
systems that empty into the Gulf collectively supply an estimated 100 million gallons of
»

fresh water and nutrients daily, lowering the salinity of the Gulfs waters. These
characteristics contribute to enormous amounts of primary producers fueling the bottom
of the food chain, leading to an abundance of life that drives the growth and development
of the food chain's tertiary consumers. The principal source of nutrients supporting this
production, however, has been generally thought to be the influx of nutrient-rich deep
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slope water from beyond the Gulf through the Northeast Channel (Townsend 1998;
Apollonio 2002). Once delivered to the Gulf, those nutrients are mixed into the surface
(photic) layers by way of various physical mechanisms including winter convection and
tidal mixing (Townsend 1998; Apollonio 2002; Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). As
Figure 15 demonstrates, the surface water currents can then deliver nutrients and other
constituents around the Gulf.
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Figure 16 Simplified Gulf of Maine trophic process (NOAA)

Thus the physical processes of the BoF/GoM set the stage for the biological
forces and living resources that comprise the ecosystem in the region. As depicted in
Figure 16, light energy from the sun is essential for photosynthesis necessary for primary
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production. But phytoplankton need more than photosynthesis, they need growth. For
growth you need nutrients. Nutrients like nitrogen and phosphate are needed to convert
the glucose to form a higher energy molecule, like ATP. Nutrients are therefore
necessary in order to have a high level of biomass that can fuel upper trophic levels
(Mann and Lazier 1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001).
There is, however, a conundrum in the marine ecological processes. Sunlight
comes down and its impact decreases with depth. Nutrients increase with depth.
Phytoplankton die near the surface in the photic zone after stripping the available
nutrients, then die and sink. At depth, bacteria work to restore nutrients from dead
phytoplankton. Hence there is a need for nutrients to get mixed back into the photic
zone. When sunlight and essential nutrients like phosphorus, nitrogen and silicates
combine with oxygen, water, and inorganic carbon, water-borne plants or phytoplankton
can survive.
Humans

Squid

Crabs

Shrimp |
Clams

Worms

Figure 17 Simplified Gulf of Maine food web (NOAA)
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Phytoplankton is consumed in the water by zooplankton. Energy is transferred to
the next level by organisms that feed on other animals (carnivores) or those that feed on
both plants and animals. As depicted in Figure 17, the food chain in the Gulf of Maine
supports adult cod as a keystone species with humans, pinnepeds, and birds also at the
top of the food chain (Mann and Lazier 1996; Jennings, Kaiser et al. 2001).
The above provides a basic overview of the physical and biological conditions
that make the BoF/GoM not only one of the most productive ecosystems in the world, but
also one of the most unique. These unique processes also create a situation that leaves
the ecosystem in the marine environment vulnerable to a variety of threats. The
BoF/GoM is a semi-isolated system. Disturbances in the form of overharvesting,
pollution, habitat destruction, nutrient overloads have impacts that do not simply get
"flushed away." Residence time for particles introduced into the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine are estimated to be around one year in the intermediate water layer, and 2 - 4
months in surface waters before exiting over Georges Bank (Personal Corres Townsend).
So pollution deposited in the basin from the land or the atmosphere does not
simply disappear. And the warning signs of degradation around the watershed have
resonated throughout the research for some time now (Hildebrand and Chircop 2010).
Perhaps Hildebrand, et al. (2002) describes it best:
The growth of human population and concomitant development in the
Gulf region have resulted in a series of stresses that impinge upon the
regional environment. Although limited data exist to fully assess the
trends in environmental quality in the Gulf of Maine, and this ecosystem
appears to remain healthy overall, the warning signs of degradation
throughout the Gulf are clear in the research results of the last two
decades. Tons of raw and partially treated sewage are discharged into the
Gulf each day, resulting in several hundred thousands of acres of
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productive shellfish habitat being closed to harvesting and serious loss of
livelihood. Industrial discharges, urban runoff, and agricultural practices
all introduce toxic contaminants and bacteria to marine and estuarine
waters on a chronic, sometimes acute basis, with the result that certain fish
and shellfish exhibit liver lesions, fin rot and other signs of environmental
stress. Health advisories have been issued in several nearshore regions of
the Gulf to protect the public from the hazards associated with swimming
in polluted waters and eating contaminated seafood. Increased fishing
effort has reduced fish stocks to all time lows and populations of some
commercially valuable fish species now depend upon an increasingly
limited number of year classes, and some may not be reproducing
themselves at all. Coastal habitat has been altered and destroyed by land
development ever since European settlement several centuries ago and
development in the coastal zone continues to encroach on environmentally
significant marine wetlands. The right whale, piping plover and other
species of wildlife are endangered or declining, and accidental spills of oil
and other toxic material place additional stresses upon the Gulf
environment (Hildebrand, Pebbles et al. 2002,424)

Unfortunately, with so much literature published decrying the threats posed to the
health and resilience of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, we still don't seem
to 'get it'. There is no need to revisit the disturbing trends described in the previous
section. There are indications, however, that current conditions and governance input
continue to pursue the failed policies of the past. In 2004, for instance, the Gulf of Maine
Council on the Marine Environment identified sewage, nutrients, and mercury as the
three contaminant problems of greatest concern to the region (Pesch and Wells 2004).
Sewage remains an issue and contributes to bacterial contamination, nutrient
loading, and, even with secondary treatment, chemicals that are endocrine disruptors,
persistent organics, and pharmaceuticals. Yet in New Brunswick's largest urban area,
Saint John, only 58% of the population's sewage is treated - the remainder discharged
raw into the Bay of Fundy. The systems of many smaller communities are in need
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upgrading. In Nova Scotia there are still towns that discharge untreated sewage. In the
U.S., most communities have at least secondary treatment. The exception is Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, which historically has had a waiver allowing them to discharge sewage
with only primary treatment (Thompson 2010).
Mercury is still likely the heavy metal of most concern because of its ubiquitous
presence in the regional ecosystem and its tendency to bioaccumulate. Mercury enters
the ecosystem largely through atmospheric deposition from combustion-related sources,
including utility and non-utility fuel combustion (Pesch and Wells 2004). Even if there is
limited information on the contaminant levels in the Gulf of Maine, other indicators exist
that tell us that there may be problems. One indicator is the number of current fish
consumption advisories in the United States due to bioaccumulative pollutants contained
in the fish we eat. New Hampshire has 9 current fish advisories, Maine 20 and
Massachusetts 122. The advisories apply to marine fishes as well as to fishes from all
lakes and streams in the region. The 2002 EPA advisories for five primary
bioaccumulative contaminants nationwide showed disturbing trends:

• Mercury = 2,140 advisories in 45 states active in 2002 (up 11% from 2001, up
138% from 1993)
• PCBs = 813 advisories active in 2002 in 38 states (up 6% from 2001, up 155%
from 1993)
• Chlordane = 97 advisories active in 2002 (down from 99 advisories in 2001)
• Dioxins = 74 advisories active in 2002 (down 2 from 2001)
• DDT and metabolites = 48 advisories active in 2002 (up 2 from 2001)
(EPA 2002)
The Gulf of Maine Council, or those who participate in the GOMC, has clearly
sounded alarms over the threats posed by sewage, nutrients, and mercury. There are
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additional threats posed by the overharvesting of marine resources that, for reasons
discussed before, are not able to be addressed by the GOMC. The latest data shows that
cod, a keystone species in the regional ecosystem, is overfished and that overfishing is
continuing. By law, when a stock is overfished and overfishing persists, there is an
obligation for the relevant regional fishery management council to take immediate action
(MSFCMA 1996). As we know from the discussion in the Trends section of this study,
the NMFS has determined that their population estimates from prior years were overly
optimistic and that cod populations are now at new lows. Quoting from the report:

• Currently, the Gulf of Maine cod stock appears to be at a very low
biomass, which will likely affect harvests of other groundfish stocks from
the nearshore Gulf of Maine.
• Management measures have not yet been formulated, but could include
reductions in other fishing opportunities, including recreational catches.
• NOAA is taking immediate and responsible steps now to work with
fishery leaders, scientists, and managers in the Northeast to make sure the
assessment results are understood and responded to as quickly and
effectively as possible
Preliminary Results
• Stock is overfished and overfishing is occurring
• Rebuilding by 2014 is not possible; under the best conditions it could get
there by around 2018 but under worst, it will be later than 2020.
• From 2007 onward, recruitment (the number of fish born each year) has
been below the long- term (1982-2010) average.
• There are few fish older than age 9, in a stock with potential lifespan of
roughly 20 years
• Fish weights-at-age in recent years are generally lower for older fish
(ages>5) than those in the early 2000-period.
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• Recreational catches (both landings and discards) have increased
substantially over the last 15 years. Over the past ten years recreational
catches have exceeded 30% of the total catch of Gulf of Maine cod.
• As stock abundance has decreased over time, the distribution of the stock
has contracted to a much smaller area compared to its distribution in the
1970s.
• Similarly, the fishery has also undergone a general contraction over the
past twenty years and is now operating primarily in the western Gulf of
Maine in the same area now occupied by the contracted stock. Because of
this contraction, catch per unit effort in the fishery has remained high,
despite a large decline in overall stock abundance. (NMFS 2011,1).
Thus the most recent data from NMFS tells us that their prior estimates of cod
populations were, frankly, wrong. Cod stock abundance is precariously low and the
distribution of cod has contracted into the western Gulf of Maine. Decades of
management by NMFS and the NEFMC have done this fishery few favors.
It should be clear by now that conditions in the BoF/GoM ecosystem are
threatened from a number of directions. But an examination of conditions must not be
limited to the natural physical and biological processes. We have discussed in these last
few sections some of the most significant physical and natural processes in the region,
their susceptibility to further deterioration, and presented some of the more relevant law
and policy that have attempted to control and alter the behavior of humans toward their
environment. It is important, however, to briefly examine the more general
socioeconomic situation extant in the Gulf.
We have discussed the contaminants and pollutants that infect the region. There
are also ample sources that can give a better history than I can about the boom and bust
nature of the fisheries in the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine. Numerous books and
articles detail the environmental tragedies and administrative incompetence that typify
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overfishing and the collapse of one stock after another (Harris 1999; Dobbs 2000See, e.g.
; Hanna, Blough et al. 2000). The fact remains that our regulatory system has still not
figured out how to deal with overcapacity - or too many boats chasing too few fish. It is
not surprising that the hands of our government regulators are tied not only with
jurisdictional limitations but their ability to reduce fleet size is hampered by political
pressure:

Q: Okay. Your goal is sustainability. What would have to change from a
governance standpoint to make this a manageable, achievable goal?
A: I think one of the hardest things for the Council and government to
deal with is the issue of capacity. It's very difficult, and with political
pressure, to say "okay, we have 1400 boats fishing and there's only room
for 400." There's a certain aspect of social engineering, a certain aspect of
designing how many permits each state gets, and this and that. The
Council knows it has to reduce capacity. There have been a number of
plans that have gone through in terms of buy-backs. The industry had a
buy-back program. The goal of the program, including the goal of the
Council, is to maintain the general diversity and make-up of the fleet. So
same percentages, same numbers of owner-operator boats, that's always
been the goal. Some people fish offshore for the day, some for a week.
You have inshore boats, draggers, gill netters, hook boats. Some boats
need 40 days, some need 80, some say they just want 10 days, that's all.
But none of them can have what they want. There's just not enough for all
these boats who just want ten days so that they can supplement their catch.
They just want 10 days. So capacity is just a huge issue. In fact, there's a
number of things we do that in my opinion we should be addressing
capacity first. Once you get it down to a manageable number then you
don't have all the pressure to be flexible and be easy on them. That's a
huge reason why tilings in the past didn't work very well, because we had
open capacity and the amount of pressure on the council, on the agency,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, on the politicians. The amount of
pressure from this huge group was just too much to put in there what was
needed. You've got to get the numbers down to manageable numbers by
matching the sustainable harvest with the capacity of the fleet to catch
them. (US Federal Employee 3)
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So our conditions analysis must include the very strong influence of special
interests and the politicians that promote them.
But enough about the fish; the region has a land-based side and those activities
should be examined if only briefly. The fact is that along with our abundant fish, the
forests of this watershed have been one of the true sources of wealth. Since the arrival of
Europeans settlers in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region pushed deep into the
material, clearing forests for farms and harnessing the power and energy of swift rivers to
mill old-growth timber. The first lumber boom began in earnest two centuries ago in the
heart of the region. Between 1840 - 1880 thousands of lumber schooners sailed to the
head tides of the Penobscot, the Merrimack, the Androscoggin, and many others to load
the logs that had been driven downstream from the far reaches of the watershed. Scores
of lumber mills ringed the basin producing clapboards, boards, and timbers. To facilitate
the transportation of logs the ecosystem was essentially "remodeled." Rivers were
straightened, splash dams installed, and ponds and lakes were raised, thus enhancing
spring water flows and rendering brooks drivable (Conkling 1995).
There were environmental impacts, of course, that persist to this day. Fish
spawning habitats were destroyed, dams blocked fish migration, and heavy
accumulations of bark and sawdust were left behind in the streams and estuaries or
flushed down rivers to settle in bays and estuaries. Together with sediment from lands
where trees had been cleared for lumber or farms caused coastal rivers, bays, and shallow
harbors to silt up. Spawning and nursery areas were destroyed. Trout and salmon
abandoned many of these streams or failed to reproduce (Pesch and Wells 2004).
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The exploitation of forests and land-based resources continued and took a variety
of forms. The industrial revolution began to drive the region in the 1790s. Shoe making,
clothing, wool and cotton textiles, tanneries, and ultimately pulp and paper were powered
first by water and then by steam. As small mercantile towns developed into mill towns,
dams were enlarged and more were built. Wood was needed to supply the heat to create
the steam. By 1920 the harvesting of Maine's remaining2 million acres of "virgin
forests" were being harvested at a rate 3.5 times faster than replacement. Chemicals,
dyes, and other pollutants were dumped into the rivers. These constituents, together with
raw sewage from growing mill towns flowed into the receiving waters of the Bay of
Fundy and Gulf of Maine. Electrification and better technology enabled mills to flourish
and there was seemingly no end to the chemicals and toxic effluent dumped into the
rivers and bay. Clear-cutting techniques scarred the landscape of the northern forest
(Conkling 1995; Pesch and Wells 2004; CoML 2012).
The conditions that stem from this serial exploitation show no signs of abating.
While federal and related state and provincial environmental laws and regulations
enacted in the 1970's have had an undeniable positive impact in the form of cleaner air,
lakes, and rivers, locally and regionally rapid population growth, coastal development,
and increasing user conflicts have degraded natural resources and led to declines in both
environmental integrity and general productivity (Ullsten 2003). Historic and on-going
human activities in and around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed and beyond
have led to increasing ecosystem alterations in a variety of forms due chiefly to
overextraction of marine organisms, invasions of nonindigenous (exotic) species,

375

chemical pollution, eutrophication, toxic phytoplankton blooms, alteration of physical
habitat, and the consequences of global climate change (Steneck 2001).
Thus the coastal areas that provide services necessary for human existence as well
as essential habitats for a significant portion of commercially valuable marine species are
reeling from the effects of habitat loss, pollution, and overfishing that have reduced
populations of coastal fish and other species to historically low levels of abundance and
diversity (VanderZwaag 1995; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000). Further, larger coastal
population leads invariably to larger sewage treatment facilities, expanded solid waste
landfills, increased recreational use, and other environmental pressures (Cicin-Sain and
Knecht 1998). Future conflicts will for sure include new challenges, like competition for
and threats posed by ports and increased shipping (Portland, Maine is the largest oil port
on the east coast, for instance), aquaculture, energy needs, including wind, tidal, LNG
exploration, transportation, and storage, and oil and gas exploration, not to mention
continued overharvesting and climate change (CoML 2012).
So for centuries exploitation, and frequently horribly excessive exploitation, of
the natural resources in the region have been allowed to continue seemingly unabated. Is
this simply another case where ".. .the same governments have always done only what
the public permitted, or pressured, them to do" (Dempsey 2004,4). So where is the
public - the residents of the region who are witnesses to the exploitation or are victimized
in some way by it?
The public, those who live and work and play around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine are, largely, absent. In the previous chapter it was stated that common or public
interests only prevail over special interests when the voice of the people collectively
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demand that the 'powers that be' rise in the face of pressure from single or special
interests to act for the public good. The silence of the public in this region confronted
with a legacy of ecosystem plundering is almost deafening. With respect to the damaging
logging practices of the 19th century described above, Conkling (1995) even seems a bit
stunned when he laments:

It is a striking fact that during the logging era almost no voices were raised
for retaining any areas of the coast, lakeshores, forests, or mountains in a
pristine condition. This was true as well in New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, where extensive forests remain in public ownership even today.
Most people of the nineteenth century would have found preservation of
virgin forests a strange and even antisocial notion. Progressive people of
the first half of the nineteenth century believed the forest was a useful but
temporary resource, which would be cleared to make way for farms. As a
result of this history, the Gulf of Maine watershed contains only tiny,
accidental remnants of forest in a primeval condition, the scarcity of which
makes it difficult to gauge the degree to which the biological diversity of
the region may have been compromised (Conkling 1995,179-80).
And today - where is the public? An ecosystem appears to be unraveling around
the basin and there is hardly a whisper of protest from those who are most affected.
Without an educated and active public movement, what chance is there to overcome the
pressures from single or special interests in order to act for the public good?
Recall that our model ecosystem-based approach requires conditions that are
iterative with collaborative efforts by scientists and community to gain and share
knowledge necessary to determine the conditions that are factors in any negative trends.
What we have seen is that collaboration is accomplished chiefly through the Gulf of
Maine Council on the Marine Environment. While that forum is apparently a valuable
tool for discussion and interaction between agency heads from both Canada and the U.S.,
it does not appear to impact the decision-making of any of the participating agencies. In
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a discussion of the data generated by Gulfwatch, a GOMC backed project that funds the
collection and analysis of mussel tissue collected from around the BoF/GoM. It is
generally considered a "signature" activity by the Council. But do the results have any
impact on decision-making within the agencies that participate in the Council?

It's a good thing to do together, and we know that knowing the levels of
contaminants in sentinal species is a good thing that will inform decision
making. Okay, we've been doing it for all of these years, we have great
data, we know what the trends are, but we haven't yet gone that next step
to say, okay, how significant? And what do I and others have to do about
it. So, that's our next step and I think sometimes in the Gulf of Maine, we
do things because we know that we've agreed that they're the right thing
and we have shared interest, but either we haven't gotten to it yet, or we
haven't had the mindset to make the link into decision-making. Because, I
can't, frankly, John, point to anything, quite frankly, that information
generated through the Gulf of Maine process that's changed decision
making. Maybe that's unfair to say not anything. I know that actually
Gulfwatch data, I think, in New Hampshire is being used for shellfish
harvesting area. So, there are some examples, I just don't have the
information to know all of that. But, overall, if we think of Gulfwatch and
all the data that we've generated and so on these various analytes and
contaminants, okay, how significant is it, and do we have to do anything?
I don't know. (Canadian Federal Employee 2).
There is no doubt that the Gulf of Maine Council provides an excellent forum for
discussion, but does it represent a true collaboration? Do its activities result in decisions
that are implemented through its members? It appears that this is not the case - certainly
not because the individuals who are part of the Council aren't trying. I have observed
them in action repeatedly over the years. They are, simply, jurisdictionally bound and are
unable to go outside the interests and mandate of their respective agencies. As a result,
true collaboration is not possible.
I think, John, it's hard for the council to be in this decision making,
dictating, leading role when everything is so disparate from jurisdiction to
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jurisdiction. The Gulf is not managed as a gulf. Not everybody is using
the same standards for water quality, for health of the ecosystem, for
what's a functioning estuary, to you name it. There isn't a standard there,
and I think until you have an agreement on what is acceptable, it's very
difficult to have a decision-making process that manages a whole system
like that that spreads across three states and two provinces. (US NGO 4)
And what if there is a problem detected by members of the Gulf of Maine Council
that is negatively impacting the health and resilience of the Gulf. Will the GOMC act?

Q: Okay, let's assume that there's a suite of indicators and that there's a
problem that's been detected, be it contaminants in St. John or
contaminants in Portland, and it's brought before the council by a
member.
A: You mean by someone outside of New Brunswick, for instance?
Q: What in reality can happen?
A: Decision-making wise, getting back to your original theme on this,
honestly, I don't think anything is going to happen. I think it will be an
informal kind of thing where it will be brought to the council's attention,
and the New Brunswick person sitting at the table is probably already
aware of it, and if they aren't they sure will be after that particular council
discussion, but I don't think the council is going to do anything itself with
it. I think the council is leading, or participating in the process so that it
can give that information to those jurisdictions. I don't think it's going to
become a Gulf-wide regulatory system. I think that if there's even a
breath of that intent it would kill ESIP. I think it's just providing objective
information about what's healthy and what's not. And if New Brunswick,
for instance, if St. John Harbor isn't meeting that particular measure or
standard, then I guess it's still is going to ultimately fall on New
Brunswick as to what they're going to do with it. (US NGO 4)
Thus our examination of the natural physical and biological conditions extant in
the region tends to indicate that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem is under
stress from a variety of sources. Overfishing, chemical pollution, nutrient overloads,
shoreland development, habitat destruction, and climate change are all actors in a
scenario that can only serve to weaken the resiliency of the ecosystem. Further, the
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socioeconomic conditions that we have looked at seem to indicate that there is no one
body that has the ability to accumulate data pertinent to these various threats and act to
counter the trends. The only entity that provides a forum for discussion among the
various responsible government agencies on both sides of the border is locked into a
pattern that limits their collaborative efforts mostly to talk, not necessarily action.
In the governance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the Gulf of Maine Council
could conceivably act as the lead or overarching institution with the ability to guide the
adaptation of government responsibilities in the region. Although many members
indicate that it is not the role that the GOMC was created to play, it has played a similar
role in the past. There have been times when members of the Gulf of Maine Council
would challenge each other to do a better job with their environmental management
functions:
I mean the goals that we've set are pretty ambitious. We do some stuff.
We do a lot of stuff. But, I think in terms of our mandate as one of those
agencies around the table, who's not a signatory, by the way, they are fully
signatory in spirit, we should go back within EC and say, look, coastal
habitat in the Gulf of Maine is a real priority, it's shared by lots of others,
what we're doing now is contributing toward it, but we've got to double
up our investment of money and people and designating more protected
areas, etc. For little brief periods in the Council's history, we had that
kind of challenge function, and where councilors would come to the table
and say, we agreed we were going to do more on coastal habitat, so, rep
from New Hampshire, what have you done? Uh.. .we only have twenty
miles of coastline, so go away. But, I think that's what's really missing
and I think we need to get back at, because it's gotten too nice.. .The fact
is that we all recognize that we need to all work together to achieve our
own selfish objectives and those shared goals, but I think we do need to go
more aggressively at upping the ante. It's only moral persuasion and/or
embarrassment. There's definitely a role for that, but I don't want to
necessarily embarrass the Minister of Environment from Nova Scotia, but
I want him or her to be challenged to come to the table and say, looking at
those goals and objectives, Nova Scotia is going to put in a stronger
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sewage management system. We commit to that, investing in it...
(Canadian Federal Employee 2) (Emphasis added)
As we have seen, however, the overall feeling of the members of the GOMC is
that its role is as a forum. There is simply no initiative to play a larger role. Of course,
without participation by fishery management it is still questionable whether the Council
could play an effective role as an overarching institutional entity.
The conditions examination has also failed to turn up any significant involvement
with the public or with communities in order to educate them about the potential threats
to the ecosystem. There doesn't appear to be any mechanism to overcome the influence
of special interests that seek to use the natural resources of the region for their private
gain. All in all, then, it is fair to conclude that the overall conditions in the BoF/GoM are
not consistent with the ecosystem-based approach ideal.
Are these conditions likely to be turned around? Is there hope that a new regime
can develop that can counter the negative environmental trends and provide a mechanism
for the public good to take precedence over special interests? This will be examined in
the nest section.
Projecting Developments. In our ideal system, reliable knowledge must underpin
the projection of developments. If trends and conditions are such that projected
developments appear to take a community away from its goals, away from progress
toward human dignity, and toward a weakened, less resilient ecosystem, there needs to be
a system that will reward those who bring these issues to the attention of policy makers.
There also must be a way for policy makers to make adaptive changes in an attempt to
reverse negative trends without fear of retribution from a system more concerned with
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power and wealth than long-term environmental viability. Strong public and community
participation is a requirement for reliable assessment and projection of developments
(Table 44).
Table 44 Projecting Developments
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Through regular public
education and outreach, an
involved public collaborates
with academic institutions,
scientists, and policy makers to
understand reliable data and
project developments.

With the input of
knowledgeable public, scientists
and policy makers can
acknowledge mistakes or policy
failures, learn from them, and
make adaptive changes, to
reverse negative trends without
fear of retribution from the
governance system.

Public education rare and
outreach even more rare. Other
than the fisheries, where fishers
play active role in development
of FMP's, there is little in the
way of public collaboration with
scientists and policy makers to
understand data and project
developments.
There is no pool of
knowledgeable public due to
lack of basin-wide or even
community outreach. Adaptive
change occurs only after long
periods of research of
departments and experts. Fear
of retribution from public
(especially fishers) or from
political sources for failed
policy is not uncommon.

In Chapter III we learned that projecting developments requires regular public
education and outreach, meaning that an involved public collaborates with academic
institutions, scientists, and policy makers to understand reliable data and project
developments. We have thus far examined the physical and natural conditions that drive
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region and described the apparent threats to the
resilience of the natural processes that combine to furnish the region with valuable goods
and services. The trends, we have seen, appear to be trending away from the goals of the
various agencies that control activities from sector to sector. Yet in the previous sections
of this chapter this study we have failed to turn up any significant consistent involvement
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with the public or with communities in order to educate them about the potential threats
to the ecosystem. There is always the danger, however, that government agencies will
insist that they are in control - that they have the expertise and resources to reverse the
trends.
An exchange highlighted by Brunner and Lynch (2010) as part of a discussion
about the need to move away from scientific management toward a more adaptive and
community-assisted governance regime, might prove helpful. Their example centers on a
debate about climate change that took place more than 20 years ago. As they describe it,
the exchange began with an editorial Introduction that was written for a September, 1989,
single-topic issue of Scientific American entitled "Managing Planet Earth." The
Introduction acknowledged that "changes in individual behavior are surely necessary but
are not sufficient" responses to climate change. The Introduction went on to emphasize
the need to expand the issue:

It is as a global species that we are transforming the planet. It is only as a
global species - pooling our knowledge, coordinating our actions and
sharing what the planet has to offer - that we have any prospect for
managing the planet's transformation along pathways of sustainable
development. Self-conscious, intelligent management of the.earth is one
of the great challenges facing humanity as it approaches the 21st century.
(Brunner and Lynch 2010b, 13)
Hendrik Tennekes, the Director of Research for the Royal Netherlands
Meteorological Institute picked up on the liberal use of the term 'management', and all
that it means to the status quo, and also took a shot at EPA's newly launched program
"Stabilize the Climate System" in a letter published in Weather in 1990:

383

I am terrified by the hubris, the conceit, the arrogance implied by words
like these.. .Who are we to claim that we can manage the planet? We
can't even manage ourselves. Who are we to claim we can run the
planetary ecosystem? In an ecosystem no one is boss, virtually by
definition. Why are we, with our magnificent brains, so easily seduced by
technocratic totalitarianism? (Brunner and Lynch 2010b, 13)
This exchange highlights the message of Chapter III that there is seeming
consensus that the way we are managing the human activities that impact the ecosystem
is not working. We have discussed Dryzek's explanation that there may simply be too
much on the government's agenda - that it no longer has the support, resources, or
expertise necessary to take on the more complex problems created with population
explosion, global trade, and increasing resource exploitation pressures. This is the
"implementation deficit" that saddles government agencies with more work as problems
increase and responsibilities expand - all with shrinking economic support (Dryzek
1997). With limited public outreach and education, and no overarching and accountable
entity working with scientists, managers, educators, communities, and the public to teach
them about the threats and learn from the perspectives of all participants, the chances of
overcoming the influence of special interests that seek to use the natural resources of the
region for their private gain.
Chapter III, and to some extent Chapter IV, attempt to explain why strong public
participation needs more than just lip service. It is in fact an imperative that:
.. .abounds with allusions to democratic ideals and principles and the good
things assumed to result from stakeholder exercise. Implicit throughout is
the notion that broad public involvement is the principal route to improved
decision making, especially where the risks are controversial and disputed.
Outcomes to be expected, it is claimed, include increased trust in experts
and decision makers, greater consensus among publics and between
science and politics, reductions in conflict and controversy, greater
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acceptance of preferred solutions, and increased ease in implementation
(Hildebrand 2009,31).
Given the degradation of the natural environment in the BoF/GoM, and the threats
that peck away at it from many directions, our exercise in projecting developments is
primarily a search for the development of improved governance process. Governing is not
necessarily the exclusive preserve of government; to govern means to influence, shape, regulate,
or determine outcomes, and in this sense there are many other agencies and institutions that are
involved in governing a social order (Kitthananan 2006).
For purposes of this study, developments in governance must begin to trend toward
the goals espoused in the ideal ecosystem-based governance model. More citizen
involvement, public participation, and more collaboration involving scientists, policy
makers, academic institutions, and the public is a possible way to permit governance to
act and for the public to understand the importance of action. It is a device for decision
making to trend more toward the public interest. Again, any trend toward greater
community involvement should not be a threat to traditional governance. The role of
government simply must begin to shift. It doesn't need to disappear or shrink. A
reshuffling of government tasks and a greater awareness of the need to cooperate with
other societal actors does not render traditional government interventions obsolete.
It merely implies a growing awareness, not only of the limitations of traditional public
command-and-control as a governing mechanism, but also as responses to societal
problems which require broader sets of approaches and instruments (Kooiman 2003;
Hildebrand 2009).
There are meaningful collaborative efforts that either exist or at least have been
attempted around the region that have included some combination of scientists,
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regulators, citizens, and, at times, industry. They should not be discounted. I will
discuss some examples of developments from which we can learn.
One organization that promotes collaboration is, of course, the Gulf of Maine
Council on the Marine Environment. We have discussed the work of this group
previously and will return to it again in future sections so there will be no further
discussion of the GOMC in this section.
Another group that provides a forum for collaboration and cooperation in the
region is the Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership. Its mission is two-fold:
.

Promoting the ecological integrity, vitality, biodiversity and productivity of the
Bay of Fundy ecosystem, in support of the social well-being and economic
sustainability of its coastal communities

• Facilitating and enhancing communication and co-operation among all citizens
interested in understanding, sustainably using and conserving the resources,
habitats and ecological processes of the Bay of Fundy (BoFEP 2011).
While much of the proceedings of BoFEP centers on the Bay of Fundy - the 270
kilometre (167 mile) northern extension of the Gulf of Maine, its influence spreads
throughout the BoF/GoM region. Membership in BoFEP is open to ".. .all interested
citizens who share the general Vision, including community groups, resource harvesters,
scientists, resource managers, coastal zone planners, businesses, government agencies,
industries, shipping interests and academic institutions" (BoFEP 2011) (Figure 18).
The Vision of BoFEP is both comprehensive and inclusive:
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• Conservation, protection and management of Bay of Fundy resources and their
habitats should be ecosystem-based and reflect an holistic understanding of
ecosystem structure, processes and interactions.
• Resource development and other coastal zone activities should be based on
ecologically sound integrated coastal planning and management.
• Coastal planning and management should be transparent and open to participation
by resource users, coastal communities, industries, scientists, governments,
managers and all other individuals and groups with interests in the Bay of Fundy
ecosystem.
•

Effective communication and active co-operation among all citizens with an
interest in the Bay of Fundy, and linkages with groups and programs that share
similar objectives are vital to this enterprise.
BoFEP also sponsors a biannual Science Proceedings that is generally well-

attended by scientists, regulators, watershed groups, and other interested parties from
around the BoF/GoM region. I have attended two of these multi-day forums and was
impressed by the diversity of the participants. Presentations were by scientists,
regulators, and even watershed group representatives. Discussion was promoted. BoFEP
also frequently hosts Citizens' Forums with "learning circles" designed to inform diverse
groups that include community and other organizations about topics important to the Bay
of Fundy ecosystem and publishes an e-magazine called the "Fundy Tidings" as a tool to
inform the community (BoFEP 2011).
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Tha Structure of BoFEP
A "Virtual Institute"
Figure 18 The BoFEP Structure (BoFEP 2011)

BoFEP also partners with DFO and others to promote citizens' groups and
watershed organizations around the Bay of Fundy. One example is the Minas Basin
Working Group which, as we can see below, has had success and struggles, as related by
an individual involved with its formation and operations:
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A: So that's a working group of BOFEP, which is the Bay of Fundy
Ecosystem Partnership. Basically, that group the Minas Basin working
group was formed around 1998, and the ultimate goal of the group has
changed over the years, and it's now to develop integrated management
plans for the Minas Basin watershed.. .It's a collaboration of industry to
some extent, primarily government and academia, some citizens, and non
government organizations.
Q: And by industry are we chiefly talking fishing?
A: We've been trying, they've been trying to get industry at the table, and
some of it's aquaculture, but for obvious reasons it's difficult to get them
at meetings, etc.
Q: What about any attempts at pulp and paper, forestry?
A: No. Nothing directly land-based. No.
Q: And the goal of BOFEP would be?
A: The goal? It would be increased communication, increased
effectiveness of work with the goal of more comprehensive management
in marine resources. And it's well recognized that land use and land
activity is a big part of that. Even if you go to the website and not see a lot
of land-based references, people at the table are aware that it's a big
issue.. ..Shoreline development is really not an issue, and it's...
Q: By agriculture you're talking about erosion, chemical runoff...
A: Yeah, runoff. There are other types of agriculture. Blueberries for
example rely a ton on chemicals.
Q: The actors that participate in those activities, do they show up at the
table?
A: Nope, they don't. The Minas Basin is primarily, it's touted as being a
community group, or community-working group, but it's really not. It's a
bunch of government people. There are a couple of citizens that come
occasionally, but it's primarily government and academic people at the
table. ... I guess it's been a really long process. A couple of years ago we
had community workshops and we had four community workshops all
around the Minas Basin to identify what the major issues are. If you want
I can give you a report. And so from there the idea was that we were
going to develop action plans and get the community involved. We asked
for volunteers who would be willing to work on this issue with others in
the area, and we had hoped to develop action plans for all these issues,
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such as water quality came out number one, agriculture came out number
two, and then forestry came out I think number three. But we didn't get
funding for a full-time coordinator, so it's really a resource deficiency
problem. Right now we have lots of things we could do, and lots of
direction from the community directly to where they want to see change
happen, and it's primarily land use and land-based activities. But, there's
just no money there now for a coordinator.
It's interesting, actually. I mean, we've gone really far, but we lost the
momentum, and now people are starting to go "...oh why bother because
they don't do anything" because we didn't get to take that next step. It's
unfortunate. We do have a lot of good background information. We have
the socioeconomic overview of the area. We have the community
workshop reports, and we have a draft ecosystem overview. The material
is there, but there's no crisis, so there's no funding. Primarily, Gulf of
Maine/Bay of Fundy funding will go toward Gulf of Maine broader issues,
making of the counsel, and all that stuff. (Canadian Federal Employee 3)

So the Minas Basin group appears, at least as of this 2007 interview, to be
struggling chiefly because of lack of funding. The point may be that people are at least
trying, government/citizen partnerships are being tested and, if there are failures, lessons
should be learned.
The region is certainly not without successful efforts at community partnerships.
There are at least two examples of community governance initiatives that are impressive.
The Saltwater Network is one such example. Saltwater Network was created in 2001 to
enable and support community-based management and conservation for the health of our
communities and the resources of the Gulf of Maine.
Since the Saltwater Network was created it has helped support two marine support
centers and started four other centers. Their goals include: support for capacity-building,
working with existing and new civil institutions involved in community capacitybuilding, helping groups and individuals to access learning opportunities that support
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community-based management, provide opportunities for diverse groups and
communities around the Gulf of Maine to meet, in order to share their knowledge, skills
and awareness about community-based management (Saltwater Network). Indeed, the
principles articulated by the group reflect a strong bias toward an ecosystem- and
community-based approach to governance and public participation (Figure 19).
Saltwater Network Principles
The principles provide fundamental guidance to all operations of Saltwater Network. This includes its
governance and all actions of the core part of the organization. It is not binding on members except in
those aspects of their activities that involve participation in the network.
The principles illuminate one another and should be considered as a whole.
1.

The Saltwater Network recognizes that the health of our communities, our economies, and the
environment are inextricably linked.
2. The Saltwater Network works to achieve health and quality of community and resources for
many generations into the future.
3. The Saltwater Network recognizes, respects, and encourages diversity of people, perspectives,
and approaches.
4. The Saltwater Network works to resolve opposing interests and opinions in a creative,
cooperative and constructive manner, and to achieve results through dialogue.
5. The Saltwater Network enables its participants to share knowledge, skills and awareness.
6. The Saltwater Network protects privacy and confidentiality of personal information, sensitive
geographic information, or information that materially diminishes competitive position.
7. In all the Saltwater Network's activities, collaboration and negotiation will be used in order for
authority to be vested in, functions performed at, and resources used by the smallest or most
local part that includes all relevant and affected parties.
8. The Saltwater Network values the work involved in community capacity-building by providing
funding that matches the organizational capacity, preparedness required for the proposed work,
and by drawing on the knowledge and skills within the network whenever possible.
9. The Saltwater Network gives high value and priority to people's unique historical attachment to
resources, places and communities.
10. The Saltwater Network recognizes citizen participation as an inherent and necessary good, not
merely a means to an end.
11. The Saltwater Network promotes, supports and facilitates collaborations among diverse
organizations and institutions, based on mutual respect and clearly articulated principles,
practices, and outcomes worked out between all involved parties.
12. The Saltwater Network implements responsive and accountable processes in all its activities
including fundraising, grantmaking and fund development.
(Saltwater Network)

Figure 19 Saltwater Network Principles
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How did the Saltwater Network get started? What role does it play? How did it
spread from the Canadian side of the Bay of Fundy to downeast Maine communities?
One of those involved in the founding of the network spoke to me about the Network,
and its evolution:
A: It's like a community based civil institution. It's not a government
thing. It wasn't set up like...it's never really been supportive in this
operation.. .the government. We rent offices for the GIS center. We
actually sell maps to DFO now. We do contract work for the government.
More or less sustainable with a good deal of support from private
foundations. So, that's going along. And while we're doing that, we find
out there's another center across the Bay at Eastport that's very similar.
At the same time we're starting to talk to people...And they came
up.. .their grand opening was the same day as ours, by chance. We started
doing this and people came up from Stonington, and people from NAMA,
people going back and forth.. .the fishermen's forum, and all that. We
started to say, we're getting a lot out of this stuff. This is a really
interesting approach. That's when we started talking about actually trying
to support that kind of work.. .community based management, and support
peer learning. We started with some support again from Campbell to talk
about some kind of bioregional community foundation. Everyone we
talked to said don't just send checks out. This should be something people
are engaged in and supports capacity ability and convening and education.
So, we started Salt Water Network.. .there's a brochure there.. .and that
essentially supports community based management around the Gulf of
Maine through grant making, convening, learning opportunities, and some
peer.. .(Canadian NGO 1).
So given the principles of the Saltwater Network, combined with the Marine
Resource Centers supported by the Network, there appears to be at least one meaningful
community participation effort in existence in the BoF/GoM watershed. There are others
that should be noted.
The Atlantic Coastal Action Program (ACAP) is another example of a successful
community-based government effort is the. ACAP is a model of community-based
ecosystem governance. Began in 1991, Environment Canada initiated ACAP as a way to
392

empower local communities to take the lead and address their environmental and coastal
restoration challenges. Seed money was given the community organizations sufficient to
provide them with core funding for their work. Beginning in 1998, though continuing to
provide some funding, the groups were conducting education and outreach, establishing
key partnerships, and working with busy, industry, and the government collaboratively in
scientific work as well as direct community action. The work resulted in substantial
improvements in water quality, reduction in toxic substances, habitat restoration, and
climate change adaptation measures. There are at least 14 ACAP organizations now in
communities throughout Atlantic Canada working toward a collective goal of
"developing capacity to take responsibility for their own futures"(Gardner_Pinfold 2002,
0There are economic implications to the success of ACAP as well. In 2002 it was
determined that the services delivered by the ACAP groups resulted in a cost savings in
excess of $65 million over the period (GardnerPinfold 2002). A later study, again
examining the cost to Environment Canada of its annual contributions to the ACAP
programs and comparing those costs with the value of the services provided by the ACAP
groups for the six-year period between 2001/02 to 2006/07. This second study
demonstrated that the 14 ACAP groups had cost Environment Canada 7.0 million dollars
over the period and that the value received by EC through the activities of the ACAP
organizations was assessed at $79 million - a net gain of over $70 million
(GardnerPinfold 2008).
Another benefit of community-based groups like ACAP is that they can help to
bridge jurisdictional gaps between federal, provincial/state, and local governments:
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Municipalities have the responsibility for land use planning.
Unincorporated areas are usually the responsibility of the province. It
varies from Nova Scotia to New Brunswick. Again it sort of broadens our
outlook. We all try to influence each other, I guess, with our various
instruments, so through our Atlantic Coastal Action Program, ACAP,
where we're enabling these community-based organizations, they are
pretty effective in terms of working together. They have municipalities as
part of their structure, so they work in terms of, "okay, we know that a
lack of sewage treatment or adequate sewage treatment is a real issue let's
make sure that we do the science, that we do the public understanding, we
build the case for getting sewage treatment." And this is still a real issue
here where we have a lot of our major municipalities, and a lot of minor
ones, with no sewage treatment. (Canadian Federal Employee 2).
There are other examples of public and community involvement around the Bay
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, but the Saltwater Network and ACAP stand out by virtue of the
scope of their success. These initiatives, however, started in the 1980s or early 1990s are not new. They certainly cannot be said to represent any growing trend toward
increased public participation.
We have seen that recent legislation in Canada under its Oceans Act, Plan, and
Strategy, call for increased collaboration, public participation, and citizen involvement
(1996; 1999). The same emphasis on integration, collaboration, and public participation
is called for under the new Ocean Policy in the U.S. (USCOP 2004; 2010). The
momentum set by the Canadian government toward integrated coastal management has
seemingly flagged (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011). And, in reality, how much difference
did the language of the Oceans Act make to the development of the Saltwater Network:
Q: Along comes the 1996 Oceans Act, which tends to put into statutory
form in Canada a lot of the ecosystem-based principles that you have
already been working with, basically. What change has it made in your
ability to carry on or accomplish any of the functions that you're working
on?
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A: Well, I think.. .1 don't want tp be negative here.. .1 think the positive
thing of it is that it was there, and so when we started the marine resource
center, I wouldn't say...there may have been other people doing this
work.. .I'm relatively new to it compared to others...1 would say that
knowing it was there, when we started the marine resource center for
example, we said, well at least we're going the same way our federal
government is going. At some point they'll turn around and support what
we're doing, because we're doing what they're talking about. We're
bringing everybody together, we're looking at integrated management.
Q: Here we are we're actually doing it?
A: We're doing the stuff, so at some point they'll turn to us and say let's
partner in this. That was.. .you know it never happened ... the partnering
thing never happened, but the fact that it was there probably was an
incentive to that kind of community-based civil society. Quite a bit has
happened. So, I suppose in an odd way it's been a kind of an incentive
just having those words on paper. The fact that you could say here is an
act of parliament, you know? It was passed years ago that says this stuff is
real.. .not only is it real, it's the law of the land, although we know the
regs were never written and that there was no policy around it or anything,
but still it does have weight. But, the actual substance of a commitment to
this work hasn't made any difference to our work. We're on our own up
here. I mean we're getting funded by Boston foundations to do work that
is described in the Ocean's Act. Or Montreal foundations, or whatever,
it's not all...and that's fine. We just went ahead and said okay we'll just
go ahead, and when the time comes, we know we're going to have to
engage with the federal government. And so we sort of said well, we'll
just keep building, and at some point they'll sit down with us and say okay
let's build this together. But, in the meantime, there's just been no
substantial communication... (Canadian NGO 1)
What is clear from the experience of our two community-driven examples is that
meaningful public participation and integrated community governance at a local or
regional level is possible with determined public involvement and the assistance of
funding. Environment Canada saw the possibilities in its partial funding of ACAP - and
reaped the rewards. For the Saltwater Network, more toward the marine side of the
land/water interface, funding or other support has been difficult to obtain through
government or agency sources, but help has come through private foundations and other
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non-governmental sources. Regardless of the source, with financial assistance there can
be meaningful public participation as part of an ecosystem-based governance regime.
The experience of Saltwater Network and ACAP as community-based groups
whose efforts were devoted to public education, outreach, and integrated community
management may indicate a developing positive trend. They also, including Minas
Basin, raise questions about the willingness or ability of government agencies, or those
entities dependent upon government agency funding to fund true citizen participation
initiatives.
We have now viewed a lot of information that should put the governance situation
in the BoF/GoM region into some context. We now to turn to the next and last section of
Problem Orientation: the task of Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives.
Inventing. Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives. As we learned in Chapter III,
and again in Chapter IV, this component is the essential real-world method for the
implementation of adaptive governance. Governance, and the ability to invent, evaluate,
and select alternatives, must be adaptive (Regier and Baskerville 1986; Francis and
Regier 1995; Straussfogel and Becker 1996; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Kjasr 2004;
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Whiteside 2006; Armitage, Berkes et al.
2007; Steelman 2010; Brunner 2010a; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are
treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating,
expanding successful interventions and terminating failed policies instead of expertdriven planning that relies primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and
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error (Francis 1993; Costanza, Low et al. 2001; Gunderson 2003; Brunner, Steelman et
al. 2005; Fiorino 2006; Steelman 2010).
The characteristics inherent in this broad function are scattered throughout and
nested within the components of the framework. Rather than risk excessive redundancy
by setting forth the basics of adaptive management in a separate table, we will, as in
Chapter IV, move on to the Social and Decision processes where the broad public
participation, rapid feedback, reliable intelligence, transparent promotion, and appropriate
value trade-offs capable of creating a process capable of coping with multiple, complex
systems may be found.
Social Process
In this section the social process extant in the BoF/GoM region is explored. This
chapter is rather front-end loaded and much of the story has been set forth in the Problem
Orientation section. I will make every effort to avoid unnecessary repetition of issues
and items that have been set forth above. I should reiterate that this study is an attempt
by one person to sketch a high altitude view of the social participants in the governance
process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine.
It is again important to be reminded that in the social process we must be
cognizant that every participant in the use of resource services and every player with a
potential say in the governance of the human activities that impact the ecosystem
employs strategies in order to pursue particular values and/or outcomes. People tend to
improve their well-being by acting in ways that they perceive will leave them better off
than if they had acted otherwise and therefore engage in an interplay of human value
trade-offs. Generally no amount of "cold, hard facts" collected by "neutral objective"
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scientists, no amount of "education," or "transparency" can completely neutralize basic
inherent value differences or perceptions among people. Certainly, however, this
realization should not take away from the fact that there are common interests and the
need to attempt to clarify and secure them (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Clark 2002). To the degree possible we will now turn to an examination of the
participants in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime.
Participants. As a reminder of the participant characteristics in ideal ecosystem
management regime, discussed in Chapter III, there is an expectation or at least the
opportunity for meaningful participation and input of a broad segment of the regulated
population in decision making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and
Maclean 2003). Significant, meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993;
Francis 1993; Francis and Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson
2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Participation must be open to
almost any person or group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjasr
2004; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
Regulatory agencies must participate in coordinated and integrated fashion and
allow softer local and regional input into governance (Regier and Baskerville 1986;
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Citizen involvement
and partnership designed to build "civic science" is needed, not public information
programs to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). Better governance and
enhanced accountability can come through grass roots ecosystem management i.e. the
ongoing, collaborative governance arrangement in which inclusive coalitions of the
unalike (citizens, government regulators, small businesses, environmentalists, commodity
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interests, and others) come together to resolve policy problems affecting the environment,
economy, and communities of a particular place (Brunner, Colburn et al. 2002; Weber
2003; Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Walker and Salt 2006; Clark 2008; Steelman 2010)
(See Table 45).
Table 45 Participants
Ecosystem-based Approach
Significant, meaningful public
participation is required. The expectation
is for significant meaningful participation
and input of a broad segment of the
affected population in decision making
processes. Participation must be open to
almost any person or group with a
significant interest in the issue. Active
outreach to develop citizen involvement
and partnerships and build "civic science"
base

Regulatory agencies must participate in
coordinated and integrated fashion and
allow softer local and regional input into
governance.

BoF/GoM Approach
This is largely a region of top-down,
traditional government. That said, there
are some organizations that provide for
collaboration and public input. GOMC
provides forum for agency collaboration,
but membership open only to designated
agencies. BoFEP has biannual basin-wide
programs supplemented by other outreach,
educational, and scientific forums. Other
citizen groups have managed to develop,
some with more success than others. Few
examples of true citizen/government
partnerships designed to build an educated
public base.
There are few discernible examples of
regulatory agencies participating in softer
local and regional governance efforts.
Compliance is generally still enforced
through formal enforcement and litigation.
ACAP and the Saltwater Network are two
notable exceptions.

Through personal observation and participation, it is my view that there are few
opportunities for meaningful public participation in the governance regime in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine. In the United States the regulation of activities that impact the
environment in the region is left to traditional top-down regulation by federal and state
officials that use the threat of enforcement action in order to induce compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.
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Figure 20 U.S. Maritime Boundaries (NOAA)

With some key variations that will be highlighted in the section on the Decision
Process devoted to prescriptions, this appears to be relatively similar to the Canadian
experience. So fragmentation of government jurisdictions is the name of the game in the
BoF/GoM watershed.
Figure 20 details the meticulous lines drawn in the sea by U.S. law. In brief, the
U.S. absolute sovereignty over its territorial land extends to its internal waters and territorial sea,
including the airspace above and the seabed below. The contiguous zone extends to 24 nautical
miles. In this zone the U.S. allows the boarding of foreign flag vessels. Finally, the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) was established by presidential proclamation for a variety of purposes,
including the protection of U.S. fish stocks and the extension of U.S. sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring, exploiting, and managing natural resources in the seabed and subsoil
(NOAA 2012).
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U.S. agencies dealing in the coastal margin have very definite geographic lines
within which to stay. The New England Fishery Management Council, for example,
knows precisely where they have jurisdiction to regulate U.S. fishing efforts (MSFCMA
1996):

Q: NEFMC essentially has jurisdiction over federal fisheries?
A: Federal fisheries 3 to 200 miles from the coast. We manage species
throughout their range, so we can manage monk fish from Maine to North
Carolina. We can manage red crab from Maine to North Carolina and we
do. Primarily the voting members are from New England, from
Connecticut to Maine. We don't have a federal region like NMFS does.
We manage throughout the range.
Q: The fisheries that are regulated are in federal waters. If I'm in state
waters I don't need to worry about your regulations?
A: If you're completely in state waters and only have a state permit
you're not regulated by the Council or the federal government. If you fish
in state waters and have a state permit to fish in state waters and have a
federal permit as well for that same species, then you are bound by the
federal permit and usually, well all the time, the federal laws are more
stringent then the state rules. So if you have a federal permit you must
abide by the more stringent federal permit. That has created problems
over the years because fishermen are very smart and they find loopholes.
So what they do is they forfeit their federal permit for a certain period or
don't renew it for a certain period, fish under their state permit, fish their
quota in state waters, then apply for their federal permit, because it's a
yearly federal permit, don't ask me why. So they've been able to get away
from the federal law because they forfeit their federal permit then get it
back again.
Q: Does that happen even in groundfish?
A: Especially in groundfish. And we don't allocate certain amounts of
fish to state fisheries. So that they have open access to groundfish.
Massachusetts, for instance, to my knowledge has an open access
program. You can still get a permit to catch cod in state waters.
Q: So you can take your 200 pounds or whatever in federal waters...
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A: You can take I think it's 800 pounds of Gulf of Maine cod in federal
waters. When you're done fishing your days, you forfeit your permit you
can go fish the same cod stock under the state permit, because you
forfeited your federal. That was going on for years until I sent a letter to
the state directors and asked them to stop this because in Massachusetts,
for instance, while we were going down on federal cod landings, we found
out state landings of cod were going up during the same period three and
four fold. So we put an end to that. I wrote some letters and Maine came
down very hard on their partner in Massachusetts because none of the
other states are going to have the phenomenon where the cod would go in
shore like they do in Massachusetts state waters. And as soon as they
came in they would be pounced upon. It was mostly the Gloucester fleet
and we had public hearings all up and down the coast for two or three
years and finally they put in some closed areas and NMFS has worked
over the last couple of years with state folks to address the loopholes in the
permitting.
That whole thing that we just talked about in my opinion shows how there
can be difficulties managing fish, state waters only 0-3 miles, then having
a different governance policy system 3 - 200. There are problems
associated with that. There are problems now, and they're only going to
get worse, as we start regulating recreational fishing. I see in the future
huge problems with recreational fishing, trying to get that under control,
and huge problems with state fisheries that are under different governance.
There laws are not near as strict as the federal laws for rebuilding. And
that's going to create problems.
Q: But the stocks are related?
A: The same stock. (US Federal Employee 3)
From the perspective of a fisheries manager in a U.S. state marine resource
agency, however, the 3 mile jurisdictional rule may have some exceptions:
Q: It seems when we talk about the United States, or even your
jurisdiction, we're talking about the zone between the low water mark and
three-miles out. Do you have any authority over anything on the land side
of that land/water interface?
A: Limited authority over some anadromous fish species. And then when
we go beyond three miles because Maine fishermen are bound by state law
regarding where they fish we have jurisdiction beyond three miles.
Q: Say that again?
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A: Maine fishermen are bound by state law regardless where they fish.
So if they're fishing in federal waters they're bound by state laws still.
And that came up most recently last week in the context of dragger
fishermen from Maine landing drag-caught lobsters in Massachusetts.
Q: I read about that. Now does it make any difference where they land
the catch?
A: No. Technically if they landed a load of lobsters in Brazil they'd be
bound by the conditions of Maine state law. (U.S. State Employee 2)
The boundaries that are drawn so meticulously in the US impact more than
fishery management. NOAA was established as a result of the 1969 Stratton
Commission. Although it was originally envisioned as a cabinet-level twin to NASA, it
was ultimately placed in the Department of Transportation by then-President Richard
Nixon. NOAA's broad mandate includes a number of marginally connected divisions,
including the National Weather Service, federal marine science, marine sanctuaries,
fisheries managements (beyond state waters) and coastal management (through state
agencies with approved coastal management plans).
For purposes pertinent to the ecosystem-based management of the coastal
margin, NOAA's most recent assessment sets forth a mission statement: "To understand
and predict changes in the Earth's environment and conserve and manage coastal and
marine resources to meet our nation's economic, social and environmental needs"
(NOAA 2004). Among NOAA's five expressed goals is to "Protect, Restore, and
Manage the Use of Coastal and Ocean Resources through an Ecosystem Approach to
Management" (NOAA 2004).
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NOAA is involved at various levels in the BoF/GoM region assisting states on
coastal issues and with issues related to consistency of state regulation with federal laws,
but generally only within the federal and state-defined coastal margin:

Q: In these roles or capacities, do you directly play a role in any of the
activities that impact the ecosystem?
A: No I do not. I move money to states. The state coastal programs are
the regulatory arm here. Neither OCRM nor CSC has any regulatory
authority to actually make changes on the ground. We partner with the
states and enable them to do that.
So the states want to review an activity happening in state waters or just
outside of state waters where they've designated that they have a real
interest in the stewardship of those resources they have the ability to block
or challenge any kind of activity, whether it's a federal or non-federal
activity, in those areas. Federal consistency is the teeth of the Coastal
Zone Management Act.
Q: The geographical region that you work within is pretty much confined
to the coastal region?
A: Correct. The state waters are 0-3 miles so in terms of my relationship
with the states, that's the geography.
Q: What about inland? Are there different jurisdictional lines in different
states?
A: Yes there are. Coastal boundaries were set in place when the
programs were approved and they can be changed over time. For instance,
New Hampshire just expanded their coastal boundary a couple of years
ago to include Great Bay and include some of the tributaries of major
fresh water flow coming in - so it's more of a watershed approach. Do all
these coastal program boundaries go up to the top of the watershed? No.
Most of them, if you look at a national map, tend to stay closer to the
coastal county line so they'll include all of the coastal counties and maybe
a county inlet. But that's usually the extent of it so they do not go up to
the top of the watershed. That is not part of the decision making process
in terms of setting the boundary and perhaps it should be. (U.S. Federal
Employee 4)
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NOAA is also concerned with another important participant in the governance
regime in the BoF/GoM watershed: municipalities and local governance. The following
exchange with an employee knowledgeable of NOAA coastal activities tends to show
that the geographical limitations imposed upon NOAA's Ocean Coastal Service may also
an impediment to the assistance of watershed-wide community support:

Q: And yet the states are often handcuffed somewhat by local
governments when it comes to land use, zoning and these kinds of nonpoint pollution factors?
A: Yes. Particularly in this region in the Gulf of Maine and in New
England in general a lot states operate by home rule and the state/local
relationship becomes dicey in terms of local governments really want to
do things their way and a lot of the land use decisions that are setting
precedent and are very important in terms of set backs or any kind of
mitigation for coastal hazards, sea level rise, or erosion or any of those
types of issues are all made at the local level. So NOAA then is two steps
removed from that real decision making and it's really up to us to give the
state the capacity to then work with the local government on making real
change whether it's helping with their master plan or providing technical
to local folks through protocols or model ordinances or things that can
actually help them on the ground.
Q: Can NOAA provide funding to watershed groups that would help
mitigate some of that local influence?
A: That's actually up to the states. When we give money to the states if
they have enough cash to then move some of those funds, like New
Hampshire for example, in the past has moved $100,000 out of the state
office to exactly what you're saying - to watershed groups, to regional
planning commissions. Then you're really building capacity of watershed
groups. But there is a problem in that those funds need to be spent within
the coastal zone boundary that's been set and approved by the program.
So if you have a watershed group that's way up stream you'd be hardpressed to actually get that approved. The fluids really are meant to be
spent within the coastal boundaries. You might be able to get a project
approved that's in the next county in if you make a case that non-point
source pollution or there's some issue that's heavily influencing the
coastal zone and work needs to be done in that region to have an impact
on the coastal zone. The sticking point is that we hold a pretty firm line in
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terms of NOAA funds being spent within that coastal zone boundary
which may not extend up into the watershed. (US Federal Employee 4)

From the above we have learned something about participants like the NEFMC, a
state fishery management employee, and NOAA. Through them we learned about
municipalities and local governance whose participation in governance in the coastal
margin is critical. Simply put, participants have limited authority, fragmented
jurisdiction, and often lack funding. We next look at the water quality in the US which,
as we learned earlier, is the responsibility of the Environmental Protection Administration
(EPA).
The Environmental Protection Agency was created in 1970 during the
administration of President Richard Nixon as the product of a groundswell of
environmental activism. The EPA administers a variety of environmental laws and
regulations. Its overall mission is to protect human health and the environment. Perhaps
most relevant to the subject matter of this summary are various commitments that the
EPA has made with respect to water quality and watershed management. The EPA has
committed to the protection of human health by reducing exposure to contaminants in
drinking water (including protecting source waters), in fish and shellfish, and in
recreational waters. It has also committed to protecting the quality of rivers, lakes, and
streams on a watershed basis and to protect coastal and ocean waters (EPA 2003)32. In
practice, however, an interview with a federal employee familiar with EPA's coastal
efforts in the region, pointed some potential jurisdictional conflicts:

32

The EPA's obligations under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are discussed in the Decision
Process section of this study.
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A: To get back to the jurisdictional point. In a nutshell, you know, we
were largely concerned with stuff that's fairly close to shore, near coastal
area. Obviously when we have dredging and remediation sites that are in
federal waters, we have jurisdiction over those. But, NOAA.. .1 think of
NOAA as really more of an ocean agency and EPA as sort of more a
coastal.. .if you had to really make some sort of distinction. But, then you
have the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the fact that NOAA
administers the Coastal Zone Management program with states. There are
definitely areas where...there's probably inefficiencies in there, and I
think the Ocean Action plan itself, but a court recommended either
merging or that certain programs like the National Estuary Program be
moved from EPA to NOAA. We didn't like that recommendation... (US
Federal Employee 1)
No discussion of water quality in the U.S. would be complete without mention of
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Not actually a branch of the armed services, much of
the mission of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("USACE") involves providing
engineering, design and construction pertaining to national infrastructure, homeland
security, war preparations and combat support. It is included in this analysis because of
its statutory mandates related to environmental and water resource matters relating to
dredging, wetlands activity permitting, and ecosystem restoration efforts. The
Environmental Operating Principles of the USACE provide insight into the agency's
emphasis and include the need to achieve environmental sustainability. The principles
expressly recognize that an environment maintained in a healthy, diverse and sustainable
condition is necessary to support life and stresses the need to assess and mitigate
cumulative impacts to the environment (USACE 2002). Further, Section 306 of the
Water Resource Development Act 1990 made environmental restoration one of the
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primary missions of the Corps of Engineers, permitting the Corps to undertake studies
and build projects which restore habitat.33
The BoF/GoM watershed extends upland from the coastal margin. There is no
longer any debate that land based activities have serious impacts on the coastal and
marine ecosystem. The USFWS is an agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Its
mission is to work "...with others to preserve, protect and enhance fish, wildlife and
plants and their habitats for the continuing benefit of the American people" (USFWS
2000). To help with its mission the USFWS has adopted an ecosystem approach to the
management. It describes its ecosystem approach as comprehensive and based on all of
the biological resources within a watershed. Consistent with this approach, its field
offices have been geographically aligned to conform to watershed boundaries.34 It also
provides additional services and data including the National Wetlands Inventory.35
Further, the USFWS is involved with enforcement, implementation and conservation on a
number of fronts pertinent to the Gulf of Maine region.
The Coastal Program, for example, focuses the USFWS efforts in bays, estuaries
and coastal regions of the United States. The purpose of the Coastal Program is to
conserve fish and wildlife and their habitats in order to support healthy coastal
ecosystems. The program is guided by 4 explicit goals: (1) Serve coastal communities
by providing assessment and planning tools to identify priority habitats that should be
protected and restored; (2) Conserve pristine coastal habitats through support of locally-

33

33 USC § 2316; See also Appendix A.

34 htto ://www.fws.gov/ecosvstems/
35

http://wetlands.fws.gov/statusandtrends.htm
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initiated conservation efforts; (3) Restore degraded coastal wetland, upland, and stream
habitats by working with partners to implement on-the-ground projects, and (4) Focus
resources through conservation alliances that leverage the financial and technical
resources of our partners and multiply the impact of the taxpayer's dollar.36 The Coastal
Program currently provides funding to 21 high-priority coastal ecosystems including the
Gulf of Maine.37
Finally, at least at the U.S. federal level, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is an
important participant in regulatory efforts that have the capacity to impact the region's
ecosystem. The USDA is the cabinet level department ultimately responsible for the
regulation of two important categories of activities that impact the Gulf of Maine
ecosystem: agriculture and forestry. The U.S. Forest Service expressly adopted an
ecosystem-based approach to forest management in 1992 in conjunction with the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") Earth Summit in Rio
de Janeiro.38 Since that time USDA agricultural regulation has increasingly supported
funding for farmers to adopt practices designed to reduce non-point source run-off of
pesticides and fertilizer and encourage open space preservation.
No discussion of participants in the regulatory regime on the US side of the
BoF/GoM region would be complete without discussion of the role of the states that are
included within the watershed. Frankly, given the federalist nature our the U.S.
governmental scheme, states play a critical role in the regulation of the human activities

36

http://www.fws.eov/coastal/CoastalProgram/

37

http://www.fws.gov/northeast/gulfofmaine/

38

http://www.fs.fed.us/global/news/article4.htm
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that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem through the exercise of police power authority
to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens as well as through the delegation
of enforcement and implementation responsibilities in accordance with federal
legislation. Although an exhaustive review of applicable state statutes and pertinent state
agencies is beyond the scope of this report, what follows is a brief survey of some of the
agencies and statutes that underpin state regulatory activities for those states that directly
border the Gulf of Maine.
Starting with Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Office of Environmental Affairs
("MOEA") is the umbrella administrative agency responsible for the coordination and
oversight of a host of Massachusetts environmental initiatives and agencies. Included
within its oversight are the Office of Coastal Zone Management, the Massachusetts
Environmental Protection Act, the Division of Conservation Services, the Smart
Conservation strategy, the Office of Technical Assistance for Toxic Use Reduction, the
Massachusetts Conservation Trust, and others. Set forth below are summaries of a
variety of statutes and administrative offices coordinated by the EOEA pertinent to the
Gulf of Maine region.39 MOEA also is charged with authority for the implementation of
the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Act ("MEPA").40 MEPA requires project
proponents file an Environmental Impact Report for projects that meet certain threshold
requirements that trigger state agency action. It mandates the gathering of information by
project proponents and provides an opportunity for input by the public and other involved
agencies and stakeholders.

39 http://www.mass.gov/envir/
40 M.G.L.

c. 30 ss 61-62H and 301 CMR 11.00
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In Massachusetts, the office of Coastal Zone Management administers the Coastal
Zone Management Act41 and for the administration and implementation of its federally
approved Coastal Zone Management Plan ("CZMP"). Its mission is

. .to balance the

impacts of human activity with the protection of coastal and marine resources..."42 The
CZMP articulates policies and permitting procedures affecting marine habitat, water
quality, protected areas, public access, energy, ocean resources and coastal growth
management in the coastal zone.43 In addition to assuring that projects comply with the
CZMP, the Office of Coastal Zone Management conducts federal consistency reviews to
determine whether federal activities undertaken or authorized by the federal government
are consistent with the state CZMP.
The Massachusetts Ocean Management Initiative and Task Force was created in
recognition of the increasing array of coastal and ocean challenges and conflicts. The
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management became the central coordinator and
facilitator of the Ocean Management Initiative. The Initiative was one of the first
attempts by a state to develop a comprehensive plan for multiple ocean uses. The
initiative created a Management Task Force in June of2003 and charged them with
investigating ocean use trends and existing governance mechanisms; drafting
recommendations for administrative, regulatory, and statutory changes; and developing
ocean management principles that address complexities of present and future multiple use
41

16 use §§1451 etseq. and 15 CFR 930; M.G.L. c 21A §§ 2,4 and 301 CMR 20.00

42 http://www.mass.gov/czm/
43 The

Coastal Zone in Massachusetts is that area bounded by the outer limit of the Commonwealth's
jurisdiction as established by the United States from time to time; the northern and southern lateral seaward
boundaries of the Commonwealth as established by interstate compact, agreement, judicial decision, or as
otherwise provided by law; and 100 feet inland of the roads, rail lines, or rights of way delimited in the
CZM Coastal Atlas. 301 CMR 21.00; http://www.mass.gOv/czm/fcrczrnregs.htm#5
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planning. The task force conducted public meetings and received input from
stakeholders over a 10 month period. The efforts of the task force resulted in the release
of its final report and recommendations entitled Waves of Change: The Massachusetts
Ocean Management Task Force Report and Recommendations. Recommendations of the
task force include the strengthening of state agencies to better address environmental,
planning, and public trust issues in both state and federal waters; establishing an
ecosystem-based protocol to improve management of federal waters; and initiating ocean
education and stewardship initiatives.44 Legislation intended to implement the
recommendations of the task force was introduced into the Massachusetts legislature in
March, 2005.45 This effort developed the foundation for ongoing mapping and planning
activities and the Oceans Act of 2008, which was signed by Governor Deval Patrick on
May 28,2008. The Act required Massachusetts to develop a comprehensive plan to
manage development in state waters. The Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan was
released on December 31,2009.
The Oceans Act of 2008 that resulted from this process specifically directs that the
Massachusetts Ocean Management Plan:
(i) set forth the commonwealth's goals, siting priorities and standards for
ensuring effective stewardship of its ocean waters held in trust for the
benefit of the public; and (ii) adhere to sound management practices,
taking into account the existing natural, social, cultural, historic and
economic characteristics of the planning areas; (iii) preserve and protect
the public trust; (iv) reflect the importance of the waters of the
commonwealth to its citizens who derive livelihoods and recreational
benefits from fishing; (v) value biodiversity and ecosystem health; (vi)
identify and protect special, sensitive or unique estuarine and marine life
44 httD://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/waves
45

of change/index.htm

http://www.mass.gov/czm/oceanmanagement/orca/index.htm
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and habitats; (vii) address climate change and sea-level rise; (viii) respect
the interdependence of ecosystems; (ix) coordinate uses that include
international, federal, state and local jurisdictions; (x) foster sustainable
uses that capitalize on economic opportunity without significant detriment
to the ecology or natural beauty of the ocean; (xi) preserve and enhance
The Division of Marine Fisheries is the Massachusetts agency charged with a
mission to provide benefits to the public by managing

.. the Commonwealth's living

marine resources and the harvesting of those resources by the commercial and
recreational fisheries, while maintaining a diverse number of self-sustaining fish
populations at healthy levels of abundance in balance with the ecosystem."46 The DMF
is responsible for the management of living marine, estuarine, and anadromous resources
within the waters of the Commonwealth. In doing so, it works closely with NOAA
Fisheries, the New England Fisheries Management Council, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries
Management Council, and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to craft
regulations that create sustainable, healthy fisheries in compliance with applicable
Fishery Management Plans.
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, by virtue of Article
XCVII of the Massachusetts Constitution, underpins the constitutional commitment to
help guarantee the people's right to "clean air and water", as well as "the natural scenic,
historic and aesthetic qualities of the environment."47 DEP is the state agency
responsible for protecting human health and the environment by ensuring clean air and
water, the safe management and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes, the timely

46 http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmfyinformation/mission.htm#x:

Massachusetts Marine Fisheries
Regulations are codified at 322 CMR; http://www.mass.gov/dfwele/dmfycommercialfishing/cmr index.htm

47

Massachusetts Constitution, Article XCVII

413

cleanup of hazardous waste sites and spills, and the preservation of wetlands and coastal
resources.48 The DEP is headed by a Commissioner with three deputy commissioners
(including the Deputy Commissioner for Operations and Programs), a general counsel,
and two directors reporting directly to the commissioner. DEP's programs are divided
between three programmatic bureaus: The Bureau of Resource Protection, the Bureau of
Waste Prevention and the Bureau of Waste Site Cleanup. The responsibility for
responsible for identifying critical inland and coastal water resources and devising
strategies for protecting and preserving them fall within the Bureau of Resource
Protection. Permitting for groundwater discharges, surface water discharges, estuary and
watershed programs and other media regulation also fall within the Bureau of Resource
Protection. Air and water planning units fall within the Bureau of Waste Prevention.49
Further, under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 91 the state legislature has charged
the Department of Environmental Protection with the responsibility for the protection of
the Commonwealth's interests in its harbors, tidelands, and waters and with acting as a
steward of the public's interest in the those lands.50 It is the basis for the
Commonwealth's waterways licensing program. It is also designed to protect traditional
maritime industries from displacement by modern development.
The Waterways Regulation Program, the section of DEP that oversees Chapter
91, is the primary division charged with implementing this codification of the traditional

48htto://www.mass.gov/dep/about/missionp.htm
49

http://www.mass.gov/dep/about/contacts.htm

50 M.G.L.c.

91 § 2; 310 Code Mass. Regs § 9.01 (2) (2000)
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"public trust doctrine."51 The DEP Waterways Regulation Program is intended to protect
access to the water's edge for fishing, fowling and navigation, protect navigation rights,
protect and promote tidelands as a workplace for commercial fishing, shipping, passenger
transportation, boat building and repair, marinas and other activities for which proximity
to the water is either essential or highly advantageous, and protect Areas of Critical
Environmental Concern, ocean sanctuaries and other ecologically sensitive areas from
unnecessary encroachment by fill and structures. Its provisions apply to any project
located in, on, over or under tidal waters seaward to the three mile Commonwealth
territorial limit. It also applies to filled tidelands, Great Ponds (ponds in excess of 10
acres), many non-tidal rivers and streams. The basic activities subject to Chapter 91
authorization include structures, regardless of size, filling or placement of unconsolidated
materials including material placed for purposes of shoreline protection or beach
nourishment, dredging of any materials or bottom sediment and sand in any waters of the
Commonwealth, any change in use of a structure for a purpose unrelated to the
authorized or original use, and any change in the dimensions or demolition/removal of a
structure as originally approved.52
In Massachusetts, air pollution controls and regulation are the responsibility of the
DEP's Air Program Planning Unit using powers delegated to it by the EPA. The program
concentrates on controlling ambient emissions of air pollutants, including emissions of
toxic compounds, from stationary sources (e.g., industrial) and mobile sources (e.g.,
automobiles) that contribute to violations of federal ambient air quality standards. In
51

At its core, the public trust doctrine stands for the proposition that certain resources are held in trust by
the government for the benefit of the public.
52

http://www.mass.gov/dep/brp/waterway/about.htrn
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addition to controlling the federally CWA priority pollutants and hazardous air pollutants
("HAPS"), additional programs provide some increased levels of regulation and air
pollution prevention in Massachusetts, including participation in a Zero Mercury
Program in furtherance of the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers
Regional Mercury Action Plan of 1998 (NEG/ECP 1998).54
Under the Massachusetts Clean Water Act the responsibility for water pollution
control and the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution rests with the
DEP.55 Pursuant to the EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Program, all point source discharges of pollutants are prohibited unless a
NPDES permit is procured. Since Massachusetts is a non-delegated NPDES permit
states, all permits are jointly issued by EPA and DEP and are equally and separately
enforceable by both agencies. Permits regulate discharges with the goals of: (1)
protecting public health and aquatic life, and (2) assuring that every facility treats
wastewater.56 The department's TMDL strategy contemplates the completion of
impaired water classification by 2012, after which an implementation plan allocating
allowable pollutant loads by watershed will be developed.57

53

http://www.mass.gov/dep/bwD/daac/files/airtox.htm

54 http://www.mass.gov/dep/bwp/daac/files/airtox.htm
55

M.G.L.C. 21, §§ 27, 53

56 40 CFR 122: EPA Administered Permit Programs: National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System;
M.G.L. Ch. 21 §. 26-53: Massachusetts Clean Waters Act; 314 CMR 3.00: Massachusetts Surface Water
Discharge Permit Program; http://www.mass.gov/czm/envpermitnpdes.htm
57

http://www.inass.gov/dep/brp/wm/files/tmdlfs.pdf
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The DEP manages wetland issues through its Wetlands Program. The statutes
underpinning the program include the Wetlands Protection Act as amended by the Rivers
Protection Act.58 The purposes of the program are the protection of private or public
water supply, protection of groundwater, flood control, prevention of storm damage,
prevention of pollution, protection of land containing shellfish, protection of wildlife
habitat, and protection of fisheries. The Rivers Protection Act establishes a state policy
for protecting the natural integrity of the Commonwealth's rivers and to establish open
space along rivers. The Act also sets aside funds for the acquisition of lands bordering
streams and rivers.
Moving now away from Massachusetts to the state of Maine, we will first
examine the institutional arrangements proscribed under the Coastal Zone Management
Act (1972). While the Maine Coastal Zone Management Plan received formal federal
approval in 1984, the Maine Coastal Program ("MCP") was established in 1978 as an
initial response to the passage of the federal CZMA. The CZMP, together with other
coastal and land use programs, are administered through the Maine State Planning Office
("MSPO"), which facilitates a variety of partnerships among state, regional and local
agencies. Under the Maine Coastal Program, the MSPO expressly recognizes that
although coastal resources must be protected and conserved, residents must be able to
thrive economically. The Maine Coastal Program strives to achieve a balance between
resource protection and human uses.59 With a coastal zone that extends for 5,300 miles

58

M.G.L. c.131, § 40.

59 The

legislative policy applicable to the Coastal Program is set forth at 18 M.R.S.A. § 1801:
The Legislature finds that the Maine coast is an asset of immeasurable value to the people of the
State and the nation, and there is a state interest in the conservation, beneficial use and effective
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and includes municipalities that border the coast, tidal waterways and territorial waters
out to the three mile territorial limit the MSPO's Coastal Program undertakes or supports
projects that promote sustainable economic development, encourage environmental
stewardship and education, conserve and manage marine fisheries, reduce coastal
hazards, and improve public access. The Maine State Planning Office is also the state
agency designated to conduct federal consistency reviews of federal actions impacting
the Maine coastal zone (MSPO 2002). Finally, Maine voters have made their priorities
known by voting for bond issues designed to fund the acquisition and protection of land
with "exceptional natural or recreational value." Thus among its other duties, the MSPO
administers the "Lands for Maine Future" Program, identifying and facilitating the
purchase and protection land identified under this program. To date, MSPO has assisted
with the purchase of at least 139,000 acres from willing sellers, with an additional 53,500
acres protected through conservation easements.60
Maine's Department of Environmental Protection ("MDEP") is the primary
agency responsible for protecting and restoring Maine's natural resources and
implementing and enforcing environmental laws. Its mission is straight forward: To
prevent, abate and control the pollution of the state's air, water and land and to preserve,

management of the coast's resources; that development of the coastal area is increasing rapidly and
that this development poses a significant threat to the resources of the coast and to the traditional
livelihoods of its residents; that the United States Congress has recognized the importance of
coastal resources through the passage of the United States Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
and that in 1978 Maine initiated a coastal management program in accordance with this Act which
continues to be of high priority; and that there are special needs in the conservation and
development of the State's coastal resources that require a statement of legislative policy and
intent with respect to state and local actions affecting the Maine coast.
1985, C . 794, Pt. A, § 11
60

http://www.state.me.us/spo/lmfy
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improve and prevent diminution of the natural environment of the State. MDEP is also
directed to protect and enhance the public's right to use and enjoy the State's natural
resources. Organizationally, three separate bureaus administer the department's
environmental programs: Air Quality, Land and Water Quality, and Remediation and
Waste Management. All three bureaus report to a Deputy Commissioner who reports to
the Commissioner.61 In addition, the Maine legislature created a 10 member appointed
Board of Environmental Protection citizen "to provide informed, independent and timely
decisions on the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of the laws relating to
environmental protection and to provide for credible, fair, and responsible public
participation in Department decisions." The Board shall fulfill its purpose through
rulemaking decisions, decisions on selected permit applications, review of the
Commissioner's licensing and enforcement actions and recommending changes in the law
to the Legislature."62
Maine's air quality regulation falls within the jurisdiction of the DEP's Bureau of
Air Quality. The mission of the Bureau is to coordinate a statewide program to control
present and future sources of air contaminants to assure the continued health, safety and
general welfare of the people of Maine, to protect property values, and to protect plant
and animal life. To fulfill this mission, the Bureau implements a two-pronged strategy
focused on the improvement of air quality in those areas where air quality has degraded
and the prevention of deterioration of air quality in areas where the air quality is

61

http://www.maine.gov/deD/overview.htm

62

38 MRSA § 341-B; http://www.maine.gov/dep/bep/purpose.htm
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acceptable.63 Maine's Air program was created in response to Federal requirements under
subsection 110 of the Clean Air Act and its State Implementation Plan ("SIP") has been
approved by the EPA.64 In addition to the regulation of priority and hazardous air
pollutants mandated by the CAA, Maine's SIP also includes other toxic chemicals such
as dioxin, furan and PCBs. Maine has also adopted a program to reduce mercury
emissions, recognizing the link between mercury exposure and human health and the
threat posed by human consumption of mercury-tainted fish and shellfish. In 1998 the
Land and Water Council adopted a multidisciplinary approach Mercury Reduction
Strategy for Maine that has resulted in an estimated reduction of overall mercury
emissions by more than 75% from 1991 levels. Further, Maine participates in the 1998
New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers Mercury Action Plan.65
Maine's DEP also manages water quality pursuant to the Natural Resource
Protection Act, 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 408 et seq. The policy articulated by this 1987
legislation provides:

The Legislature finds and declares that the State's rivers and
streams, great ponds, fragile mountain areas, freshwater wetlands,
significant wildlife habitat, coastal wetlands and coastal sand
dunes systems are resources of state significance. These resources
have great scenic beauty and unique characteristics, unsurpassed
recreational, cultural, historical and environmental value of present
and future benefit to the citizens of the State and that uses are
causing the rapid degradation and, in some cases, the destruction of
these critical resources, producing significant adverse economic
63

38 M.R.S.A § 581: http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/overview.htm

64 40

CFR Part 52, Subpart U.; Maine statutes specific to the air program are codified at 38 M.R.S.A. §§581
through 608-A; regulations implementing the program set forth at Chapters 100 - 138 of the Department's
Regulations.
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and environmental impacts and threatening the health, safety and
general welfare of the citizens of the State.. .The Legislature
further finds and declares that the cumulative effect of frequent
minor alterations and occasional major alterations of these
resources poses a substantial threat to the environment and
economy of the State and its quality of life. 39 M.R.S.A. § 408A
Under the Act a permit is required66 whenever any "activity" is proposed on or
over any protected natural resource or in an area located adjacent to a coastal wetland,
great pond, river, stream, wetland or significant wildlife habitat. "Activity" includes
dredging, bulldozing, removing or displacing soil or vegetation, as well as the
construction, repair or alternation of any permanent structure.67 Thus the NRPA provides
the fundamental statutory protection for Maine's wetlands, estuaries and other areas of
environmental significance. Rules and regulations promulgated by the MEPA and other
state agencies provide specific permitting requirements for activities proposed in
significant areas.68
Maine's application to administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Program of the Federal Clean Water Act was approved by the EPA on January
12,2001. Pursuant to the Waste Discharge Permitting Program a license must be
obtained from MDEP for the point source discharge of pollutants to a stream, river, or
lake of the state, or to the ocean.69

66 The

MDEP is the permitting authority within the organized territory of the State of Maine. Permits for
activities in the unorganized territories, i.e. land not in organized municipalities or townships, are obtained
from Maine's Land Use Regulation Commission ("LURC"),
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39 M.R.S.A. § 408-C
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http://www.maine.gOv/dep/blwQ/docstand/nrpapage.htm#stat
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38 M.R.S.A. § 413
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Maine has also acted to address the threat posed by invasive species. In 2001
Maine's Legislature adopted An Act to Prevent Infestation of Invasive Aquatic Plants and
to Control Other Invasive Species.70 The Act provided for the establishment of an
interagency task force to study the risks and potential responses of invasive species
infestation. The resulting Invasive Aquatic Species Program Report was released in
2002. The task force recommendations included the designation of MDEP and the Maine
Department of Inland Fisheries to jointly head an intergovernmental effort to educate the
public on the existence and threats posed by invasive species, the ways to prevent their
introduction and spread, and put in place a largely-volunteer monitoring effort to track
the progression of invasive species in the land and coastal regions of the state. Strategies
for interagency coordination, monitoring plans, rapid identification and eradication, and
other measures for invasive species control are set forth the report (Interangency Task
Force 2002).71
In recognition of the importance of municipal and local government to the
governance of the human activities that impact the environment, in Maine municipal
zoning ordinances along the coast must conform to certain minimum requirements
determined by the MDEP.72 Developments that qualify for MDEP-mandated
requirements are those that may have a substantial impact upon the environment,
including those that occupy more than 20 acres, oil and terminal facilities, and other large
70

12 M.R.S.A. §§ 7791, etseq.
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Invasive species have also been a focus of the Casco Bay Estuary Partnership and other National Estuary
Programs within the Gulf of Maine. A forum sponsored by the CBEP was held in November, 2004 and the
threat of marine invasive species has been added to the list of priorities for the CBEP and other programs.
http://www.cascobav.usm.maine.edU/habitat.html#Habitat%20Protection
72

38 M.R.S.A. § 438-A
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structures and subdivisions. Also subject to MDEP permitting requirements are projects
in shoreland areas subject to zoning and land use controls. Shoreland areas include those
areas within 250 feet of the normal high-water line of any great pond, river or saltwater
body, and within 250 feet of the upland edge of a coastal wetland.73
Finally we come to the manner in which Maine, through its Department of Marine
Resources, manages the activities within the state's maritime zone. The purpose of the
Maine DMR, as set forth in its enabling legislation, is to conserve and develop marine
and estuarine resources; to conduct and sponsor scientific research; to promote and
develop the Maine coastal fishing industries; to advise and cooperate with local, state and
federal officials concerning activities in coastal waters; and to implement, administer and
enforce the laws and regulations necessary for these enumerated purposes, as well as the
exercise of all authority conferred by this Part.74 In the exercise of its functions, the
Department is empowered to adopt and enforce fisheries management plans (within the
three mile territorial limit) as well as to adopt emergency measures for resource
protection when confronted with unusual damage or imminent depletion. It also has
jurisdiction to manage and regulate the inshore recreational fishing and aquaculture
sectors. Finally, DMR has policy and regulatory responsibilities to prevent the
introduction and spread of unwanted marine organisms into Maine waters.75
Moving now to our final U.S. state, New Hampshire, we can discuss the
participants within that state's jurisdiction. First it should be noted that the vast majority
73

38 M.R.S.A. § 435
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12 M.R.S.A. § 6021;

75 http://www.cascobav.usm.maine.edii/invasilaw.html
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of responsibility for statewide environmental policy, regulation and enforcement in New
Hampshire has been consolidated within the jurisdiction of the Department of
Environmental Services ("DES") since 1987.76 Its duties include water quality and
supply, shoreland development, recreation, ecological balance, air quality and
monitoring, and municipal and industrial waste management. These functions are carried
out through the department's three divisions: Air Resources, Waste Management, and
Water. A Senior Leadership Team comprised of the three division directors and two
commissioners coordinate policy making and implementation for the department. In
addition, a several commissions have been created by statute to advise the departmental
directors on matters related to their jurisdiction and to hear appeals of final agency
administrative decisions. These include the Air Resources Council, Water Resources
Council, Water Council, Waste Management Council, Water Council, Wetlands Council,
and Well Board. The mission of the department is "...to help sustain a high quality of
life for all citizens by protecting and restoring the environment and public health in New
Hampshire."77
New Hampshire's coastal zone is comprised of the 17 municipal communities that
border on the coast of New Hampshire or its tidal bays, estuaries and rivers. The New
Hampshire Coastal Program ("NHCP") received federal approval under the CZMA in
stages, with approval for the current NHCP obtained from the federal ORCM in 2004.
The New Hampshire Department of Environment Services ("DES") has administered the
NHCP and federal consistency reviews through the NHCP since 2004 (NHDES 2005).
76

RSA 21-0 (1987)
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http://des.state.nh.us/alook.htm
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The mission of the New Hampshire Coastal Program includes a reference to
intergenerational equity by declaring that NHCP seeks to "balance the preservation of
natural resources of the coast with the social and economic needs of this and succeeding
generations." To accomplish this mission, the Coastal Program pursues goals that include
the prevention and abatement of coastal pollution, fostering community stewardship and
awareness of coastal resources, and protection and restoration of coastal natural
resources. The NHCP is active in other aspects of coastal land and habitat protection
through its participation in NOAA's Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Program
("CELCP") NHCP has contracted with The Nature Conservancy to develop a draft
Coastal and Estuarine Land Conservation Plan (CELCP). The CELCP will assess and
prioritize conservation needs in the Great Bay Watershed.78 The NHCP is also attempting
to qualify for funding to help restore coastal wetlands through the CZMA's Enhancement
Program.79 The New Hampshire Estuaries Project, a program funded by the EPA's
National Estuary Program and administered by the University of New Hampshire, plays a
vital role in research and planning for the state's coastal estuaries, including Great Bay
and Little Bay (NHEP 2003).
With respect to air quality issues, the New Hampshire Department of
Environmental Services, Air Resources Division, with guidance from the New
Hampshire Air Resources Council, seeks to promote cost-effective, sensible strategies
and control measures to address complex and inter-related air quality issues. The issues
addressed by the Air Resources Division include ground-level ozone, particulate matter,

78 http://www.des.
79

state.nh.us/Coastal/CoastalEstuarine.html

CZMA § 309; http://www.des.state.nh.us/Coastal/Restoration/
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regional haze (visibility), mercury emissions, increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases, acid deposition, and air toxics. Like the other New England states, New
Hampshire recognizes that its direct impact is limited since many problems that the states
in the Northeast U.S. can only be solved on a regional or national basis. The express
considerations set forth for the Air Resources Division include guidance that Actions
should be supported by the most recent scientific and health effects data available, while
at the same time recognizing that new information will emerge in the future. Many
ongoing state, (e.g., NH Comparative Risk Project), regional and national research efforts
will provide better scientific data and improved understanding of ways to achieve
multiple health and environmental benefits at lower cost. Further, the importance of
public education and outreach activities is emphasized "...because they transcend all
programs and because the pollution contributions of individual citizen's activities
represent an increasing share of air pollution emissions." The DES also recognizes that
alternative approaches to the "command and control" approach to regulation are needed
to face current issues and to develop solutions that provide better environmental and
public health outcomes faster and more cost-effectively.80 New Hampshire DES has also
promulgated rules that recognize the link between mercury emissions and mercurytainted fish consumption and has joined with Maine, Massachusetts and Canadian
Maritime Provinces Maine to participate in the 1998 New England Governors and
Eastern Canadian Premiers Mercury Action Plan. The DES has also implemented a

80 http://www.des.state.nh.us/airdiv.htm
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statewide New Hampshire Mercury Reduction Strategy to help reduce more localized
mercury releases.81
The Water Division of DES, with guidance from the Water Council, the Water
Resources Council and the Wetlands Council, is responsible for the variety of programs
that draft and implement water quality and waste water regulations, including Safe
Drinking Water, wetlands, coastal water issues, groundwater, safe beaches and other
programs.82 The mission of the Water Division is

. .to ensure that New Hampshire's

lakes and ponds, rivers and streams, coastal waters, groundwater and wetlands are clean
and support healthy ecosystems, provide habitats for a diversity of plant and animal life,
and support appropriate uses." Water quality standards under the CWA are used to
protect the state's surface waters. Accordingly, New Hampshire designates uses for water
bodies, such as fishing or swimming; establishes numerical or narrative criteria to protect
the designated uses; and an establishes policies intended to maintain water quality that
exceeds the criteria.83 NHDES has recently completed its surface water quality surveys
in accordance with the Clean Water Act, including a TMDL inventory (or "303d list").84
New Hampshire's permitting requirements for the discharge of pollutants into surface
and ground water are set forth in its Water Pollution and Waste Water legislation.85
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http://www.des.state.nh.us/nhppp/intro20.pdf

82 http://www.des.state.nh.us/waterdiv.htm
83 R.S.A.

§ 485-A; http://www.eencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/L/485-A/485-A-8.htm

84 http://www.des.state.nh.
85

us/wmb/swQa/2004/default.asp?go=summarv

R.S.A. § 485 etseq.
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The management and protection of New Hampshire's rivers are subject to the
provisions of the Rivers Management and Protection Act.86 The act established the River
Management and Protection Program ("RMPP") and is administered by the NHDES. Any
interested individual or group may nominate a river for inclusion under the RMPP based
upon the river's values and outstanding natural or cultural characteristics. If the
nomination is accepted the river is deemed a "designated river" by the DES
Commissioner the legislature may approve the designation if it finds sufficient local
support and important river values. The designation is final upon signature of the
governor. Once a river has been designated for protection a management plan must be
developed designed to protect the river for future generations. Any such plan is
developed and implemented by a volunteer local river advisory committee. Plans
generally identify goals and propose actions necessary to protect the designated river.
NHDES assists with the development and implementation of the plan and enforces
o*j

regulations governing quality and quantity of flow in the protected river segments.
Invasive species are the task of the New Hampshire DES Exotic Species Program
which coordinates activities associated with the control and management of exotic
aquatic plants; as well as activities associated with the implementation of education
programs and volunteer plant monitoring programs.
Finally, the New Hampshire Office of Energy and Planning plays a role in
planning, land protection and municipal assistance in New Hampshire. Through 1993 the
Land Conservation Investment Program acquired over 100,000 acres of land in New
86

R.S.A. § 483
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See generally: http://www.des.state.nh.us/rivers/
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Hampshire in partnership with the private Trust for New Hampshire Land. Since the end
of its acquisition phase in 1993, the Conservation Land Stewardship Program has been
responsible for the monitoring and protection of state-acquired land.
Before we shift gears and move into a description of the participants on the
Canadian side of the BoF/GoM watershed, it might be helpful to recall the maritime
jurisdiction figure (Figure 20) that defined the various lines drawn in the sea under U.S.
law. For reasons that will be explored more closely in the prescription task in the next
section on the Decision Process, the governance approach on the Canadian side is a bit
less fragmented and more collaborative to a large part due to their failure to draw such
tight jurisdictional lines in the Canadian coastal region and territorial seas.
Simply put, there are few firm boundaries to confine agency activity. When
questioned, a Canadian federal employee who has been dealing with environmental
issues in the Canadian Maritimes for nearly three decades explained the jurisdictional
situation along the coastal margin in Canada this way:
Q: Does the [federal agency] jurisdiction stop at the water's edge?
A: We don't know where the jurisdiction stops, quite frankly, in the
Canadian coastal zone, [laughter] It's one of those questions we just kind
of never resolved. It's unclear. I work with some constitutional lawyers,
law of the sea experts, at Dalhousie and they don't even know. It is
uncertain. We don't have, as in the U.S., with the states with 3 mile and
so on. It's felt, generally, that jurisdiction between federal and provincial
jurisdiction is somewhere around the land/water interface. (Canadian
Federal Employee 2).
It turns out, however, that this murky jurisdictional grey area may not be such a
bad thing:
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A: With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the division of
legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian way of just
avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've been
operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government have
an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to resolve this
and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A and someone
gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because we realize
that you need at least both levels of government working together. So in
the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have an interest in
the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work together.
Q: So.. .the grey area does actually play a role in...
A: It's been quite helpful; not really forcing us, but instead enabling us or
inspiring us to work together.
Q: With no permit needed from federal...
A: Correct. With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the
division of legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian
way of just avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've
been operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government
have an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to
resolve this and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A
and someone gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because
we realize that you need at least both levels of government working
together. So in the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have
an interest in the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work
together.
Q: So.. .the grey area does actually play a role in...
A: It's been quite helpful; not really forcing us, but instead enabling us or
inspiring us to work together. (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
From a federal agency perspective in Canada, jurisdictional questions promote
cooperation and collaboration between all levels of government. Is the view the same
from perspective of a provincial agency?
Q: And when you're talking about the coastal zone, how do you define
the coastal zone?
430

A: That's kind of a "what's the meaning of life" question. You can give it
definition almost anywhere along the coastal drainage area, but that would
be all of Nova Scotia. That's a challenge we have here is defining what
we call our coastal zone. Intuitively you know what a coastal area is. I
think everybody does. I think someone would say 60 kilometers inland
may not be considered a coastal area where it drains into the ocean, but it
is. But, on the other end of it, to the nearest road, which some
jurisdictions have as their coastal zone, is not inclusive enough, either. So,
that's one of the challenges that we're facing provincially is in defining
what we would consider our coastal zone.
Q: Has it been defined either federally or in any legislation....
A: No, and that's a problem with Canada is the jurisdiction issues around
the coastal zone. Larry might have touched upon this a little bit but the
coastal zone is really poorly defined. We've all agreed to disagree. And a
lot of what's interesting is you hear from my colleagues at
Intergovernmental Affairs, they're our agency who work directly for the
Premier, and their job is to basically deal with Provincial government
interactions internal, but more importantly the external related provinces,
federal government, other countries. And their issue is that when they do
a coastal issue they spend all their time in making sure that the jurisdiction
issue doesn't become an issue. Basically, making sure that how things are
phrased, how decisions are made, that we don't start going down the path
having to deal with that jurisdictional issue.
Anyway, in short, coastal zone management is not defined in Nova Scotia.
I think everyone has a personal interpretation of what it is. I've tried not
to really nail it down and try to figure it out like to me it's two kilometers
inland. I think it shifts depending on issues, whether you're looking at
environmental or social or economic.
Q: Just out of curiosity, in your opinion, does that gray area, for instance,
that one.. .definition of coastal zoning...does that tend to force more
collaboration between federal, state and local?
A: I don't know. I think it's both. It can force it in the sense that "look,
we have to work together because we don't want to deal with that gray
issue." But, it also makes collaboration more difficult because on the one
hand you have folks saying "well, it's not really defined so I'm not sure
it's our jurisdiction, so therefore, why should we be a part of it?" And on
the other hand you say,".. .well it's not defined and we think it's been
more ours than theirs, so why do they want to do work there?" We deal
with this federally and provincially. Why are you doing coastal
management? That's our coastal land base. That's our stuff. Feds have
from the water down. So I don't know if it actually helps. I would
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actually say that it in some issues .. .it actually makes it more of a struggle.
I think, though, I would add as a condition say that there has been a
history, at least, of working collaboratively to deal with that issue, in terms
of ignoring it or figuring a way to get around it. The feds and the province
don't want to deal with that issue. I think it's one of those things that the
CNO folks think is a quagmire they don't want to step into. So, there is a
history of collaboration. Sable Island is a good example of seabed rights.
Instead of getting constitutional or funding, let's just create MOU. Let's
just come to a formal agreement that it's Canadian, but we reserve
jurisdiction on how to say how it's going to be used, but it's still a national
region. So, I think there is some history there, but when it comes down to,
that's at a higher level, but when it actually comes down to doing stuff, I
think there it becomes more of a hindrance to opportunity. (Canadian
Provincial Employee 1)
So from the perspective of at least one provincial employee, jurisdictional
vagueness is a mixed bag. Curiously, the difference in governance approaches and the
way in which Canada divides its duties between provinces and states, which will be
covered in more detail below, appears to mean that there are relatively fewer but better
connected participants in the Canadian governance scheme.
In summary fashion we will run through some of the more important Canadian
governmental participants. On the Canadian side, the goals for water quality are
generally set forth in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEPA")
and are the responsibility of Environment Canada (EC). The goal of CEPA is to
contribute to sustainable development - development that meets the needs of the present
generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. EC also has responsibilities for pollutants under the Fisheries Act (1985) as well
as the other duties and responsibilities set forth in the Goal Clarification section above.
With respect to the fisheries regulation in Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is
the counterpart to NMFS in Canada - responsible for developing and implementing
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policies and programs in support of Canada's scientific, ecological, social and economic
interests in oceans and fresh waters. Aside from the Coast Guard, DFO's mission is to
integrate environment, economic and social perspectives to ensure Canada's oceans and
freshwater resources benefit this generation and those to come.
The Department's guiding legislation includes the Oceans Act (1996), which
charges the Minister with leading oceans management and providing coast guard and
hydrographic services on behalf of the Government of Canada, and the Fisheries Act
(1985), which confers responsibility to the Minister for the management of fisheries,
habitat and aquaculture.
Other notable Canadian federal participants include Industry Canada and Natural
Resources Canada. Industry Canada offers support for aquaculture in the region and
provides support for continued development of oceans mapping. Natural Resources
Canada contributes knowledge and expertise related to geoscience for oceans
management and other data collection, management and related services relevant to
sustainable development through knowledge integration (CoastLands 2005).
Moving away from the federal Canadian agencies, we can begin to sketch out the
provincial agencies that participate in the governance regime in the BoF/GoM. The New
Brunswick Department of Environment is active in the Gulf of Maine Council and has
numerous environmentally-critical responsibilities. Their historic mission, back when it
was the Department of Environment and Local Government, was "Healthy Environment
- Strong Communities," effectively capturing the integrated nature of a department that
combined environmental quality with community well-being (CoastLands 2005). Now
that they are simply known as the NB Department of Environment it appears that they are
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taking dynamic steps on a local and province-wide to tackle important issues. The
division is now responsible for the administration of all community planning and
environmental programs. Its main goal is to connect and integrate the decision making
process for all of the department's regulatory programs.
Further, the branch has the responsibility to monitor current environmental
conditions, provide scientific testing services, and interpret, evaluate, and report on the
state of the environment in NB. It also has a responsibility to provide interpreted data,
forecasts, and advice to assist in informed decision making throughout the Department of
Environment. Recent accomplishments include:
• In 2010-2011 the department implemented its first year under a pesticides
management strategy. The Department announced a ban on the sale and use of
more than 240 over-the-counter lawn care pesticide products, and the use of all
2,4-D products, on domestic lawns in the province.
• The Province signed a collaborative agreement with all three Atlantic provinces
on climate change adaptation strategies. The three-year initiative, called the
Atlantic Climate Adaptation Solutions Project, is aimed at helping the Atlantic
provinces target local issues such as coastal and inland erosion and flooding, and
groundwater resource management.
•

New Brunswick recorded the largest percentage reduction in greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in Canada in 2008 according to Environment Canada's 2010
National Inventory Report.

• In January 2011, the Department launched the Neighbourhood Eco-Challenge.
The challenge highlighted the importance of families taking action to reduce their
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carbon footprint. It was a partnership between the Department of Environment,
Efficiency NB, the New Brunswick Lung Association and the New Brunswick
Environmental Network.89
The New Brunswick Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture is also
active in the Gulf of Maine Council. The department plays a pivotal role in the
promotion of aquaculture in New Brunswick. It receives applications for non-repayable
strategic assistance in the aquaculture and fisheries sector with an objective to enhance
the competitiveness and innovation of the fishery, aquaculture and seafood processing
sectors in New Brunswick and to create new economic development opportunities.90 The
department also has the objective of fostering the development of the wild marine
resources industry in the province. It is a strong advocate of provincial fisheries interests
and provides a variety of extension services to help ensure that maximum value is derived
from the harvesting of fisheries resources. Simultaneously the department promotes
responsible fishing, sustainable development, and habitat and resource enhancement
activities.91
Moving from New Brunswick to the province of Nova Scotia we will next
examine the two provincial agencies that are active in BoF/GoM governance through the
Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. The first participant that we will
look at is the Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture. This department is
89 2010-2011 Annual Report: Departnwnt of the Environment. htto.V/www. enb.ca/0009/0374/0013/20102011.pdf
90httD://www2.gnb.ca/content/gnb/en/services/services
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gic Assistance Manual.html
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no small player in the activities that it governs that impact the ecosystem. The Nova
Scotia Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture provides services to the province's
agriculture and fishing sectors — two of the biggest economies in the province's coastal
and rural regions. Combined, these industries contribute almost $2 billion annually to the
provincial economy and create over 20,000 jobs. Its mission statement expresses its goal:
To foster prosperous and sustainable fisheries, aquaculture and food industries through
the delivery of quality public services for the betterment of coastal communities and of
all Nova Scotians.92 The goals were expanded on by someone familiar with the goals of
the department as well as the implicit need to work with the federal agencies:

Well, as an agency, ignoring agriculture for now, looking at just fisheries and
aquaculture we deal with aquaculture, obviously, which is leasing of
aquaculture areas, we do the monitoring, we do promotion. We service the
industry. But we also regulate it in a sense. We don't deal with onsite
enforcement as such, that's federal, but we work on that issue because we
want to see this industry thrive, so we work with industry to make sure we
meet its needs. We also process leases for rock weed, so for some marine
plants we do that as well. That's it in terms of the marine environment what
we do. We also, for inland fisheries, we have MOU's for the federal
government over management of inland fisheries. Because the feds retain the
rights over all water courses and the fish in them. But we have signed and
MOU with them so that we have management responsibilities for inland
fisheries. But, when it comes down to our actual management of actual
activity, that's it for our part. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1)
The last Canadian provincial department that will be looked at is the Nova Scotia
Department of the Environment. Nova Scotia Environment is responsible for delivering
effective and efficient regulatory management for the protection of our environment.
With a staff of more than 250 employees working from offices throughout Nova Scotia,

92 http://www.gov.ns.ca/fish/department/mission.shtml
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Almost 70 per cent of the department's resources support inspections and monitoring
activities. Among the items the department is responsible for are air quality, drinking
water and many other facets of everyday life. Thus the department regulates coal bed
methane extraction, natural gas extraction, municipal solid waste landfills and waste
transfer stations, storm drainage, municipal groundwater source water facilities, drinking
water standards, and a host of other significant responsibilities.93
So in Canada, the lack of formal jurisdictional lines may act as a vehicle that
forces increased collaboration among the regulatory agencies at all levels. There may be
a trend to include the public more in governance issues, but if there is it is not very
significant at the moment.
We have now examined most of the government participants that play a role in
the governance scheme of the BoF/GoM watershed. Certainly we have already said a
great deal about the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. They are a
critical participant in the governance process with the chief function of providing a forum
for ideas to be discussed and debated among the key regulatory agencies in the region.
To get a more complete picture of the Gulf of Maine Council, it may prove helpful to
show their organizational chart, which gives a good idea of the broad spectrum of their
activities (Figure 21).
From Figure 21 it is interesting that there is a "box" for every function necessary to
provide guidance and even accountable oversight for nearly every issue threatening the
regional ecosystem - except overfishing. The other critical element missing - input by
communities and by an active, knowledgeable public. The vast number of
93
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Figure 21 Gulf of Maine Council Organization Chart (GOMC)

responsibilities falls to the Working Group - the mid-level agency management
personnel who give of their time to take on tasks for the GOMC, including its committees
and subcommittees well in excess of their normal employment.
In the fall of 2005 with funding from the GOMC I conducted a phone survey of
Council members. Basically it was my task to obtain the insights of each council
member by asking them nine questions drafted by representatives of the Council's
working group (Coon 2005b). Rather than use any more space talking about my
impressions of the Council, what follows are quotes from Council members themselves
which I believe are representative of their different views of the Council's role:
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The purpose is to provide a forum primarily for representatives of our
state, provincial and federal governments to focus on common resources
and issues that affect the common body of water that we all reside on.
[The purpose is to] [coordinate regionally on issues of transboundary
importance that we can't attack on our own and to work to improve
environmental quality in the region.
I always go back to the original cooperative agreement that the states and
provinces signed. The GoMC is a consortium of state and provincial
jurisdictions that creates a dialogue to discuss issues that impact the Gulf
of Maine environment and that may resonate because they are of mutual
concern between two or more of the jurisdictions. Those issues can be
discussed in a forum that is not driven by some of the things as the
individual jurisdictions, i.e. it is less encumbered by the issue of the day.
It is more prescriptive and broader in its focus on the overall health of the
GoMC. In a sense they have their organizational entities able to
participate openly without the jurisdictions being put on the spot. The
Council has done a good job of getting those ideas out in the open and
discussed.
The main strength is that it provides a forum to discuss issues with
counterparts. It also is a priority for my department's leadership. The
main weakness is that you have so many different points of view and there
are so many complexities. Individual agencies often have their hands tied
and they are therefore unable to enter into regional commitments. Another
weakness is our public relations program. Only people in the scientific
community or agencies of government know what the GOMC is or does.
We need to get the word out to a broader constituency.
I'm not the biggest fan of the Gulf of Maine Council although I'm a
member. I do believe the communication function is worthwhile. In
addition, because of mission creep I participate to make sure I know what
actions the organization is taking.
It's part of the mandate of the office of the premier to participate. The
motivation comes from my love of the ocean and my prior involvement
with individuals who are striving to protect the Gulf of Maine. Thus there
is a need for good information and the GOMC provides good information
and reliable science that we can use in the department.
From my perspective there is value in getting decision makers together to
talk. I don't need a lot of show and tell time, however. I think that we end
up with so much structure that we are ignoring the real issues that are
impacting the Gulf of Maine ecosystem, for example issues related to
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LNG citing. For example we spend so much time revising the action plan
that we lose opportunities to provide a forum for leaders to discuss the
threats in our Gulf of Maine region and talk about our common interests
and how to face challenges. That shouldn't all be public meetings with
reporters present. There should be time or a way to have executive
sessions to discuss sensitive issues. (Coon 2005b)

The quotes excerpted from the survey help demonstrate the diversity of the views
held by Council members and may help explain why there is no apparent movement by
the Council to play a bolder role in the governance regime of the BoF/GoM region.
There are, of course, other participants. Industry, for instance, plays a role.
Commercial and industrial enterprise is essential to the regional economy and they often
rely upon the natural resources of the region either for fuel, or as commodities to be
incorporated in a product, or to absorb their wastes. This study only peripherally looked
at industrial participants. There is one trend of increased industrial activism and that is in
the management of the region's fisheries:
Q: Industry trade groups, what role?
A: I think that you'll find that industry trade groups are becoming more
organized lately as they were when I first took over. So when I first took
over you might have 400 angry fishermen and not very organized, maybe
all saying the same things, or all saying different things. Their message
didn't come across too clearly. Now I think you have some very key
industry groups like Associated Fisheries of Maine, the Cape Cod Hook
Association, the one in Gloucester, the Northeast Seafood Coalition, the
Fisheries Survival Fund for scallops, the Herring Alliance. The industry
groups are very well organized to the point where you see fewer people at
the meetings but you see the representatives paying close attention at
every meeting. I've seen that change. (U.S. Federal Employee 3)
Other industry and trade associations play roles, and these will examined in
connection with their impact on the Decision Process.
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There are also participants from the world of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). As we have discussed, the NGOs in the region have no umbrella organization
and do not appear to work together on the factors that pose threats to the regional
ecosystem.
The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") is an example of an international
environmental non-profit that has offices in every state bordering the Gulf of Maine.
Their Gulf of Maine program has helped protect thousands of acres of coastal habitat in
the Gulf. They have launched an oyster reef restoration project in Wellfleet Bay with a
goal of revitalizing populations of the American Oyster. In New Hampshire, TNC is
working in the Great Bay to control invasive species like common reed grass. TNC likes
to use "market-based" approaches - meaning land conservation through the purchasing of
easements, and the leasing or purchasing of resource rights.94 In addition, TNC has
significantly added to the knowledge base of the Gulf of Maine regional community by
making available Phase One of its Northwest Atlantic Ecoregional Assessment. The
Ecoregional Assessment is a survey and compilation of literature and data relevant to the
physical and biological components of the ecosystem (Green, Anderson et al. 2010).
The Conservation Law Foundation works in all states as well. Its Mission is
stated as follows:
CLF protects New England's environment for the benefit of all people.
We use the law, science and the market to create solutions that preserve

94http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/maine/facesofconservation/gulf

mainebrochfinal cropped.pdf

441

of

our natural resources, build healthy communities, and sustain a vibrant
economy.95

CLF's work in New England has four focus areas: Clean energy and climate
change, ocean conservation (including fisheries management and estuary restoration),
clean water (including nutrient and stormwater pollution), and healthy communities
(livable cities and transportation). In my experience, CLF has been one of the most
effective conservation advocates in the region. It was a named plaintiff in the 1991
litigation that helped for a while to stop overfishing of the depleted groundfish stocks in
the Gulf of Maine. CLF is also taking a lead role in efforts in rivers and estuaries in New
England to tackle issues related to nutrients overloads from wastewater treatment plants
and agriculture as well as contaminated storm water. CLF's main strategy seems to be
using the law and their web site touts their "tenacious legal advocacy."96
There are literally hundreds of separate NGOs scattered around the BoF/GoM
watershed. Indeed the web site for the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine
Environment states that there are more than 600 organizations with a declared interest in
the Gulf of Maine and its waters in its NGO directory.97 It would appear, however, that
the NGO movement around the watershed is fragmented as the governmental efforts. I
selected TNC and CLF because they are two of the more prominent NGOs in the region
and because of the contrast in their strategies. The CLF is noted for its chief strategy of
using the law and, by inference, litigation, to gain traction to achieve their goals. TNC,
95

http://www.clf.org/about-clf7our-mission/

96 http://www.clf.org/our-work/clean-water/
97

http://www.gulfofmaine.org/ngo_directory/
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on the other hand, appears to favor market and economic measures, including the
conservation of critical lands through the purchasing of easements as well as the
purchasing or leasing of harvesting or permitting rights.
The participants in the governance regime in the region include government
federal, state, and provincial agencies, as well as local governments. We have examined
the major government players, including the legislation that guides them and their
perspectives. We also looked at the growth of industry trade groups in the fisheries
management area. Finally two prominent NGOs were briefly examined along with their
goals, mission, and principle strategy.
What is missing, unfortunately, is mention of any notion of collaborative
partnerships between governments, industry, NGOs, and communities. Significant public
participation appears to be largely missing from any examination of the participants in
the regional governance regime. At the beginning of this discussion of the participants it
was noted that an expectation or at least the opportunity for meaningful participation and
input of a broad segment of the regulated population in decision making processes
(Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). This means that significant,
meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; Francis 1993; Francis and
Regier 1995; Cortner and Moote 1999; Clark 2002; Jackson 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke,
Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Finally, participation must be open to almost any person or
group with a significant interest in the issue (Becker 1993; Kjaer 2004; Brunner, Steelman
et al. 2005; Jackson 2005; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
As this section demonstrates, public participation and community involvement are
largely missing in the BoF/GoM. Without this important aspect of ecosystem-based
443

governance, the region is destined to continue the management of human activities that
impact the environment in the same manner as in the past. If past is prologue, nothing
good can come from that.
The discussion of participants also included many of the perspectives held by the
participants examined above. Thus the framework look at perspectives will be summary
in nature.
Perspectives. As we have seen, all participants have perspectives. Such
perspectives can include conflicting ideas, feelings, and beliefs about a problem and often
rest on basic beliefs. Social groups may coalesce around a perspective, but participants
are individuals with their own beliefs, interests, loyalties, and faith. The way they see
themselves, or their identifications as members of some group, are important to explain
their actions. In our ecosystem-based approach model, governance would be open to new
ideas and experimental approaches. Participants would reject their traditional adherence
to processes that are parochial and resistant to innovation. They would also place the
good of the BoF/GoM ecosystem, the resilience and integrity of the natural processes
necessary to sustain ecosystem and structure ahead of other more parochial interests and
would share a belief in collaboration, cooperation, and citizen empowerment. Finally, the
ideal of human dignity would no longer be ignored, and citizen access to democratic
processes and an overall commitment by participants to the common interests should
prove more important than the preservation of bureaucratic turf. (Table 46)
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Table 46 Perspectives
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Perspective requires a governance structure
that looks to find common ground on
policies that advance common interests. In
addition, the perspective necessary for
ecosystem-based governance should be
more universal and open to new ideas and
experimental approaches rather than
parochial and institutionally resistant to
innovation.
Problem solving should be viewed as a
flexible process with broad participation and
a variety of perspectives and should be
cognizant that environmental, social, and
economic systems are related with problems
that overlap and need to be approached with
a concern for human dignity and a respect
for democratic access.
Common interest in ecosystem-based
governance is to enable management to
focus on the natural processes necessary to
sustain ecosystem structure and function
while recognizing the need for human and
institutional involvement at every level of
the ecosystem. The common interest of
maintaining and supporting ecosystem
integrity should outweigh parochial interests
in preserving bureaucratic turf or command
and control hierarchy.

Governance in the BoF/GoM watershed is a
bureaucracy with participants unable to
move beyond jurisdictional restraints
imposed by law. Overriding perspective is
to maintain the status quo. Agency
employees who seek to advance common
interests are unable to do so because of
parochial resistance to significant
innovation.
Problems are dealt with by agencies with
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
problem. Uniform general rules or laws are
applied to specific problems. Concern for
human dignity and respect for democratic
access are seldom factors.

The parochial interests in preserving
bureaucratic turf and traditional rules take
precedence over the common interest of
maintaining and supporting ecosystem
resilience and integrity. Innovative efforts
are approached by GOMC but true gulfwide governance focused on the natural
processes necessary to sustain ecosystem
structure and function is not a realistic
prospect at present.

It should be apparent at this point that governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region is executed through decisions made by agencies charged by law with the
authority over some segment of the ecosystem. For the most part, the same agencies
have been performing the same services for 30 or 40 years. The beliefs, loyalties, and
interests of the participants in the government regime appear to be aligned firmly with the
goals and limitations of the agency. While frustrating to many, it is a paradigm by
default in the region.
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Writing about his experiences and observations gleaned from the spotted owl
controversy, natural resource analyst Steven Yaffee wrote about how comfortable it is for
bureaucracies to act in standardized ways:

Traditional ways of doing things have been tested by the realities of time,
agency staff are accomplished at carrying out their tasks, and longstanding
patterns of individual and organizational behavior create a predictable and
energy-conserving reality for agency staffers and leaders alike.
Organizations generally do what they do because they are administratively
comfortable, politically and fiscally feasible, and legally allowable Like
all organisms, bureaucracies define, find, and protect a decision space - a
niche - in which they are comfortable and can thrive (Yaffee 1995,
402).402
Or as expressed by a state employee familiar with management efforts in the
region:
Government right now, whether it's federal or state, is unwilling to grow.
When you talk about with ecosystem-based management is that the
management system has to grow and the science system has to grow
before we can do that. It's not a function of taking my urchin
management person and making them an ecosystem person. In fact you
need to have both functions going on. (U.S. State Employee 1)
Thus perspectives of the governance participants in the BoF/GoM watershed tend
to center around the maintenance of the fragmented regulatory regime in place now for
decades. While certainly some individual participants are, again, frustrated with this
perspective, there remains little that can be done to overcome the jurisdictional restraints
imposed upon them by current law and regulation. Anything more added at this point
would be redundant. We turn, therefore, to the task of Situations.
Situations. Participants to an ecosystem governance process may interact in
formal or informal settings, on a number of levels, and regularly or only during crises.
Thus the examination of the situations in which participants interact may have temporal
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elements depending upon how often the participants interact. It may also have spatial
issues determined by the geographic boundaries represented by the participants. There
may be institutional issues that depend upon the degree that power is centralized or
decentralized in the region and whether regimentation is increasing or decreasing.
Finally the issue is whether it takes a crisis for participants to mobilize participants to
alter their perspectives and discourse-related practices in order to resolve the crises (Clark
2002).
Table 47 Situations
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Collaboration, communication and cooperation
between government, stakeholders, and the
public allow for governance that works more
with participants than on them. This means
more frequent collaborative interaction
between government and participants at all
levels. Further, agencies need to be less geared
toward enforcement and more willing to be
used as resources for local involvement and for
solving problems where they arise.

There are few opportunities for frequent
collaboration, communication and cooperation
between government, stakeholders, and the
public. Traditional agency government
implementation requires enforcement of
uniform laws, applying laws to specific
situations. Some progress has been made in
public involvement in fisheries management
with the advent of sector management, but it
may backfire as permits are bought up by
wealthy fishermen and local small-boat
fishermen are forced out of the industry.
There are few opportunities for meaningful
public participation opportunities in
governance. Enforcement of regulatory laws
are still basically through penalties and
citations for non-compliance.

Decision-making and other collaborative
processes are iterative and ongoing, not simply
single-play problem-solving efforts. The need
for passive formal public and adversarial public
hearings can be reduced through citizen
involvement and partnership, not just public
information programs to inform passively.

In an ecosystem-based approach we would expect that there would be ample
opportunity, or situations, for participants to communicate and collaborate (See Table
47). In the BoF/GoM region, however, there are generally limited opportunities for
communication, collaboration, and citizen involvement. There have been attempts,
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including the Gulf of Maine Summit sponsored by the GOMC, but these are infrequent
and relatively rare. The GOMC also provides opportunities for its working group to meet
four times a year, and the actual Council to meet twice a year. These meetings often are
devoted to developing their five year Action Plans. While various approaches have been
tried for each plan, the public has not been a huge factor in any one plan - at least
through 2008, as one member of the Council's Working Group relates:

Yes, we've used a different process for each of the four action plans. The
first one came out of the big Gulf of Maine conference in 1989. It sort of
identified the issues and established a general plan around that. The
second and third plans were, we thought, okay we need to have more
specific objectives, so to fine-tune our actions, and this one's getting more
results-based. The second action plan, I don't think, 2001/2006,1don't
think had much of a public engagement process. We'd just done a big
workshop, we know what it is, we can just make a more specific plan.
The plan after that had a lot more outreach: Surveys, engagement,
workshops, and some gathering the input. Here's what we've known over
the last five or six years, here are the goals we're shooting toward, what do
you think our priorities should be, what role will counsel play? So, it was
quite active. We did the summit and everything leading up to this one.
The decision here is this is probably more internal. We sort of know the
lay of the land, we did some outreach, some engagement. But, I wouldn't
say that was the real emphasis of this current action plan for 2006/2011.
It's really, let's look internally to what the priority is. (Canadian Federal
Employee 2)
One example of a group that exemplifies ecosystem and community-based
governance in the region that takes advantage of situations and uses them to encompass
frequent opportunities for cooperation and collaboration among a broad-based coalition
of the public, scientists, and policy makers
The ACAP model is very much about leadership at the local level. We
don't tell them what they have to work on. What we did in the early years
was that we helped them come together and they went through a visioning
process, setting the goals and objectives, and each of them developed a
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comprehensive environmental management plan. We gave them the first
five years to do that. Nothing existed in these areas before, so helping a
group come together, letting them determine what they actually wanted to
achieve, and helping them do that. So those comprehensive management
plans were real touchstones for them. Throughout that process we've said,
look here are Environment Canada's goals, which they align with local
interests. We hope there is some alignment or we're going to have
difficult times working with you. By having those shared goals and the
way they developed it, it wasn't just a couple of people sitting in a room
doing this. It very much involved broad engagement of the citizenry, all
levels of government, the private sector, that's who represents, who forms
these ACAP organizations. (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
BoFEP as we have seen provides periodic gatherings of scientists, experts, and
citizens from around the basin as discussed previously.

But, as we have seen, efforts

that go beyond the legal boundaries limiting agency jurisdictions are rare. There has
been little indication of movement towards a governance system that is heading toward
partnerships with innovative techniques for working with industry other than the
traditional confrontational methods. Thus situations in which participants in the region
interact are generally controlled and relatively choreographed.
Base Values. In Chapter III it was pointed out that environmental policy disputes
are almost always "contests over values" despite the fact that they are often masked in
economic or environmental jargon or appear to revolve around technical issues (Layzer
2006).
The values that we will discuss in terms of the BoF/GoM governance regime
include the typical assets or resources that participants use in their efforts to achieve their
goals. All values, including authority, can be used as bases of power. Brewer and
deLeon (1983) have listed the values pertinent to this inquiry:
Power is to make and carry out decisions
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Enlightenment is to have knowledge
Wealth is to have money or its equivalent
Well-being is to have health, physical and psychological
Skill is to have special abilities.
Affection is to have family, friends, and warm community relationships
Respect is to show and receive deference
Rectitude is to have ethical standards
The characteristics of an ideal ecosystem approach to governance include a heavy
reliance on significant public participation, vertical and horizontal collaboration,
resilience, and learning through trial and error. The values necessary for the
implementation of an ecosystem-based approach must move away from the traditional
goals of power and wealth as ends in themselves. In order for implementation of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance to have a chance there needs to be much more
emphasis on utilizing power and wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the values of
knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and respect. A trial-and-error approach to management
solutions, for example, requires a strong commitment to the gathering and sharing of
knowledge together with an ability to acknowledge failures without the fear of
punishment or the loss of funding. In addition, collaboration and significant public
participation will require a focus on the values of respect, affection, rectitude and wellbeing. There is simply no way to gain the trust, credibility, and respect necessary for
problem-solving and planning collaboration and public and broad-based community
support without a shift more in the direction of these important values.
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Thus our ideal system must first be characterized by resource sharing and
collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public and regulated interests
together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to
identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take in order to preserve and
restore ecosystem resilience. In an ecosystem-based approach to governance, base values
come into play in both the goals for the governance of the ecosystem and in the
implementation processes that seek to implement the goals (Table 48).
Table 48 Base Values
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Values sought should be consistent with
goals of promotion of broad collaboration
with emphasis on ecosystem resilience.
The values of power and wealth should be
utilized to press demands for common
interests prioritizing human dignity,
ecosystem integrity and resilience.
Knowledge (enlightenment) should be a
goal that is ideally gained from a variety
of sources through a process of trial and
error as much as through traditional
experimental science.

Agencies rely on the support of
elected officials and support is often
tied to the satisfaction of those
officials with the agency's
contributions to or lack of
interference with local or regional
gains. With limited exceptions
(Saltwater Network, ACAP) human
dignity is not prioritized. Ecosystem
resilience and integrity, though the
goal of some participants, limited by
jurisdictional constraints and agency
turf concerns.
The values of power and wealth
appear to be used to preserve the
status quo agency set-up as well as to
promote private economic gain.
There appears to rarely be trades of
power and/or wealth to obtain
knowledge, well-being, or rectitude.

In order for implementation of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance
to have a chance there needs to be much
more emphasis on utilizing power and
wealth to obtain stronger inputs from the
values of knowledge, rectitude, wellbeing, and respect

As we know, the governance regime in the BoF/GoM is fragmented with separate
agencies each responsible for a portion of the activities that impact the ecosystem.
Without an accountable overarching entity and a spirit of cooperation, collaboration, and
significant public involvement it would be difficult to achieve governance "characterized
by resource sharing and collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public
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and regulated interests together with regulators to share ideas, develop knowledge, and
gain mutual respect to identify goals, threats to those goals, and possible actions to take
in order to preserve and restore ecosystem resilience."
Given the existing governance regime in the region, it is not surprising that the
values of power and wealth tend to trump those of knowledge, rectitude, well-being and
respect. As discussed in the prior sections, bureaucratic agencies in the region must
constantly guard their turf. As we learned in Chapter III, the behavior of regulatory
agencies is often strongly influenced by industrial interests and a desire to minimize or
avoid loss of values such as power, wealth (i.e. funding), and respect. In decisions
involving potential adverse effects on important industries (e.g. fishing in New England),
agency value losses include decreased budget allocations from unsympathetic legislatures
so the costs of making decisions that adversely affect various industries are often
perceived as too great to risk. Agencies rely on the support of elected officials and
support is often tied to the satisfaction of those officials with the agency's contributions
to or lack of interference with local or regional gains. Backlash against strong
conservation methods that may impact economic productivity can be severe even at a
local level (Wallace 2003).
In contrast to the traditional model of resource management which reduces
agency and institutional (public institutions and private business interests) behavior into a
constant quest for power and wealth as capital for the purchase of other values, the policy
sciences approach has consistently been focused on the intelligence relevant to an
integration of values derived from interpersonal relations which prizes not the glory of a
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depersonalized state or the efficiency of a social mechanism, but human dignity and the
realization of human capacities" (deLeon 1988, 37 - 38) Thus in an ideal society:

.. .citizens enjoy a full range of values, a state that has also been called 'a
commonwealth of human dignity.' A healthy society is possible only
when citizens enjoy a level of all eight values satisfactory to their needs
(Clark 2008,45).
In order to begin to achieve the kind of society described above, governance in
the BoF/GoM region must move away from its administrative rationalist (Dryzek 1997)
paradigm. Speaking broadly, the values of power and wealth should be utilized to press
demands for common interests of human dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience
(Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson 2002a; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Knowledge
(enlightenment) should be a goal that, as we have seen, is ideally gained from a variety of
sources through a process of trial and error as much as through traditional experimental
science (Brunner and Steelman 2005).
Certainly given the current governance scheme, there is little likelihood that the
various jurisdictions represented on the Gulf of Maine Council would move away from a
purely fragmented system and toward a more accountable, responsible arrangement with
the GOMC playing the coordinating role. The reluctance of the Council, or more
appropriate its membership, to evolve into a more accountable governance role can be
frustrating to some:
A: Time and time again when we talk to the Council about what they want
their role to be, whether it's about EBM or anything else, and we give
them the spectrum, like the chance to give the Council some authority to
change something, they always gravitate back to the forum role.
Q: There's been a reluctance to regulate as a group?
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A: Yes. Definitely.
Q: Or to give up or share any power in any way, shape or form?
A: Yes. It's hard enough even to articulate their power. I mean not even
a challenge... (U.S. Federal Employee 4)

Others who participate in the Council feel that to maintain their agency's power
and respect, as well as the credibility of the Council, industry must be appeased:

Q: Okay, we're almost done here. Gulf of Maine Council. What
direction would you like to see it take?
A: Well, it's all over the spectrum, and they probably told you that...
New Brunswick Agriculture and Fisheries and Aquaculture and I are
really focused on getting industry. It's our priority. If it doesn't happen,
we walk. We basically made that very clear because, what's difficult for
us is that development agencies will come to the table not engaging our
constituents and being perceived by industry as well, you're just working
an environmental group. That's not what council is or is about. And,
really, if council wants to achieve what it wants to achieve and we talked
about this when we started, you can't do it without engaging industry.
You can't ignore the biggest users or potentially biggest impact in the
marine environment. (Canadian Provincial Employee 1)
Thus while no one can deny that the GOMC provides a valuable forum for the
exchange of information, the goals of power and wealth seem to be the key drivers for
governance within the current regulatory system - at least as to many of the agencies
participating through the GOMC. As we saw above, however, that is often simply the
nature of bureaucracy.
The situation is no different with some regulatory agencies that do not participate
in Council activities. The process set up for the New England Fisheries Management
Council by the Magnuson-Stevens Sustainable Fisheries Act (1976) appears to allow for
power and wealth to be the dominant values in some decision-making. One example is
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the ability of the NEFMC or NMFS to crack down on state fisheries that permit too many
fish to be caught within waters over which the states have jurisdiction (3 mile limit) - a
result that violates the duty of states to act consistent with the federal government or
NMFS regulations:

Q: It seems to me that the harder the states hammer the stocks, the more
difficult it will be for the Council and the federal agencies to show a court,
for instance, that you're rebuilding according to the timetables.
A: Absolutely. And there's one section of the Magnuson Act that I think
says that if the states are interfering with rebuilding, the federal
government can preempt the state laws if they're not consistent with
federal. It has never happened; won't happen. Politics. There's no way
that the Department of Commerce is going to preempt the states.
Q: Why the pressure? Why wouldn't Commerce step in?
A: Political pressure.
Q: It would be just too unpopular?
A: Yes. We work closely that they abide by the federal laws but they
don't want to. The federal laws are far too stringent for the state fisheries
experts.
Q: But if we're talking about the same stocks what is the argument that
the states use to keep laws less stringent?
A: They just can. States rights. They can do whatever they want zero to
three miles out.
A: So to them it's an economic issue?
A: It's an economic issue and a political issue.
Q: The fishing industry has enough power to force...
A: Absolutely. You know you get to Rhode Island, Massachusetts, they
have in shore commercial fisheries that are, like the flounder fishery,
black-back fishery, yellowtail in shore fisheries, herring. (US Federal
Employee 3)
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Recall that under our ideal view of ecosystem based governance, the values
sought by participants should be consistent with the promotion of broad collaboration
with emphasis on ecosystem resilience. The values of power and wealth should be
utilized to press demands for common interests prioritizing human dignity, ecosystem
integrity and resilience. Thus whether it involves the regulation of fisheries or the other
threats confronting the region's ecosystem, the values that tend to drive the regulatory
process in the BoF/GoM region have little relationship to the ideal model. From what
we have learned in this study, power and wealth appear to be used often to preserve the
status quo agency set-up as well as to promote private economic gain. This approach
differs markedly from our ideal, which would advocate the use of power and wealth as a
means to obtain stronger inputs from the values of knowledge, rectitude, well-being, and
respect.
Strategies. Thus far in the analysis of the social process at work in the Great
Lakes in first two decades of the GLWQA we have examined the participants, their
perspectives, the situations in which they interact, and the base values that are used to
achieve the goals of the participants. The strategies employed by the participants will be
examined next.
The four basic strategies that were identified in Chapter III may be listed
as follows:
•

Diplomatic strategies use communication among and between the leaders
and/or elites of any group or agency;
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•

Ideological strategies involve communications to a public that is wider
than just leaders or heads of agencies and include public talks, newspaper
and other mass media appeals and, in the extreme, propaganda;

•

Economic strategies that consist of practices that rely on the production
and distribution of goods and services. Boycotts and labor actions are
included in economic strategies (Clark 2002), and

•

Litigation which in this study is defined as disputes that are submitted for
binding resolution by a third party.
In Chapter III the need to move toward a governance system that moves

away from regulatory enforcement efforts geared toward targeted interventions at point
sources and problem areas in the form of commands to different classes of firms
mandating change in existing technologies or behavior was discussed at some length. In
place of coercive command and control regulatory conduct, at least to some degree,
should be a movement toward cooperation and collaboration in decisions about processes
and raw materials, sustainability planning integrating environmental goals with other
social and economic goals using diplomatic and ideological strategies (Table 49).
Certainly there will always be a need for basic rules backed by the coercive power of the
state in order to keep firms in line and not give unfair competitive advantage to
environmentally noncompliant firms (Harrison 1995; Kagan 2001; Kjaer 2004; Fiorino
2006). The point is that ecosystem-based approach governance would seek to work with
the regulated public to a greater degree.
In addition to the need to move away from coercive regulatory conduct and
litigation, the literature and case studies discussed in chapter III suggest the need for a
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bridging organization that connects, navigates and/or coordinates the interests of
different institutions and stakeholders across organizational levels should also be an
integral part of adaptive governance of social-ecological systems. As was pointed out
earlier, such organizations provide social incentives by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and innovation.
Table 49 Strategies
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

An ecosystem-based approach would rely
more on ideological and diplomatic
strategies, moving away from regulatory
enforcement efforts geared toward targeted
interventions at point sources and problem
areas which take the form of commands to
different classes of firms mandating change
in existing technologies or behavior. Instead
there would be cooperation and
collaboration in decisions about processes
and raw materials, sustainability planning
integrating environmental goals with other
social and economic goals.
Litigation will play a role as there is a need
for basic rules to be backed by the coercive
power of the state in order to keep firms in
line and not give unfair competitive
advantage to environmentally noncompliant
firms. Litigation would, however, rely more
upon alternative dispute mechanisms,
including facilitation and mediation.
The existence of a bridging organization
that connects and navigates the interests of
different stakeholders across organizational
levels should be integral part of adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems.
Such organizations provide social incentives
by rewarding and creating space for
collaboration, value formation, and
innovation. The collaboration that bridging
organizations initiate is strategic-,
conditional on the goals to enhance the
values from the ecosystems

Strategies differ between Canada
and the U.S. although both are still
based largely on traditional
command and control governance
and enforcement. Canada shows
more willingness to use softer
intervention using diplomacy rather
than punishment as inducement to
change behavior and foster
compliance.
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In U.S. litigation is the principle tool
used for enforcement and penalties.
There may be recognition of a need
for greater voluntary compliance
efforts, especially as funding is
diminished and costly litigation loses
attraction.
There is no bridging organization in
the region currently capable of
connecting and coordinating
different stakeholders across
organizational levels. GOMC plays
role of a forum to provide discourse
between and among regulatory
agencies. The goals of the GOMC
are broad and ecosystem-based, but
are not shared by all participants.
Jurisdictional constraints of
members also are barriers to
change.

The collaboration that bridging organizations initiate is strategic, conditional on the goals
to enhance the values that may tend to promote the sustainability and resilience of the
ecosystems (Hahn, Schultz et al. 2008).
In the final analysis strategies in an ecosystem-based approach should be more
goal-oriented and should have institutions and processes that enable and incentivize more
diplomatic and ideological strategies and discourage the use of more adversarial and/or
litigious strategies (Table 49).
The current regulatory regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region appears
to adhere to a more traditional governance scheme. Activities are regulated by federal,
state, or provincial agencies. Strategies have to be built upon a basis laid by formal laws
and rules. Reliance is therefore generally upon regulation using economic or social
intervention to force compliance with uniform rules. Where this intervention fails,
litigation provides the remedy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino 2006). Thus status quo strategies
use litigation, and by extension enforcement with the threat of litigation, as a principle
weapon in the management arsenal (Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004; Walker and Salt 2006;
Bardach and Kagan 2010).
There is a clear difference between Canada and the United States regarding
enforcement strategies. In Canada, with vague jurisdictional lines, federal and provincial
agencies tend to work together and compromise with resource users. The strategy is
principally diplomatic. Indeed, while formal enforcement responses like criminal
prosecution and administrative notices are important tools in Canada, they are typically
viewed as mechanisms of last resort. Administrators in Canada more often utilize
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informal mechanisms to bring about compliance (Abbot 2009). As one Canadian federal
official pointed out respect to environmental enforcement strategy in Canada:
Q: So, your principle strategy, is it safe to say, is basically.. .and I can
give you a choices.. .there's diplomatic, there's litigation or does that
include that from the outside, there's economic, and there's ideological,
meaning trying to achieve goals through education on scientific, social,
economic, research, etc., education. It seems to me if I were pick
strategies, you're using chiefly diplomatic and ideological, would that be
fair?
A: Yes. That's fair. Diplomatic...I'm not sure you're
interpretation.. ..certainly ideological...
Q: Let's say negotiations...
A: Yes. Okay. Finding consensus, if you will. The legal stuff is always
there. Everyone says their legal obligations have to be met, meet them. If
you need to educate, enforce, whatever, so if Environment Canada is
responsible for enforcing certain regulations, just do it. Meet the letter of
the law. We expect that. And industries and so on, meet your obligations
on that end. But, in terms of anything legal beyond that, no, it's what are
our common interests? (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
Despite the existence of alternatives, litigation has become a tactical and strategic
weapon employed by all sides to policy conflicts - at least in the United States (Fiorino
2006). In the US, the courts have also become a political venue for the losers in prior
policy battles fought in Congress, or in the agency regulatory process, to launch another
assault. Litigation also provides a stalling mechanism to the policy process and creates a
bargaining chip to be bartered for concessions from opponents (Rosenbaum 2008).
The management of groundfish stocks in New England is one example of the use
of litigation as a strategy that has resulted in the courts playing a significant role in
fisheries management in the Gulf of Maine. It was largely the litigation in Conservation
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Law Foundation v. Evans that forced NMFS and the NEFMC to take tough measures in
order to stop the overfishing of groundfish stocks in the Gulf of Maine following their
collapse in the early 1990s. Another result of the New England groundfish collapse was
the establishment of the political will to pass amendments to the Magnuson Stevens
Fishery Management Act. These amendments, known in short form as the Sustainable
Fisheries Act ("SFA"), include mandatory rebuilding provisions as well as a section
designed to protect essential fish habitat ("EFH") (1996a). The EFH provisions of the
Sustainable Fisheries Act may open up the possibility of more litigation aimed at
controlling the destruction of marine benthic habitats, corals, and other structures caused
by bottom trawling and other destructive fishing practices (Bilsky 2006).
Litigation is also beginning to play a role in efforts by the EPA to reduce the
nutrient levels in the region's bays and estuaries. In a recent opinion by the
Environmental Appeals Board of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in Upper
Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement District," the court ruled that EPA had an
obligation under Section 303 of the Clean Water Act to require permits to include
whatever conditions are necessary to "[ajchieve water quality standards under section
303 of the CWA, including State...criteria for water quality." The limitations and
conditions in any permit under Section 303 "must control all pollutants...which the
[Region] determines are or may be discharged at a level which will cause, have the
reasonable potential to cause, or contribute to any excursion above any State water
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quality standard..." Blackstone at p. 24. Thus the EPA may now impose on any State or
municipality a requirement that its sewage discharge reduce levels of nutrients, including
nitrogen and phosphorous, to extremely low levels if there is evidence showing that
effluent discharged by the state or municipality "contributes" to a violation of state water
quality standards. This has incredible implications to regions like New Hampshire's
Great Bay where nitrogen and phosphorus levels exceed water quality standards. No
longer does the EPA have to prove that the effluent discharged by municipal water
treatment facilities is the "cause" of the violation - a nearly impossible task given the
multitude of sources that contribute nutrients to the water. Under Blackstone the EPA
need only prove that such facilities contribute to the problem. Given that any addition of
nutrients in waste water discharge necessarily contributes to the water quality standard
violations, EPA enforcement of new permitting standards is sure to be enforced through
the courts using the Blackstone precedent.
In sum, traditional top-down government enforcement and intervention is still the
main government strategy in the region. When issues arise over compliance with
uniform laws, litigation is the primary strategy used to enforce legal standards. There
are, perhaps, more diplomatic and ideological tactics being attempted, but litigation
remains the main strategy used to achieve compliance with laws, rules, and regulations.
Outcomes. Outcomes, generally short-term but may be medium or long-term as
well, are the culminating events measured in terms of values that may be seen as
indicative of progress, or not, depending on the perspective of the participants. Outcomes
may take the form of changes in process, or institutions, which, at least in terms of a
transition to ecosystem-based governance, indicate movement toward the creation and
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implementation of the perspectives and institutional structures that are conducive to
innovation.
In terms of our ideal system, progress would be indicated by efforts to share
power with and distribute more values to a greater portion of the public (Table 50). If
analysis of the values set forth in our social process reveals that more power and wealth is
being accumulated by fewer entities, this would reflect a negative trend to those who seek
to move in the direction of a more ecosystem-based approach to governance. If, on the
other hand, there are tangible efforts toward creating governance processes and structures
that encourage public participation, collaboration, the mobilization of local knowledge,
and more adaptable, accountable, and flexible management, then outcomes are headed in
a direction consistent with ecosystem-based governance (Brewer and deLeon 1983;
deLeon 1999; Clark 2002; Clark 2008).
Table 50 Outcomes
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Transition toward a more adaptive
ecosystem-based approach to governance.
Innovative measures are tried that
transform current governance entities and
create new or modified value institutions
that get beyond scientific management and
strict command and control hierarchy of
bureaucracy using local input and
collaborative processes.

There have been positive developments in
the language used by the GOMC and its
member agencies indicating their adoption
of ecosystem-based approaches to
governance. It remains to be seen whether
truly collaborative efforts evolve out of
these pronouncements and whether the
public and communities will be enticed
and welcomed into the process to
contribute local knowledge and
information.

In terms of outcomes in the BoF/GoM region, there are some to be found,
although often they are largely symbolic. One outcome, of course, is the continued
existence of the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment as a forum for the
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exchange of ideas and information for regulatory agencies in the region. Another
positive development are the goals and operating principles set forth in the most recent
Gulf of Maine Council Action Plan (GOMCc 2007). Discussed at length earlier in this
chapter, that document clearly embraces the principles of ecosystem-based governance
and recognizes the need for increased collaboration as well as the desirability of
increased public outreach and education. In addition, as has been mentioned earlier,
many of the participants in the Gulf of Maine governance regime, especially those who
are active within the Gulf of Maine Council, have adopted ecosystem-based approaches
and public involvement as goals within their agencies. The question is whether these
symbolic pronouncements will translate into truly ecosystem-based approaches. Time
will tell, therefore, if agencies begin to partner more with each other and with the public
and communities to solve problems without regard to jurisdiction.
Effects. Effects refer to the long-term changes in the value positions and
institutions in the relevant community. They are outcomes writ large, i.e. long-term
outcomes in terms of values, processes, and institutional innovation (Clark 2002).
In essence, effects developed for our ideal system would include innovative
measures that transform current governance entities and create new or modified value
institutions that get beyond scientific management and strict command and control
hierarchy of bureaucracy using local input and collaborative processes (Brunner and
Steelman 2005; Coe-Juell 2005; Fiorino 2006; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). It
would allow for softer and more voluntary local or regional regulation of activities that
impact the ecosystem consistent with community goals and consistent with national
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standards. There should also be evidence of a greater acceptance by regulators of public
and community input and decision-making (Table 51).
Table 51 Effects
Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Transition toward a more adaptive
ecosystem-based approach to
governance. Innovative measures
are tried that transform current
governance entities and create
new or modified value institutions
that get beyond scientific
management and strict command
and control hierarchy of
bureaucracy using local input and
collaborative processes

Transition in the region is more
symbolic than tangible.
Government agencies are
increasingly acknowledging the
need for change. Strict command
and control is still largely the
operating premise, but agencies
are aware of need for transition.
GOMC Action Plan incorporates
goals and operating principles
calling for transition toward EBM
and greater public outreach and
education.

While it is difficult to look around the region and point to tangible outcomes that
reflect a broader, more holistic, less confrontational, and more community-oriented
governance regime, there is a very important positive outcome that can be discussed.
There is, generally, a broader acceptance and understanding of the need to transition
toward an ecosystem-based approach to governance. There is even some optimism
within government that transition is possible. Illustrative is this exchange with a veteran
of U.S. fisheries management efforts:
Q: There's very little institutional memory of a groundfish industry
downeast.
A: Everything is fished out. So maybe some day there will be enough
fish to allocate some portion there. But right now we've got to get pretty
smart about how many fish there are left and what do we have in terms of
capacity to fish them and things like that. But yes there is definitely a role
for community stewardship within the structure we have now. There's no
reason why we can't have, as we move towards ecosystem management,
why can't we have a Gulf of Maine committee, a Georges Bank
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committee, and a Southern New England committee, all under the Council
structure and only Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire will worry
about the Gulf of Maine. And then the whole Council can get together can
get together to decide on the allocations between Georges Bank and Gulf
of Maine, and Georges Bank and SNE, because the fish go up and down.
Once you allocate, and you know the numbers of fish you can catch in
each ecosystem, you have better governance with a smaller scale and you
can then further break it down to advisory groups, of course we can do
that. I've been a longtime proponent of that. A Gulf of Maine committee
with its own advisors in its own space, all other the council structure so
that we can track how they interact with each other and allocate the
different species because some of them don't just stay on Georges or don't
just stay in the Gulf of Maine. (US Federal Employee 3)
What's impressive is the vision - the mission to rebuild fish stocks so that fish
will return to places from which they've been long absent and, once that occurs, the
decisions on how to best manage those fisheries can be made with the meaningful input
of groups on a smaller scale - perhaps communities.
Further, there are people in government that care about a transition away from the
status quo and are increasingly willing to lead a transition towards broader ecosystembased approaches to governance. NOAA may be headed that way, despite some barriers,
as we learn from someone familiar with the situation:
All these definitions are general and innocuous enough but NOAA has
dragged its feet a little bit because we don't have an EBM mandate. So
it's no one's job to do EBM. It's someone's job to do coastal zone
management, someone's job to do fisheries management, marine mammal
protection, endangered species, etc., but it's no one's job to do EBM. So I
think there's just been a lot of rhetoric at the national level to date to try to
define this and figure out how our activities could be better connected
through our budget and planning decisions. I haven't felt that it has yet to
translate to the regional level where these projects and programs could
actually interact and focus on pilot areas and include agencies and other
partners. In a data rich place like the Gulf of Maine it certainly could and
should be done. But the impetus from NOAA has been a need for NOAA
to get its own ducks in a row before it reaches out to other agencies. In
conversations with Steve Murawski and other folks at headquarters I have
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learned that there is definitely interest by FY 09 to start spending money
up here and actually pulling a NOAA team together, talking about EBM,
how it would work, how an assessment would work up here. Once we
understand our approach we could then start to engage other agencies and
do a concentric circle thing but we have to start with ourselves. I don't
feel like in this region it has happened yet. There are plans to move that
way. But it's no one's full time job to do that. Everybody is still
operating in their own stovepipes. (US Federal Employee 4)
If all NOAA needed was a mandate, with the President's recent Executive Order
many of the recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force are now law.
The mandate is in place and awaits only implementing regulations. Is this the license that
NOAA and other pertinent U.S. federal agencies need to move toward integrated
management and involving the public and communities in coastal and ocean-related
decisions? Time will tell but as we have seen there is unlikely to be a warm reception for
significant change at the agency level in the United States.
In sum then, the social process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed has
generally been handicapped by an ability to work outside of traditional agency structures.
What we have seen, however, is there is some recognition that governance in the region
must change. It will require a galvanized and educated public to drive any change in the
direction of ecosystem-based governance, together with government representatives with
the courage to lead change heading into an uncertain future.
Decision Process
The third and final portion of the policy sciences framework that needs to be
discussed is the decision process. Much of the information, background, and data
concerning the decision process has been set forth and absorbed within the prior sections
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involving problem orientation and the social process. Every effort will be made to avoid
unnecessary duplication.
Natural resource policy and management are generally analyzed on the basis of
the decision process employed in the execution of agency mandates. As we have seen,
there is no one agency that oversees the myriad of threats posed to the ecosystem of the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem. Thus an examination of the decision process for
this region involves the mapping of six interlinked functions: intelligence, promotion,
prescription, implementation, termination, and appraisal.
As we have seen, the decision process in the BoF/GoM is a crowded field.
Understanding the collective decision process, however, can be a way of reconciling or at
least productively managing competing interests and policies through politics. There are
inevitable agency turf battles and politics plays a role in their outcome. Politics will
always be with us because people seek different policies that reflect their particular, or
"special", interests. The ideal, of course, is for participants to reconcile interest
differences in order to clarify and secure their common interest. In the BoF/GoM
governance regime, we have seen that it is not really clear who establishes what the
common interests are or should be, and even what the community believes is in their
common interests.
In terms of ecosystem-based governance, trends can be determined that might
indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and linked to the appropriate scales within
an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being communicated to policy makers in a
meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a structure exists that allows for decision
makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive fashion. Note that ecosystem-based
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governance requires a decision process that is open and transparent, not slanted toward
special interests and power (Clark 2002). In terms of ecosystem-based governance,
trends can be determined that might indicate whether intelligence data is reliable and
linked to the appropriate scales within an ecosystem, whether such intelligence is being
communicated to policy makers in a meaningful manner and, ultimately, whether a
structure exists that allows for decision makers to react to intelligence in an adaptive
fashion, and whether there is impartial third-party appraisal of existing policies that will
permit participants to adapt or even terminate programs (Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Wilson 2000; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007). We have largely examined the trends in the
region earlier in this chapter. We now examine the task of intelligence.
Intelligence. Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information
and making it available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and
others (Clark 2002). It involves the generation of knowledge, the transmission of
knowledge, the use of knowledge, and the effects of knowledge on the policy process.
Knowledge relevant to environmental decision making may be generated by scientists or
it can come from other sources, including local knowledge. Intelligence is simply the
process used to gather information about the problem(s) at hand and the relevant context
and should incorporate characteristics like timeliness, dependability, and creativity (Clark
2008). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability turns on whether
intelligence is comprehensive and gathered from appropriate scales in order to detect
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function (Lasswell 1971; Gunderson and
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Holling 2002; Gunderson 2003; Reid, Berkes et al. 2006). Data gathering and analysis
should, in an ideal world, be inclusive and open to honest debate. Policy makers, as we
have seen in the prior sections, must be willing to put special interests and bias aside and
make decisions based upon the available data. The data, and the decisions, should be
understandable to the public. Intelligence that reveals trend direction should lead to
policy responses through an adaptable and accountable process (Busch and Trexler 2003;
Gunderson 2003; Brunner 2010a). (Table 52)
Table 52 Intelligence
Ecosystem-based Approach
System is facilitated by identification of
intelligence needs and enabled by
cooperative agreements among relevant
entities to assure reliability, compatibility,
timely analysis and accessibility.
Intelligence must come from a broad array
of participants that includes scientists,
academics, the regulated public, and the
public at large.
Intelligence must be communicated to an
accountable entity for analysis and
coordinated action, i.e. a person,
partnership, or other entity that has an
obligation or responsibility to an authority,
group, standard, mandate or behavior norm
external to that person or entity.
Intelligence and information must be made
readily available to researchers, scientists
and the public.
In order for the public to be interested and
be able to understand the data and other
intelligence, significant public outreach and
capacity building is required.

BoF/GoM Approach
Intelligence is largely a function of member
agencies of the GOMC. There are NGOs
that perform intelligence functions as well.
In both cases, results of intelligence is
generally accessible via the web sites of the
agency or NGO. Information is shared
with GOMC which makes data and reports
available on its web site. Public is rarely
meaningfully involved in the gathering of
intelligence.
Intelligence on many topics is
communicated to the GOMC. The GOMC,
however, is powerless to act upon the
information received. It is a forum for
discussion and it may foster discussion
related to intelligence, but no authority to
compel action. With respect to fisheries,
GOMC plays no role and all intelligence
performed by agencies with jurisdiction
over fisheries on either side of the border.
There is little in the way of significant
public outreach. Intelligence may be
available to the public through web sites,
etc., but very few meaningful efforts to
inform public as to why they should seek
out the information.

Intelligence and complex natural science information cannot simply be dropped
on an uninformed public. The public must be informed and interested and therefore be
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able to understand the data and other intelligence. Thus the groundwork necessary to
create an informed public is necessary before significant public outreach and capacity
building can be meaningful (Becker 1993; Fischer 2000; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003;
Weber 2003; Walker and Salt 2006). Local groups able to inventory and sample the
natural resources with results communicated to a variety of actors, including the general
public, using a wide range of methods, are preferable to the kind of closed process we
have now that often collects and transfers knowledge only among a select group of peer
review journal aficionados. Information, collected by a range of volunteers under the
guidance of a blend of scientific and local knowledge and transferred freely provides the
basis for feedback loops required for the holistic and sustainable management of complex
systems (Walker and Salt 2006).
Examining the factors set forth above, and in Table 52, how does the governance
process used to obtain reliable intelligence in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed
compare with our ideal model? The answer is that historically the fragmented
governance system in the region has generally conducted research institution-byinstitution and agency-by-agency.
Q: Are you comfortable that you know the status quo of the environment
of the ecosystem, whether it's functioning, whether it's not?
A: I think the council would probably be happier getting a better handle
on that. I think first breaking it up into the pieces that make sense like, are
the harbors clean, do we have functioning estuaries, do we have salt
marshes, are we addressing tidal barriers? Things like that. I think if we
could articulate those areas of concern for those particular resources, then
it would be easier to answer that question.
Q: And as I understand it, most of the data, most of the monitoring, is
done by staff of the members of the council members.
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A: The monitoring of the outputs from the action plan, or the actual
conditions?
Q: Actual conditions.
A: Yes. Absolutely.
Q: So, you're relying on data from your members and their employees.
A: Absolutely, and it's not always comparable, which is why that whole
ecosystem initiative that David's been working on, I think it's been taking
flight. I mean they're looking to come up with indicators that everyone
can use to measure the health of the particular system. And not just the
health of the environment. Probably one of the things that I remember
talking about, and I don't know if it's on the ESIP agenda, which is
Ecosystem Indicator Partnership, but the just health of a community,
because if a community isn't healthy then we get into the whole land
conversion issues and there's no stewardship anymore, and so it just
makes it vulnerable to all kinds of exploitation and change. (US NGO 4)
Results of these the diverse intelligence efforts are often shared with interested
parties via the web site for the Gulf of Maine Council, BoFEP, or the web sites for the
responsible agencies, like NOAA, DFO, the EPA, and New England Fishery
Management Council.
The first requirement for the intelligence function under the ideal model is that
there be a system in place that facilitates the identification of intelligence needs that is
then enabled by cooperative agreements among relevant entities to assure reliability,
compatibility, timely analysis and accessibility. Intelligence must come from a broad
array of participants that includes scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the
public at large.
Q: Is the health of the ecosystem a factor in the policy process? And I
can define that further if you want.
A: I'd say that's the basis for environmental laws that make up the coastal
program.. .evaluate the impacts, minimize the impacts, mitigate.. .avoid,
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minimize, mitigate. But, my biggest concern when looking at our
effectiveness is that we don't know ... whether the functions that we're
intending to preserve are actually preserved, or a process, because we're
not doing the early enough monitoring, and we don't understand the
systems well enough to really...
Q: Know when you get official...
A: Exactly.
Q: How can you make it better? What would it take to understand better
what the human impacts are and what the impacts of decisions are?
A: I think we need to do a whole lot more monitoring and have
understanding of how some really basic systems work, and we need to, in
addition to a site by site review and development permitting, we need to
have some sort of...a design of regulations with the system in mind. (US
State Employee 2)
From the perspective of a U.S. Federal employee familiar with the governance
scheme in the watershed and with much of the data that is being gathered:
Q: But, going back to the four threats that we mentioned earlier, what are
the trends? Are we getting better or are we moving further away from our
goals?
A: Well, that depends on how good your indicator systems are and that's
an issue. I think you have a lot of different groups that are trying to
understand the state of the environment and Gulf of Maine Council is one
through their Ecosystem Indicator Partnership. Every office, again, looks
at its own indicators. I don't think that anyone.. .1 know that NOAA
doesn't have a system in place where we actually understand a whole suite
of indicators. So, for instance, coastal development wise, we know that
the Northeast is the most highly populated region of the US and it's
getting more populated, so that trend is going up. The non-point source
pollution is getting worse due in large part to increased development.
Now fisheries has their set of indicators where they're measuring fishery
stocks and it's very difficult to put that picture together in terms of an
ecosystem where some stocks are going up, some stocks are going down,
and where you have trophic cascades going on. You might not be able to
speak for the entire ecosystem but they're trying to put that picture
through individual stocks or suites of stocks. Again, that's not in an
ecosystem context.
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Q: Here's the ultimate question. Do we really know the status of the
ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine?
A: I think we can generally say thumbs up or thumbs down but not in an
ecosystem context. It's still stove piped in terms of the way we measure.
(US Federal Employee 4)
From the series of interview segments above it appears that at least as of when
these interviews were taken in 2006 and 2007 some questions remained as to the status of
the ecosystem in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. It is my view that a complete picture
of the current state of the system is still missing.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime there has never been an
identification of intelligence needs that was then then enabled by cooperative agreements
among relevant entities to assure reliability, compatibility, timely analysis and
accessibility. Further, what intelligence that exists has not been the product of a broad
array of participants that includes scientists, academics, the regulated public, and the
public at large.
We perhaps need to break the monitoring needs down. Let's at least say that
monitoring should be sufficient to give governance and the public notice of a problem or
even indications that a policy change has helped or harmed. In this study we have
focused primarily on the threats posed by overharvesting, shoreland development,
pollution (chemical and nutrient), climate change and, to a lesser degree, invasive species
(Steneck, Vavrinec et al. 2004).
Let's pick a couple of these threats and see if the status of the region's ecosystem
is such that it has the resilience and integrity to either survive the threat or to bounce back
from the harm caused by the threat. First we'll examine the threat posed by overfishing.
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Are our intelligence efforts reliable, compatible, with timely analysis and accessibility?
Is the intelligence the result of collaboration between a broad cross section of participants
including scientists, academics, the regulated public and the public at large? Here are the
views of someone active in fisheries management:

Q: Do you think that with the technology that we have now we know the
status of the catch as we go?
A: I think we have a pretty good handle on landings. I don't think we
have a good handle on catch, which includes discards. I think we have
better monitoring, observer coverage, to really figure out what's being
caught out there.
Q: And what do we have now percentage-wise for observer coverage.
A: Not near enough. I'd say five to 20% depending on the fishery. The
amount of funding needed for observer coverage is not there.
Q: Hasn't been for awhile?
A: Hasn't been for a long time.
Q: And you keep asking for it and it doesn't come?
A: Hight. It doesn't come.
Q: Does industry or the Council support observer coverage?
A: Well, we've asked for a national program that appropriates the funding
so we can get a good handle on catch. Observer coverage will also help
stock assessments. You know those fish are primarily dead if they're
caught. If you're catching more fish than landings show and that gets built
into the scientific survey, stock assessment, there may be more fish than
the science is saying. Or there may be less, I don't know. But they're not
including a critical element, the total catch, the total mortality, it's not
being included in every fishery. In some of them we do include discards
because there has been sufficient observer coverage to give you the
accuracy and precision that scientists say they can use. I think that our
new, we just passed a standard by-catch reporting plan, and it lists the
different percentages of boats that should have an observer that would
give you that accuracy and precision to quantify discards based on the
sample size of observer coverage. But most of us know that if you've got
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an observer on the boat you change your behavior and that's a problem.
My goal would be 100% observer coverage and 100% dockside
monitoring. That to me will give you the best available science. It's
expensive but it's where I'd go. Stop spending money in other places and
100% observer coverage and 100% dockside monitoring. Then you'd
have real time data. (US Federal Employee 3)
Thus without 100% observer coverage, NEFMC data can only tell us something
about how many fish are landed i.e. brought to port and sold. Due to bycatch100 and other
issues, we simply don't know the total mortality of fish caused by fishing. Given the
amount of fishing activity in the region, this is a rather frightening gap in our ability to
monitor fish populations.
Fishery management also relies on data from bottom trawl surveys conducted by
the National Marine Fishery Service. Making estimates of fish populations, and then
proscribing total allowable catch limitations on a species-by-species consistent with the
National Standards set forth in the Sustainable Fisheries Act (1996a) is no easy task. As
P.A. Larkin said in his 1976 keynote address to the American Fisheries Society:
No one can deny that hypothetical animal populations can produce
hypothetical maximum sustained yields, but the same cannot be said of
real animal populations that are really being harvested (Larkin 1977,3)
No one can seriously argue that the monitoring and assessment of the status of the
fishery in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is not an endeavor fraught with uncertainty.
To use one example already touched on in this study, the status of the cod stock in the
Gulf of Maine was assessed using a peer-reviewed assessment process along with other
100

National Standard 9 of the Sustainable Fisheries Act states "Conservation and
management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to the extent
bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality of such bycatch." The SFA defines bycatch as
"fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use," and
includes regulatory discards - or the discarding of fish caught but unable by law to be kept or
landed. (1996a). Sustainable Fisheries Act Amendments of 1996. USC. US. 16.
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groundfish species managed under the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan
in 2008. That assessment resulted in a determination that the cod stock was rebuilding
and that prospects for a full recovery by 2014 were good. Annual catch targets and total
allowable catch ("TAC") were adjusted upwards as a result.
The peer-reviewed 2008 study turned out to be wrong. The 2010 data suggests
that Gulf of Maine cod recruitment (the number of fish bom each year) has been below
average. Rebuilding by 2014 is no longer possible. Within the stock, there are few fish
older than age 9 in a stock with a lifespan of over 20 years. Finally, what's left of the
stock has contracted into an area in the western Gulf of Maine which is where the last
vestiges of a cod industry is located. Why is the 2008 assessment wrong and 2011
assessment correct? It is apparently because the 2011 assessment does a better job of
dealing with uncertainty.
Thus stock assessments for commercial fish, or for any fish for that matter, have
inherent uncertainties. Do we know the status of the Gulf of Maine ecosystem without
truly having a handle on fish stock abundance and distribution? Maybe. If we learned
from our 2007 mistakes and are now better able to factor uncertainties into the
assessments. Of course, there are no guarantees that uncertainties won't increase and
become more complex. The water temperature in the Gulf is increasing. The water
chemistry is changing and salinity is decreasing as more fresh water from glacial melting
surges into the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine bringing with it a changing nutrient regime
(Townsend, Rebuck et al. 2010). Further, the composition of the phytoplankton - the
bottom of the food chain - community is changing (Balch, Drapeau et al. 2007). Clearly
uncertainty will remain a factor in future stock assessment.
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Fish stocks and stock assessments are tricky. But what about indicators that tell
us about water quality. Is it getting better or worse? What do we have as indicators? If
so, is their existence the result of a system designed to facilitate the identification of
intelligence needs that is then enabled by cooperative agreements among relevant entities
to assure reliability, compatibility, timely analysis and accessibility? Does our water
quality intelligence come from a broad array of participants that includes scientists,
academics, stakeholders, and the public at large?
As we see from a Canadian federal regulator, the stove pipes are still a problem
when it comes to monitoring and indicators for, among other things, water quality:

Q: The status quo right now is, separate departments, separate indicators,
separate monitoring?
A: Largely. Largely. Now there are good examples of collaboration, a
few departments working together. I think, when we talk about our
priorities, there's always the need for more consistent set of indicators,
collaborative monitoring, sharing of the data, joint interpretation, feeding
into more than one body for decision making. (Canadian Federal
Employee 2)
Contamination continues as a persistent and perhaps growing problem within the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. The GOMC has identified sewage, nutrients and mercury
as the three contaminants of greatest concern to the BoF/GoM. There has already been
discussion of all of the above, including the problem of un- or under-treated sewage,
nutrient overloads (not unrelated to the sewage issues), and mercury, particularly the fish
consumption advisories involving mercury burdens in fish tissue.
Mercury burdens, nutrient overloads, and sewage contamination are, of course,
monitored by the appropriate federal, state/provincial, or local government charged with
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that responsibility under law. The water quality issue gets murkier when the discussion
turns to the emerging threats posed by persistent and bio-accumulative chemicals making
their way into the pelagic food chains and their risks.
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment sponsors a valuable and
vitally important monitoring program involving the collection and testing of mussels
from around the basin for the presence of a range of chemical contaminants. Mussels, of
course, are filter feeders. Thus contaminants in the water column accumulate in their
tissues through feeding and surface contact. Obviously, tissue concentrations of
chemicals are indications of the presence or absence of chemical constituents in the
water.101 Thus environmental concentrations their tissue contains a wealth of information
as to the presence, or not, of a variety of contaminants. With the collection of mussel
tissue on an annual basis conducted mostly by volunteers, the Gulfwatch program is
charged with:

... the assessment component of the GOMC's 2007-2012 Action Plan
Goal 2 (of 3): Environmental conditions in the Gulf of Maine support
ecosystem and human health. Two monitoring goals were established to
help meet the goals of the current Action Plan and the mission of the
Gulfwatch Program:
(1) Conduct regional contaminant monitoring using the blue mussel
(Mytilus edulis) as an indicator of exposure to organic and inorganic
contaminants
(2) Assess the status and trends of chemical contaminants in coastal
habitats of the Gulf of Maine and Bay of Fundy. (LeBlanc, Krahforst et al.
2011)

Thus the GOMC has sponsored, over time, a valuable monitoring program that
has tracked the presence of ten heavy metals (Ag, Al, Cd, Cr, Cu, Fe, Hg, Ni, Pb, Zn) and
101

http://www.gulfofmaine.org/gulfwatch/mussels.php
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a number of organic compounds, including aromatic hydrocarbons, chlorinated
pesticides, as well as a range PCB congeners102 in the water column around the
BoF/GoM since the mid-1990s.
While it is somewhat comforting that the Gulfwatch program sponsored by the
GOMC has monitored to some degree heavy metals and some PAHs and PCBs in the
water column and designated regions around the basin, there is still a fundamental issue
with respect to what is done with these results. The results of the Gulfwatch indicate that
the regional ecosystem remains exposed to low levels of PCBs, DDT, and residues, long
after their use was banned. Further, many bioaccumulative industrial chemicals in the
Gulfs ecosystem have yet to be characterized for risks to human health and biota in the
region. These include nanomaterials, platicizers, toxaphines, and fire retardants like
PCDEs. Further, endocrine disrupting chemicals including pharmaceuticals, estrogens
and personal care products, many the common constituents of normal wastewater
discharges, are present in the waters of the BoF/GoM (Wells 2010).
The list could go on. Emerging chemicals from point and non-point sources that
threaten ecosystem resilience and integrity include the common herbicide atrazine,
bisphenyl (think plastics), and other dioxin-like compounds, non-ionic organics, the
antimicrobial agent triclosam, and other unfortunately ubiquitous chemicals that are part

102

A PCB congener is any single, unique well-defined chemical compound in the PCB category. The name
of a congener specifies the total number of chlorine substituents and the position of each chlorine. For
example: 4,4-Dichlorobiphenyl is a congener comprising the biphenyl structure with two chlorine
substituents, one on each of the #4 carbons of the two rings. In 1980, a numbering system was developed
which assigned a sequential number to each of the 209 PCB congeners.
http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/congeners.htm
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of the hundreds of household, industrial, and other chemicals in common use (Wells
2010). Many of these "new" chemicals of concern are being increasingly detected in the
Great Lakes (Figure 22). Despite the harm posed by their present in the water column
and tissue of fish, pinnipeds, and humans, there is no monitoring for these substances in
the Bay of Fundy or Gulf of Maine (personal communication S. Jones).
Chemical/Group

Comments

Perfluoro carboxylic acids and related perfluoro
alcohols

PFOA found with PFOS; terminal residues of
perfluorinated alcohols?

Chlorinated naphthalenes

Contribute to TCDD/ planar PCB TEQs; fish and
fish eating birds

Pharmaceuticals e.g. ibuprofen, clofibric acid,
diclofenac, carbamazepine

ng/L in tributary waters and MWTP effluents

Current use pesticides
(e.g. atrazine, metolachlor, endosulfan)

Atrazine persistent in oligotrophic waters

Figure 22 "New" Chemicals of Concern" adapted from (Suzuki 2000)

Certainly there is a need to monitor for the presence of these substances, but
perhaps a bigger question looms: aimed with the knowledge of the presence of these
compounds in our water and the food chain, what can be done under the current
governance scheme? Do we need to wait for an outbreak of disease or some other tragic
consequence before the governing agencies around the BoF/GoM decide to roll up their
sleeves and get to work to solve problems?
These examples are merely representative of the many issues and conflicts that
confront our current fragmented and egocentric governance system. The intelligence
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mechanisms that exist under the current regime are sufficient to put us on notice that
there are threats - some more tangible at the moment than others. Yet there is no
movement to change, no educated public driven to stand up and say "enough." Thus the
status quo of intelligence in a piecemeal, agency-by-agency fashion will inevitably
continue.
Which brings us, however briefly, to another characteristic of intelligence in our
ideal model: Intelligence must be communicated to an accountable entity for analysis
and coordinated action, i.e. a person, partnership, or other entity that has an obligation or
responsibility to an authority, group, standard, mandate or behavior norm external to that
person or entity. Intelligence and information must be made readily available to
researchers, scientists and the public.
In the case of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime, most
intelligence is performed by the agencies with responsibility to manage activities within
their jurisdiction or by NGOs that have conferred upon themselves some portion of the
overall picture. The information gathered via such intelligence is generally used within
each agency or NGO in order to help achieve the mission and goals of the respective
institution to satisfy the expectations of government overseers or, in the case of NGOs, to
gather information relevant to their mission and make a case for increased donations.
Intelligence, as exemplified by the data generated by Gulfwatch, is often made available
by members to the GOMC. Unfortunately, as we have seen, the GOMC has no authority
or responsibility to act upon whatever intelligence it might receive from Gulfwatch or
any of its member agencies. Further, it is absolutely powerless to act upon anything
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concerning the fishery, as this exchange with a veteran member of the Council's working
group illustrates:

Q: You haven't got fish.
A: No, that's an explicit decision taken by the Council years ago. The
effort, just don't go there. I think that's a practical reality of these
initiatives. There's some things that you just can't tackle. Either you
don't have the capacity or they're going to be divisive, or they're felt to be
handled reasonably well elsewhere.
Q: Would it be a good thing to bring the fishery into this?
A: From an ecosystem governance perspective, in the definitional level,
yes. To be that sort of comprehensive, I mean it's a pretty significant
impact on the ecosystem, so yes, obviously. Practically given fisheries
management in Canada and the U.S. and its history and current activities, I
would say no. So, I think any ecosystem initiative will always fall short of
the full ideal definition. There are some things practically you're not
going to deal with. (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
So the requirement of our ideal model calling for intelligence to be turned over to
an accountable authority, which translates into an entity that has the ability via
enforcement or coercion to try and implement change in the face of challenge, is absent
in this region. Furthermore, while a great deal of information is available to interested
parties, there exists little reason for the public to seek out such information. There is little
in the way of dedicated and aggressive outreach that might be capable of creating a
knowledgeable citizen base capable of speaking for the public good.
The need for public pressure and political persuasion from the perspective of the
integrity and resilience of the Gulf has never been more apparent. The question of what
can be done brings us to the task of Promotion.
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Promotion. Using data and information gathered as part of the intelligence
function, recall that promotion, sometimes called estimation, involves the "thoughtful
assessment of options and alternatives" (Brewer and deLeon 1983, 83). Promotion serves
the function of recommending and mobilizing support for policy alternatives and serves
to define and even limit the possible solutions to a problem. It is the stage where
information and data gathered as a result of the intelligence task are debated and
discussed and alternatives and options are recommended and debated (Clark 1997).
As we have seen, promotion under an ecosystem-based approach to governance
differs markedly from the status quo; that is, expert-driven planning models that rely
almost exclusively on science- and expert-based technology. We have noted that under
the traditional view, generally only experts are qualified to make and implement sound
management plans. Promotion is largely the role of bureaucracies - bureaucracies that
are also responsible for enforcement of uniform rules and regulations (Fiorino 2006).
Promotion also includes politics, bringing with it an array of political parties,
lobbyists, pressure groups, people, and powerful organizations of all types (including
business and environmental groups) working to shape and share values. (Lasswell 1971;
Brewer and deLeon 1983; Clark 2002; Clark 2008). While it has been noted that the
participation of a broad range of promotional actors, many with opposing interests and
values creates an "agitational intensity to the dissemination of a value demand", it is
nonetheless preferable to the totalitarian alternative of placing promotion exclusively in
the hands of a single party that monopolizes and controls debate (Lasswell and
MacDougal 1992,29). Politics, as discussed earlier in Chapter III and reiterated in
Chapter IV, need not be divisive and polarizing. Indeed, in an ideal world, healthy
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politics that includes "policy relevant science, pertinent local information, constructive
public involvement, and conflict resolution - can serve to clarify and secure the common
interest in knowledge generation for environmental decision processes" (Ascher,
Steelman et al. 2010, 8).
Table 53 Promotion
Ecosystem-based Approach
Promotion and politics involve honest
debate using policy relevant science,
pertinent local information, constructive
public involvement, and conflict resolution
in order to clarify and secure the common
interests (as opposed to special interests)
and secure knowledge generation for
environmental decision processes. Hard
questions are asked and "difficult" data is
not neglected. Constructive, honest, debate
helps to promote trust and cooperation and
equitable outcomes are pursued through the
open sharing of knowledge and open debate
with broad participation.

BoF/GoM Approach
The activities that impact the ecosystem of
the region are governed by separate
agencies, each responsible for some piece of
the picture. Although the goals of the
GOMC require joint action, promotion to
actually develop and implement policies
that would benefit the region as a whole and
require binational action is unlikely. Hard
questions, like fisheries are ignored and left
to individual agencies. Constructive, honest
debate that help to promote trust and
cooperation is generally absent. No debate
can be productive if no one takes the side of
the resilience and integrity of the Gulf as a
whole.

The politics of promotion should include honest debate about what to do.
Further, in our ideal system, the overall decision process should provide " a means of
reconciling (or at least managing) conflict through politics in order to find a working
specification of a community's common interests" (Clark 2002, 57). (Table 53)
In the BoF/GoM region, promotion is largely accomplished through the agencies
responsible for some component of the activities that impact the ecosystem or NGOs with
an interest in changing the policies pertinent to some component of the same ecosystem.
Promotion via fragmented agency and NGO initiatives does not bode well for the
region's ecosystem.
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There is a fundamental paradox that exists with respect to the goals, objectives,
and operating principles articulated by the GOMC in their most recent Action Plan. The
paradox is that the goals and principles to which the membership of the GOMC has
committed require a degree of coordinated action that existing institutional arrangements
are unlikely to provide. Promotion of the resilience and integrity of the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem, and its interacting physical, biological, and chemical
components, is the job of no one. There is not one overarching entity with the real or
implicit authority to speak for the health of the ecosystem. Thus promotion is left to the
individual GOMC members and, to some extent, NGOs who elect to involve themselves
with issues pertaining to the Gulf. Each is ultimately responsible primarily to its own
constituencies. So, and here paraphrasing Lynton Caldwell (1993), who speaks for the
Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine?
Promotion on behalf of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is therefore, well, non
existent. The GOMC is without authority to mediate disputes or to hold member
agencies accountable. There is no organized umbrella organization of NGOs determined
to bring sanity to the deteriorating situation in the region. Promotion is therefore a one
way street with industrial and commercial interests attempting to exploit the resources of
the region and regulatory agencies trying to enforce laws that require moderation at the
risk of political retribution. Thus promotion in the BoF/GoM is at present a tool for a
variety of special interests that include industry, agencies, and NGOs. No one, to my
knowledge, is in a position to speak for the Gulf.
Prescription. In the prescription, or selection, phase, the data, values, and
interests distilled from the intelligence and promotion tasks are used to select appropriate
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law, policy, or management options appropriate to the targeted challenge. The activities
and process used in this phase result in the establishment of new rules or guidelines to
solve a problem or deal with an environmental conflict or issue (Clark 2002; Clark 2008).
Table 54 sets forth the characteristics of prescription using an ecosystem-based
approach to governance. Without repeating them verbatim, the common thread is that
prescriptions should transition to involve greater use of cooperation and collaboration in
their enforcement and compliance processes. The process doesn't have to be as
adversarial as they appear to be at present and more and more partnerships between
industry, government, and communities could issue in an era of "softer" regulation to
replace the adversarial legalism that marks compliance and deterrence efforts at present.
As has been discussed, there is no treaty in operation that currently governs the
activities of the United States and Canada impacting the health and resilience of the Bay
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. Each country, as we have seen, regulates activities
through agencies and entities operating under their respective national, state, provincial,
or local laws. Many, if not most, of the existing prescriptions were summarized in the
Participants task of the Social Process.
Other major prescriptions have been liberally sprinkled throughout this chapter.
This section will briefly outline the underpinnings of prescriptive development in Canada
and the U.S. and briefly discuss the more major legislation and how the countries may
differ in their approach to statutory creation and implementation.
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Table 54 Prescription
Ecosystem-based Approach
A transition away from adversarial
methods designed to punish violations
toward greater emphasis on cooperation
and collaboration between private and
public entities to prevent pollution,
reduce risk, and promote sustainability.
New relationships, structures, and roles
are fashioned by careful planning with
broad-based involvement and
implemented on a trial and error basis in
order to facilitate learning
Adversarial strategies and deterrence are
not the only way to influence behavior.
Collaboration and cooperation with
partnerships designed to achieve
economic goals, can promote ecoefficiency, innovation, and
sustainability.
Community and regional involvement in
the development and enforcement of
environmental regulations can increase
learning, inform the public, and lead to
greater progress towards goals.

BoF/GoM Approach
There doesn't appear to be any
movement to transition away from
traditional command and control agency
strategies. There also doesn't appear to
be the kind of broad-based involvement
planning required by our ideal model,
although that may be changing as
provinces and states begin to plan for
climate change impacts.

Generally adversarial strategies and
deterrence methods continue to be the
main methods that agencies use to
influence behavior. I see no movement
toward more collaboration and
cooperation, including public/private
partnerships, designed with community
assistance to achieve economic goals.
With some exceptions, community and
regional involvement in the
development and enforcement of
environmental regulations is largely
absent. Without this opportunity, we
lose an important opportunity to build
capacity and develop an informed a
public that could promote the public
good.

Before any discussion of specific laws in Canada and the U.S. are discussed,
however, it is incumbent on us to have some understanding of the sources of powers of
government and rights of individuals. Organic acts, generally constitutions, are the
painstakingly negotiated documents that define the rights of government and those of
individuals. In the United States, constitutions created the federal government as well as
all state governments. Local governments are generally created by charters (Sullivan
2001).

The United States government arose out of the smoke and fury of armed
revolution. Suspicious of power and authority, the U.S. Constitution was carefully
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negotiated so as to embrace strict separation between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. No single branch of government may encroach upon
the powers of another and, as we all learned in bygone days, a system of "checks and
balances" is designed to keep government honest. Thus the U.S. president may not serve
in Congress while serving in the office of the presidency. Indeed a U.S. president is often
unable to control Congress when a majority of Congressional members may be from a
political party different than the president. The system, the "checks and balances," can
make it very difficult for a president to implement the very programs that were promoted
during a political campaign and probably formed the basis for his or her election. Again,
this process is simply a reflection of the American suspicion and mistrust of the power of
the state, and the preference for limiting or hobbling government as the best means to
protect individual liberty (Wilson 2000; Monahan 2002; Plater, Abrams et al. 2004).
Further fragmenting the U.S. attempts at controlling ecosystem-impacting
behavior through bureaucratic efforts is the federalism inherent in the U.S. system.
Federalism is a way of organizing a nation so that two or more levels of government have
formal authority over the same area and people. In the U.S., the same region and its
residents are generally subject to several levels of government - federal, state, and local.
The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes it clear that "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."103 We will now turn to some U.S.
prescriptions relevant to governance in the BoF/GoM.

103

U.S. CONST, amend. X
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The statutes implemented and enforced in whole or in part by the EPA most pertinent
to the regulation of the human activities that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem are
summarized below.
• The Clean Air Act of 1970,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. The focus of the EPA's
Clean Air Act ("CAA") efforts is the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). State and federal regulation under the CAA has as its objective the
attainment of air quality consistent with the NAAQS. Standards are set for
"criteria" pollutants. The CAA is included in this report because the EPA has
expressly recognized the nexus between air quality and the health of marine
ecosystems. Currently many fish consumed in the Gulf of Maine region are
subject to Food Consumption Advisories due to contaminants, including mercury,
present in their tissues. Mercury is released into the air from coal-fired power
plants and incinerators and is deposited onto land and water, working its way up
the food chain through fish to people. The EPA has committed to a reduction of
mercury released into the air from coal-fired power plants by 22 tons from their
2000 level of 48 tons (EPA 2003).
• Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. Officially known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the goal of the Clean Water
Act ("CWA") is to ".. .restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters."104 The amendments attempt to achieve

104 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The goals section of the act also provides, inter alia, for elimination of the
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985 and the absolute prohibition of discharges of toxic
pollutants (not an enforceable requirement but a rebuttable presumption that pollution prevention is the
most desirable form of pollution control Plater, Z. J. B., R. H. Abrams, et al. (2004). Environmental Law
and Policy: Nature. Law., and Society. New York, Aspen Publishers., 626 -627).
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maximum "effluent limitations on point sources" of pollution as well as achieve
acceptable water quality standards.,05The CWA contains a broad range of
regulatory tools designed to attain its regulatory goals and objectives. The statute
prohibits discharges of any pollutant106 unless authorized pursuant to the permit
requirements of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System.107
Implementation of the permit provisions and other sections of the CWA rely upon
an express process for federal/state cooperation.108 The EPA or approved State
(or States if there is an approved interstate compact), and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, in consultation with USFWS, NMFS, and State resource agencies,
also control the discharge or placement of dredged or fill material.109
The focus of the EPA's CWA efforts has been the establishment of technologybased standards for the regulation of point source dischargers of pollutants
(outfall pipes, municipal sewage treatment plants, vessels, etc.). States are now
being required to turn their attention on non-point discharges and establish water

105 The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that States play a key role in the enforcement and
implementation of the CWA. NPDES permits are secured in the first instance from EPA consonant with its
policy "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate pollution." States with an EPA approved CWA enforcement program may issue
NPDES permits "for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction." Further, States play a key
role in the determination of acceptable water quality standards, as "effluent limitation' is defined by the
CWA as".. .any restriction established by a State.. .on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical,
physical, biological or other constituents which are discharged from point sources.. .including schedules of
compliance." Thus States may determine "how clean is clean" as well as the schedule for the clean-up of
polluted waters within the state. U.S. Environmental Protection Aeencv v. California. 426 U.S. 200 (1976).
106

33 U.S.C.§ 1311(a)

107

33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)

108

33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)

109

33 U.S.C. § 1344; http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/factlO.html
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quality standards to upgrade waters that remain polluted after the application of
technology-based requirements.110
Finally, amendments to the CWA since its enactment have added a variety of
programs to the EPA's water quality regulatory arsenal. The 1987 amendments,
augmented by the 2000 amendments, created the National Estuary Program ("NEP") to
improve the quality of estuaries of national importance. The NEP is designed to promote
the restoration of estuary habitat, develop a national estuary habitat restoration strategy,
and provide the funds for the establishment, research and funding for NEP-designated
estuaries.111 The 2000 amendments also enacted the Beaches Environmental Assessment
and Coastal Health Act of2000 ("BEACH"). BEACH mandates that states with coastal
recreation waters adopt water quality criteria and standards for designated pathogens and
pathogen indicators. States must submit water quality criteria and standards to the EPA
and demonstrate that the standards are sufficient to protect human health. Funding for
the establishment of the plan and for monitoring and implementation are available
through the Act.112
Thus, in terms of the Clean Water Act, the EPA sets the standard for states in the
region by regulating point sources Do they have jurisdictional issues? A person

110

In brief, the CWA requires that states identify waters that are and will remain polluted after the
application of technology standards; prioritize these waters based on the severity of their pollution; and
establish 'total maximum daily loads' ("TMDLs") for these waters at levels necessary to meet applicable
water quality standards. States are required to submit their inventory and TMDLs to EPA for approval. 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d>: http://www.eDa.gov/owow/tmdl.
111 33 U.S.C. § 1330; http://www.epa.gov/nep. Estuary programs within the Gulf of Maine watershed
include the New Hampshire Estuary Program encompassing Great/Little Bays and Hampton Harbor, the
Casco Bay Estuary Partnership in Maine, and the Massachusetts Bay Program encompassing Massachusetts
and Cape Cod Bays, http://www.epa.gov/nep.
112

33 U.S.C. § 1313(i); http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/beaches/act.html
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knowledgeable about the EPA's efforts in the Gulf of Maine region expressed some
issues:

A: To get back to the jurisdictional point. In a nutshell, you know, we
were largely concerned with stuff that's fairly close to shore, near coastal
area. Obviously when we have dredging and remediation sites that are in
federal waters, we have jurisdiction over those. But, NOAA.. .1 think of
NOAA as really more of an ocean agency and EPA as sort of more a
coastal.. .if you had to really make some sort of distinction. But, then you
have the Coastal Zone Management Act, and the fact that NOAA
administers the Coastal Zone Management program with states. There are
definitely areas where.. .there's probably inefficiencies in there, and I
think the Ocean Action plan itself, but a court recommended either
merging or that certain programs like the National Estuary Program be
moved from EPA to NOAA. We didn't like that recommendation... (US
Federal Employee 1)
And the EPA and NOAA are trying to collaborate on the US side of the Gulf of
Maine as NOAA tries to funnel federal money into the states for improvement of water
quality in the coastal margin - when there are funds available - as someone familiar with
NOAA's efforts in the BoF/GoM relates:
We don't have any regulatory authority to tell them [states] how to
manage water quality - that's really EPA. What's interesting is, and this
sort of gets to the question ...a portion of the NOAA grant has
traditionally gone to non-point source pollution. That's been zeroed out
for the first time this past year. The irony is, the EPA, through their Clean
Water Act, also has funds coming to the state to do non-point source
pollution. It depends on the state whether or not they're coordinated. And
there's some work being done at the national level between EPA and
NOAA to coordinate these activities that are receiving funds from two
different agencies. But at the end of the day it's really interesting to pool
those funds and do something constructive although the funds from the
NOAA side just dried up. (U.S. Federal Employee 4)
We started our analysis of the U.S. federal and state prescriptions with a brief
introduction explaining the governance scheme set up by the U.S. Constitution with its
insistence on separation of powers and federalism. Before we begin our discussion of
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some of the more relevant Canadian laws or prescriptions, we should first examine the
scheme set up by the Canadian Constitutional documents.
First it should be pointed out that government in Canada has little in the nature of
separation of powers. Contrary to the U.S. scheme's seeming obsession with limiting the
power of the executive branch, the Canadian (and British) approach is to concentrate
political power in the hands of the executive. Under the doctrine of responsible
government, both the legislative and the executive branch are subject to the control of the
prime minister. The prime minister controls the executive branch since the governor
general (the formal head of the executive branch of government) must exercise all of
his/her powers on the basis of the prime minister's advice. Control of the legislative
branch flows to the prime minister because the governor general is obliged to appoint as
prime minister the leader of the party controlling the greatest number of seats in the
elected House of Commons. In this manner, a Canadian prime minister with a majority
in the House of Commons has a far greater ability to implement political programs than
does an American president (Monahan 2002; Hughes, Lucas et al. 2003).
Federalism, or the division of powers between the federal and provincial
governments is under the Canadian governance scheme is set out in the Constitution Act,
%

1867.113 Rather than following the American 10th Amendment example of simply
leaving all powers to the states not specifically designated in the U.S. Constitution,
Canada's Constitution Act sets forth a list of powers in Section 92 dividing powers
between federal and provincial powers that is meant to be exhaustive. Thus provincial
governments are to be supreme with their own designated sphere. Pursuant to this list,
113

Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985)
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provinces can act on pollution that, at the risk of oversimplifying, is local in nature (s.
92(13); s. 92(16)). Given that a lot of pollution arises as a result of land use, pollution
regulation is probably of a local and regional nature. Provinces do not, however, have the
right to regulate out of province companies. Other sources of provincial regulation may
be found in their control and ownership of their land, mines and minerals (s. 109) and
non-renewable natural resources, forestry and electrical energy (s. 92A).
The federal power to legislate over environmental matters is clear where such
matters have interprovincial and international effects. Parliament's jurisdiction to
regulate the environment comes from a number of different sources and it is questionable
that any one source gives Parliament the ability to play a strong role in providing national
standards and policy. Still, section 92 gives Parliament certain functional powers over:
•
•
•
•

Navigation and shipping (s. 91(10))
Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries (s. 91(12))
Canals, Harbours, rivers and Lake Improvements (s. 108)
Federal Works and Undertakings (s. 91(29) and 92(10))
Parliament was also granted certain conceptual powers giving it general authority

to legislate over broadly defined activities which could conceivably include
environmental quality legislation:
•
•
•
•
•

Criminal Law (s. 91(27))
Peace, Order and Good Government (s. 91)
Taxation (s. 91(3))
Trade and Commerce (s. 91(2))
Public Debt and Property (s. 91(1A))

It should be apparent that the Canadian governance system, while it consolidates
power in the hands of the Prime Minister and the executive branch, requires a great deal
of collaboration, communication and cooperation between parliament and the provinces.
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To illustrate this point, the following exchange with a Canadian federal regulator speaks
to the permitting of contaminant discharge in Canada:

Q: So, when it comes to for instance discharging of contaminants, does
that require a permit from this agency?
A: Depending on the type of discharge. We have, under the Fisheries
Act, we have a series of regulations for a number of industrial sectors. So
there's the pulp and paper effluent regulations, chloro-alkali plants, a
bunch of others. Municipalities would regulate sewage discharges on the
domestic end.
Q: With no permit needed from federal.
A: Correct. With the uncertainty of where the line is and where the
division of legal mandates and roles and responsibility, and the Canadian
way of just avoiding the question, where we've come and the way we've
been operating for years is by saying look, do both levels of government
have an interest in this coastal area. Yes, absolutely. Will trying to
resolve this and say someone wins and someone loses or someone gets A
and someone gets B, going be helpful and productive? Not really, because
we realize that you need at least both levels of government working
together. So in the absence of that clear definition, we say they both have
an interest in the near land and the near shore, and so let's just work
together. (Canadian Federal Employee 2)
Thus we see that the legal/jurisdictional structure in Canada helps to promote
dialogue between federal, state, and local governments in order to act on ecosystemrelated prescriptions
As we did with U.S. laws, we can take a summary glance at the more significant
Canadian environmental prescriptions.
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In Canada, the Fisheries Act (1985) is federal legislation dating back to
Confederation.114 It was established to manage and protect Canada's fisheries resources.
It applies to all fishing zones, territorial seas and inland waters of Canada and is binding
to federal, provincial and territorial governments. As federal legislation, the Fisheries Act
supersedes provincial legislation when the two conflict. Consequently, approval under
provincial legislation may not necessarily mean approval under the Fisheries Act.
This Act deemed the Government of Canada responsible for sea, coastal and inland
fisheries, navigation and migratory birds and fiduciary responsibility to aboriginal people.
Provincial governments were given the right to make laws governing property, public
lands and property rights. While the Government of Canada has the authority to manage
fish habitat, it has essentially no control over the use of inland waters, beds of
watercourses or shorelines which fall under provincial jurisdiction. Alternatively, the
provinces cannot make regulatory decisions concerning fish habitat.
Water quality prescriptions are generally set forth in the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act, 1999 (1999) ("CEPA") and are the responsibility of Environment Canada
(EC). The goal of CEPA is to contribute to sustainable development - development that
meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. EC also has responsibilities for pollutants under the
Fisheries Act (1985) as well as the other duties and responsibilities set forth in the Goal
Clarification section above.

114 July 1,1867, the day that three British colonies were formed into four Canadian provinces. The British
Province of "Canada was divided into the new Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and two other
British colonies, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, also became provinces of Canada.
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The federal oceans policy in Canada is bolstered by prescriptions with strong
language that promote integration, innovation, and collaboration in government of the
oceans, including the development of Large Ocean Management Areas ("LOMAs")
(1996). The Oceans Act was followed by the Oceans Action Plan (2005 - 2007), then
by a 2007 Health of the Oceans ("HOTO") promising five years of funding which
included cooperation between domestic and international partners as but one of its five
initiatives. Curiously, the effect of the strong ocean policy in Canada has not been what
one would have expected. The development of LOMAs under the Oceans Action Plan in
general has been slow. Even the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan
("ESSIM"), a LOMA that was in the advanced stages of formation off the coast of Nova
Scotia, has stalled.115 As a note of caution, one commentator has drawn attention to a
2005 Auditor General review of the Oceans Act which found that following its passage
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The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Management Plan ("ESSIM") in Atlantic Canada involved over ten
years of stakeholder involvement to develop a final draft plan. ESSIM was Canada's pilot integrated
management effort, and drew upon stakeholders to come up with a plan to deal with a coastal margin with
competitive uses that included a Marine Protected Area (The Gully),. .protected areas of cold-water
corals, multispecies fisheries including ground fisheries, small and large pelagic fisheries, crab, lobster, and
an extensive Aboriginal Communal Commercial Snow Crab fisher, dragger, long line, oil and gas
exploration, works, seismic activities, oil and gas pipelines, other oil and gas development projects, marine
transport..." GOMC (2012). Action Plan 2012 - 2017, Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment:
15.. With what I assume was a tail wind from the from the 2005 Ocean Actions Plan, which favored
"Integrated Oceans Management" as one of its four pillars Ricketts, P. J. and L. P. Hildebrand (2011).
"Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada: Progress or Paralysis." Coastal Management 39: 4 -19., and
with the establishment of a 32 member Stakeholder Advisory Council ("SAC") comprised of a diverse
group of shareholders that agreed to share the responsibility for leadership toward the ESSIM vision,
ESSIM stalled. Although a plan was drafted with SAC guidance and submitted to the government fir
approval in 2007, the plan has yet to be approved. A survey of SAC members places blame on lack of
leadership by the government - and expresses the notion that whereas multiple stakeholders can work
together, apparently governments cannot GOMC (2012). Action Plan 2012 - 2017, Gulf of Maine Council
on the Marine Environment: 15.
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the oceans ceased to be a government priority, and that government had failed to meet its
obligations under the Act (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011).116
With respect to coastal conflicts and issues, we have seen that the provinces work
with the federal government, chiefly with DFO for aquaculture issues and Environment
Canada for water quality issues.
With respect to how well the existing governance regime in the region matches up
to ideals, let's look at our three model characteristics. First, there doesn't appear to be
any movement to transition away from traditional command and control agency
strategies. There also doesn't appear to be the kind of broad-based involvement planning
required by our ideal model, although that may be changing as provinces and states begin
to plan for climate change impacts. Second, generally adversarial strategies and
deterrence methods continue to be the main methods that agencies use to influence
behavior. Our ideal model requires a transition toward the using more collaboration and
cooperation, including public/private partnerships, as a means of achieving economic
goals and promoting innovation. Finally, community and regional involvement in the
development and enforcement of environmental regulations is largely absent. Without
this opportunity, we lose an important opportunity to build capacity and develop an
informed a public that could promote the public good and, perhaps, begin to give a voice
to the Gulf.
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The Canadian experience may have lessons for the U.S. as the new U.S. Oceans Policy evolves. Clearly
there has been institutional resistance at the various levels of government in Canada to the various
initiatives under the Oceans Strategy and HOTO. There is no reason to think that there won't be the same
kind of reaction to the national movement toward an ocean policy in the U.S. The resistance is likely to be
worse in areas like the U.S. Northeast that never worked with a River Basin Commission and don't have a
favorable history of collaboration.
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Given the attention that has been paid to prescriptions in both countries
throughout this chapter, largely because governance operates on an agency-by-agency
basis, the significant prescriptions enabling government to attempt to control the human
activities that impact the ecosystem have largely been covered where necessary
throughout this chapter. To avoid redundancy, we will move on to discuss the task of
Implementation.
Implementation. As we have discussed, implementation combines the policy
analysis framework categories of invocation and application. Invocation includes the
initial actions that communities and institutions to invoke, enforce, or otherwise
implement a prescription. Application is the process that a community chooses to
ultimately characterize the subject behavior and determine what behavior violates the
prescription and how such behavior should be sanctioned (Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Clark 2002).
Table 55 highlights the some of the "ideal" characteristics of implementation for
an ecosystem-based governance approach. They can be summarized as requiring a need
to move away from adversarial relationships toward more collaborative and cooperative
processes designed to solve problems with strategies that are developed and shared with
the input of scientists, regulators, the regulated community, and other interested parties.
As we are all too aware, implementation, as with enforcement, in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region is completely the task of bureaucratic agencies. There is
little in the way of transition away from the seemingly entrenched traditions of
bureaucratic rationality adversarial legalism.
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Table 55 Implementation
BoF/GoM Approach

Ecosystem-based Approach
Transition is needed to move implementation
toward more community-driven, more
voluntary, cooperative systems. Government
could assist with the identification and
clarification of community goals as well as
develop measureable standards. It would be up
to regional or community efforts to develop
solutions to bring environmental indicators into
compliance with those standards

Implementation in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine region is completely the task of
bureaucratic agencies. There is little in the way
of transition away from the seemingly
entrenched traditions of bureaucratic rationality
adversarial legalism. Agencies continue to
control behavior through a system of rules that
prescribe uniform standards for diverse
circumstances.

Adversarial relationships should give way to
cooperative and collaborative ones with the
emphasis on interactions designed to solve
problems with strategies that are developed and
shared with the input of scientists, regulators,
the regulated community, and other interested
parties. In consultation with industry, citizen
groups, and government officials, plans created
through collaboration can look beyond "end of
pipe" discharges to "identify and change
activities that cause pollution in the first place.
Command and control could gradually be
replaced with incentives and learning through
trial and error.

Government sets the requirements that
regulated rules must follow. Anyone failing to
meet the requirements is faced with penalties of
one sort or another. Deterrence is the primary
motivational strategy Communities and the
public not meaningfully involved in the
determination of standards and rules with
which the community will comply. It also fails
to permit meaningful community participation
in the determination of what conduct should be
considered sanctionable. In essence, the public
is shut out of the implementation of compliance
and deterrence standards.

More reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. If
litigation is necessary there should be
specialized courts with knowledge of science
and environmental factors.

ADR is becoming more popular to increasing
unavailability of judicial intervention due to
budget cuts. Use of facilitation and mediation
is increasing. No movement toward specialized
courts for environmental issues.

Agencies continue to control behavior through a system of rules that prescribe uniform
standards for diverse circumstances. Government sets the requirements that regulated
rules must follow. Anyone failing to meet the requirements is faced with penalties of one
sort or another. Deterrence is the primary motivational strategy (Kagan 2001; Fiorino
2006). This scenario is a far cry from our ideal of involving communities and the public
in the determination of standards and rules with which the community will comply. It
also fails to permit meaningful community participation in the determination of what
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conduct should be considered sanctionable. In essence, the public is shut out of the
implementation of compliance and deterrence standards.
Our ideal model also calls for more reliance upon facilitation, mediation, and
other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Perhaps this is a role that the GOMC could
assist with developing as members might be able to create ways to resolve conflicts and
differences and resolve disputes involving agency-agency and agency-public conflicts.
In any event, from personal knowledge and experience, the use of ADR in all its forms
seems to be on the rise, if for no other reason than the prohibitive costs involved in
traditional litigation.
Finally, our model suggests that if litigation is necessary there should be
specialized courts with knowledge of science and environmental factors. While this idea
has caught on in a variety of nations, I have seen no movement in either the U.S. or
Canada to create a specialized environment court. Indeed it appears that existing courts
are having difficulty getting funding to hold onto the judges and staff that they have.
Thus there appears to be little movement in the BoF/GoM region towards a more
ecosystem-based approach to the task of implementation.
Appraisal. As discussed more fully in Chapter III, appraisal involves the task of
assessing whether relevant prescriptions and their implementation have effectively met
the goals set by the community and who is responsible and accountable (Lasswell 1971;
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
Table 56 sets forth the characteristics for appraisal under an "ideal" ecosystembased approach to governance. At its most basic, the ideal model requires that there
simply be a mechanism for appraisal of policies and actions to determine whether
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progress is being made toward the prescribed goals. Further, appraisal should utilize
trend data appropriate to the task and include a periodic public assessment of the state of
the ecosystem. It is important that appraisal be performed by third parties to enhance the
dependability and creditability of the conclusions. Finally, appraisal should be
undertaken by an overarching body with the ability to use the knowledge gained to
implement change in order to reverse adverse trends.
Table 56 Appraisal

Ecosystem-based Approach

BoF/GoM Approach

Appraisal provides a major opportunity for
learning and course correction, for using the
lessons of experience to adapt failing
practices into future changes. The main
criteria for appraisals are dependability,
comprehensiveness, continuity and
independence

No established mechanism for periodic
appraisals in the region. The GOMC's
2010 State of the Gulf Report is written
largely by agency employees, although
appears to be excellent and
comprehensive. Independence,
however, could be questioned and
impact credibility. Not clear if lessons
can be learned or course correction can
occur or is even possible.

Trend data from relevant scales must be
available and transparent. Local knowledge
and scientific efforts need to be combined
and included in a periodic public assessment
of the state of the ecosystem.

Unknown how trend data was
accumulated for the 2010 State of the
Gulf Report. If local knowledge and
scientific efforts were combined to make
the reports possible it is not apparent
from the reports themselves.

It is critical that appraisals be carried out by
third parties, i.e. not the agencies that are
charged with programmatic responsibilities.

There are no third party appraisals in the
region other than those carried out
through peer-reviewed stock assessment
processes by NMFS and the NEFMC.

Existence of a collaborative entity or single
overarching body that can, formally or
informally, accumulate the knowledge
accumulated through appraisals and
implement change to reverse adverse trends.

There is no single overarching body
that, formally or informally, has the
jurisdiction or inclination to accumulate
knowledge from appraisals and
implement change to reverse adverse
trends.
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The appraisal process is particularly confusing in the BoF/GoM region. With an
ecosystem-based approach to governance, the appraisal process is designed to tell
participants . .how well the selected alternative has solved the original problem and, in
larger terms, how well the overall decision process has served in achieving common
interest outcomes" (Clark 2008, 54).
In order to accomplish thorough and unbiased appraisals, trend data from relevant
scales must be available and transparent. Local knowledge and scientific efforts need to
be combined. One example is a periodic public assessment of the state of the ecosystem.
This provides opportunity for meaningful public education and involvement. Further, it
is critical that appraisals be carried out by third parties, i.e. NOT the agencies that are
charged with programmatic responsibility (Lasswell 1971; Clark, Willard et al. 2000;
Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010).
It is also important, as was stressed in Chapter III, to view the appraisal function
as the philosophical and practical home of adaptive governance, which is frequently
proposed as a tool to frame the management of the human activities that impact
ecosystems (Holling 1986; Lee 1993; Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995). While appraisal is
about the assessment of the success of prescriptions and implementation schemes,
adaptive governance goes one step further to recommend that we have governance
systems that are able to learn from the appraisal process and change course if anticipated
results fail to materialize. Included in appraisal, therefore, is the need for trend data
obtained through monitoring and other methods designed to inform governance of the
status and change in key indicators over time as a result of management actions (Berkes,
Colding et al. 2003; Armitage, Berkes et al. 2007; Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010; Steelman
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2010). "As a given policy is implemented, information gained is quickly fed back so that
it can produce midcourse corrections in the specific policy being studied, and the
experience gained can add to the general stock of environmental knowledge" (Steelman
2010,202). In short, if society is to insist on a shift from regulatory strategies based on
bureaucratic control to strategies based on learning and trial and error, appraisal functions
that involve a broad base of agency, stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment
will be critical to the quest to achieve common, as opposed to special, interests (Brunner,
Colbum et al. 2002; Weber 2003; Fiorino 2006; Brunner and Lynch 2010b).
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region appraisal falls mainly to the same
agencies that have programmatic responsibilities relevant to the activities that impact the
ecosystem. Information and data, therefore, is collected by a variety of federal, state, and
provincial agencies, as well as scientists, academics, and others. There is no mechanism
or linked network where databases and information sources are available (Wells 2010).
Even if information were readily available and reliable trend data existed from around the
basin, there are no clear goals against which to measure the trends. Without clear goals,
it is difficult to determine whether trends are moving in the right direction and, if they
aren't what type of management or policy change might be needed.
A lot of the problems with appraisal in the region go back to the reality that there
is simply no one group with the authority to coerce binational action. There is no one
entity responsible for the gathering or accumulation and analysis of data from around the
basin, examining the data to determine status and trends, and making accountable
decisions to change course or implement new policies or limitations. We have seen that
the GOMC has no interest in expanding beyond its "forum" status. There are no other bi505

national groups that have the participation of the agencies responsible for the
sustainability of many of the components of the ecosystem. Adaptive governance simply
is not possible in this or any other region without a move toward strategies based on
learning and trial and error, appraisal functions that involve a broad base of agency,
stakeholder, and public monitoring and assessment.
Finally, appraisal must be overseen by a third party - some entity that is not a
program charged with administrative responsibility over the subject matter of the
appraisal. The Gulf of Maine Council in 2010 began the publication of its State of the
Gulf of Maine Report (2010). Despite the existence of many excellent reports over the
years, this documents ..is the first Gulf-wide synthesis of pressures on the environment,
biophysical and socio-economic status and trends, and responses to identified issues"
(Thompson 2010,1). The report provides several informative chapters, each chapter
dealing with a separate issue of concern to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
Thus there are chapters on socio-economic issues (Thompson 2010), climate change (Nye
2010), microbial pathogens and biotoxins (Jones 2011), coastal ecosystems and habitats
(Gustavson 2010), marine invasive species (Pappal 2010), as well as an excellent
summary and explanation of emerging issues in the Gulf of Maine as of 2010 (Wells
2010).

The excellent articles contained in GOMC's State of the Gulf Report are written
variously by federal, state, and provincial employees as well as a consultant or two.
There doesn't seem to be any indication that the public was involved in the accumulation
of information that led to the reports. Further, again many of the problems and issues
confronting the region are binational - with no mechanism to galvanize a binational
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strategy and little demonstration of any inclination to act in an accountable binational
manner. Once again, the night seems to have written a check that the morning couldn't
cash - or in this case problems and threats are highlighted for which there can be no
binational response under the current regime.
Termination. This is the final activity of the decision process and occurs when a
problem is either solved by a previously selected prescription or course of conduct or data
analysis reveals that the prescription or course of conduct has been unsuccessful at
moving the toward the goals of the community (Clark 1997; Clark 2008). As we noted in
Chapter III, termination, like appraisal, relies upon the dependable conveyance of
knowledge from intelligence generation through transmission, including thorough
monitoring to assess whether the knowledge has proved that the original problem has
been resolved (Ascher, Steelman et al. 2010). Thus much of the discussion of the
Intelligence, Strategies, and Outcome functions earlier in this chapter is relevant to the
termination task.
The termination function in an ecosystem-based governance regime requires that
there be an independent bridging entity with overall knowledge of trend data that
provides periodic public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the
addition or elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward
the goals specified by prescription (Table 57).
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Table 57 Termination
Ecosystem-based Approach
Ecosystem-based governance requires the
periodic public assessment of the
progress, status, and continued need for
any environmental policy prescription or
implementation scheme. The decision to
terminate should be made by a bridging
entity with knowledge of trend data.

BoF/GoM Approach
Termination is the responsibility of
whatever agency charged with carrying
out a program. There is no periodic
public assessment of the progress, status,
and continued need for prescription in
must agencies with the exception of
fisheries management.There is no
accountable bridging entity with the
knowledge of trend data so no ability to
terminate

In order to avoid redundancy I will just point out that agencies within each of the
jurisdictions have programmatic responsibility in the BoF/GoM. No independent
bridging authority exists with overall knowledge of trend data that provides periodic
public assessments of the status, progress, and need (or not) for the addition or
elimination of policies and prescriptions intended to facilitate progress toward the goals
specified by prescription. Termination, therefore, must be left to the individual agencies
as they assess the programs for which they have responsibility. Termination, therefore, is
not a binational option.
Conclusion
Chapter V compared the governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed with the characteristics for an ideal ecosystem-based approach to governance
using the framework provided by the Policy Sciences. Again as viewed through the lens
of the framework the difficulties of creating, implementing, and continually appraising
the policies and decision-making of bureaucracies of two nations and five
states/provinces, and their results, are apparent.
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The theme that is emerging through this research is the very real impediment of
the fundamental paradox at work when trying to commit binational policy makers to
goals and concerted efforts dedicated to the preservation and/or restoration of a shared
body of water. Again in Chapter V we how see the interests and concerns of national
sovereignty, jurisdictionally fragmented federal, state, and provincial governments, and
bureaucratic interests distributed among all participants tend to limit the effectiveness of
transboundary institutions. So again, the paradox: The goals of policy that may be best
for the health and resilience of the ecosystem are only achievable through a significant
degree of coordinated action that is typically absent in existing institutional arrangements
(Regier and Baskerville 1986; Becker 1993; Caldwell 1993; Young 1998; Prelli and
Becker 2001).
As with Chapter IV, the Policy Sciences framework was used to examine the
Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process in the BoF/GoM. Laws,
rules, and regulations were researched to the extent possible and primary documents were
consulted. Literature was reviewed. Interviews with key participants in the governance
scheme were also utilized.
An examination of the Problem Orientation function highlighted the questionable
state of the water quality within the BoF/GoM. It also revealed the overharvested status
of much of the region's valuable commercial fishery. The Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine is
changing. Overharvesting has changed a food web into a food chain. The waters of the
basin are freshening as increasing glacial melt waters rush over the banks and through the
Northeast Passage, displacing nutrient rich deep slope water. Phytoplankton, the base of
the food chain, are being altered as different species adjust to the changing conditions.
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Water temperature is rising and the region is beginning to ready itself for eventual sea
level rise due to global climate change. There is no question that changes are occurring
and that there will be surprises and serious challenges for managers, scientists, and policy
makers. There will need to be more than talk to deal with the challenges that are on their
way.
An examination of the social process confirmed the importance of including a
broad range of participants and understanding their values, perspectives, and strategies.
It also highlighted the key element missing in the governance regime in the region: the
public. With a few notable exceptions, the social process in the region completely lacks a
knowledgeable, active public participant. In an ecosystem-based approach to
governance, or even in a healthy democracy, there should be open participation by
anyone with an interest in the issues. The social process analysis shows clearly that
governance in the region is carried out by numerous federal, state, and provincial
agencies using typical top-down command and control strategies to apply uniform laws to
a variety of situations. The one institution that exists and brings together regulatory
agencies from both countries for periodic meetings that allow for the exchange of ideas
and information is the Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment. GOMC
basically provides a forum for the discussion of gulf-related issues by the heads of the
responsible agencies. It also publishes and distributes excellent information about the
Gulf and even the potential threats to the ecosystems of the regions. It has thus far
declined to take the next step and become an accountable, if informal, overarching body
with the capacity to accumulate data from monitoring efforts around the region, analyze
the data, and act through its member agencies be able to change policy and learn by trial
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and error - scaling up policies that work, scaling back policies that don't. There is really
no other participant positioned to play this role.
Finally, the evaluation of the decision process confirmed that governance on a
fragmented agency-by-agency basis is not doing the ecosystem in the region any favors.
Participants even at the level of the Gulf of Maine Council have a primary loyalty to their
agency or employer. They all have constituencies that demand satisfaction and the Bay
of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem is unable to voice its demands loudly enough to get
their collective attention. Without the ability to step away from nationalistic or
bureaucratic self-interest, it is unlikely that participants in the governance regime through
the GOMC will be freed to adopt a problem-solving approach that includes a free and
open flow of ideas and the ability to take bold action to address problems without fear of
retribution if failure results. Problem solving through trial and error, at least
intentionally, does not appear to be a realistic option in the BoF/GoM.
The threats to the BoF/GoM are coming at it from all directions. Without a
governance scheme that can handle the unpredictable surprises that most assuredly will
occur, the prospects for the resilience and integrity of the region's ecosystem are not
good. I have had the privilege to observe many of the meetings of the Gulf of Maine
Council and, more often, its Working Group. I have come away knowing that the people
who are involved in the Council, certainly in the Working Group, are extremely
dedicated, hard-working people who care about the BoF/GoM watershed. If left up to
them, I truly feel they could roll up their sleeves and roll out programs that involve the
public and that transcend sovereign boundaries for the good of the ecosystem and its
residents. There is frustration with jurisdictional constraints that tend to rob them of the
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ability to act in the public interest as often as they'd like, It can still happen - but time is
running out.
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CHAPTER VI DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction
This study has attempted to gather data and information pertinent to the
governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. As we have seen,
current governance has failed to reverse ecosystem indications that are trending away
from goals that may be assumed to include at minimum the need for clean water and
healthy food, and the maintenance of biodiversity. There are stresses on the Bay of
Fundy and Gulf of Maine, however, from a number of directions and sources. As we
learned from Chapter V, overharvesting has turned a food web into a weak food chain.
Pollution has been absorbed and, and in the case of persistent organic pollutants and other
chemicals that resist breaking down, passed along to a higher trophic level. Pollution and
nutrients resulting from land-based activities are harming our estuaries and increasing the
incidence of harmful algal blooms. Invasive species are essentially treated as a cost of
business in an increasingly global market. Despite these negative trends, government
organization and methods are pretty much the same as existed 40 years ago with the
adoption of many of the environmental statutes in the U.S. and Canada.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine we have seen that there are stresses from
human activities that are negatively impacting ecosystem resilience. Yet the management
of those human activities that impact the ecosystem has remained relatively unchanged
over the last 40 years. The more we manage the activities that cause the harm in the
513

same manner and expect different results, the worse the problems in the ecosystem
become. And all around us there is a growing body of literature that explains that a new
way of management, using an ecosystem-based approach, may improve the chances for
ecosystem resilience. But there are a lot of participants, a lot of powerful interests, that
rely on the status quo and are therefore aligned with the existing governance system.
There is fear that the many special interests that stack the current governance system may
lose power or wealth if a new governance approach is attempted. It seems that the drum
beat marches on, ignoring reality, and pretending that the existing governance and
management scheme was good enough forty years ago, so it should be just fine now.
Thus the goal of this research has been to examine whether the existing
governance regime of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an
integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity
of the respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which the humans in the
ecosystem rely. Questions related to this principle research question are set forth in
Table 58.
Table 58 Related Questions
Related Questions
What are the current goals of the governance system (units and subunits) in relation to the human uses
and anthropogenic threats to the ecosystem in the Gulf of Maine and how do these differ or resemble
those of similar ecosystem restoration projects?
What are the barriers that may prevent the current governance regime in the Gulf of Maine and
comparable ecosystem restoration areas from managing the living marine resources in the region in a
sustainable manner?
What measures have been adopted in more veteran regions with more experience implementing
ecosystem-based governance models to modify and improve the governance and management regime so
that the critical functions of the ecosystem can be preserved or enhanced while at the same time
competing interests can be harmonized in a fair and equitable manner?
How can these innovations be incorporated in the Gulf of Maine, if at all?
How can the policies, priorities, and actions of local, state, provincial and federal entities be integrated to
assure a sustainable approach to the management, use and development of coastal ocean resources
across political boundaries?
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In order to examine the governance regime in the region, the framework provided
by the Policy Sciences has been used to distill the various ecosystem-based governance
and related concepts into characteristics that provides an opportunity to apply the concept
of the ecosystem-based approach to real world regions.
Transitioning from traditional sector-by-sector governance to a more ecosystembased approach entails change. The critical differences between the traditional approach
and an ecosystem-based approach were summarized in chapter III. In some ways, the
ecosystem-approach is basically democracy writ large. In chapter III, however, the
literature was reviewed and seven characteristics were listed as components of an
ecosystem-based governance regime:
• Management for resilience;
• Significant, meaningful public participation
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement;
• Adaptive governance;
• Mobilizing local knowledge;
• Overarching lead or joint institution, and
• A precautionary approach to uncertainty.
These characteristics do not fit within neatly bound boxes separated from each
other and there is no precise order or prioritization. There is instead overlap, redundancy,
and complexity. The characteristics also do not materialize out of the mist. Using the
framework analysis of the Policy Sciences, we can see how these characteristics are
formed from the tasks found within the Policy Orientation, Social Process, and Decision
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Process functions laid out in the framework. We will conclude this study by tracking
through each of the common characteristics of ecosystem-based governance and
describing how they are nested within the framework. It is important to understand how
these characteristics emerge out of the framework so that we have knowledge of where
we can apply leverage for change i.e. where in the Policy Sciences framework, the
Problem Orientation, Social Process, or Decision Process or some combination.
Once we understand how the framework components combine to contribute to the
ecosystem-based characteristics (i.e. management for resilience, adaptive governance,
etc.), we can look at the comparative case studies of the Great Lakes Basin under the
GLWQA and the current governance in the BoF/GoM. In essence, the tasks as executed
by the governance within each case contribute to the existence, or not, of each ecosystembased characteristic. If, for instance, we are looking at the characteristic of adaptive
governance as a necessary component of ecosystem-based governance, the tasks as
executed within the Problem Orientation, Social Process, and Decision Process, can be
examined to determine whether the tasks within each case study add up to some version
of adaptive governance, and if not, what tasks are missing. In this way, we are better able
to focus on augmenting the tasks that are absent and can make recommendations that go
further than the traditional literature in this area.
Discussion: The Framework. Ecosystem Based Governance, and Case Comparison
Returning to the Chapter III characteristics of ecosystem-based governance, we
will begin with the need for management for ecosystem resilience and integrity by
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describing it, assessing what tasks with the Policy Science framework are encompassed
within the characteristic, and then comparing the cases based upon those tasks.
Management for resilience.
Governance must take the perspective that its task is to find common ground on
policies that advance the common interest (Brunner 2002). The common interest of
maintaining and supporting ecosystem integrity should outweigh parochial interests in
preserving bureaucratic turf or command and control hierarchy. The critical component
of ecosystem-based governance is that management focuses on the relationship between
people and the natural processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function,
the life support systems, while recognizing the need for human and institutional
involvement at every level of the ecosystem (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000).
As the analysis set forth in chapters IV and V make clear, the governance regime
extant in the Great Lakes in the early years of the GLWQA managed for the resilience
and integrity of the ecosystem. The current governance in the BoF/GoM, despite the best
intentions and efforts of the Gulf Maine Council, does not.
The analysis from the framework perspective starts with Problem Orientation.
The goal clarification task requires:
1) Meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process;
2) Strong public outreach and education efforts devoted to raising
awareness and understanding of ecosystem issues and governance options,
and
3) Multiple goals that overall embrace human dignity and equal access to
governance with a premium placed on maintenance of the integrity and
resilience of ecosystem functions.
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Further, goals should no longer be based on single targets or economic need. Conditions
should be trending toward widely accepted goals.
In the Great Lakes Basin in the early years under the GLWQA, goals were
provided by two powerful sources - the GLWQA and the Clean Water Act, after a
growth of public concern about pollution and an explosion of demonstrations and
campaigns in the 1960s and 70s. The effect of the GLWQA goals was binational. We
have seen that public outreach and education, through the Lake Michigan Federation,
Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great Lakes, and other, promoted and
advocated for active and knowledgeable public participation. The IJC actively promoted
public involvement. Further, the word "integrity" as used in the Clean Water Act and the
GLWQA meant a great deal to those who participated in the governance regime under the
IJC and encompassed gender and racial integration and justice.
Conditions and trends in the early years of the GLWQA trended toward the
binational goals with the construction and improvement of municipal water treatment
facilities and the banning of phosphorus from detergents. As we have seen, the water
cleared up, and a fishery was restored. Trends were openly communicated through
several vehicles, including biennial meetings of the IJC, annual meetings of the
International Association of Great Lakes Researchers, and on-line through the Great
Lakes Information Network.
While public input and ecosystem integrity were important in the early years
under the GLWQA in the Great Lakes Basin, the story was different in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region. There is no overarching entity with the authority to
coordinate the goals, promotion, and implementation and evaluation of regulatory efforts.
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The Gulf of Maine Council operates as a forum for agency heads to share information
and ideas, but no consolidated management decisions can come from the GOMC. Thus
policy is left to fragmented, bureaucratic regulation by two federal and 5 state/provincial
government agencies. Policy development thus by-passes the first requirement for goal
clarification - meaningful involvement by the public and/or community participation and
input into the goal process. Further, goals are set agency-by-agency and rulemaking is
often the result of compromise between resource conservation and economic special
interests and not necessarily focused on the Gulf of Maine itself. Conditions in the region
are displaying stresses from coastal development, pollution, overharvesting, and global
climate change. Trends are often not moving toward the goals of the individual agencies,
and transparent periodic communication is frequently absent.
The Social Process is also critical to management for resilience. Social process
tasks in an ideal ecosystem approach are largely geared to the building of a
knowledgeable public capable of meaningfully partnering with government, scientists,
industry, NGOs, and other participants with the perspectives necessary to secure common
interests, most critically the common interest of ecosystem integrity and resilience. The
first requirement is that anyone with an interest in participation may do so. Participants,
of course, come with values. The base values required by our ideal model to be the
predominant goals are the values of knowledge and rectitude. Speaking broadly, the
values of power and wealth should not ends in themselves with an ecosystem-based
approach, but must instead be utilized to press demands for common interests of human
dignity, ecosystem integrity and resilience (Holling 1995; Holling and Gunderson 2002a;
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003). Thus the Social Process in our ideal system is characterized
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by resource sharing and collaborative efforts designed to bring a broad base of the public
and regulated interests together in a variety of situations with regulators to share ideas,
develop knowledge, and gain mutual respect to identify goals, threats to those goals, and
possible actions to take in order to preserve and restore ecosystem resilience.
The social process in the early years of the GLWQA demonstrates many of the
components of our ideal ecosystem governance model. First, public participation is
mandated by the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (1909). Formal public participation
blossomed when in 1975 the DC and its Boards began to recognize the need for public
support in order to implement the terms of the GLWQA and build infrastructure. It then
took affirmative steps to galvanize citizen involvement (Becker 1993). The meetings
between the boards and the UC, formerly internal matters, began to be made public in
1975 and "...in time presentation of the board reports to the UC in public meetings
became a mechanism for increased public understanding of Great Lakes problems, as
well as for citizen activism" (Botts and Muldoon 2005, 23).

Further, NGOs banded

together to try and bring the full brunt of the binational NGO community to bear on
issues related to the Great Lakes watershed (Jackson 2005). This study also talks
extensively about the PLUARG process under the GLWQA, where involvement of the
public was stressed and there was open and transparent communication by the IJC and its
Boards to a public made more knowledgeable by extensive and effective outreach efforts.
There was also laudable opportunity for community members to be involved with
scientists and regulators in the assessment of trends through panel meetings, regular
annual (then biennial) meetings of the IJC, and participation of knowledgeable citizens
on IJC Boards and panels (UCIRG 1978). The Lake Michigan Federation and Great
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Lakes Tomorrow traveled around the basin to educate members of the public about Great
Lakes and IJC-related issues. Decisions for the Great Lakes was created to deliver 40
hour courses geared toward creating citizen leaders in the GLB. Collaborators and
partners in this program included the IJC, the USEPA, Environment Canada (through the
Canada-Ontario Agreement), the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, and others. The
base values among many who participated stressed the values of knowledge and
rectitude.
The perspectives of the participants is also important as part of the social process
and provides perhaps the starkest contrast between governance in the Great Lakes Basin
versus governance in the BoF/GoM.. The governance regime under the GLWQA
between the late 1960s and early 1990s thrived on a perspective that included a
dedication to collaboration, cooperation, inclusion, and a desire to do good for the Great
Lakes Basin that was stronger than the desire to profit or otherwise drain it of resources
or resilience. The IJC commissioners took an oath that they would make decisions
independent from consideration or interference from national interests. Another
important operating principle was that each member of the IJC, its Boards, and working
committees was to operate "in his (or her) own professional capacity and expertise"
rather than as a representative of an agency, NGO, or other special interest. In this
manner, attention was focused on the resilience and integrity of the Great Lakes Basin
ecosystem without worrying about agency interests and limitations. The requirement that
persons serving on the IJC's advisory boards did so in their own capacities as citizens and
experts, not in the capacity of representing the organizations that employed them, "helped
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draw the best, least selfish, least compromised advice from its advisors... (Dempsey
2004,192-93).
Given the public nature of the IJC and its Boards, and the significant public
involvement, strategies and situations were relatively straight forward. With strategies,
the custom and practice of being open to all ideas helped instill a collaborative attitude
and allowed for diplomatic efforts. Litigation played a role early in the GLWQA years
on the U.S. side until polluters got the message. Litigation was coordinated by a single
NGO and targets were often kin key cities involving major corporations (e.g. GE, US
Steel, Dow Chemical). Situations where participants could interact were frequent in the
Great Lakes Basin, with public IJC biennial meetings, Great Lakes United, the
International Association of Great Lakes Researchers, and the Great Lakes Information
Network.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, public participation has seldom been a
priority. Policy-making, as we have seen, often by-passes the first requirement for goal
clarification: meaningful public and/or community participation and input into the goal
setting process. Goal clarification is determined piecemeal by the legislative process or
the rulemaking processes of the relevant regulatory bodies and agencies with jurisdiction
over those human activities that impact some component of the ecosystem. The goals of
most of the relevant agencies in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine were examined in
Chapter V - but there is little evidence that governance participants in the region would
ever set aside their national or agency allegiances in favor of the public good. Simply
put, the notion seems substantially at odds with the administrative culture observed in the
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region. So with little public input with respect to the goals in the binational117 BoF/GoM,
and with governance participants that are a fragmented collection of federal and
state/provincial agencies with differing, and sometimes competing, goals, there is little
about the social process in the region that would likely promote management decisions
that would favor the resilience of the ecosystem as a whole over the special interests of
the agencies involved in governance.
Perspectives in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine governance regime differ
significantly from those highlighted during the early years of the GLWQA participants in
the Great Lakes Basin. Frequently it appears that powerful political and economic
pressures on agencies force them to take special interests into consideration to the
detriment of the resilience of the ecosystem. In Chapter V comments from a fisheries
management participant made it clear that reduction of fleet capacity was made very
difficult because of pressure from industry as well as political pressure.
The Gulf of Maine Council on the Marine Environment, as we have seen, is the
only organization that attempts to get as many agencies from both Canada and the U.S.
involved in a forum within which they may share ideas and exchange information. The
members of the GOMC have agreed to three goals and four governing principles that, if
clearly followed by all agencies, would prove beneficial to overall ecosystem integrity.
But the Council has no authority to bring pressure to bear on its members to step-up their
efforts or even to adhere to its own principles. It is clearly difficult for the GOMC to
play a leading role when there is so much difference in goals, values, and perspectives

117 As an observation, there is little recognition outside of fisheries and the Gulf of Maine Council that the
Gulf of Maine is a shared binational resource.
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One of the messages about the Council that came out of
interviews highlighted in Chapter V was the fact that information generated through the
Gulf of Maine process rarely changed or impacted the decision-making of its members.
What we see, therefore, is that the Social Process in the BoF/GoM region is
jurisdictionally fragmented and that agencies are often so pressured and constrained by
legal limitation and politics that the goal of ecosystem resilience must often take a back
seat to nationalistic concerns or agency limitations. The Gulf of Maine Council must
avoid fisheries issues, and the New England Fishery Management Council must look the
other way when pollution impacts are on the table. Politics and pressure are brought to
bear by special interests and, with no reliably consistent overarching body providing
political cover, the participants in the region must frequently appease both agency politics
and special interest pressures - sometimes to the detriment of ecosystem resilience.
There is also a distinct difference in perspectives between participants in the
GOMC and those from the early days under the GLWQA. In the former, some
participating agencies have goals, e.g. to get industry, and "if it doesn't happen, we
walk." In the Great Lakes, as we have seen, participants were obligated to make the
resilience and integrity of the Great Lakes Basin their primary function, with nationalistic
and agency constraints checked at the door. Of course, in the Great Lakes Basin there is
an international treaty that helps to enable federal, state, and provincial implementation.
Finally, we look at the role that the Decision Process plays in the two case studies
in order to determine their effectiveness at prioritizing ecosystem resilience. Recall that
in our ideal ecosystem-based governance model, the Decision Process uses the tasks of
intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation, appraisal, and termination to
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promote human dignity and the fair distribution of values in order to gain the willingness
of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to clarify and secure
common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to healthy, functional,
and resilient systems.
Intelligence is the process of obtaining and processing information and making it
available to decision makers, stakeholders, members of the public, and others (Clark
2002). The purpose of intelligence is to provide reliable data and information that
permits an understanding of whether conditions in the ecosystem are trending toward or
away from the goals of the region (Busch and Trexler 2003). Reliability and credibility
of the data matters and it should be collected from appropriate scales in order to detect
trends and changes in ecosystem resilience and function and it should be open honest
debate. Public participation in the debate as well as communication of the results to the
public is critical to the maintenance of a knowledgeable and connected base of citizen
involvement.
In the Great Lakes Basin in the early years of the GLWQA governance, water
sampling began long before the passage of the Clean Water Act - and in fact led to the
reference that resulted in the negotiation of the GLWQA. Beginning in the early 1970s,
the IJC and its Boards began work on a basin-wide surveillance plan. With help from
Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference Group ("PLUARG") and agencies
working on both sides of the border, 1975 Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was adopted
through the Water Quality Board and the UC (WQB 1975). The IJC and its Boards
monitored the results of the surveillance plan, and with increasing evidence of toxic
contamination challenged the parties to buttress the plan and increase funding for basin525

wide biological monitoring. The plan was revisited and revised often to keep pace with
developing threats. The results of the surveillance activities were reported out each year
in a various forums, including annual meetings of IAGLR, the biennial IJC meetings and
formal reports to the Parties, and beginning in the late 1980s on-line through the Great
Lakes Information Network (GLIN). The active and at times raucous involvement of the
public at IJC meetings has been described in prior sections. It extended to promotion,
also accomplished under public scrutiny and basically a "bottom up" process involving a
wide variety of actors, including government agencies, NGOs, citizens, and related
institutions.
There was significant appraisal of how the policies were doing. Every two years
the IJC issued a report that reviewed the progress, or not, of ecosystem factors toward the
goals of the GLWQA. The report was aired publically every two years at the biennial
meetings, where from 1975 through the 1990s the IJC publically questioned its Boards
and working committees on the status of the ecosystems in the Great Lakes. In addition,
the public had an opportunity to question the IJC and its boards. This is in addition to the
other public outreach referenced previously.
The Decision Process in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed is different.
With no overarching governance entity, the decision process in the BoF/GoM is a
crowded field. Understanding the collective decision process, however, can be a way of
reconciling or at least productively managing competing interests and policies through
politics. There are inevitable agency turf battles and politics plays a role in their
outcome. Politics will always be with us because people seek different policies that
reflect their particular, or "special", interests. The ideal, of course, is for participants to
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reconcile interest differences in order to clarify and secure their common interest. In the
BoF/GoM governance regime, we have seen that it is not really clear who establishes
what the common interests are or should be, and even what the community believes is in
their common interests.
The intelligence task in the region is carried out by individual agencies. Data
collected by separate agencies may or may not wind up with the Gulf of Maine Council
or its working group. There also may still be issues with how data is collected and
whether the same standards are followed by all agencies.
While intelligence is collected by various agencies at various times for a variety
of purposes, we are still not very knowledgeable about the resilience and integrity of the
BoF/GoM. It became clear in Chapter V that in many ways we don't know the status of
the ecosystem in the region. The way agencies manage their jurisdictions, data is largely
stove piped and the overall picture of the health of the system is still relatively unknown.
There is a real need for more consistent indicators, collaborative monitoring, joint
interpretation, and data sharing.
While the "fragmented incrementalism" process persists, the Gulf of Maine
Council has demonstrated that it can work together to publish valuable and informative
information about the region - like its Tides of Change report (Pesch and Wells 2004)
and the new State of the Gulf (Thompson 2010) series. The Gulfwatch Contaminants
Monitoring Program has been using mussels from some 38 locations around the Gulf
since the early-1990s to monitor dozens of chemicals and metals in the mussel tissue.118
There are still gaps, of course. Endocrine disrupting chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
118

http://www.gulfofinaine.org/gulfwatch/
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some of the more harmful persistent organic pollutants which can be found in the tissue
of pinnipeds and humans are not monitored (De Guise, Shaw et al. 2001; Wells 2010).
The bottom line is that we haven't a clue how pervasive these harmful emerging
contaminants are in the sediments and water column of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine.
So what happens to the information that is collected from the various member
agencies around the region? To an outside observer, it's not clear. Presumably its
primary use is to move an agency forward with its mission. Some, maybe most,
information gets posted on the web site of the Gulf of Maine Council where it is easily
accessible to the public. Which brings us to the next fundamental problem: Why would
members of the public in the region ever look on the GOMC web site? There is little in
the way of dedicated and aggressive outreach that might be capable of creating a
knowledgeable citizen base capable of speaking for the public good. Promotion, like
intelligence, is largely done within agency and between agencies and legislators and
Members of Parliament. Promotion does not tend to involve the citizens, unless you
consider advertising by special interests as promotion.
Prescriptions in the region, thoroughly reviewed in chapter VI, are many and
varied and do little to promote integrity and resilience as the primary driver for
governance decision making in the BoF/GoM region. Rather, as we know, they focus on
some component of the ecosystem. Further, concepts like human dignity, economic wellbeing, fair distribution, and justice appear nowhere in the lexicon of the BoF/GoM
prescriptions or governance.
Thus it would appear that ecosystem resilience is not the highest priority in the
regional governance regime. It may be that the cumulative effort of all of the agencies
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enforcing their regulatory interests has a positive impact on the ecosystem. I am unable
to determine that from the information that I have seen. Ultimately, if ESIP can agree
upon a meaning suite of indicators, and if the reports and data produced by regulatory
agencies, NGOs, and others relevant to the ecosystem can be accessed easily and in one
place, it might be possible to better understand the state of the integrity and resilience of
the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
Significant meaningful public participation.
Any ecosystem management regime must provide the opportunity for meaningful
participation and input of a broad representative segment of the population in decision
making processes (Costanza, Norton et al. 1992; Pauly and Maclean 2003). Significant,
meaningful public participation is required (Becker 1993; Cortner and Moote 1999;
Jackson 2005). Participation must be open to almost any person or group with a
significant interest in the issue (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Citizen involvement and
partnership must be sufficient to build "civic science" instead of the traditional public
information programs designed to inform passively (Gunderson, Holling et al. 1995).
Together we must "pay the price of civilization through multiple acts of good
citizenship..." (Sachs 2011,5) In the Policy Science framework, meaningful public
participation is called for in Problem Orientation (especially goal clarification), Social
Process (throughout), and the Decision Process.
With respect to the degree of public involvement in the Great Lakes Basin under
the GLWQA, I believe enough has been said. We have seen that meaningful public
participation and the building of a knowledgeable citizen base was a priority of the IJC in
the early years. Numerous efforts at outreach and education were sponsored by the IJC
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and undertaken by the Lake Michigan Federation, the Great Lakes Basin Commission,
and Great Lakes Tomorrow, through Decisions for the Great Lakes. We've also seen
how NGOs and other entities from around the basin came together under the banner of
Great Lakes United. During the early years of governance under the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, the process it sparked was designed to promote significant,
meaningful, public participation.
In the BoF/GoM watershed, meaningful public participation has seldom been a
part of the governance process. This is not by design but instead more a weakness of the
laws underpinning federal, state and provincial governance in the region - which largely
takes the form of traditional regulatory legislation. There are many that believe the
culture of "independence" as characterized by state mottos like that of New Hampshire
("Live Free or Die") mentally drives a culture of regulatory "hands off' and discourages
innovation, collaboration, and cooperation. Thus traditional regulatory activity ushers in
legislation that relies on scientific management which attempts to use the latest scientific
knowledge and expert, disinterested personnel. This makes the key participants in the
region's resource management process the experts and scientists, with government
relying upon their divination and implementation of the best available science. If the
public is involved at all, it is generally limited to an opportunity for comments or
participation in a hearing after the experts and scientists have drafted a proposed plan of
action. Further, the "iron triangle" is alive and well in the region as pressure groups
concerned with single interests, e.g. navigation, fishing, energy, join with administrative
agencies in charge of individual programs as well as congressional committees to defeat
any attempt at an integrated approach. Courts, as we have seen, are common participants
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in traditional natural resource management and are called upon to provide conflict
resolution. Although there is evidence that in some parts of the region, Great Bay, NH,
and Casco Bay, Maine, for instance, there are changes occurring, top-down, commandoriented, fragmented natural resource and environmental policy management is the rule
in general in traditional governance and, typically, the rule in reality in the BoF/GoM
region, leaving little room for meaningful public involvement.
Integrated, collaborative government involvement
In an ideal ecosystem-based approach, regulatory agencies participate in a
coordinated and integrated fashion. The approach is applied within a geographic
framework determined primarily by ecological, not political, boundaries. Thus the
process must overcome the fragmentation inherent in both the sectoral management
approach and the splits in jurisdiction among levels of government (Regier and
Baskerville 1986; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). In an
ideal system, government acts less on other actors and more with other actors in a
collaborative and communicative way. There is, therefore, more frequent, collaborative
contact (i.e. not just during crisis). Thus government would require less of the local,
state, or federal governments exerting control over others in society and more of a
partnership-like interaction among them (Fiorino 2006).
In the ideal ecosystem-based approach model collaboration is highlighted in a
variety of areas. It is found in the Conditions task where collaboration between scientists,
regulators, and citizen participants is required in order to jointly work to identify causes
and conditions responsible for negative trends. It is also found in a number of tasks
within the Social Process. A task within the Social Process consistent with ecosystem531

based governance is that regulatory agencies should participate in a coordinated and
integrated fashion and allow softer local and regional input into governance. There is
also a need for collaborative processes to be iterative and ongoing - not simply singleplay problem solving efforts. Collaboration is also called for as part of the intelligence
and appraisal feedback mechanism, meaning that there needs to be collaborative and
cooperative partnerships with scientists, regulators, and the public to collect data as well
as a collaborative entity or overarching body that can accumulate knowledge from
appraisals and implement change to reverse adverse trends.
In the Great Lakes Basin, integrated, collaborative government involvement was
critical to the ecosystem approach built under the UC GLWQA arrangement.
Interlocking directors, acting on behalf of the good of the Great Lakes and not necessarily
on behalf of a participant's agency, played a critical role in the ability of the UC and its
principle boards, together with the Great Lakes Fisheries Commission, to solve problems.
As some of those who were interviewed for the Great Lakes study related, many of the
participants in the early years under the GLWQA held offices, served on boards, or
otherwise participated in several of the management entities. A member of the UC's
Science Advisory board might also be a Commissioner of the Great Lakes Fishery
Commission and participate in the Great Lakes Basin Commission. Knowledge was
freely shared. The point is, collaboration was an important aspect of the Great Lakes
Basin governance regime.
Collaboration in the GLB took a number of forms, including commissioners and
board members who put the good of the Great Lakes, an esprit d' corps, in front of
allegiance to national government, agency, or special interests. It also came in the form
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of working with the public and being open to all ideas - the free market of concepts and
ideas. Biennial IJC meetings provided valuable engagement between the SAB, the
WQB, and the press with the public present in a very public discourse in open sessions.
These efforts were buttressed by an interdisciplinary Great Lakes science community. In
the late 1960s concern about fishery and lamprey eel problems and the reference on
phosphorus spawned the establishment of the International Association for Great Lakes
Research (IAGLR) in 1967. Its journal and well-attended annual meetings became
venues for a greater flow of information within the binational Great Lakes community.
Although begun by physical and biological scientists, by 1971 academic political
scientists and others interested in natural resource management issues began to
participate in earnest. Thus collaboration and cooperation between government agencies
was common in the early years of the GLWQA.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, cooperation and collaboration has
been slower to come. The history of the governance efforts tends to show that
collaboration and cooperation between government, NGOs, stakeholders, and the public
has been a bit of a hit or miss story. The Gulf of Maine Council, as we know, provides
an excellent forum for government agencies from both sides of the Hague Line, but their
collaborative efforts may extend only as far as the sum of its parts allows, and
collaboration in the form of the sharing of ideas and exchange of information does not
often translate into significant cooperative action.
There have been excellent examples of collaboration discussed in the body of this
report; namely, the Saltwater Network and ACAP. Another government attempt at
collaboration in Canada has not fared so well. The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated
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Management Plan ("ESSIM") in Atlantic Canada involved over ten years of stakeholder
involvement to develop a final draft plan. ESSIM was Canada's pilot integrated
management effort, and drew upon stakeholders to come up with a plan to deal with a
coastal margin with competitive uses that included a Marine Protected Area (The Gully),
..protected areas of cold-water corals, multispecies fisheries including ground fisheries,
small and large pelagic fisheries, crab, lobster, and an extensive Aboriginal Communal
Commercial Snow Crab fisher, dragger, long line, oil and gas exploration, works, seismic
activities, oil and gas pipelines, other oil and gas development projects, marine
transport..." (GOMC 2012, 5). With what I assume was a tail wind from the from the
2005 Ocean Actions Plan, which favored "Integrated Oceans Management" as one of its
four pillars (Ricketts and Hildebrand 2011), and with the establishment of a 32 member
Stakeholder Advisory Council ("SAC") comprised of a diverse group of shareholders that
agreed to share the responsibility for leadership toward the ESSIM vision, ESSIM stalled.
Although a plan was drafted with SAC guidance and submitted to the government fir
approval in 2007, the plan has yet to be approved. A survey of SAC members places
blame on lack of leadership by the government - and expresses the notion that whereas
multiple stakeholders can work together, apparently governments cannot (GOMC 2012).
This result may unfortunately be consistent with the findings of a 2005 Auditor
General review of Canada's Oceans Act which found that following its passage the
oceans ceased to be a government priority, and that government had failed to meet its
obligations under the Act. There may be a cautionary lesson for the U.S. as its Oceans
Policy gets closer to reality. The Canadian experience may demonstrate that the policy
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and its various collaborative and cooperative measures may not be welcomed with open
arms by federal agencies currently responsible for ocean and coastal management.
The resistance may likely be strongest in areas like the U.S. Northeast that have no
history of working with a River Basin Commission and that don't have a notable history
of collaboration.
Whether it is the lack of a River Basin Commission, the independence and "hands
off' attitude inscribed by some states on their license plates and which oozes into the
attitude toward governance in general, there seems to be a culture in the region that
discourages meaningful collaboration and cooperative problem-solving. There are
numerous excellent examples of collaboration that are sprinkled around the region, but in
general collaboration, or the sharing of power in any manner, is hardly on the top of any
regulator's "to do" list. With some meaningful exceptions described earlier, and others,
cooperative and collaborative governance is generally not present in the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine region.
Governance is adaptive.
There must be a realization that stewardship cannot wait on science to achieve a
full understanding of ecosystem structure and function. Thus an ecosystem based
approach in any region must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in complex
natural and institutional systems (Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002).
Adaptive governance is a mode of learning that allows for decision makers with a poor
understanding of the connection between their actions and the consequences to learn by
doing (Ludwig, Hilborn et al. 1993; Holling 1995; NRC 2009). Ecosystem surprises
stemming from delay in feedback, and/or rapid feedback, are normal ecosystem dynamics
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and require adaptive governance. Recall that the purpose here is not to design a flawless
governance process capable of coping with multiple, complex systems. All that can be
done is attempt to design a system that operates under rules that allow sufficient
information to be generated over time to enable participants to learn from their mistakes
and continually adapt and improve the institutional system to operate within natural limits
(Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and
interventions are treated as experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring,
evaluating, and terminating failed policies instead of expert-driven planning that relies
primarily on science-based technology rather than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et
al. 2005).
Translated to the policy sciences framework, the Social Process tasks of
"Inventing, Evaluating, and Selecting Alternatives" are requirements of adaptive
governance. This is where the ability for trial and error is nested. Confronted with
uncertainty, participants must have the capacity and the courage to invent, evaluate, and
select alternatives. The Decision Process requires: (1) reliable intelligence, honest
promotion, prescriptions and implementation that are often experimental, (2) appraisal in
the form of monitoring and other feedback, and (3) the ability to terminate policies that
aren't working and scale up policies that are successful in moving the community toward
its goals. An overarching institutional entity is necessary in order to evaluate the data and
select policy alternatives when there is a need to try and reverse negative trends.
Chapter IV taught us that in the early days of governance under the there was an
effort to coordinate intelligence and accumulate data relevant to the goals set forth in the
GLWQA. Specific water quality standards were part of the original 1972 Agreement.
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With the input of the citizen panels from Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference
Group ("PLUARG") and with recommendations from Canadian agencies, and with
pressure from the public to understand whether ecosystem conditions were trending
toward the goals, the Great Lakes Surveillance Plan was approved by the Water Quality
Board and the IJC in 1975. In 1976, with the increasing threats posed by toxic
contaminants and the development of new technology, the UC challenged the Parties to
commit to increased funding to include basin-wide biological monitoring (IJC 1976).
Similar challenges to buttress surveillance monitoring were issued the following year in
anticipation of the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to governance for the entire
Great Lakes Basin - which would include land-based activities due to the findings and
recommendations of PLUARG (IJC 1978). The fact that the UC and its Boards
continued to alter and amend the Surveillance Plan demonstrates both adaptability and
accountability.
Consistent with the notion of promotion in an ideal ecosystem-based governance
regime, during the first decade of the GLWQA there was strong support by the UC and
its Boards and panels to pursue common interests and the health of the Great Lakes Basin
ecosystem were paramount. The problem-solving approach of the Science Advisory
Board and related IJC panels and working committees was to solicit and listen to all ideas
being promoted from multiple interests - a universal approach - in order to make sure no
potential innovation was overlooked. IJC, Science Advisory Board, and other Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement participants shared an implicit commitment to the basin
and to the equity and justice. Equity, fairness, and human health reached operational
levels under the GLWQA and were significant factors in the early years. Also,
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information and input was gathered from broad base of participants, overlapping board
members, and knowledgeable citizens.
As we learned in Chapter IV, participants in the decision process of the UC and
its boards made decisions in the face of uncertainty. In terms of prescription, they asked
both parties to ban the use of phosphates in the basin. The measures ordered by the IJC
were accepted by the parties with the assistance of a knowledgeable public. As a result,
the water cleared up. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission also took some courageous
action when it elected to work with states to begin a new fishery for Pacific salmon in the
Great Lakes. During this time, of course, the public was kept informed through the
public IJC biennial meetings, the Great Lakes Basin Commission, Great Lakes
Tomorrow, annual meetings of the International Association of Great Lakes Researchers,
periodic meetings and publications of Great Lakes United, and the Great Lakes
Information Network.
The story in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region is quite different. Adaptive
governance is difficult if not impossible without an overarching institutional entity. As
we know, adaptive governance is a process - and it needs to be a process capable of
integrating valid and appropriate interests into the policy process to advance the common
interest. We have seen that the UC in the early years of the GLWQA had a series of
management principles that enabled the Parties to make decisions for the public good
without regard to national interests or other interests. Their role was to make decisions
that were good for the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.
Currently there is no equivalent system or process in the BoF/GoM. Recall that
under an adaptive governance regime, policy choices and interventions are treated as
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experiments (NRC 2009), relying explicitly on monitoring, evaluating, and terminating
failed policies instead of expert-driven planning that relies primarily on science-based
technology rather than trial and error (Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005). Without an
accountable overarching entity, there is no entity capable of organizing a monitoring
design, evaluating the results, or changing policies in order to reverse ecosystem
components that are trending away from the goals of the community. There is no entity
tasked with the function of making decisions for the good of the ecosystem. There is also
no way to learn from trial and error as there is no entity willing to confront uncertainty to
learn by taking a chance. It also means that processes that work will not be recognized
and cannot be scaled up for use across the Gulf. A case in point is ACAP, the Atlantic
Coastal Action Program that has involved the public in meaningful ways and provides the
opportunity for communities to make decisions about their own future. There are 14
ACAP communities in the Canadian Maritimes. From the audits that we discussed in
chapter V, the ACAP program has saved Environment Canada some $70 million by
performing tasks and functions that would have ordinarily been executed by regulators
within the agency. Despite the successes of the ACAP model, attempts by Environment
Canada to get agencies in the U.S. to look at it and perhaps scale up the program and
adopt it for the United States have been unsuccessful (Personal Correspondence 2010).
This is not a promising message that would lead to risk-taking and innovation.
Adaptive governance is clearly not something that can be counted on any time soon in the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. While there are many caring, hard-working people
involved in tasks related to governance, they are for the most part working in
governmental agencies, institutions, or NGOs that have their own cultures, interests, and
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values. In this region there is an extremely strong allegiance to traditional expert-driven
scientific management. With the many threats that are looming over the BoF/GoM
ecosystem at present, practically guaranteeing changes that will no doubt surprise and
surpass the coping mechanisms of existing governance systems, there will be no adaptive
governance process to understand, detect, warn or react when conditions hit a tipping
point and strange things begin to happen.
Mobilizing local knowledge
Social and cultural memory and contemporary local knowledge must be
mobilized by developing links between key persons and providing a direction for
adaptive governance. This is a way of building social capacity for resilience in socialecological systems (Holling 1995; Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Steelman 2010).
This factor is being used as a separate category that includes more than just public
participation. This category involved more the intelligence, promotion, and prescription
tasks of the Decision Process. We saw how citizen panels were used by the DC through
PLUARG to examine the possible impacts of land-based activities on water quality. One
important part of those panels was the local knowledge brought to the table by many of
the farmers and residents of the regions where there were panels. This local knowledge
helps to round out scientific knowledge and give a more holistic vision to rising problems
and potential solutions. Further, participation by citizens into the Decision Process will
inevitably get a better buy-in from the public should citizen action be required for any
potential actions. There was no doubt that citizen participation in the decision process in
the Great Lakes Basin helped to get the phosphorus ban through every state in which it
was introduced over industry objection.
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In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine there are numerous programs that link fishers
with scientists for research related to fish populations and distribution. Local knowledge
is being brought to the table currently in Exeter, NH, as part of the process that is
ultimately deciding whether a bridge in that town is removed. There are active watershed
organizations that work hard to maintain and restore riverine systems in their
communities. The Annapolis River Watershed is home the Annapolis River Guardians,
one of the longest running volunteer water monitoring programs in Canada. Starting in
1992 its over 90 volunteers have collected more than 4000 water samples. The group
annually publishes score cards giving citizens an overview of the status of the river.119
There are other sources of local knowledge in the many other watershed associations,
land trusts, and related organizations that surely can be tapped by regulators as sources of
information for use by future governance.
Local knowledge, however, is still used on a piecemeal basis. While there are
excellent examples of local groups in the region empowering themselves and
participating in decisions that affect their future, more often than not such decisions are
made in the tradition of scientific management. Government agencies use purportedly
impartial experts and scientists to make decisions and develop plans, with local
knowledge generally overlooked until the final comment stages.
Overarching lead or foint institution
Governance must have a lead or joint institution able to adapt to new information
and understanding (Christensen, Bartuska et al. 1996). This requirement is found in the
Social and Decision Processes and is considered critical to the existence and
119
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implementation of adaptive governance. Any overarching lead or joint institution must
have the authority (formal or informal) and means to carry out systematic scientific
research to understand system response and status, to track compliance with policy goals
and objectives as well as to make changes when necessary. The obvious need is for
transparency and fairness as perceived by the public and regulated community. More
pertinent, however, may be the existence of informal or voluntary venues for dispute
resolution that gives the public and stakeholders an opportunity to work together toward
resolution of local or regional problems. This may be especially important where, as in
this study area, the problems we are having with environmental degradation are the result
of the cumulative impact of activities that are entirely (or mostly) legal under our existing
laws and regulations (Brunner 2002; Fiorino 2006).
It is important to note that the lead or overarching institutional entity need not
have formal authority in order to be effective. The IJC and its boards do not have formal
authority to enforce its decisions and directives with respect to water quality.120 This is
not uncommon in international law. It simply needs to be able to investigate, monitor,
and lead or direct any changes required in order to adapt to new conditions as well as to
make recommendations directly to governments.
In the governance of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, the Gulf of Maine Council
could conceivably act as the lead or overarching institution with the ability to guide the
adaptation of government responsibilities in the region. There have been times in the
past when members actually challenged each other to put pressure on recalcitrant
120 Under the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty the IJC has regulatory authority over matters related to
diversions and consumptive use of waterways shared by the U.S. and Canada. (1909). Treaty Relating to
the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between the United States and Canada.
U.S.-Gr.Brit. 36 Stat. 2448.
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jurisdictions to up the ante and take more effective measures to help achieve the shared
goals articulated in the Council's Action Plans. Of course, without participation of
fishery management even if the Council was willing to pressure reluctant jurisdictions
into better environmental performance there would still be a huge gap in efforts to restore
and preserve the integrity of the ecosystem.
Given the above, it should be clear that a key element necessary for effective
ecosystem-based governance is missing. Thus far in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
there is a lack of will - or lack of courage - to act in the public interest by making some
arrangement to be accountable to an entity with the authority and capacity to monitor
developing trends and guide policy change in order to prepare for and react to negative
trends and surprises.
A precautionary approach to uncertainty
Finally, the Decision Process of governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
not only needs to have an overarching entity, but that entity needs to have management
principles that apply flexible principles to its decisions. Certainly it is necessary that any
lead entity in the region would need to have principles that enables an independence and
esprit d' corps similar to the spirit that guided the UC, its boards, and working
committees in the early years under the GLWQA.
A precautionary decision-making approach must be incorporated into the
Decision Process and management principles in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine in order
to account for the great degree of uncertainty inherent in complex natural resource issues
(Sherman 1994; Sutinen, Clay et al. 2000; Costanza, Low et al. 2001). Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration makes it clear that where there are threats of serious or irreversible
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damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation (Sitarz 1994). Thus ecosystem
management in the region must be prepared to cope with the uncertainty inherent in
complex natural and institutional systems ((Sherman, Kane et al. 2002; Whiteside 2006),
Clay et al. 2000; Sherman, Kane et al. 2002). Rapid feedback and appropriate decisionselection mechanisms must be in place to compensate for lack of knowledge by decision
makers - or what we have called adaptive governance (Costanza, Low et al. 2001). This
becomes a more compelling need as climate change accelerates and adaptive governance
and management is forced to become increasingly nimble.
Historically, environmentally harmful activities have only been stopped after they
have manifested extreme environmental degradation or exposed people to harm. In the
case of DDT, lead, and asbestos, and commercial fisheries for instance, significant
regulatory intervention took place only after disaster had occurred. The delay between
first knowledge of harm and appropriate action to deal with it can be measured in human
lives cut short or in the serious, often permanent, environmental degradation that has
occurred.
In contrast to the traditional management approach of reacting only when human
health has suffered or environmental harm has occurred, precautionary planning may be
used to prevent or address problems before they occur. The 1992 Rio Declaration
specifically laid out the foundation for the precautionary approach in Principle 15:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States, according to their abilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation" (UNCED 1992).
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While decision making using a precautionary approach recognizes that the
absence of full scientific certainty must not be used as a reason to postpone decisions
where there is a risk of serious or irreversible harm, there is a need for some level of
guidance. Guidance and assurance are required as to the conditions governing the actions
that will be taken. Guidance and assurance are particularly needed when a decision must
be made regarding a risk of serious or irreversible harm about which there is significant
scientific uncertainty.
Who makes these decisions? How does an agency determine whether a threat has
the potential for "serious or irreversible" damage? What should the guidelines be for the
determination of whether a proposed measure is "cost effective?" Finally, who should
bear the burden of proof for any of these issues?
What may make the precautionary approach unique (i.e. different from traditional
risk analysis) is the notion that the burden of proof be on the proponents of any actions
that might prove harmful to human health or the environment to show that the impacts
will be benign, or at least that the harm caused will be outweighed by a 'greater good.'.
It still begs the question of when the actors have to submit such actions to an
administrative body and what standards should apply to the decision process thereafter.
One key will be the level of protection that society chooses. The threats can then be
compared to society's expressed level of protection (e.g. ranging from zero tolerance for
toxic or persistent organic pollutants to some form of threshold limit values combined
with monitoring and control rules with prearranged management actions in response to
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unanticipated monitoring results - for instance if a target Total Allowable Catch ("TAC")
is hit, by prior agreement the fishery shuts down).
Involvement of the public in the determination of the desired level of protection,
through outreach and education, could be developed so that transparency and full public
input could give credibility to regulatory efforts. The bottom line is the need for
overarching law that applies the precautionary approach to all relevant aspects of
regulation. Guidelines and regulations developed in an agency-by-agency fashion would
have to meet certain requirements as defined by the legislation. I would assume that the
approach would be flexible, that it would provide a "balancing of interests" approach so
frequently found in law, that is, the magnitude of the threat of harm or irreversible
damage would be weighed against the value to society of the actor's planned act. The
greater the uncertainty, the more conservative would be the criteria before actions are
permitted. For example, the burden of proof may be difficult for industry to demonstrate
that the risk of irreversible harm of the release of dioxins by the pulp and paper mills into
the waters of Canada and the U.S. outweighs the social value of toilet paper that is whiter
in appearance than toilet paper manufactured without the need to discharge dioxins. The
test may come out differently if we weigh the benefit of oil and gas exploration and
exploitation on Browns and Georges Banks against the threat of harm to the ecosystem
and, by inference, the fishery. Again - who decides? Are these incredibly significant
decisions to be left to the typical array of scientists and experts or do we establish
meaningful partnerships with stakeholders, communities, and the public to arrive at
resolution of these conflicts?
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It is apparent that governance in the BoF/GoM does not include management or
rule-making principles that in any way resemble a precautionary approach. It is also
apparent that future governance must include the precautionary approach to decision
making as part of a package with other management principles, like independence and
freedom from agency and national interests when decisions are made that pertain to the
resilience and integrity of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region.
Conclusions
We have seen that all is not well with the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem.
The Conditions section of Chapter V makes it clear that the stresses that are picking away
at the ecosystem are not going away - in fact they may be worsening.
In order to determine whether the existing governance regime of the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine has the capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem
approach to restore and sustain, over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems,
including the functions upon which the humans in the ecosystem rely, several logical
steps were followed. From a thorough review of the literature there was the ability to
learn about the modern manifestation of traditional government and the differences
between traditional scientific management and the ecosystem-based approach to
governance. The seven characteristics of ecosystem-based governance developed in
chapter III and discussed immediately above were gleaned from the literature.
Obviously, in an evaluation of the existing governance in the study region, the more
characteristics that can be found in existing institutional and related governance regime,
the better are the chances that there exists the capacity to implement an ecosystem-based
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approach to the management of those activities that impact the environment. No
governance regime is perfect and improved governance or the capacity to implement a
more ecosystem-based approach to governance does not require that all seven
characteristics be present. It only requires that there are enough characteristics present
with sufficient strength to create a process that can foster change that results in
measurable ecosystem components trending toward the goals of the community.
To better assess the existence and strength of the ecosystem-based approach to
governance the framework developed by the Policy Sciences was utilized. Using the
framework, it was possible to examine the problem orientation, social process, and
decision process to better understand the differences, task by task, between traditional
government and an ecosystem-based approach to governance.
Once the ecosystem-based approach to governance was broken down into its
functional components with the framework approach, Chapter IV used the framework to
assess the governance regime under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in the first
20 years after the Agreement was entered into between the United States and Canada.
Using the framework, the governance regime in the Great Lakes Basin between roughly
1972 and 1992 was compared with the "ideal" ecosystem-based governance framework
criteria. As demonstrated in Chapter IV and immediately above, the analysis revealed
that that the governance system in the Great Lakes Basin in the early years of the
GLWQA compared favorably to the ideal model. Therefore it became evident that the
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance were present as revealed by the
framework analysis.
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Chapter V then used the framework analysis to compare the existing governance
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed to the ideal. From the analysis of Chapter
V and the summary of the ecosystem-based characteristics above, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the existing governance scheme in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed does not have the capacity to implement an ecosystem-based approach to
governance. The reasons for this conclusion become apparent when the framework
analysis is used to examine the existing governance regime and the existing problem
orientation, social process, and decision process are compared with the ideal framework
from Chapter III. The conclusions may be summarized using the seven characteristics of
ecosystem-based governance discussed above. The "related questions" are addressed in
the summary of conclusions that follow.
The first characteristic that was proposed for the existence of an ecosystem-based
approach to governance was the priority that must be place on management for resilience.
Without repeating what has been already been discussed, the governance regime in the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine does not have ecosystem resilience as a priority. The
framework analysis demonstrated that the basics of problem orientation, which include
meaningful community participation in the goal clarification process and strong public
outreach and education efforts combined with multiple goals that embrace human dignity
with a premium placed on the maintenance of integrity and resilience were not readily
recognizable in the study area. The goals in the study region are fragmented among a
diverse array of agencies at the local, state/provincial and federal levels in two countries.
There is no goal or even multiple goals that all participants strive to achieve. The social
process analysis disclosed that public participation was not a priority, and that the
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perspectives and values of government and other institutions in the region appeared to
focus more on the preservation and/or increase of power and wealth as a way to protect or
increase agency influence and budget. The integrity and resilience of the region's
ecosystem seems to be less of a priority than the well-being of the agencies and other
participants involved in governance. Finally, when the Decision Processes present in the
region are examined and compared with the ideal, it is clear that they are not supportive
of the need to prioritize ecosystem integrity in the management of human activities that
impact the environment. In the ideal ecosystem-based governance model, the Decision
Process uses the tasks of intelligence, promotion, prescription, implementation, appraisal,
and termination to promote human dignity and the fair distribution of values in order to
gain the willingness of a community to pitch in and become an active part of the effort to
clarify and secure common interests that can lead to the restoration of our ecosystems to
healthy, functional, and resilient systems. In Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region,
intelligence is gathered agency-by-agency, with little input from an informed public and
without significant community or local knowledge. The information that is collected is
not readily available to the public. Finally, there is no overarching entity in the region
capable of reviewing the existing data and implementing policy changes based on trends
reflected by the data. Other, more veteran, jurisdictions have by various forms of
agreement managed to get past these barriers. The International Joint Commission used
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement to enable greater collaboration although the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty provided the basis for the Agreement. The Great Lakes
Commission is a compact between states within the Great Lakes watershed, but Canadian
provinces are included and their votes, though legally non-binding, are treated as binding
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by the Commission. In any event, there are ways to create an accountable body able to
oversee and guide policy development in the region - all that is needed is the political
will.
In sum, the existing governance regime in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed does not demonstrate the ecosystem-based governance characteristic of
managing for resilience and integrity.
The next characteristic, the significant, meaningful public participation in the
governance regime is also, with some exceptions, not generally present in the region.
The combination of fragmented governance and a cultural bias favoring independent or
"hands off' regulatory approaches lead to governance by traditional top-down scientific
management. Government enforces uniform rules across the board using experts and
scientists to divine the best available science. The public often resents regulation and
frequently resists implementation or uses courts (at least in the US) and other delay
tactics to avoid compliance. Thus significant, meaningful public involvement is
generally not present in the region. This situation is a far cry from the education and
aggressive outreach insisted upon by the International Joint Commission and others
during the early years of governance under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
Integrated, collaborative government involvement is also characteristic of an
ecosystem-based approach to governance. While there are examples of integrated,
collaborative governance efforts in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed, these
efforts are still the exception. There generally is little if any collaboration between
scientists, regulators, and citizen public to identify conditions, document scale-relevant
trends, and cooperating to determine the causes and conditions responsible for negative
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trends. Again, the fragmented nature of governance in the region is a very high hurdle to
effective collaboration. There also is no significant history or culture of collaboration in
the region. Fisheries management, for instance, has ignored the impacts of land-based
activities just as collaborative efforts to control such impacts have largely been ignored
by entities that regulate fisheries and ocean-related activities. Agencies within the region
are generally unable or unwilling to collaborate to any significant degree. Indeed it may
be the unwavering allegiance shown by participants to their national and agency interests
that prove to be the biggest barrier to transition to an ecosystem-based approach to
governance. So long as there are agencies and government representatives who are
unwilling to put the public interest in the integrity and resilience of the Bay of
Fundy/Gulf of Maine ecosystem ahead of agency and national power and protection can
be no significant change in traditional government processes and certainly no capacity to
transition into a more holistic ecosystem-based approach to governance.
Adaptive governance, mobilizing local knowledge, an overarching lead or joint
institution, and a precautionary approach to uncertainty are the final characteristics of
ecosystem-based governance. The discussion above has already highlighted the
fragmented governance structure in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine with no overarching
institution and the lack of meaningful public or community involvement. These factors
act as barriers to the final four characteristics as much as they did to the first three. Thus
any further discussion at this point would be redundant.
Therefore, given all of the above, an examination of the existing governance
system in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine reveals that it currently does not have the
capacity to implement an integrated, adaptable ecosystem approach to restore and sustain,
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over time, the integrity of the respective ecosystems, including the functions upon which
the humans in the ecosystem rely.
The capacity to govern the human activities that impact the ecosystem in the
region using an ecosystem-based approach would be possible with some changes. Some
of these changes are set forth in the recommendations that follow in the next section.

Recommendations and Next Steps

In Voltaire's Candide, published originally in 1759, the young protagonist is
booted (literally) from the Baron's castle paradise in Westphalia after being discovered in
an amorous embrace with the Baron's daughter and goes on to encounter a truly dizzying
series of brutal, calamitous, and unfair adventures. His tutor, mentor, personal
philosopher, and companion at a young age and at critical junctures throughout the tale,
Dr. Pangloss, continually teaches his young ward that regardless the situation or danger,
he must remember that he is always in "this best of all possible worlds." This is so,
Pangloss explained, because "it cannot be otherwise." (Voltaire 1956, 111).
Voltaire, however, used the character of Pangloss to poke fun at those who
espouse impractical speculations on unknown topics. Dr. Pangloss, you see, was an
expert. His expertise was in metaphysico-theologo-cosmolonigology. He spent all of his
time theorizing. He talked without doing. When starvation was at hand and all around
him were tending a garden, Pangloss talked. As Candide lay near death after surviving a
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shipwreck and crawling into Lisbon only to be injured in an earthquake begged for water
before losing consciousness, Pangloss talked.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine region, there has been enough talk. While
debate and discussion about environmental threats and possible causes and solutions are
absolutely critical, there comes a time when action is needed. Given the characteristics
that we know are generally present for an ecosystem-based approach to governance to
take hold, the next part of this study will briefly suggest changes that could change
governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine so that is more holistic, adaptive, and
inclusive.
Recommendations
As we know, governance in the region is comprised of various agencies are
charged with the responsibility of enforcing uniform rules and laws across the wide array
of circumstances presented around the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. In this
manner, compliance is thought to be achieved - albeit in piecemeal fashion. However the
current governance arrangement in the region is described, the fact remains that it is not
working and is unable to stand up to special interests and clarify and secure common
interests. Existing governance is simply unable to keep up with the threats that are posed
to the ecosystem of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine. Governance in the region must
figure out how to navigate the dynamic nature of multilevel and interconnected socioecological systems. In most of the world, this translates into "collaboration among
heterogeneous actors with diverse interests, institutions that are flexible and nested across
scales and levels, and analytic deliberation that develops understanding through multiple
knowledge systems; builds trust through repeated interactions; and fosters learning and
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adaptive responses through continuous feedback" (Dietz, Ostrom et al. 2003; Folke,
Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007; Armitage and Plummer 2010, 5). Not surprisingly, these
recommended requirements are captured in various ways in our suite of ecosystem-based
governance characteristics, to wit:
• Management for resilience;
• Significant, meaningful public participation
• Integrated, collaborative government involvement;
• Adaptive governance;
• Mobilizing local knowledge;
• Overarching lead or joint institution, and
•

A precautionary approach to uncertainty.

As we know, and before specific recommendations are presented, it deserves to be
reiterated that the characteristics itemized above are set forth in no particular order and
the list is not intended to imply priorities. They are not neatly packaged and there is
overlap. Redundancy and complexity go with the territory. It is truly unknown how
many characteristics must be present and to what degree before governance is able to turn
the corner and begin to reverse negative trends and foster positive trends.
As this study demonstrates, increasing threats to the region's ecosystem have
stressed conventional institutional assumptions and arrangements with demands for
action beyond the competence of existing agencies to respond. Thus these
recommendations are designed to increase the capacity for governance to respond to
increasing stress - with a full understanding that there will be many who will be reluctant
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to change from for a variety of reasons, including those who foresee possibilities for
binational political embarrassment.
This study concludes that the region does not have the capacity to implement an
ecosystem-based approach to governance. It can't be stressed enough that time is
running out: capacity-building must begin soon and involve the active participation of a
generally committed and informed public. Hard choices will have to be made, and
sacrifice by some may be unavoidable (Smil 1993). Given the above, there are steps that
can be taken that do not involve a major change in legislation but can give Canada and
the U.S. the ability to implement an ecosystem based approach to governance. The
measures called for in this paper will not be without cost or sacrifice.
First it should be clear from this study that our current regime of top-down,
"leave-it-to-the-expert," administrative rationalism governance is simply not working.
There is a need for significant change. The recommendations that follow are based on a
these legitimate conclusions. The recommendations are also designed to help achieve the
characteristics of ecosystem-based governance. Fundamental to the ecosystem based
approach are a few basic propositions. As so many commentators have now noted, there
must be a rational approach to problem solving that involves learning through
experimentation. Further, the problems we face are so complex that relevant knowledge
can no longer be centralized in the hands of any government or agency structure but,
rather, should be accessible to all. The governance process must also be flexible and
involve many voices and a broad variety of perspectives (Dryzek 1997; Fischer 2000;
Berkes, Colding et al. 2003; Weber 2003; Daly and Farley 2004; Brunner, Steelman et al.
2005; Folke, Lowell Pritchard et al. 2007). Finally, these recommendations contemplate
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a movement away from centralized, command and control governance toward more
emphasis on community-based efforts. The task of managing the impacts and threats
posed across the entire Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed are simply too daunting
for most of us to understand. The magnitude and complexity of the issues are so
immense that we feel disempowered - the feeling is often "why bother." That's why
there is a real need to approach these problems at a local or watershed level - think local
and act local (Dryzek 1997; Suzuki and McConnell 1997; Fischer 2000; Weber 2003;
Brunner, Steelman et al. 2005; Steelman 2010).
Given the above, we may now set forth some recommendations that, if adopted,
might help move governance in a direction that is more responsive, democratic, and
ecosystem-based. The first requirement we will discuss is the need for an informed
public. There simply needs to be a purposeful and articulate transnational constituency
with the ability to pressure governments on both sides of the border toward a common
course of action (Caldwell 1988). It would be easy enough to mandate that K - 12 the
curriculums taught in schools around the basin include a focus on the resources, ecology,
and threats in the watershed. In addition, we know that in the Great Lakes Basin an
informed citizen base was critical to the implementation of measures that were opposed
by special interests, including Proctor and Gamble and others who objected to the
phosphate ban. The Joyce Foundation in the United States and, in Canada, the Max Bell
Foundation and, later, the Center for the Great Lakes/Great Lakes Trust Funds provided
the financial resources to support the kind of aggressive public education and outreach
carried out by Great Lakes Tomorrow, Decisions for the Great Lakes, the Lake Michigan
Federation, and others. Chapter IV discusses the numerous efforts to involve
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communities and the public. PLUARG was part of the original reference to the UC and
involved community panels in an attempt to determine the extent that land-based
activities played a role in water quality issues. It also relates the fact that citizens were
included in IJC boards and working committees.
In the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine, there needs to be funding devoted to the
establishment of an organization of facilitators, not unlike the efforts of the Lake
Michigan Federation, Great Lakes Tomorrow and its offspring Decisions for the Great
Lakes. Facilitators need to have the ability and flexibility to identify individuals around
the basin and travel to areas that are supported by watershed councils and begin to knit
together the interests of those in the watershed and prepare them for some level of selfdetermination. Facilitators should be recruited from communities and watersheds around
the region and should be trained extensively in the existing governance of the region, the
threats to the ecosystem, and the importance of education and outreach as part of a
program to get citizens involved in decisions that will impact their futures. I would
envision a first step, after participants are recruited, would be to hold conferences in order
to use facilitators and other scientists, regulators, and academics to help clarify the goals
and outcomes for the communities around the watershed. The Gulf of Maine Council
and Fishery Management officials in both the U.S. and Canada should work closely with
the chosen facilitators. It would be logical, upon identification and recruitment of
participants, to develop the ability of groups to work together by first holding regional
meetings focusing on the development of goals and outcomes. Thereafter conferences in
each country could broaden the involvement and experience of the participant groups.
Finally there should be an international conference with all groups from the United States
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and Canada focus again on goals and outcomes and bring it all together and develop a
plan that everyone could take back to their communities. Certainly this effort must
include an effort to identify those groups around the basin who are already involved in
some part of governance, i.e. Saltwater Network, ACAP, Annapolis Basin, and other
existing community or watershed groups, and include them and their knowledge in this
basin-wide effort. Other important participants would be representatives from NOAA's
National Estuarine Reserve Research System (NERRS), EPA's National Estuary
Partnerships (NEPs), and other government or NGOs with experience working with
communities around watershed.
Another requirement for meaningful change in the existing governance is that
there needs to be an overarching institutional entity capable of collecting ecosystem-wide
data, analyzing the data, and deciding upon measures that need to be implemented
through the agencies on both sides of the border and implementing such measures. The
ideal system would recognize that uncertainty plays a role in every decision made by the
overarching institutional entity and that the results of policy decisions and changes must
be monitored to determine whether policy changes result in ecosystem components that
begin to trend in favor of goals that buttress the public good. The easiest way to
accomplish this would be by reference to the International Joint Commission. There is
no question that the Bay of Fundy and the Gulf of Maine are boundary waters within the
meaning of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. Through the Gulf of Maine Council
membership, a reference could be negotiated that leaves the GOMC and Fishery
Management as jointly coordinating organizations at the operations level (although these
entities have not worked together in the past, I know of no historical animosity that would
559

prevent them from greater cooperation in the future). The IJC, or a panel or committee
formed pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, could oversee and recommend
policy measures for the region and periodically appraise and report on trends in the
region through written report and biennial public meetings.
It would take both parties to join the reference to the IJC for the formation of a
Board within the IJC structure devoted to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed.
Agencies and bureaucracies around the basin need to finally have the courage and
tenacity to admit that the way that management agencies must deal with the stresses that
threaten the very health and integrity of the ecosystem no longer works. We simply can
no longer keep doing the same thing over and over and expect different results. It is not
going to happen. Yet institutional innovations must be appropriate and responsible to the
environmental problems of the region and to their qualitative enhancement. There may
be disagreement over the amount and kinds of power that an overarching institution
should have, but given the situation in the region currently some agreement should be
worked out to provide some accountability for the results (or not) achieved by agencies in
the region. The medicine may taste awful, but it may save our future.
Management for resilience is another characteristic that needs to be strengthened
in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine watershed. The 'fragmented incrementalism' that is
the hallmark of management in the region will never be able to manage for resilience.
Too many substantive and procedural levels and segments of jurisdictions can never
allow for the collaboration and cooperation required in order to manage for resilience.
The only way that the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine can turn the management system
around and manage for resilience is through a reference to the IJC. Even with a
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reference, care must be taken that the reference requires a Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
Board with management principles that requires participants in Board activities to set
aside national and agency interests and act solely for the good of the ecosystem. Further,
all participants must pledge to participate in his or her personal and professional capacity
and not as a representative of the agency or government that provides his or her
employment. As part of the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board there should be a
Research Advisory Board within the structure that includes scientists, academics,
regulators, citizens, watershed organization members, and other community members
who monitor trends in the region and make recommendations to the Bay of Fundy/Gulf
of Maine Board about potential policies and actions. The management principles
described above would apply to the Research Advisory Board activities, and
experimentation with learning by trial and error must be encouraged.
There is a need for integrated, collaborative governance in the region. The need
for coordinated scientific work, including research, monitoring, interpretation and those
aspects of evaluation amenable to scientific inquiry can no longer be seriously
questioned. There are a variety of measures that could strengthen this characteristic. The
existence of Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board by reference must include integrated and
collaborative governance that mandates collaboration and cooperation between fishery
management other ocean, land, and coastal margin-related agencies. To continue to stove
pipe these critical regulatory functions is simply absurd and needs finally to change and
begin to communicate and work together. Fishery management trends, already
monitored, with significant uncertainty, by federal governments in Canada and the U.S.,
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should be accountable to the same overarching institutional entity as other governance
efforts in the region.
Adaptive governance is non-existent in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
watershed. The changes recommended here would make it possible. The existence of an
overarching institutional entity overseeing and guiding the regulatory efforts in the region
and able to monitor environmental data collected by the various agencies and to make
recommendations based on that data would be a huge step. Also needed is for closer
links to communities and watershed residents so that intelligence can be gathered at a
variety of scales and communities can the public can be involved in an increasingly
transparent effort to assess community goals, work more with stakeholders than on them,
and ultimately be able to rapidly implement policy change to react to negative trends or
unexpected surprises with the help of a knowledgeable public and informed communities.
This will require the significant outreach and education efforts described above.
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Figure 23 The Major Watersheds that drain into the BoF/GoM (from The Gulf of Maine
Environmental Data and Information Management System)

As depicted in Figure 25 there is no lack of watersheds around the Bay of Fundy
and the Gulf of Maine. It is somewhat sad that the recommendations of John Wesley
Powell and others in the late 1800s that the U.S. adopt a watershed-level approach to the
governance of the expanding West were ignored. Instead the United States continued to
draw political lines that resulted in the fragmentation of natural functions and the division
of the governing entities that oversaw them. Governance was further frustrated by
fragmentation between federal, state, and local as well as between the branches and levels
within each of the branches at every level. Integration and collaboration was made nearly
impossible (Steelman 2010).
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This study has demonstrated that current governance in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of
Maine watershed is too fragmented and divided to effectively manage the human
activities that impact the environment or react to surprises that are without doubt on the
horizon. The only real hope for the region is for communities around the basin to pull
together, become knowledgeable about the ecosystem and its threats, and assume some
significant portion of responsibility for the environmental well-being of their watershed.
Building on a sense of place, the watershed approach replaces expert-driven control and
command and control agency administration with an arrangement of power sharing
among public and private actors, collaborative, ongoing, consensus-based processes,
results-oriented management, and broad civic participation by a knowledgeable and
interested public (Berry 2000; Berry 2002; Weber 2003; Steelman 2010).
It will also require agencies responsible for some portion of ecosystem resilience
or integrity to get out of their offices and get out into the watershed. In both nations,
more time and effort needs to be expended away from regional or national headquarters.
Employees should live and work mostly in the field - attending meetings of community
groups at night and acting more as a resource and partner in the community during
working hours. Existing watershed groups and community efforts need to be nurtured
and expanded at the watershed and community levels. Indeed these proposals rely to
some degree on advancing watersheds as a greater influence for local governance.
Clearly efforts need to be fostered. This can't be done from Boston, Washington,
D.C., Halifax, or Ottawa. It also can't be done from state or provincial capitals. It
requires employees to live and work in the communities they serve. The Oregon Plan
provides an exceptional example of the success of this approach as regulators moved out
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of their state capital headquarters and into watersheds around the states to act as resources
and support for watershed groups attempting to restore habitat after the ESA listing of
several species of Pacific Salmon (Coe-Juell 2005)
With the characteristics described above, the door opens further for input by local
knowledge. As the public becomes more knowledgeable, and communities more
involved, governance will be more welcoming of local knowledge. With more
appreciation of local knowledge, there may be a positive feedback mechanism that sets in
and more citizens may become willing to get involved and bring their knowledge to bear
on environmental issues that impact the community.
The final characteristic that must be address is the use of the precautionary
approach to uncertainty. This concept has been fully explored - what is needed is some
idea of how it can become a part of the decision making scheme in the region. The
precautionary approach should be utilized and it could be part of the decision making
landscape if it is incorporated in the management principles at all levels. Any reference
to the IJC should, by agreement, include the precautionary approach as a management
principle. Recommendations of the IJC or Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine Board, whatever
entity is developed to provide overall guidance and accountability should be implemented
by existing governance using a precautionary approach to the inevitable uncertainty that
will be encountered.
Fortunately, the kind of change that is needed in the Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine
governance is not new. Changes away from expert driven scientific management regimes
are becoming more and more common. The changes proposed above rely upon an
educated and active public, collaborative governance, coordinated scientific work with
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input from local knowledge, an accountable overarching institutional entity, all of which
result in an increasingly adaptive governance process better able to deal with inevitable
surprise. Given the above, we will now briefly look at next steps.
Next Steps
Given the nature of the threats confronting our ecosystem, and the degree of
change advocated by the recommendations set forth above, there are a few steps that
should be taken to begin down the road toward meaningful change in the region.
First there needs to be an assessment of the community outreach efforts, existing
watershed groups, and other related movements that can be identified and incorporated
into the first steps of a plan to link such efforts around the basin. As mentioned above,
those watershed groups and associations, as well as government (e.g. NERRS, and NEPs)
and NGO- sponsored coastal community partnership efforts, must be consulted and
included in new governance efforts around the watershed.
There needs also to be an assessment of funding sources that might be available to
fund a watershed-wide public outreach and education effort utilizing existing community
resources wherever they may be found.
With the assistance of an increasingly educated public that has some knowledge
of the threats posed to the region's ecosystems, discussions need to be started with
government agencies at all levels to better understand the needs and willingness to move
in the direction of collaboration and coordination. The concept of an overarching
institutional entity needs to be discussed as well.
Finally, some thought should be given to holding a series of open public
conferences on both sides of the border that includes watershed groups and communities
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along with scientists and regulators to present the findings of the GOMC's State of the
Gulf report to get local and public to review monitoring results and get broad input into
the findings and the potential directions that governance could take to address the threats
raised in the report. As discussed above, this will go a long way toward establishing the
goals and outcomes desired by communities in the watershed. These conferences should
culminate in a binational conference that brings all groups and anyone with interest in
watershed governance issues to further explore goals and future directions.
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Written Consent Form
Can We Get There From Here: Toward an Integrated Ecosystem
Approach to the Management of the Gulf of Maine
To Participants in this study:
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the institutional capacity in the Gulf of Maine region to
implement an ecosystem-based management regime in the Gulf of Maine watershed. The goal of these
interviews is to gain a better understanding of the laws and prescriptions governing the human activities
that impact the Gulf of Maine ecosystem, the institutions that develop, implement and influence those laws
and activities, and to evaluate the capacity of the existing institutions, agencies and organizations to
develop and implement an ecosystem-based approach to management in the region. The information
gained through the course of this research will be used to evaluate the current capacity of the
legal/institutional regime in the Gulf of Maine and to suggest options that might lead to a more effective
ecosystem-based approach to the management of human activities that impact the ecosystem of the Gulf of
Maine.
Participants in this research include public officials in the U.S., Canada, and New Zealand. The views of
officials in professional, regulatory, scientific and administrative capacities in federal, state, provincial and
local institutions, the regulated community and NGOs will also be sought.
You are being asked to participate in a focused interview lasting approximately one hour. Further contact
might prove necessary in order to ensure that your responses have been accurately interpreted. I will take
written notes during toe interview, but I also request your permission to record the interview by audio
recorder. You will be free to cease the interview at any time. The information received will be treated as
confidential, and participants will not be identified in reports or articles without their prior written
permission. All audio tapes will be destroyed/erased at die conclusion of the study. Please understand that
you will not be compensated for your participation in this research.
My advisor, Dr. Mimi L. Becker and I can be reached for future questions and/or clarifications, at the
University of New Hampshire, Department of Natural Resources, 215 James Hall, Durham, NH 03824.
We can also be contacted by phone at (603) 862 3950 or email mlbecker@cisunix.unh.edu or
ircoon@cisunix.iinh.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject you can discuss
them with us or you may contact Julie Simpson in the UNH Office of Sponsored Research at (603) 862
2003 or Julie.simpsnn@iinh.eHii.
I have read the above statement and agree to be interviewed under the conditions stated above. I am aware
that my participation is voluntary and that I may discontinue participation at any time without penalty.
Signature
Printed Name

Date

I agree with the use of audiotape recorder under the condition that I may request that it be turned off at any
time during the interview.
Signature

Date
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Focused Interview Questionnaire
Code

Background
1.

Background questions to identify the participant?
a. What is your name, business phone and email address?
b. By whom or by what agency/institution/NGO or regulated entity?
c. What are your duties and responsibilities?
i. Are they set forth in a written job description?
ii. Is there a difference between the duties described in the job description
and those that you actually perform?

Problems and Goals
2.

3.

4.

5.

What role does your agency play in the management of human activities that may
tend to impact the ecosystem?
a. Who or what do you regulate?
b. How have decision makers in your agency/institution identified the
environmental problems and the significant threats to the ecosystem in your
region?
Are there goals set out for your agency designed to address the problems identified
above?
a. How are those goals determined (who, what, where, how, when)?
b. Are there additional or specific biological, social, or community goals
incorporated in the goals of your institution?
c. Are any attempts made to determine the goals or ends of the community (or
regulated community, industry, etc.)?
d. What goals or ends, both biological and social, does the community want?
e. Are values of the people or regulated community clear? Do the goals of the
community or regulated community differ from those of your agency?
What anthropogenic factors have the greatest impact or pose the most significant
threats to the health or integrity of the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem?
a. What are the goals of your agency in terms of the governance system used to
regulate the human uses of your region's resources?
b. What are the indicators that are being used to tell you what progress is being
made toward those goals?
c. What are the measurements or indicators that you believe should be used to
monitor the health of the ecosystem?
Looking back at the history of your institution's efforts, can you identify the key
resource trends in your area of involvement?
a. What are the historical trends in terms of management and governance over the
human activities that impact the ecosystem in your region?
b. Have events moved toward or away from the goals you specified previously?
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6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

c. Does trend information help us understand why policy and governance have
succeeded or failed (e.g. is decreased diversity a result of policy or governance or
is something else at work)?
d. How has your approach to governance changed over time?
Does your agency/institution have a view of what a healthy [GoM, GL or NZ]
ecosystem should provide or what it would look like?
a. What is needed to restore the ecosystem to health?
What are the desired goals for the future (i.e. the goal being to rehabilitate the
ecosystem so that it is resilient to human demands)?
a. Based on current trends and conditions, what is likely to happen in the future?
b. What scenarios can you project?
c. Which is most likely?
Are trends moving toward the goals?
a. If trends are not moving toward the goals (then a problem exists and alternatives
must be considered), what other policies, rules, norms, institutional structures,
and/or procedures might cause trends to move toward the goals?
b. Can we evaluate one or more alternatives in terms of the goals?
c. How could the alternative be implemented?
d. Who would need to be involved?
Who or what agencies are the principle participants in terms of the governance of
human activities that impact the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem?
a. Are there others who should be participating?
b. Are there groups that are demanding to participate who have been somehow shut
out of the governance issues?
Can you describe the perspective of your agency?
a. By perspectives I mean
i. What are your demands, or what they want in terms of values or
organization?
ii. What are your expectations?
iii. On whose behalf are demands made (i.e. identifications)?
In your opinion is an "ecosystem approach" different from the traditional approach
for solving the region's environmental problems?
a. How have you defined the concept of "ecosystem approach" and what changes
have been made in your agency on institution to implement an ecosystem
approach to the way in which you solve environmental problems?
i. Pollutant-by-pollutant, media/activity or species specific management vs.
integrated management?
ii. Increased participatory decision making vs single agency or
jurisdictional decision making?
In your opinion, does the geographical scope of your institution's jurisdiction
encompass the major sources of stress to the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem?
a. Why or why not?
b. Do you think these limitations will affect the feasibility of making progress on
ecosystem restoration goals?
In your opinion, does the substantive legal jurisdiction of your institution or agency
encompass the major sources of stress to the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem?
a. Why or why not?
b. Do you think these limitations will affect the feasibility of making progress on
ecosystem restoration goals?
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14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Which of the following base values are most important in the development of goals
and decisions concerning the regulation of human activities that impact the [GoM,
GL, NZ] ecosystem?
a. Power - or the ability to carry out decisions
b. Enlightenment - the quest for knowledge
c. Wealth - money or its equivalent
d. Well-being - to have or obtain physical or psychological health
e. Skill - to obtain special abilities
f. Affection - the effort to have family, friends, and warm community relationships
g. Respect - to show and receive respect
h. Rectitude - to have ethical standards
For each of those you have identified that play roles in governance, which of these
base values comes most into play or provides the strongest motivation for their
actions?
a. What political pressures, values, and motivations must be recognized as powerful
drivers into the current governance systems?
b. What values provide the greatest barriers for the implementation of an ecosystem
approach to governance?
c. How can these barriers be lowered or shuffled to increase the likelihood of
greater ecosystem-based decision making?
What is the principle strategy used by your institution or organization to achieve your
goals?
a. By strategies, we mean:
i. Diplomatic (negotiation)
ii. Litigation (binding resolution by impartial third party)
iii. Economic (achieve goals through economic power or threats of
economic harm)
iv. Ideological (achieve goals through spreading of scientific, social,
economic or research, ideas and education)
b. From your experience, what strategies are the most successful?
If you have noted a transition from the traditional sectoral approach to management
and an ecosystem-based approach, have new institutions emerged in the governance
efforts?
a. If so, who are they?
b. What values do they represent (from the list of 7 above?)
c. What strategies do they employ (from the list of 4 above)?
d. Have they been successful?
i. Why or why not?
e. Have new practices been put in place?
f. Is there a resistance to innovation in governance?
i. Do you have an opinion as to the source of the resistance?
Are you satisfied with the quality, credibility and/accuracy of the data and
information you receive that pertains to the problems you are facing?
a. What are principle sources of your information?
b. Is the public or regulated community involved in any way in the development of
information?
c. Do you believe that the information you receive is comprehensive?
d. Is the information available to everyone?
600

19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

Have you ever had to build support and capacity in order to implement a desired
change in the way information is obtained or analyzed? If so, how did you go about
building support?
How do you communicate your ideas, findings or decisions?
a. To whom do you pass along your recommendations, findings or ideas?
b. Do you have the authority to make your ideas binding upon the regulated public
or other interests?
c. Do you seek input from the public before your findings, ideas or decisions are
finalized?
d. Are stakeholders involved in the decision making process in any way?
Overall, what would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of your institution's
current approach to the management, of the human activities that impact the health of
the [GoM, GL, NZ] ecosystem.
What changes would you recommend that might increase the chances for successful
restoration of the [GoM, GL, NZ] coastal ecosystem?
Do you have any additional specific concerns or comments?
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